The recent comments about the “landlocked” Northeastern Region (NER) by Prof. Muhammad Yunus, head of Bangladesh's interim government, during his four-day trip to China has come as a shock to many not just in India but also within the strategic community in the West. However, it is worth noting that this is a pattern of “gun on head” diplomacy all South Asian nations practice from time to time when it comes to India where the proverbial “gun” being China. In order to squeeze out maximum benefits from India, which is the largest trading partner to Bangladesh, Yunus seems to have taken it to an unprecedented level this time.
The “Chicken Neck” remains a strategic red-line for India to which New Delhi is ultra-sensitive, and rightly so. By crossing this red line, Yunus has tripped a wire which could have consequences for his already troubled nation, which even President Xi won’t be able to offset, even if he wants to. The strategic aspect aside, there are other areas where Bangladesh depends on India’s NER crucially.
James Carville, the campaign strategist of Bill Clinton, famously coined the phrase, “It's the economy, stupid!.” This phrase, in its many bastardised forms, remains catchy and relevant even today not just because of its simplicity but also because it is true. Since the violent regime change in August last year, the Bangladeshi economy has only gone one way, downwards. While the natural choice of partners in arresting this trend should have been New Delhi, its largest trading partner, Dhaka chose to further fuel anti-India sentiments for internal political convenience. Thus, in its attempt to shore up its fortune, Bangladesh seems to have chosen to lean on the Chinese.
Despite having a free-trade agreement with China, this strategy has not proven to be of much consequence and that seems to have forced Yunus to personally plead in the court of President Xi. In doing so, the academician, who may have bitten a little more than he can chew by taking up the mantel of running a country instead of a successful bank or a university, is having to prove more loyal than the king. While China itself refrains from commenting directly on the NER, appreciating India’s strategic red-line, Yunus, in his ignorance of such diplomatic maneuvers, exposed a level of naïveté, quite unbecoming of a man of his stature.
Bangladesh’s dependencies on NER may not be in the popular narrative either in New Delhi or in Dhaka, but it is as tangible as it can get. For instance, one of the primary contributors to the erstwhile growth of Bangladesh was its booming textile industry. For this, Bangladesh needs energy supply. In this regard, NER plays a crucial and yet largely unacknowledged role. The power supply from Palatana in Tripura to Comilla in Bangladesh provides 190 megawatts of power to an energy-hungry nation. The diesel supply through a 150 km pipeline from Siliguri Terminal in India to Parbatipur in Rangpur Division remains another critical point of dependency on India’s NER for Bangladesh.
While courting China seems to be a critical pillar of Bangladeshi foreign policy currently, it is hard to imagine how these crucial dependencies can be mitigated without the cooperation of NER. There are other significant enablers to Bangladeshi economy and culture that the NER provides. Be it stones, boulders, coal and limestone from Meghalaya or tea from Assam and Tripura or spices from Sikkim or fruits and vegetables from Meghalaya and Tripura, all these exports play a vital role in Bangladesh’s economy and culture. Thus, it would be advisable for Yunus to consider his options more prudently as neither the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative nor the free trade agreement has shown much impact on ground over the past years or months.
However, Bangladesh’s Achilles' heel remains within the NER. While there has been strong opposition to the professor’s statement across party lines, India has largely refrained from securitizing the issue beyond a point. Even the statement of Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has been statesman-like as usual. However, it might be a good time to reintroduce Yunus to one word, the Brahmaputra. The river is as essential to Bangladesh as it is to India’s Northeast, providing the essential lifeline for all its people. If the Gangetic plains of India depend solely on the river Ganga and its tributaries, same is true when it comes to Brahmaputra for the states in India’s Northeast as well as large section of the Bangladeshi populace.
India and Bangladesh have not signed any treaty on the river yet though there have been several levels of deliberations that have taken place. A reminder also seems due here, given Bangladesh is the lowest riparian state in Brahmaputra, that India, along with China, has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses which came into force in 2014 after the UNGA Resolution of 1997. Though, unlike China, India has taken a humanitarian view and has always been a responsible upper riparian state, it does not have any legal obligations to be so. It is only India’s rich international heritage, its cultural ethos of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, and its historic and cultural connectivity with the people of Bangladesh that has fueled such behaviour, even when Dhaka had fueled or facilitated secessionist movements in India’s Northeast. That being said, the Siliguri Corridor remains a strategic red line, which, if tampered with, could provoke reactions on India’s part for which it cannot be held legally responsible by any party, especially when precedence is being set up by the uppermost riparian state of Brahmaputra, China. Thus, it would be a good time to borrow from Carville and remind Md. Yunus, “The Brahmaputra, Professor.”
The author is a former Director General of Assam Police and General Secretary of the think tank SHARE (Society to Harmonise Aspirations for Responsible Engagement). The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.