As recently as 18 months ago, the Indo-Pacific appeared to be a very different region. China and the US were locked in a growing competition for influence and resources, but their rivalry remained largely confined within accepted norms of international conduct.
The US was focused on strengthening alliances with Japan and South Korea, while building new structures such as the Quad (US, Japan, India & Australia) and Aukus (US, UK & Australia) as additional geopolitical enablers of American power in the Indo-Pacific. Its withdrawal, in 2017, from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) was a disappointment to its partners. Nevertheless, Washington continued economic engagement through bilateral channels and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
China, meanwhile, took the lead on economic integration by steering the Indo-Pacific states into a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Yet, its wolf warrior diplomacy and demonstrably assertive behaviour towards neighbours, including the Philippines and India, proved equally disappointing for regional states. Broadly speaking, the balance of power between the US and China ensured a degree of stability and predictability in Indo-Pacific affairs. India, too, appeared comfortable with this equilibrium—balancing China by leaning towards the US, even as maintaining close ties with other Indo-Pacific states.
When President Donald Trump was re-elected there were expectations from the region that he would leverage American power in a more overt and forceful manner. Demands on Japan and South Korea to pay more for American security guarantees, scrutiny of Aukus commitments made by the previous administration, and trade concessions sought from regional states—though distasteful—were all par for the course. Individually, the Indo-Pacific states re-negotiated their bilateral equations with Washington. However, there was a prevailing assumption that the broader geopolitical framework—anchored in a robust American presence counterbalancing China—would endure. These assumptions are now eroding rapidly.
In October 2025, the RAND Corporation published a study that was subsequently withdrawn following public scrutiny for allegedly reflecting the Trump administration’s strategic thinking. The gist of the report was to recommend that Washington retrench its security presence in the Indo-Pacific by reaching a new modus vivendi with Beijing—one premised on accepting the Chinese Communist Party’s political legitimacy and agreeing on shared organising principles for global politics. It suggests a radical departure from established US policy in many ways.
First, it removed the ideological element from the US’s China policy; communism was no longer to be unfavourably contrasted with American democracy. Second, it proposed a reordering of global politics with China. Finally, it argued that reducing America’s Indo-Pacific footprint would yield better outcomes than persisting on the path of ‘late-imperial exhaustion’. The subsequent release of the National Security Strategy in November, followed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s press conference in December, confirmed suspicions that the RAND report functioned as a blueprint for a new American strategy—one rooted in the concept of ‘spheres of influence’.
The ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine spells out the domination of the western hemisphere as America’s priority—a far cry from the claim of former secretary of state Madeleine Albright that the US was globally the ‘indispensable nation’. It has subsequently demonstrated this in practice in Venezuela in the first week of 2026. A narrower definition of core interests also implies a less ideological foreign policy, based on the assumption that the US no longer possesses the capacity to dominate everywhere.
Rubio’s remarks—describing China as a wealthy and powerful country, and the Communist Party as a geopolitical actor with whom the US can work together—reflect this recalibration. The logic of spheres of influence suggests a willingness to regard China as an equal power. History will recall that in 1878, the British empire and its European allies sought to similarly accommodate a fast-rising Germany through arrangements formalised as the Congress of Berlin. Thirty-six years later, in 1914, the world went to war.
The Indo-Pacific states are rightly concerned about whether the US might seek an accommodation with China that permits Beijing greater freedom of action in the region in return for continued access and influence, and what this could mean for regional geopolitics in the near to medium term.
The Trump administration insists that engagement with China will not undermine its regional partnerships. Yet, in reality, both the Quad and Aukus have been weakened. The US decision not to take sides in a Sino-Japanese dispute over Taiwan, and the stagnation in ties with India for reasons unrelated to bilateral relations, have only deepened these doubts.
While Beijing may not immediately respond to Washington’s overtures, China is an opportunistic power that will exploit any opening to expand its regional dominance. Indo-Pacific states should, therefore, anticipate greater Chinese assertiveness and renewed efforts to dilute the influence of balancing powers such as India, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.
From India’s perspective, two things are clear. First, the tilt towards the US has faltered yet again for the second time in two decades. While Indo-US ties remain critical for regional stability, expectations on both sides must be tempered. Second, the Quad may endure, but it is unlikely to generate the trust required for India to enable the US power against China.
India’s Indo-Pacific strategy rests on its self-image as a maritime power with influence stretching from the South China Sea to the Red Sea. Progress in Indo-US ties will remain critical for the region’s growth and security, but expectations on either side about the other’s readiness to go that extra mile, to help secure their interests, must be more realistic. Two, the Quad might yet survive, but it is not likely to engender the kind of trust that allows India to move in the direction of enabling American power to effectively deal with China. Deeper commercial integration with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Australia and the GCC should anchor policy, alongside broader security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region.
India must also prepare for an inevitable Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean by strengthening maritime capabilities, infrastructure and partnerships with key littoral states. Finally, as India recalibrates its foreign and security policy amid Indo-Pacific shifts, sustained public shift will depend on clearer strategic communication that links policy choices to citizens’ everyday concerns.
Gokhale, former foreign secretary of India, is the author of four books on China, including The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India.