‘Violence has almost disappeared; ideology hasn’t vanished’: Telangana DGP

How effective is Telangana’s surrender policy?

The policy has been in place since 1993 and is comprehensive. Nearly 6,000 Maoists—including senior leaders—have surrendered over the years. When senior leaders surrender, it has a strong psychological impact—it exposes the limitations of the movement and affects its credibility. We have a simple principle: if they die in exchanges of fire, they may be seen as martyrs; if arrested, heroes; but if they surrender, they become zeros in the eyes of their supporters. Also, the policy is genuinely implemented—immediate relief, housing, medical care, skill training, Aadhaar cards, bank accounts and a sympathetic review of legal cases except in serious offences.

How serious is the spillover threat from neighbouring states?

Around 2007-08, sustained operations forced Maoists to shift focus to Dandakaranya. Since then, several attempts to re-enter Telangana were repulsed through targeted Greyhounds operations and intelligence from the Special Intelligence Branch. Crucially, they lost public support—the older generation of sympathisers lost interest, and younger people are not drawn to the ideology. Recruitment has almost stopped.

Beyond the surrender policy, what led to the decline?

Several factors combined. Government welfare programmes reached remote areas. Road connectivity and administrative access improved. Crucially, political empowerment through reservations from the 1990s gave marginalised groups—OBCs, SCs, STs, women—a stake in the democratic system. Former supporters became bulwarks against Maoist re-entry. Feudal structures weakened, the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act gave people access to formal justice, and internal ideological disputes—particularly around caste versus class—distanced SC communities. Many with Maoist leanings joined the Telangana statehood movement after 1996. Then, of course, Hyderabad’s growth as an IT hub created a major aspirational shift among the youth. With schemes like fee reimbursement, many young people moved towards education and employment rather than extremism.

How strong is Maoist ideology today, and are cadre seeking overground space?

Armed violence has almost disappeared, but the ideology hasn’t vanished—a small section still romanticises it, and in pockets where land rights or displacement remain unresolved, limited appeal persists. The more significant shift is that many former cadre are now working within democratic channels. Public support for violence has clearly declined.

Why did CPI (Maoist) fail to gain international support despite sustaining so long?

The movement remained largely domestic with no geopolitical relevance. After the Cold War, Maoist movements globally declined. Some attempts were made—leaders like Kobad Ghandy tried to establish contacts in Europe, and a coordination body was formed in 2001—but none succeeded in generating meaningful international backing.

Should the ban on CPI (Maoist) be lifted to allow political activity?

In the short term, no. Lifting the ban could allow regrouping, revive networks and send the wrong signal to surrendered cadre and the public. The state must be fully satisfied that violence has been genuinely and completely renounced. In the long term, a democracy does allow space for different ideologies within the Constitution—but only with strict conditions: complete renunciation of violence, surrender of arms, and a clear commitment to constitutional methods.