In the autumn of 2025, the global stage is a cauldron of realignments, with ripple effects cascading into South Asia like seismic waves. The October 13 Gaza truce, brokered by President Donald Trump, marks a pivotal moment in West Asia, ending a protracted conflict and unlocking reconstruction pathways. This 'Trump Declaration for Enduring
Peace and Prosperity' not only stabilises the region, but also revives stalled initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a strategic counter to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Yet, this peace comes amid broader US strategic introspection, revealing an "America First" pivot, over expansive global commitments. This inward turn signals a transactional US foreign policy, with profound effects on South Asia.
Regional dynamics
Recent developments with the USA showing increased interest in Pakistan, resurrect the spectre of the 'Great Game'—the 19th-century imperial rivalry over Central Asia, now recast in a bipolar arena between the US and China. Beijing's BRI, with its tentacles in Pakistan via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), seeks dominance over trade routes and resources in this region, while Washington counters through selective engagements, including rare earth mineral (REM) deals in Pakistan's Balochistan to reduce dependence on Chinese REM supplies. At stake is control over critical minerals, energy corridors and influence in a region bridging Eurasia and the Indian Ocean.
For South Asia, this rivalry amplifies local fault lines, turning Pakistan into a precarious pawn. Internally, the country grapples with insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants have resurged, claiming over 900 lives in 2025 alone from 329 incidents through September. Externally, border clashes with Afghanistan escalate, with October skirmishes killing dozens and straining resources amid accusations of Kabul harbouring TTP fighters. Fissiparous tendencies simmer in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Sindh, fueled by poverty (affecting 45 per cent of the population), elite corruption (Pakistan ranks 135/180 on the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index) and anti-democratic impulses under military dominance. Youth discontent hints at a potential Gen Z uprising, inspired by regional precedents like Bangladesh's 2024 Monsoon Revolution and Nepal's explosive September 2025 protests. Meanwhile, the Gaza accord has thrust Pakistan into West Asia's orbit, with commitments to deploy troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) for peacekeeping in Gaza and also to Saudi Arabia under a new mutual defence pact. These obligations overstretch an army already juggling three fronts: India, Afghanistan and internal dissent.
The US has demanded the return of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan—a demand that was firmly rejected by Kabul. A US-controlled Bagram or a base in Pakistan would provide Washington with a strategic perch to open additional fronts against China (near Xinjiang) and Iran, escalating the Great Game by enabling surveillance, rapid strikes and resource access in Central Asia. Islamabad has reportedly offered seaport and naval basing rights at Pasni. A US-backed Pasni port ($1.2B proposal) located 80 miles on the same coastline, would directly rival Gwadar, undermining CPEC by diverting trade, investments and strategic focus—potentially reducing Gwadar's viability as a hub. It would provide the US a foothold for mineral exports and maritime ops, countering China's Arabian Sea dominance and complicating Beijing's Malacca Strait bypass (via Gwadar for oil/energy routes). China is unlikely to accept this setback passively and will view it as US encirclement, potentially escalating regional tensions. Iran looms as a wildcard: Tehran could subtly fuel instability along the shared border to deter US REM pursuits in Balochistan.
Washington's renewed courtship of Islamabad—evident in $112 million military aid, F-16 support, and REM shipments—aims to pry Pakistan from China's embrace and counter Beijing's regional heft. It is possible that China could pull back or condition its support to Pakistan if a sizeable US presence materialises, viewing it as a direct threat.
While China won't abandon Pakistan entirely—given CPEC's $62B stake—it might delay projects, reduce military aid or pivot to alternatives like Iran/Afghanistan to safeguard BRI. For the region, these dynamics portend instability. Pakistan's hedging—echoing Cold War-era games with the US and Soviets—has historically yielded short-term gains (aid, arms) but long-term pitfalls (sanctions, blowback, insurgencies).
The upheaval in Bangladesh adds another layer of volatility to South Asia's fragile equilibrium. One year after the 2024 Monsoon Revolution, an Islamic revival has taken root, with calls for an "Islamic government," and reports of Islamist terrorism threats, including attacks on minorities. Renewed ties with Pakistan's ISI compound the instability. This axis raises alarms for regional security, potentially funnelling anti-India
activities through Dhaka. Nepal's recent Gen Z turmoil further underscores the wave of youth-driven unrest sweeping the region. In September 2025, what began as protests against a government ban on social media platforms escalated into a leaderless revolt demanding an end to corruption, inequality and systemic abuse of power. The movement toppled the government within days. This upheaval, part of a global Gen Z surge inspiring movements in Madagascar and Morocco, highlights how digital mobilisation can swiftly challenge entrenched elites. Nepal's Gen Z revolt, while not directly anti-India, could spill over through shared borders and diaspora networks, amplifying regional instability.
An India analysis
IMEC's potential revival post-Gaza truce offers a Western-aligned alternative to BRI, slashing transit times and costs. India stands at a crossroads, poised to exploit these fractures while navigating risks. Delhi's proactive doctrine—exemplified by the recent Operation Sindoor strikes—has punished Pakistan's terror nexus, exposing its vulnerabilities. The operation exposed military vulnerabilities, resulting in substantial casualties to military and terrorists, damage to infrastructure and a surge in internal dissent—stretching an already overburdened army across multiple fronts.
Economically, it disrupted trade and heightened instability, while diplomatically, it isolated Islamabad amid global condemnation of its terror support. Chinese-made jets were tested in combat, drawing scrutiny to Beijing's role in arming a state sponsor of terrorism.
The October 9-16 visit by Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India signals pragmatic engagement with discussions on security, trade and India's embassy reopening in Kabul. This creates serious issues for Pakistan, which has long viewed Afghanistan as a client state and should restrain ISI’s anti-India activities in Bangladesh.
Going forward, Delhi can amplify PoK/Baloch dissent diplomatically, deepen Afghan ties for intel-sharing, monitor Bangladesh's Islamist drift and Nepal's unrest and bolster Quad alliances to counter US-Pakistan warmth. Yet, challenges abound. Reports indicate that anti-India terrorist camps and groups have relocated eastward from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) following India's Operation Sindoor in May 2025, with backing from Pakistan's ISI. India should leverage its good equation with Afghanistan to rein in this activity.
India-US-China-Russia-BRICS
India’s equations with these nations are key to its ‘hedging strategy’ and profoundly affect the dynamics of South Asia. India has to re-establish its rapport with a transactional Trump administration, settle trade talks without compromising its key concerns, strengthen QUAD and continue to showcase its Russia-China equation to chasten the US administration. There is a need to progressively improve relations with China and to retain existing levels of Indo-Russian rapport. With the leadership of BRICS devolving on India in 2026, a strategy is needed which gives India geo-political heft without stepping on US sensitivities.
So what are the key concerns for India?
• Bangladesh's turmoil and radical networks abutting India's northeast is a vulnerability which India needs to counter. The statements by key Bangladeshi officials about India’s Siliguri corridor vulnerability are of concern.
• The dynamics of four sensitive border states —Jammu & Kashmir, Ladakh, Punjab and Manipur—need to be monitored and addressed with sensitivity as they provide China and Pakistan options to exploit Indian vulnerabilities. Credible intelligence reports already indicate that smuggling of arms by drones into Punjab has increased manifold post Op Sindoor.
• Nepal's Gen Z movement could inspire similar demands in India's own youth demographics.
• A sizeable US presence in Pakistan would hinder India's strategic options, complicating its proactive counter-terror doctrine announced post Op Sindoor. It may limit India's strike options due to escalation risks involving US assets.
• The warming US-Pakistan ties could further embolden Islamabad to sustain terror proxies, knowing US mediation might shield it from full Indian retaliation. Reducing Washington's pressure on Pakistan's terror support would also impact trust in US-India partnerships.
• Need to fortify defenses against a "triple threat" from Pakistan, China and potentially Bangladesh.
• Lack of adequate leverage in the global geo-economics.