On June 8, US Customs and Border Protection officers at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport detained Chengxuan Han, a 28‑year‑old PhD student from Huazhong University of Science and Technology in Wuhan, China. The US authorities were suspicious as she had wiped off the contents of her electronic devices just three days before her trip to Detroit. Travelling on a J‑1 visa for academic work in the US, Han was arrested after questioning by the FBI on charges of smuggling biological materials into the US. The agency found that she had sent four parcels with concealed biological specimens from China to a lab at the University of Michigan.
Han pleaded no contest to three smuggling charges and to making false statements. She was sentenced to time served—three months—and deported shortly after. Her arrest took place at a moment of heightened scrutiny of Chinese researchers in the US. However, it also coincided with a shift in policy direction. Just days after her arrest, President Donald Trump reversed a directive aimed at revoking visas for Chinese students in sensitive STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) fields or those linked to the Chinese Communist Party. The reversal followed a deal with President Xi Jinping, in which China agreed to unconditionally resume the export of rare earth elements—materials critical to both military and civilian technologies in the US. The trade-off did more than open commercial pathways; it also allowed Chinese students, many of them in critical scientific disciplines, to continue their education in the US.
Chinese students are the second-largest international cohort in American universities after Indians. Their presence benefits Beijing, providing both soft power and a skilled workforce. For Xi, talent is a pillar of China’s shift from a manufacturing-driven economy to one based on innovation and knowledge. Academic exchange with the US is an important part of this transformation, creating a pipeline of scientists and technologists who can help Beijing meet its long-term developmental goals. Xi’s trade-off—an immediate and tangible concession for long-term strategic gains in human capital—was widely seen as a diplomatic win. It cooled tensions between Washington and Beijing, rebalanced bilateral ties and allowed China to secure space for its students in the US.
This recalibration, however, has had a ripple effect across the Indo-Pacific. For India, it has exposed vulnerabilities. Just days before Han’s arrest, the Trump administration had ordered the deportation of several undocumented Indian immigrants, who were flown back in shackles on military aircraft. And now Indian students, already confronting mounting restrictions and visa barriers, are also facing a $100,000 fee for H-1B visa applications. The cumulative effect is making the US a less viable destination for Indians.
Nine months into Trump’s presidency, India is yet to devise a counter-strategy or a compelling trade-off that could ease its tariff tensions with Washington or offset visa restrictions. Indian negotiators continue to pursue a bilateral trade agreement to address the 50 per cent reciprocal tariffs on Indian goods, the second-highest after Brazil. However, progress has been slow, and New Delhi’s approach has been criticised for relying too heavily on bureaucratic detail rather than imaginative diplomacy.
“Xi did not pull a rabbit out of the hat,” says Jayadeva Ranade, former member of India’s National Security Advisory Board, “rather he quickly aligned his long-term strategies for short-term results that reversed Trump’s aggressive posture.” Xi is playing the long game, and is playing it rather boldly. “He has laid down timelines (aligned with the Communist Party’s hundred years in power in 2049) in his quest to make China a global power or at least sharing power with the US,” says Ranade.
Indian foreign policy, in comparison, has been more cautious. Diplomats have not studied the American system as deeply as their Chinese counterparts and have tried to drag out negotiations with legalese and procedural roadblocks, hoping to delay punitive measures. But this strategy has so far failed to produce results. “The India–US relationship has always been more structural than transactional,” says M.V. Rappai, who is with the New Delhi-based Institute of Chinese Studies. “It may require more ingenuity by the South Block to tie economics with long-term strategic interests to break the spell.”
Rapprochement with China, primarily for trade and business, is seen by some as a way to create additional diplomatic options. The process began last year, even before Trump came in, after a long period of hostility. India is now allowing Chinese investment and business activity under stricter security protocols. The resumption of direct flights between the two countries from October 26 signals a tentative but notable thaw. India has also used its membership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, especially Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s presence at the recent SCO summit, to push for a regional vision centred on sovereignty, security and balanced development, while resisting double standards.
That resistance is now also being directed at the United States, which penalises India for buying Russian oil even as it turns a blind eye towards Chinese purchase of Russian crude. The ongoing rupture with Trump has even forced India to set aside its discomfiture about Chinese military proximity towards Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, Xi emerges the winner, in both these cases. “Trump keeps on saying he is putting these tariffs on India because we are buying Russian oil. What about the Chinese? I have not seen any tariff on China because of that,” says Namrata Hasija, research fellow at the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy. “One thing has increasingly become clear: Trump’s focus is not India at the moment. He really wants a deal with Xi.”
Indeed, Xi has earned both praise and strategic space from Trump by offering the rare earth agreement and hinting at cooperation on digital platforms. The framework for handing over partial control of TikTok to American investors has been seen as another stroke of diplomacy from Xi. Concerns over TikTok’s potential to influence voter behaviour had prompted calls in Washington to restrict or localise its operations. By offering limited concessions, Xi provided Trump with a campaign boost while retaining leverage.
Crucially, China is yet to issue a licence to export TikTok’s core algorithm, keeping the most valuable component under its control. ByteDance, the parent company, continues to operate the local version of the app in China and Taiwan. “Of course, such deals involve trade-offs, and there are always questions about what is being exchanged behind the scenes,” says Kenny Huang, chairman of the executive council of the Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre.
For the first time, a US–China deal has exposed the boundaries of digital sovereignty and how powerful states can compel ownership changes in technology firms, cloud services and digital platforms. “Whether it is American or Chinese-controlled applications, it will all depend on how these countries want to use it in the future,” says Huang. “They can always use artificial intelligence and bots to generate large volumes of posts to attract attention and manipulate specific audiences.”
India is one of the few countries that took a firm stand and banned TikTok along with 58 other Chinese apps, following the 2020 military confrontations. However, with the normalisation of ties gaining momentum, several Chinese apps are beginning to find their way back into the Indian market.
“It may be too harsh to say India is between the devil and the deep sea,” says Rappai, “but the mending of ties with Beijing also coincides with the US engaging Xi. There must not be an overkill from our side,” he warns. Indian security hawks are watching Xi’s expanding footprint in the region—physical, economic and digital. India’s approach to China has always been more direct, driven by the need to defuse tensions along a long, disputed border. Any additional troop deployments or defence systems carry heavy economic costs. Since prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s time, New Delhi has prioritised building border mechanisms and has maintained a cautious tone with China. Manmohan Singh shifted the emphasis towards trade, investment and growth. Under Modi, border management remains central, balanced by efforts to deepen economic ties.
“We have always been nimble-footed in our relationship with China. But in the coming days and months, a lot depends on how the US–China equation plays out. If Trump decides to look the other way, China can have a free run in Asia,” says Ranade. Already, anti‑China groupings show signs of strain. Smaller nations, and even Quad partners, may prefer engagement with China rather than with an unpredictable Trump. This brings the contest closer to India’s doorstep. Trump is preparing to meet Xi at the Asia‑Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in South Korea in November, their first meeting since Trump returned to the White House. On the agenda will be tech, trade and security, giving New Delhi ample reason to rally its partners and avoid being elbowed aside by growing Trump–Xi bonhomie.
Xi and Trump now seek another deal, this time over soybeans. Chinese importers have delayed purchases, inflicting pain on American farmers. As the world’s largest importer of soybeans, China wields enormous leverage; US farmers, many of them core Trump voters, could lose billions if shipments do not resume.
A recent Pentagon phone call may have been music to Xi’s ears. On September 9, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth spoke with Chinese Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun and assured him that America did not seek conflict with China. He emphasised that the US has vital interests in the ‘Asia-Pacific’ and would protect them resolutely. That choice of phrase is telling. Hegseth avoided ‘Indo‑Pacific,’ a term long used by the Biden administration and by Quad partners to frame an anti‑China architecture, which hints at Trump’s intent to court China, at least for now. Analysts warn that Trump’s habit of making deals plays into Beijing’s hands. These ‘sweet deals’ may gradually alienate the US from its democratic partners in the region and erode decades of trust.
“When they are talking to Japan or India, they say Indo‑Pacific. When they are talking to the Chinese, it’s Asia‑Pacific. Asia‑Pacific is a term the Chinese have always used,” says Hasija. That strategic duality may weaken the Indo‑Pacific framework once seen as a bulwark against Beijing’s rise. “Look at the way he is gone after India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Australia with tariffs. These are all the countries that actually stood up to the Chinese.”
In New Delhi, this dualism does not go unnoticed. India lies at the core of the Indo‑Pacific strategy: controlling the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the broader Indian Ocean region and guarding its own frontiers with China and Pakistan. A US that drifts away from these priorities forces India to reassess the durability of its strategic partnerships.
Beyond trade and diplomacy, the shift in Washington’s China policy carries deeper consequences for India. “What the Chinese have been saying for more than a decade—that the US is not a reliable partner—the Americans are proving it,” says Hasija. Trump’s inconsistency, his deals with Xi and his recent praise for Pakistan and Turkey have sparked alarm in New Delhi as it prepares to host the next Quad meeting.
“Mere sloganeering will not cut ice,” says Vikram Sood, former head of India’s foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing. “America has yielded ground to China in the South China Sea. It has upset almost all its allies, be it South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, the Maldives or Australia.” Washington may find it hard to handle China alone; sooner or later it will need its long-term partners, and India must be ready to step in.
A growing diplomatic consensus suggests that the India-US relationship will endure in the long term. But, for now, New Delhi must pursue a steady, transparent strategy of engaging medium and small powers across Southeast Asia and the Pacific, such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. India should look at diversifying supply chains, investment and manufacturing and counterbalancing China’s economic influence.
Beijing, meanwhile, understands its central position in the Asia-Pacific’s economic ecosystem, from its population and markets to its industrial and military heft. To maximise gains, China may seek to keep the US at arm’s length from regional partners, forcing them to recalibrate their stances. Japan and Taiwan, for instance, are already feeling the strain. The White House recently claimed Tokyo had pledged to create a $550 billion investment fund, with 90 per cent of the profits flowing to America. The announcement drew a clarification from Shigeru Ishiba, who stepped down as prime minister shortly after stating Japan would offer a mix of investment, loans and guarantees and not a one-sided handout. Australia, which relies heavily on trade with China, is trying to avoid tensions with Trump while focusing on repairing ties with Beijing.
Taiwan, long dependent on American support, no longer sees Washington, or the Quad, as its sole guarantee against Chinese aggression. “If we were asked whether Taiwan would have American protection five to ten years ago, the answer would always have been affirmative. But now we are not so sure,” says Mumin Chen, representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre in New Delhi.
The source of current anxiety, admits Chen, is Trump’s foreign policy, which diverges significantly from that of past administrations. “Trump has categorically stated that America will not have this global responsibility any more if it does not suit them,” he says.
New Delhi, meanwhile, hopes the fallout does not reach its doorstep too soon, with the memory of Doklam and Galwan still fresh, and simmering tensions with Pakistan, recently fuelled by Chinese weapons, continuing to muddy the waters. For India, the path forward lies in balance. “We have done the mature thing by maintaining a strategic silence on the Trump–Xi deals so far, but one thing is clear—we cannot put all our eggs in one basket, neither the US nor China,” says Claude Arpi, well-known historian and China watcher. “Trump is going to give way more than he is going to get. Xi will take him round and round.”
In the meantime, Xi’s net is only widening. Not long ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin praised China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to overshadow any trade deals pursued by Trump. Putin views it as an opportunity to attract global investment into the Northern Sea route, not to mention his country’s burgeoning ties with China.
The BRI remains India’s foremost security concern, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as its central pillar, running through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan has launched the second phase of the CPEC, opening up further avenues for business deals. Given this, Trump’s near-obsession with Pakistan and its army chief is understandable, as China aggressively expands its global footprint in renewable energy, mining and related technologies, drawing in billions of dollars.
It is with China’s tacit support that Pakistan seems to have gained some latitude with Trump. Islamabad offered more than raw minerals to win influence for its army chief, Asim Munir, and even made strategic concessions that prompted General Michael Kurilla, who till recently headed the US Central Command, to call Pakistan a “phenomenal partner” in counterterrorism. Interestingly, a few decades ago, it was Pakistan that mediated closer ties between the US and China. In the 1970s, president Richard Nixon opened a secret channel to Beijing through Pakistan’s president Yahya Khan as he sought to normalise relations with China. With Khan as an intermediary, the US and China finally managed to end decades of diplomatic estrangement.
New Delhi is increasingly aware of how isolating the international landscape can become as China builds a vast network of trading partners, capable of shifting allegiances with ease. “We can’t compete dollar to dollar with China, but where India has an edge is that it is seen as a dependable partner,” says Ranade.
There are growing opportunities in the neighbourhood. China’s passivity during Sri Lanka’s economic crisis pushed the island nation back towards India, which stepped in with $4 billion in aid, helping to stabilise the situation. Insiders say that Chinese influence in Nepal is waning, though more must be done to sway public sentiment in favour of India. Likewise, India needs to rebuild trust in Bangladesh.
By engaging with neighbouring countries, Southeast Asia and beyond through people-centric and welfare-oriented projects, New Delhi can occupy the space left by China, which remains preoccupied with its dealings with Trump. India might be better served by focusing less on Trump and more on mastering Xi’s playbook to gain a comprehensive understanding of both powers.