As US Vice President J.D. Vance climbed the steps to board a flight from Islamabad to Washington, D.C. on April 12, he looked quite weary. The negotiations had tired him—he had argued for 21 hours with the tactical Iranians. After all, strategy would come naturally to the people who popularised India’s chaturanga and introduced chess to much of the world.
Vance might also have been wary of dealing with Donald Trump’s mood—the president would not be happy with the failure of the talks.
Most important, he would have been thinking about what is next for the US.
There might have been a gnawing realisation that there was a miscalculation somewhere in the White House on Iran. Far from the expectation that a restive citizenry would rush to overthrow a clergy-driven dictatorial regime, the Iranians had rallied together and had been resilient among all the bombardment by US and Israeli aircraft. That the regime has not collapsed even after the top leadership was eliminated underlines that Iran had been prepared all the while.
And the fact that it continues striking targets in the Gulf proves that its retaliatory capability hasn’t been blunted.
Dr Seyed Haji Sajedi, who teaches social sciences at University of Tehran, told THE WEEK: “In Iran, most citizens treat Trump and his impossible statement on ‘ending’ our civilisation as a joke. Iran has a 5,000-year-old civilisation and somebody from a country with 250 years of history threatens to destroy us. It is a commonly accepted view among intellectuals in Iran that a civilisation cannot be finished by bombing. It is an abstract concept. It lives in its history, ethics, spirituality, philosophy, science and in the outlook of its people.”
In the past decade, Sajedi said, there were two main groups in Iran, one of which is reformist. “They believe that the way to handle the American challenge is to have negotiations. The second group, or the fundamentalists, believe that negotiations can never solve problems with the US because the conflict is not a simple one, but is foundational. Now, however, a majority of Iranians believe that negotiations will never solve any problem with the US. When the Islamabad negotiations failed, majority of Iranians was happy. The people’s current demand is to continue the war and make nuclear bombs. Officially and from the religious perspective, the government had abhorred nuclear bombs as it is dangerous for the environment. If we had a nuclear bomb, America would not have dared to attack us.”
Reports say people gather in the main streets in the evening every day till midnight vowing solidarity with the war.
Importantly, the failed negotiations have set the base for Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, which it has eyed for long. Iranian control over the strait will be an important tool to influence Asian and European economies; they would have to re-initiate trade ties with Iran or risk jeopardising their energy security. The Gulf nations and Israel will have to live with the reality of a resurgent Iran and the rise of the Iran-Russia-China axis in West Asia.
Meanwhile, Trump’s reaction was predictable. On April 13, the US Central Command began imposing a blockade of maritime traffic entering or exiting Iranian ports. The funny part is that Hormuz—the trade route for 20 per cent of the world’s crude oil movement—had already been off-limits for maritime traffic except for a trickling of ships ever since the war began on February 28.
Reports say that the US had three main demands: a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and free navigation through the strait. Iran put forth a moratorium on uranium enrichment only for a “single-digit” number of years and an offer to dilute its highly enriched uranium stockpile instead of handing it over.
The fact that neither showed any signs of relenting indicates that the conflict would be long.
A protracted conflict fits into Iran’s scheme of things. This is because the US military would be drawn into an unfamiliar land with a tough geography, and would be forced to counter Iran’s ‘mosaic military strategy’.
This is a strategy devised for the eventuality of Iran losing its top military leadership and military and communications network. At its core, it implies organising the military architecture into 31 independent units comprising surviving elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the ‘Basij’ force, regular army and its various arms, all with their own weaponry.
Away from the main players, what has stood out is the sudden enhanced profile of Pakistan. While India chose to stay out in alignment with its policy of ‘strategic autonomy’, Islamabad cashed in on the situation.
Muhammad Amir Rana, head of the Islamabad-based Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, told THE WEEK: “Pakistan’s role in all of this has mostly been about bringing two long-time adversaries to the table.... This is a continuation of Pakistan’s efforts to balance its relationship with the US, which went through a difficult phase because of Afghanistan, its tilt towards China, and shifting dynamics in West Asia. The crisis in the region has created an opportunity, one that Pakistan had been waiting for. As this new regional order starts taking shape, we are seeing middle powers like Pakistan and Turkey stepping into more important roles.... Meanwhile, the US itself seems to be shifting towards a burden-sharing model, where it redistributes responsibilities across the region.”
Round one might have yielded gains for Iran and Pakistan, but the immediate prospects for peace appear bleak.