×

‘Front organisations can function if they do not support armed insurgency’: Chhattisgarh DGP

Arun Dev Gautam, Chhattisgarh DGP, says the primary issue with Maoist ideology is its reliance on violence

Arun Dev Gautam

Interview/ Arun Dev Gautam, director general of police, Chhattisgarh

The CPI (Maoist) insurgency appears significantly weakened. What explains the turnaround?

Left-wing extremism was once described as the country’s biggest internal security threat. When the Union home minister set a target to end it by March 31, 2026, many believed it was unrealistic. A key turning point came after a high-level meeting on January 21, 2024. The clarity of direction, firm resolve and unified approach across agencies created momentum. Close coordination between Central forces, state police and intelligence units followed. A major contribution came from the District Reserve Guard.

What were the key operational shifts?

The biggest shift was expanding the security grid into the most inaccessible areas of Bastar. Earlier, Maoist armed units, including PLGA (People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army) battalions, controlled large territories, making it difficult for forces to operate. We established forward operating bases and extended our reach into interior regions, denying Maoists the physical space they relied on. Once that operational freedom was restricted, their ability to regroup and sustain activities weakened significantly.

Alongside operations, how important was the surrender and rehabilitation policy?

Equally important. Those who surrendered were assured full rehabilitation—employment, land for housing, PM Awas Yojana benefits, medical care, financial assistance and incentives for starting small businesses. Once the first group began receiving these benefits and reintegrating peacefully, it created a ripple effect.

What role have security camps played beyond policing?

They represent, in many cases, the first sustained presence of the state in areas isolated for decades. Forces conducted medical camps and initiated civic activities. Villagers began visiting not just for assistance but for community interactions, including sports and social events. People who had never experienced state institutions began to see them up close, reducing fear and suspicion.

Essential services were delivered from these locations—ration distribution, Aadhaar enrolment, improved mobile connectivity— and people began associating the camps with support rather than threat. This encouraged communities to cooperate with authorities, which further weakened Maoist influence.

With armed activity declining, what happens to the ideological aspect?

The primary issue with Maoist ideology is its reliance on violence. The belief that power flows from the barrel of a gun is fundamentally at odds with democratic principles. However, the Constitution allows space for diverse political views. If individuals or groups abandon violence and operate within the democratic framework, they are free to do so. Even front organisations can function, provided they do not support or facilitate armed insurgency.

Is this the end of the Maoist movement?

The armed movement has been significantly weakened and its operational capabilities curtailed. However, vigilance remains important. The underlying issues that allowed it to grow—remoteness, lack of access, governance gaps—must continue to be addressed.