China-Pakistan military cooperation: What it portends for India-China ties

The recent India-Pakistan military conflict was an eye-opener for Indian security planners regarding the extensive scope and depth of military cooperation between Pakistan and China - and how it could impact on India's security in future - in the short and long term. Further, other than collusive military support to Pakistan, politically too, China used its influence in the UN Security Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to water down official communiques concerning attributability of Pakistani agencies and terror groups in the Pahalgam terror attack - in which 26 civilians, mostly tourists, were killed - for which a Pakistan-linked group, The Resistance Front, had claimed responsibility.

Not that India's security planners were taken totally by surprise. It has been common knowledge for quite some time now, especially since work by Chinese agencies on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) commenced in Pakistan in 2013, that, other than mutual economic interests, the security interests of both these countries appear to be enmeshed. It seems to have reached a point that Pakistan's security calculus today - both threats and opportunities - are being perceived and dealt with by China as its own.

Pakistan-China military cooperation

The order by Pakistan Air Force in 2021 for 36 J-10CE fighter aircraft from China, to bolster its combat fleet of American F-16s and Chinese JF-17s, of which 20 aircraft have already been delivered, would also have been common knowledge among Indian security planners. But what may not have been so is the possible supply by China to Pakistan of PL 15, extended range (BVR) version of air-to-air missiles, having a range of 200 - 300 km, in addition to the PL-15E, the export version, in which the range is restricted to 145 km, due to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) regulations. Otherwise how could Pakistan Air Force (PAF) sources have claimed to Pakistani journalists on May13 that a J-10CE aircraft shot down an Indian fighter aircraft at a range of 182 km on May 7. Further, Chinese social media groups reportedly were also celebrating this 'kill' of a Western origin aircraft at a record distance, thus substantiating the possibility that longer range missiles may have been clandestinely supplied to Pakistan. Significantly, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan visited the Pakistani Air Chief in the latter's office in Islamabad on May 20, 2025, in which he praised the PAF for "commendable utilisation of Chinese origin equipment and technology in thwarting hostile aggression."

Nonetheless, for China, these are not overly important questions, considering that, between 2020 and 2024, China supplied Pakistan with 81 per cnet of its military needs. These include, other than J-10CE and JF-17 combat aircraft, the Wing Loong II and CH-4 armed drones for the Air Force, F-22P Zulfiqar Class frigates, Type 054A/P frigates, Azmat class missile boats and Type 039B Yuan (Hangor) Class submarines for the Navy, as well as MBT-2000 tanks, SH-15 155 mm Howitzers, Red Arrow Anti-tank missiles and several radar and electronic warfare systems for the Army. Further, many air defence systems have been supplied, like the HQ-9P and HQ-9B Long range surface to air missiles (SAMs), HQ-16/ LY-80 medium range SAMs, HQ-7 short range SAMs and IBIS-150 radar systems.

More importantly, it appears, in preparation for possible retaliatory air strikes by the Indian Air Force (Operation Sindoor) in response to the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025, attributed to Pakistan and its Army Chief, China reportedly provided Pakistan's Air Force with a robust network centric warfare (NCW) system - spanning real-time sensor-fusion systems, command and control, space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), data links and electronic warfare support. This reportedly included AI-based data link and sensor fusion systems - for shared real time situational awareness - Beidou, Gaofen and Yaogan satellites for navigation, surveillance and electronic intelligence support, as well as electronic warfare (EW) systems for real-time interception, jamming and spoofing, while Chinese integrated and upgraded SAAB 2000 Erieye AWACS were provided extended range surveillance, enabled for coordinated stand-off operations.

Also reportedly, AI-enabled EW and Link-17 tactical data link on J-10C and JF-17 Block III aircraft provided for enhanced jamming, early detection, sensor integration, missile warning and network centric warfare, including launch of BVR missiles with mid-course updates, even with their radar off. Also, it appears that China used the opportunity provided by the recent India-Pakistan conflict to make the Pakistan military test its equipment as well as network centricity and cooperative kill chain against the Indian military. All this also raises a credible suspicion that Chinese technical personnel may well have been physically deployed with Pakistani military units during Operation Sindoor.

Also, in the foreseeable future, the Pakistani military is slated to receive a further infusion of advanced technology Chinese equipment, which reportedly includes 40 5th generation J-35A stealth fighters - equipped with PL-17 missiles - as well as HQ-19 theatre-level ballistic missile defence and KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft. Undoubtedly, even in future, China is likely to provide the requisite ISR inputs, communication systems, data link and network centricity to Pakistan to maximise operational outcomes against the Indian military in case of a conflict.

Backdrop - an adverse India-China relationship

China has always perceived India as its regional and global rival, and thus, despite numerous peaceful overtures by India in the past, has worked, overtly and covertly, to keep India off-balance, and limit its influence to just the South Asia framework. Publicly, in global fora, it makes efforts to undermine India's standing and aspirations, whenever it has got an opportunity. A series of such unfriendly acts are what contributed to India joining the QUAD, despite not having joined the SEATO, the earlier version of a West sponsored regional alliance in Asia, in the 1950s.

On the other hand, China and Pakistan have had a friendly relationship ever since March 1963, when Pakistan handed over to China the Shaksgam Valley - a tract of land, measuring 5,180 square kilometres in Gilgit Baltistan - which China sought from Pakistan. The illegal transfer of this tract, which is part of India's Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory and was in Pakistan's control after 1948, formed the basis of a very strong partnership between the two countries, which has grown from strength to strength, the common antipathy against India providing the glue to strengthen the bond. Extensive military support by China to Pakistan is a visible component of this relationship, whereby China provides military aid in all forms through equipment, training, logistics and technological support to the Pakistan military.

Consequently, it has been amply clear for some time now that, in any future military conflict between India and Pakistan, China could also be an active partner, on the side of Pakistan. And that such collaboration and cooperation between these 'iron brothers' could even extend to the point of creating a 'two front' situation for India, in case of a conflict with either. Militarily, the unprovoked intrusions by Chinese troops in Eastern Ladakh in 2020, despite a number of preventive agreements having been in place, were a clear indication that, in the realm of regional and global dynamics, China prefers the route of confrontation rather than cooperation or competition. That the intrusions of 2020 occurred just a few months after President Xi's exhortations of peace and cooperation at the Mamallapuram Summit meeting in October 2019, which he attended at the invitation of PM Modi, was a clear indication that China may not be a trustworthy partner for India.

The border dispute has dominated the India-China relationship

Notably, China has maintained an unfriendly attitude towards India ever since the border dispute between the two countries surfaced in 1959, and India gave political asylum to the Dalai Lama, who escaped to India to avoid persecution after the uprising in Tibet. Before that, the border dispute over China's claims of Indian territory had been simmering ever since China occupied Tibet in 1950, and Indian patrols subsequently discovered Chinese road-building activities in Aksai Chin in Eastern Ladakh, an area which India considered as belonging to its Jammu & Kashmir State. The attack by Chinese troops in October 1962 took the Indian Army positions in Eastern Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh (then known as North East Frontier Agency) by surprise and led to a military setback for the Indian Army, though the Chinese troops withdrew at most places immediately thereafter, possibly due to the harsh winter conditions. That unprovoked war laid the foundations of a hostile relationship, which continues to this day.

Currently, China's military assistance to Pakistan and its continuing efforts at strategic encirclement of India - by establishing or gaining access to military facilities in countries in India's immediate neighbourhood - are the most visible manifestations of its hostility towards India. Notably, these efforts continued even during the three decades from 1990 to 2020, when China tried to put a friendly face on its relationship. But the mask came off in May 2020 when Chinese troops intruded across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, resulting in the Galwan clashes a month later. The 'eyeball to eyeball' deployment by both sides, which continued thereafter on the LAC, has not yet been fully lifted as, reportedly, the access to our troops in some of the areas of intrusion have not yet been fully restored, despite 21 rounds of military-to-military talks.

Surprisingly, all this is happening when China is India's second largest trading partner, with bilateral trade having reached $127.7 billion in the Financial Year 2024-25. Significantly, India's imports from China were worth $113.4 billion, while exports plunged to $14.25 billion, resulting in a record-high deficit of $99.2 billion, reflecting the over-dependency on Chinese imports, especially in some critical sectors.

What does all this mean for India's future threat perception?

The experience of Operation Sindoor has made it clear to our security planners that, in future conflicts between India and Pakistan, China may get active militarily, in support of Pakistani military efforts - manifesting in the 'two front war' threat as it is generally described. More likely, the Pakistan's single front itself will be bolstered by all forms of China's military support, strategic, operational and tactical - with Chinese equipment, ISR, network centricity, communications, EW, cyber warfare and logistics supply. Even the Chinese Navy resources may be based out of Gwadar to provide some form of naval support to Pakistan.

Primary lesson for India

The primary lesson for India is to recognise that China is an adversary and that the concept of a 'two front threat' is no longer a theoretical construct - it has become a reality, with predictable consequences. Further, even in the case of a single front conflict with Pakistan, like Operation Sindoor, China is likely to participate more actively, on the side of Pakistan. In this context, it needs highlighting that, in the backdrop of recent economic tensions with the US, there were suggestions in some quarters in our country that India should make efforts to befriend China instead, to promote global multi-polarity - as suggested in the BRICS agenda. However, based on facts on the ground related to active anti-India behaviour by China, it appears that such an effort would be a wasted exercise. Clearly, there is no alternative for India at this point, especially based on its lived experience in Operation Sindoor, but to continue to classify China as its adversary, and deal with it accordingly.

More importantly, can India respond in any other way, when it finds, in case of an India-Pakistan conflict, its military assets being attacked by Chinese missiles, fired from Chinese aircraft, functioning as part of China established kill-chain networks, using Chinese satellites and communication systems - all provided to Pakistan with a clear designated purpose. What has been confirmed this time is that, undoubtedly, on every occasion that there is a face-off or something more serious between India and Pakistan in the future, India will face a coordinated employment of Pakistani and Chinese prowess, both military and technological. Hence, India must prepare accordingly to face this dual-threat in future conflict scenarios.

India too must develop and strengthen all-weather friendships

Undoubtedly, India must develop and deepen relationships with its traditional friends like Russia, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, and also with countries like the US, Japan, Australia, France, Germany, the UK, other European countries, South Africa etc. with which it shares liberal values - like democracy, freedom, pluralism and respect for human rights. Relatedly, there is a need to strengthen our ranking in these values, so that we bolster our global image and maintain a more influential role in the Global North as well as a leadership role in the Global South. Though it involves tightrope-walking in some cases, Indian diplomacy should ensure that we do not fall short of friends or support - in times of need.

India must prepare for enhanced military threat

Operation Sindoor has provided an opportunity to learn some important military lessons at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, in our context. These cover the realms of airpower employment, drone warfare and anti-drone systems, network centric warfare, air defence saturation, cyber and electronic warfare, the role of Gwadar port in the maritime realm, as well as logistic chains and fast resupply. Undoubtedly, speedier indigenisation holds the key to requisite capability-development.

In conclusion, it may be said that China's 360-degree military support to Pakistan, including 'advanced realistic combat training', is the reality that the Indian military will face on the India-Pakistan battlefield of the future. China may employ the Pakistani military as its proxy, but it is an important proxy, that China cannot afford to suffer a defeat. So, just as in Operation Sindoor, China's footprints and signatures are likely to be discernible in hostile actions undertaken by the Pakistani military in future too.

Post Script: On July 7, 2025, Pakistani Army Chief 'Field Marshal' Asim Munir, during an address to military officers in Islamabad, stated that "insinuations regarding external support are irresponsible and factually incorrect." On the same day, China's foreign ministry spokesman said that defence and security cooperation between China and Pakistan does not target any third party. Further, he stated that the India-China relationship is in a critical moment of improvement and development, and that Beijing would like to promote steady growth of bilateral ties with New Delhi. But considering the reality of what occurred exactly two months earlier, can these clarifications be taken seriously?

The writer was Vice Chief of the Indian Army.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.