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Power of resistance: Rebuilding Bangladesh’s parliamentary pillars

A durable democracy in Bangladesh needs an empowered, institutional and responsible opposition

Fighting spirit: Jamaat-e-Islami supporters gather outside Dhaka’s Baitul Mukarram National Mosque to protest alleged irregularities in the national election results | AP
Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir

AS BANGLADESH enters a new political phase after prolonged authoritarian rule and the election of a new government, attention has focused on the transfer of power. History offers a hard lesson. Democracy does not consolidate because rulers change. It stabilises only when institutions function. Among these, none is more essential than a responsible parliamentary opposition.

The mass uprising of 2024 did not merely remove a regime. It created a structural opening to rebuild the state. Political reform, constitutional redesign and electoral integrity have since dominated debate. Yet one foundational question remains. Parliament cannot become the centre of democratic life without an institutionalised, empowered and responsible opposition.

Democracy is defined not by the strength of government alone, but by the balance between authority, scrutiny, mandate and accountability. Opposition is not an accessory, but rather a structural pillar. Without it, parliament risks becoming formally intact but substantively hollow.

The structural roots

Bangladesh’s political history reveals a recurring paradox. Opposition has existed, but rarely within parliament in a meaningful way. Instead, political contestation has repeatedly moved to the streets. This pattern is not cultural. It is institutional.

The first cause is the systematic marginalisation of the opposition inside parliament. Parties have historically lacked guaranteed procedural rights and meaningful roles. Their influence depended less on constitutional entitlement and more on executive tolerance. Legislation routinely passed with minimal scrutiny. Opposition amendments rarely shaped outcomes. Parliamentary committees, the backbone of oversight in functioning democracies, often reduced opposition participation to a formality.

This imbalance has deep roots. Bangladesh inherited a highly centralised state under colonial rule, designed to command compliance, not to ensure democratic deliberation. Independence transferred political authority but did not transform institutional logic. Parliament remained structurally subordinate to the executive. Over time, the imbalance intensified. After 2008, parliament increasingly took on one-party characteristics. Electoral legitimacy itself became deeply contested. Parliament continued to function as a legislative body in form but not in substance.

The second reason is Bangladesh’s inheritance of resistance politics. Street mobilisation, including protests and civil disobedience, historically resisted authoritarianism and restored democratic openings. These methods were necessary and effective. But when parliamentary institutions fail to provide meaningful channels for contestation, opposition parties rationally revert to extra-parliamentary methods.

The costs are clear. Political confrontation disrupts economic activity, weakens investor confidence and burdens workers and small enterprises. Institutional fragility translates directly into economic and social insecurity. The solution lies in institutionalisation.

The institutional imperative

The July Charter marked a historic recognition that democracy cannot endure without an empowered opposition.

First, the Charter guaranteed opposition leadership of key parliamentary oversight committees, particularly those reviewing public finance and administrative performance. Oversight cannot be credible if those being scrutinised control the scrutiny itself. Second, it secured protected parliamentary space for opposition business. The right to question policy, propose alternatives and initiate debate must exist as an institutional guarantee, not a discretionary concession. Third, it emphasised structured consultation with opposition leadership on matters of national consequence, including constitutional reform, emergencies and major strategic decisions.

Democratic stability requires not only electoral competition but shared institutional responsibility. A responsible opposition does not merely resist. It proposes. It does not merely criticise. It offers alternatives and demonstrates readiness to govern.

Beyond Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s democratic trajectory matters far beyond its borders. As one of South Asia’s largest economies, its institutional stability shapes regional investment, economic integration and democratic confidence. Democratic erosion in one country weakens confidence across the region, while consolidation strengthens it. Institutionalising a responsible opposition is a safeguard against democratic relapse. The opposition must demonstrate to the masses that it is a government in waiting.

Democracy matures when the government and opposition recognise a shared objective. A strong government and a responsible opposition are not adversaries. They allow the republic to endure. They are co-stewards of its future.

The author is adviser to Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman.

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