The US has raised the tariffs on India’s exports from 10 per cent on April 2, to 25 per cent on August 1, to 50 per cent on August 6, mounting pressure on India to wean away from the Russian crude. There is a point at which the rise in tariffs could affect an exporting country, where the exporters cut their margins, and the exports slow down. Once the tariffs become overwhelmingly unprofitable, any further rise in tariffs would have no meaningful effect on the targeted country toward coercion, as there would be no worthwhile trade thereafter. That limit has probably been breached on August 6, and any further increase in tariffs by the US would not yield any additional leverage in coercing New Delhi. India’s ministry of external affairs has clearly called it out in a very clear and measured response, stating that India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security, whilst terming the US actions as unfair, unjustified and unreasonable.
In this backdrop, let us revisit the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, as it is called now, which had its humble beginnings in the aftermath of the December 2004 Tsunami, where the four capable democracies of the Indo-Pacific—Australia, India, Japan and the United States—coordinated humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and provided succor to various affected countries in the region. The idea of Quad as an informal strategic grouping of these four democracies was proposed by Japan, and in 2007, its first informal meeting was held in Manila, the Philippines, on the sidelines of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum. This initial version of the Quad was short-lived and lost steam soon thereafter, as there were concerns about how it would be perceived by other countries in the region, especially China.
However, in the ensuing period, with the increasingly assertive stance of China in the Indo-Pacific, there was a renewed thought by these four democracies, and the Quad regained momentum in 2017. The Quad was raised to Summit-level annual meetings by 2021. The Quad is not a military alliance, and its statements reflect cooperation with various regional organisations like the ASEAN, Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), among others. The grouping is committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific where peace and stability in the maritime domain underpin the security and prosperity of the region, and all countries are free from coercion. The Quad strongly opposes any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion. In due course, Quad came up with working groups on: Health Security, Critical and Emerging Technologies, Climate, Space, Cybersecurity, and Cable Connectivity and Resilience, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), Counter-terrorism, Maritime Security, including the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), Policy Planners Dialogue, and Fellowships in STEM Education.
Apart from the Quad, the Malabar naval exercise between India and the US was expanded to include participation from Japan and Australia. In the Indo-Pacific, the United States launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) in May 2022, with the Quad members, along with Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness in the economies. Future negotiations are planned on its four pillars—Trade; Supply Chains; Clean Energy, Decarbonization, and Infrastructure; and Tax and Anti-Corruption. Agreements have been signed on the three pillars except Trade, where discussions are still underway. The IPEF heralded by the US appears to be in stark contrast with its recent imposition of indiscriminate tariffs, upsetting the global trade.
Australia, New Zealand and the US had signed the ANZUS Security Treaty in 1951, which remains a foundational treaty in the security relationship between Australia and the US, although it is held in abeyance with New Zealand since 1986 due to the latter’s nuclear-free policy. Both Australia and the US have fought together in the World Wars I & II, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and are together in the operations against Al Qaida, the Islamic State, and their global affiliates. In September 2021, Australia, the UK and the US inked another trilateral security partnership—AUKUS—intended to support security and defence interests, including a commitment to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). Similarly, the Japan-US Security Treaty of 1960 granted the US the right to establish bases on the archipelago in exchange for a commitment to defend Japan in the event of an attack.
At the same time, India has no formal security pact with the US, whilst their bilateral defence trade cooperation has expanded with the signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the Industrial Security Agreement (ISA), and procurement of military assets and equipment. The Malabar series of exercises, which began as an annual bilateral naval exercise between India and the United States in 1992, has since expanded in scope, size and participation.
The very thought of a Quad grouping was to get the four major democracies in the Indo-Pacific region together, of which Australia and Japan were already close allies of the US through two separate long-standing security treaties. Without India, a trilateral grouping with security treaties in place could possibly have gained more in terms of security imperatives against China, but at the cost of being labelled as joint adversary. Let us consider the other possible option—the Republic of Korea (RoK) being the fourth Quad member, in lieu of India and not as an additional member. Here too, the US and the Republic of Korea signed a Mutual Defence Treaty during the Korean War in 1953, and the US has positioned over 28,500 military personnel in the RoK to maintain a strong defensive military posture alongside the RoK military personnel, to deter and defend the threat from the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Further, there was possibly no other country in the Indo-Pacific region, who would have come forward to be a part of the Quad as its fourth member, and not as an additional supporting member, challenging China’s territorial ambitions and interests, without having the cover of a mutual defence security umbrella of the US, since the genesis of the Quad grouping. It may, therefore, be surmised that India, without a security pact with the US, and being the largest democracy, provided greater credibility and considerable heft to the Quad grouping, through a shared vision and collaborative efforts for the well-being of the countries and the populace of the Indo-Pacific region.
With the next Quad Leaders’ Summit being hosted by India later this year, and the likelihood of President Trump or his representative participating, given the background of the Quad, there will be some hard questions to be addressed sooner than later. The next Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit meeting is scheduled from August 31 to September 1 in China and as gleaned from the available references, preparations are underway for the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend the summit, although yet to be confirmed, and could possibly include a bilateral on the sidelines with the President Xi Jinping on the US tariffs and purchase of the Russian crude. A separate bilateral with President Putin, if his attendance is confirmed in the SCO summit, could also be in the pipe line. India is also due to host the annual India- Russia summit later this year, which will include wide-ranging discussions across various sectors.
At 50 per cent tariffs imposed by the US on Indian exports, the US demand will shift from India to the other South and Southeast Asian neighbours with relatively less tariffs, unless a reasonable deal is struck with the US before August 27, when these tariffs actually kick in. India has also rightly dug its heels on sensitive areas like dairy and agricultural produce, including genetically modified food. As the 50 per cent tariffs are bad enough, any further increase in tariffs slapped by the US does not significantly alter the situation for India, and therefore, any threat of slapping additional tariffs over the existing 50 per cent, may not yield anything to the US. From an Indian perspective, this could also be seen as an opportunity to review its trade policy and practices, reduce bottlenecks towards faster clearances, diversifying and seeking new opportunities in emerging markets etc.
While the additional tariffs by the US and the Quad partnership are two distinctly separate issues, these geo-economic and geo-strategic strands inter-twine with many other factors like the pieces on the chessboard, and their moves should be seen in the larger strategic calculus, which have a direct impact on India’s national interests. Is the US inadvertently pushing India towards a stronger BRICS partnership through these additional tariffs without adequate foresight?
On all these issues, India has the option of exercising its strategic autonomy, addressing them holistically, but before that, New Delhi has to study all the available options. India’s policy makers may have a difficult task at hand, to convince the US to review the path it has taken in the last few days on the tariffs, and its stance on the Russian crude purchase, balancing it with many other positives, which an Indo-US partnership has to offer, including one such piece on the chessboard—the success of Quad in keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open for all.
Commodore Sudhir Singh (Retired) retired from the Indian Navy in 2024, after over 35 years of service. specialist in Missiles and Gunnery, the officer spent over fifteen years on warships teneting various appointments. His shore assignments include Director of a Maritime Warfare Centre, a Deputy Director General in a Maritime Infrastructure Project, Director (Military Affairs) at the D&ISA Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, Officer-in-Charge of Offshore Defence Advisory Group Cell (Delhi), and Joint Director in the Directorate of Foreign Cooperation. The Officer was assigned to the United Nations Headquarters, New York, as a Maritime Planning Officer in 2009. He is a keen student and follows geopolitics and international relations.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.