India’s quiet exit from the Ayni air base in Tajikistan, after the bilateral arrangement lapsed in 2022, marks the end of a two-decade experiment. The aim was to keep a small, forward-operating presence in Central Asia to gain strategic depth vis-à-vis Pakistan and to retain a contingency air corridor to Afghanistan.
When India helped refurbish Ayni air base between 2002 and 2010, spending an estimated $70 million to extend the runway and install navigation and air-defence systems, it was India’s most ambitious out-of-area military project. It provided New Delhi with two advantages: (1) a platform to supply the Northern Alliance, a notional second axis against Pakistan (Ayni sits roughly opposite Pakistan-occupied Kashmir across the Wakhan corridor), and (2) a political presence in Central Asia.
However, this air base always had certain built-in constraints. Given Tajikistan’s close security alignment within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and Russia’s primary role in overseeing the regional airspace management, Dushanbe has maintained a cautious approach toward ensuring that the Ayni facility remains consistent with its broader security commitments and regional sensitivities.
India’s limited presence at the facility was contextually aligned with the evolving security situation in Afghanistan; however, following the political transition in Kabul in 2021 and the completion of evacuation efforts, the strategic rationale for maintaining such a footprint naturally diminished.
What does this exit signal?
The closure does not mean India is giving up on Central Asia; it means New Delhi is recalibrating to a more economic-connectivity-plus-selective-security model, rather than a hard military foothold inside the CSTO space. At the same time, it frees political and military bandwidth for India’s interests, which are growing fastest. This can be extended towards the western flank, i.e., the Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and the western Indian Ocean. This is where the opportunity for India–Middle East collaboration opens up. India’s evolving strategic orientation in the aftermath of its withdrawal from the Ayni air base reflects a broader recalibration towards collaborative, networked security partnerships—probably across the Gulf region.
However, the Middle Eastern landscape offers a markedly different environment, where India already enjoys mature and multifaceted defence relationships with nations like the UAE, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The Indian Navy’s operational use of Oman’s Duqm port and logistics understandings with the UAE exemplify this pragmatic approach. So, India can pursue networked access arrangements across the Gulf, supporting air-sea mobility, humanitarian assistance, evacuation operations, and counter-piracy initiatives. Such cooperation also aligns with Middle Eastern nations’ aspirations to diversify and internationalise their defence partnerships beyond their traditional reliance on the United States. With the shifting nature of terrorism after 2021 — where the threat lies more in financing networks, digital radicalisation, and information warfare — the Middle East’s proactive measures in countering extremism offer a valuable platform for partnership.
The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have established sophisticated mechanisms for intelligence-sharing, technology-driven monitoring, and de-radicalisation programmes following their experiences during the ISIS insurgency. Joint counter-terrorism working groups, enhanced intelligence coordination on foreign terrorist fighters, and cooperation in cyber surveillance can yield far greater dividends for India’s security objectives than maintaining a limited presence in Central Asia. For the Middle Eastern states, such engagement reinforces their identity as credible, responsible security providers in the wider region. These initiatives would leverage the substantial Indian diaspora, existing air connectivity, and mutual trust developed through past cooperation. This approach also builds upon India’s track record of successful humanitarian evacuations — such as Operation Rahat in Yemen, Operation Kaveri in Sudan, and recent extractions from crisis zones in the Middle East — reinforcing New Delhi’s image as a capable and compassionate regional actor.
Strategic takeaway
India’s maritime engagements are emerging as the cornerstone of its western strategic posture. While Ayni once provided limited continental depth vis-à-vis Pakistan, the Indian Ocean now offers broader strategic depth against a spectrum of regional challenges. The volatility in the Red Sea, the persistence of piracy, and the risks to energy supply chains underscore the need for cooperative maritime security frameworks.
India’s sustained naval presence, joint patrols, and initiatives such as the Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) can play a pivotal role in enhancing maritime domain awareness and ensuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). For the Middle Eastern states, deeper maritime cooperation with India complements their efforts to safeguard energy exports and diversify partnerships in the western Indian Ocean.
Finally, the closure of Ayni symbolises a strategic pivot from overland access to Central Asia towards a maritime and Middle East-oriented corridor architecture. Initiatives like the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) and the I2U2 grouping illustrate this shift, linking South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe through energy, trade, and digital connectivity. Even as regional crises disrupt immediate implementation, the long-term vision of these frameworks positions the Gulf as a vital hinge between India and the wider Eurasian space. Collectively, these developments demonstrate that India’s transition from a land-based forward outpost to a partnership-driven maritime network is not a retreat, but a reconfiguration — one that aligns with the evolving realities of twenty-first-century geopolitics and enhances India’s ability to act as a stabilising force across its extended neighbourhood.
Even though the closing of India’s only operational overseas air base looks like a loss of strategic depth, it can be turned into a reallocation of strategic effort. New Delhi can judiciously enhance its engagement across the western Indian Ocean and Gulf region, where partnerships are mutually desired, access arrangements remain both cost-effective and politically sustainable, and shared economic, diaspora, and security interests naturally intersect. If New Delhi uses the Ayni exit to argue for more visible, more multilateral, and more maritime-specific India–Middle East security cooperation, the story will be “India choosing the theatre where it can really shape outcomes.”
The author is assistant professor, Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Amity University, NOIDA