The revival of US-Pakistan ties is not a neutral adjustment in Washington’s playbook. It risks rearming a state that has historically converted external support into proxy aggression against India. Strategic foresight demands that India prepare to counter this cycle before it matures into a renewed security crisis.
The emerging new bonhomie
Something is stirring in South Asia that India cannot afford to dismiss. In just three months post Operation Sindoor, US President Donald Trump has met Pakistan’s prime minister three times and its Army Chief twice. For a country that only a few years ago was described by Trump as a haven for terrorists, this sudden access to the Oval Office is a remarkable turnaround. These meetings are not routine photo-ops; they mark a clear recalibration in Washington’s approach. If India treats them as diplomatic theatre, we risk being blindsided by a strategic shift with serious consequences.
Why the sudden embrace?
The American establishment rarely acts out of sentiment. The US is recalibrating its South Asia policy because geopolitical shifts impact its stakes—China’s reach and rise, Iran flexing its presence in the Middle East and Gulf, and Afghanistan increasingly out of US reach. Add to that visible strain in the US–India relationship over trade, energy and Russia. Pakistan spots an opening, and Washington, looking for quick tactical leverage, seems willing to play along.
Trump has already gone beyond the old counterterrorism script. He has spoken of investments in energy, mining and technology in Pakistan. This is about repositioning Islamabad as a partner that can serve multiple US interests, from keeping an eye on Kabul to moderating Tehran and even acting as a check on Beijing. It is also sending a strategic message for India, whose strategic autonomy forays are to Trump's dislike. For Pakistan, it is a lifeline. This shift gives Islamabad new legitimacy at precisely the time it was struggling with economic collapse, military humiliation and diplomatic isolation.
Islamabad’s familiar playbook
For India, this development cannot be viewed in isolation. Pakistan has a long history of using external patrons to bankroll its strategic goals. During the Cold War, US arms and aid fed the Pakistani military machine even as insurgency in Kashmir was encouraged. In the early 2000s, billions in American assistance were siphoned off even while terror networks were given space to regroup. Each time, the inflow of resources lowered Pakistan’s risk threshold for provoking India. There is little reason to believe this cycle will not repeat itself.
The likelihood is that with new funding, technology access and diplomatic cover, Pakistan’s security establishment will feel emboldened to test the waters in Kashmir. Even if Washington’s intent is not to destabilise India, its engagement provides Pakistan the confidence to push infiltration, radicalisation and proxy attacks. The added Saudi pact gives it psychological confidence. India’s declared doctrine that every terror strike will be treated as an act of war will then face a serious test of deterrence and political will.
The Afghan connection
Afghanistan is where Islamabad sells itself as indispensable. Since the Taliban takeover, Pakistan has positioned itself as the gatekeeper. Information sharing, logistics and selective counterterror pressure could all flow through Rawalpindi.
For India, this is a double setback along with the sanction on Chabahar, which facilitated connectivity to Central Asia. Our developmental investments and political goodwill in Afghanistan could be marginalised. More importantly, Pakistan could use its restored clout to block Indian influence and allow anti-India groups to re-establish safe zones with tacit American tolerance. In effect, Washington’s dependence on Pakistan for Afghan stability could leave Delhi sidelined in key regional calculations.
The larger bargain is stark. The US seeks Pakistan’s help to manage Islamist extremism in Afghanistan, contain Iran on its eastern flank and keep an eye on China’s Belt and Road corridors. Pakistan, in return, expects a free hand in shaping the subcontinent’s security environment, where India remains its primary focus.
The danger of complacency
India cannot fall back on the assumption that the US policy is cyclical and will swing back in our favour. History shows that by the time America changes course, the damage has already been done. Every previous round of US-Pakistan engagement left India with a stronger proxy war to manage and militants better equipped to strike with diplomatic impunity.
This time, the risks are sharper. India’s own relations with Washington are showing signs of friction. Pakistan has moved swiftly to exploit those cracks and position itself as the cooperative partner. For Islamabad, this is not just about resources; it is about returning to the region as a key strategic influencer after years of marginalisation.
Recommendations for India
The response cannot be passive. India needs a multi-layered plan.
Harden deterrence. Security forces along the Line of Control and in the Valley must assume that infiltration attempts will rise. Intelligence coordination has to be improved with a focus on terror financing and sleeper networks. Precision strike and cyber capabilities must be made ready for fast retaliation. Only visible preparedness will dissuade misadventure.
Diplomatic clarity: New Delhi must engage Washington with a blunt message. Strengthening Pakistan’s military capacity while ignoring its sponsorship of terrorism directly undermines Indian security. India must underline that no strategic calculation in South Asia can be sustainable if it overlooks Pakistan’s record.
Regional hedging: India should strengthen ties with Iran, the Central Asian states and Afghan stakeholders beyond the Taliban. Broader networks will dilute Pakistan’s monopoly and provide India with multiple levers of influence. Partnerships with Moscow, Europe and ASEAN on Afghan stability can further offset US reliance on Islamabad. The key remains hetero-polarity, which protects its strategic autonomy and national interests.
Control the narrative: Pakistan thrives on playing victim even as it nurtures terror. India must relentlessly expose this duplicity. Every forum, from the UN to regional conferences, should hear the evidence. Global opinion is not a substitute for hard power, but it shapes the space in which hard power is used.
The stakes: Forewarned is forearmed
The US-Pakistan rapprochement is not just a passing alignment. It reflects a structural choice by Washington to use Pakistan as a regional instrument once again. For Islamabad, it is a chance to escape the isolation that followed the fall of Kabul and the exposure of its duplicity. For India, it is a warning that global alignments are fluid and that even trusted partners may recalibrate when their interests demand it.
The real risk is not simply that Pakistan will receive new resources. The deeper danger is that American indulgence will embolden its security establishment to reopen fronts against India. If that happens, the Valley could see a surge in violence and India’s red lines will face a trial by fire.
Strategic patience has often been India’s instinct, but this is a moment that calls for strategic urgency. We cannot rely on Washington’s eventual disillusionment with Pakistan. By then, the cost will already have been extracted in blood and instability. The time to anticipate, deter and shape outcomes is now.