Maritime chokepoints are a critical aspect of global trade, and their significance extends beyond borders as they influence economic dynamics and geopolitical stability. West Asia’s energy supplies are connected to the consumer markets in the Indo-Pacific through strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca. These chokepoints are hotspots for regional and global conflicts, piracy, and maritime terrorism.
Strategic significance of maritime chokepoints
The Strait of Hormuz, located between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, is the world’s most important energy chokepoint. Approximately 20 per cent of the world’s crude oil and 25 per cent of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) are transported through this chokepoint. As of January 2025, heightened tensions between Iran and Western powers have made the strait a potential challenge. Especially concerning is Iran’s periodic threats to disrupt navigation in response to sanctions or military provocations. The increasing military presence of external powers, including the United States and China, in the Gulf region underscores the strait’s global strategic importance.
Piracy and organised crime have increased in West Asian waterways. Despite the reduction of events due to coordinated patrols by littoral governments, the possibility of recurrence persists. Likewise, the seas next to the Strait of Hormuz are susceptible to smuggling and other unlawful operations. The threat of maritime terrorism is a serious concern, especially in the Gulf region. For instance, Iran’s use of asymmetrical tactics, including the seizure of oil tankers, highlights the risks of state-sponsored disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. On similar lines, the presence of Jeemah Islamiyah also known as ‘mini-Al-Qaeda’ in Southeast Asia makes this region vulnerable to security threats.
Indo-Pacific is characterised by the growing maritime presence of China through its initiatives such as the Maritime Silk Road, and the Strait of Hormuz is a hotspot for tendons between Iran and West-aligned Gulf states. Contemporarily, the presence of major powers like the US, China and India in the Indo-Pacific has led to naval buildups, and increased militarisation in the region. For instance, when a Portuguese-flagged vessel was seized by the Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz and seizure of a Marshall Islands-flagged ship in the Gulf of Oman. According to the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, 62 out of 107 reported piracy and armed robbery cases in Asia (58 per cent) in 2024 occurred in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
Collaborative frameworks for maritime security
Collaborative frameworks for maritime security include IORA, IMEC and the Quad. The IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) plays an important role in fostering regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean as it focuses on capacity-building and information-sharing, complementing the efforts of individual states to enhance maritime domain awareness. Second, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced in 2024, represents a significant attempt to create a seamless connectivity framework linking India with West Asia and Europe via land and maritime routes. Lastly, the Quad has become a significant platform for tackling security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region through its Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative as it improves the real-time sharing of maritime data to effectively monitor and address security risks in the Strait of Malacca. However, the Quad’s limited engagement with West Asia constrains its ability to address the interconnected dynamics of the Strait of Hormuz.
The efficaciousness of maritime security initiatives in the Strait of Malacca is largely attributable to the trilateral cooperation between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore—for instance, the Malacca Strait Patrols. Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation Council can help in patrolling and securing the Strait of Hormuz. One of the major challenges of multilateral initiatives is the resource constraints and competing priorities. For instance, while IORA has a broad mandate, its ability to address high-stakes security issues like the militarisation of the Strait of Hormuz remains limited due to strategic divergences. While the presence of major powers such as the US, China and the EU can deter threats, it also heightens geopolitical rivalries. For example, China’s investments in Gulf ports and its naval base in Djibouti signal its intent to secure the Strait of Hormuz, which could lead to friction with the United States and India.
Conclusion
The Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca serve as critical lifelines for global trade, underscoring the deep interconnectedness between West Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Given their strategic importance, securing these chokepoints is not just a regional concern but a globally significant issue at hand. There is the potential for investments in satellite-based tracking systems and information-sharing platforms to improve the capability of monitoring and responding to threats in both chokepoints. Initiatives like the IPMDA should be expanded to include Gulf states to make it more comprehensive. This could involve expanding the Quad’s maritime focus to include partnerships with GCC states or leveraging IORA’s platform to integrate Gulf-specific security concerns. Regional powers like India can play a leading role in building the maritime capabilities of smaller states in both regions. This includes sharing expertise in coastal surveillance, port management, and disaster response. It is imperative that collaborative frameworks incorporate mechanisms for responding to environmental risks, given the ecological sensitivity of both chokepoints. This could involve joint exercises for oil spill response and the establishment of marine protected areas. While frameworks like the Quad, IORA, and IMEC offer potential solutions to maritime threats, their success largely depends on how well they navigate the region’s diverse priorities. In an era dominated by great power rivalries and complex trans-regional challenges, a unified strategy is essential—not just for economic stability but for maintaining the broader maritime commons.
The author is a Visiting Faculty and Doctoral Scholar at Amity Institute of International Studies, Amity University. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.