Israel's population growth hits historic low: A new demographic era begins

Israel seems to have entered a new demographic phase that marks a break from the patterns that have defined its population development since the state’s founding in 1948.  For the first time since the establishment of the state, the annual population growth rate has fallen below the symbolic 1 per cent threshold, dropping to 0.9 per cent in 2025. This  is not a marginal fluctuation. Historically, Israel’s growth rate has remained well above 1.5 per cent, dipping below that level only briefly in the early 1980s.

The slowdown reflects the convergence of three structural forces: declining fertility,  rising mortality and a shift towards negative net migration. Together, they signal the end of an era in which rapid natural increase served as Israel’s primary demographic engine.

Israel has always been an outlier among developed countries for its unusually high  fertility rates. Nearly all population groups in Israel have shown robust birth rates. That exceptionalism is now fading. Fertility has begun to decline across the entire population, rather than within any single sector.

The earliest and steepest declines were recorded among Muslim, Druze, and Christian women, whose fertility rates have fallen by roughly 30 per cent in recent years. More recently, however, the downturn has spread to Jewish populations as well. Among secular and traditional Jewish women, fertility is projected to fall from its current range of around 1.9–2.2 children per woman to approximately 1.7 within the next decade.

Even the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community, long regarded as the driving force behind  Israel’s high birth rates, is experiencing a marked decline. Fertility among Haredi women is projected to fall from 6.48 children per woman today to around 4.3 by 2039. While still high by international standards, this represents a profound shift in Israel’s demographic foundations.

At the same time, Israel’s population is ageing. Large cohorts of both Jewish and Arab citizens are now entering their seventies and eighties, age groups associated with sharply rising mortality rates. As a result, the gap between births and deaths is narrowing, eroding the “natural increase” that historically accounted for roughly 80 per cent of population growth.

With natural growth slowing, demographic stability would normally depend on sustained positive migration. Yet Israel is currently experiencing the opposite. In both 2024 and 2025, more people left the country than arrived. In 2025 alone, the net migration balance was negative by approximately 37,000 people.

The composition of this emigration is mixed. A majority of the outgoing population has been recent immigrants from Russia and Ukraine, who arrived after the war broke out in 2022. The concerning trend, however, is the sharp rise in emigration among those who were born in Israel. While less than 20,000 native Israelis left the country in 2022, the numbers have gone up to 30,000 this year. That will be unaffordable in the long term for a country like Israel.  

Such emigration of alarming proportions is closely linked to political and security instability. The war that began in October 2023, alongside earlier domestic unrest surrounding proposed judicial reforms, has prompted tens of thousands of Israelis to seek stability and opportunity abroad. Although immigration from Western countries such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom rose by 23.6 per cent in 2025—driven largely by rising global antisemitism—the total of roughly 13,600 non-Russian immigrants remains far too small to offset the scale of departures.

Professor Alex Weinreb of the Taub Centre has described this moment as the start of a “new era in Israel’s demographic development”. The significance lies not only in slower growth, but in the collapse of a long-standing model. Israeli planners have always relied on high fertility rates to offset the threat of migration. But with the fall in fertility rates, the country will have to look more closely at enhancing immigration to retain its demographic balance.

Unfortunately for Israel, a drop in population and fertility rates will add to the strain on public finances and social services. Policy makers are worried about the dependency ratio, which is hampered further by an ageing society. The rising emigration of native-born skilled workers and professionals, meanwhile, is leading to brain drain, with major socioeconomic consequences.

As its traditional growth engines—high fertility and strong immigration—are cooling simultaneously, Israel is facing an existential dilemma. An ageing population, a cultural shift towards smaller families, and prolonged geopolitical uncertainty have combined to produce the slowest population growth in the country’s history, signalling a fundamental transformation in Israel’s demographic future.