Major General Gajinder Singh (retd)
China’s quiet but steady backing has been a constant factor in the India-Pakistan equation, more so during periods of conflict. This trend once again came to the fore during Operation Sindoor.
Pakistan describes its friendship with China as “higher than the mountains, deeper than the sea, sweeter than honey and harder than steel”. It is not merely diplomatic rhetoric, it is a strategic alignment developed over time, primarily intended at containing India. China has significantly invested in Pakistan over the years, economically via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and militarily through the sale of arms and technology transfers.
This relationship began with the signing of the Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement in 1963 and Pakistan’s ceding of the Shaksgam Valley to China. It now manifests in multiple ways, including diplomatic protection, economic assistance and military collaboration. China has consistently blocked India’s efforts to designate Pakistan-based terrorists under the UN Security Council’s sanctions framework. This has allowed Islamabad to continue using proxy actors without facing significant international consequences.
China is Pakistan’s principal arms supplier, having provided military equipment worth billions of dollars. The list includes J-10C and JF-17 fighter aircraft, Wing Loong drones, frigates, submarines, HQ-9P surface-to-air missiles, PL-15E air-to-air missiles, LY-80 air defence systems, ZDK early warning aircraft, tanks and artillery systems. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China now accounts for approximately 80 per cent of Pakistan’s defence imports.
While Chinese forces have never come out to support the Pakistani military openly, China’s military posturing along the Line of Actual Control subtly pressurises India to divert attention and resources. Even if the People’s Liberation Army does not fire a shot, its presence in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh serves as a warning: China is watching, and it is not neutral.
During Operation Sindoor, too, China did not openly join hands with Pakistan. Even a news story circulating on the internet about the landing of China’s largest transport aircraft, the Y-20, in Pakistan with weapons has been denied by the Chinese. Moreover, the duration of the conflict was too short for any substantial physical support to materialise.
Nonetheless, the signs of passive collaboration were evident. Intelligence reports suggest Chinese satellite imagery and cyber tools were extensively made available to Pakistan to monitor Indian activity. A prominent Chinese newspaper has asserted that Pakistan utilised a sophisticated command and control system created by China, which integrates radars, fighter aircraft and airborne control aircraft into a cohesive automatic response system.
Since April 22, Chinese media have been conveying Pakistan’s viewpoint. The state-run platforms Xinhua and CCTV described the Pahalgam incident as an attack by unidentified local terrorists. During the conflict, despite Indian restraint and a measured approach, they portrayed India as the aggressor. Additionally, at the United Nations, China supported Pakistan by moderating the Security Council’s statement regarding the Pahalgam attack.
Chinese bloggers significantly aided Pakistan in disseminating disinformation and conducting psychological warfare, directly sourcing material from the Pakistan Army’s Inter-Services Public Relations, amplifying Indian losses and crafting Pakistan’s narrative warfare. This implicit support, while not immediately apparent, provided moral and psychological strength to Pakistan. It conveyed to Islamabad that China stood by it— quietly but firmly.
In the future, China and Pakistan are expected to strengthen their strategic partnership, particularly if India becomes more assertive. Future conflicts for India could, therefore, be two-front challenges, where one country engages India militarily and the other amplifies the pressure silently. India must equip itself for this dual challenge through a combination of diplomatic finesse and strategic alliances. Working with like-minded countries, such as the US, France, Japan, Israel and Australia, can build pressure on both nations to shift the balance.
India’s military must persist in modernisation and execute institutional changes, emphasising enhanced cooperation across the defence and border-guarding forces. Simultaneously, India should fortify its technological and intelligence collaborations with pivotal allies, particularly in domains such as cyber warfare, satellite surveillance, drone technology and artificial intelligence. Increased focus is required on space-based assets, sophisticated missile defence systems, electronic warfare and naval capabilities.
China’s passive support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor may not have involved direct action, but it played a subtle and strategic role. It emboldened Pakistan, distracted India and conveyed a silent message of alliance. This evolving partnership poses a complex challenge that India must address holistically.
The author commanded a mountain division on the Line of Actual Control.