TEL AVIV
Is the Middle East entering a new dawn of peace, or is this merely another diplomatic fata morgana—a mirage that often deceives many, even leaders, in the hot and arid lands of this region? The answer remains elusive.
A few days after the fanfare at Sharm el-Sheikh and the Knesset, the most we can hope for is that this might mark another milestone in the ongoing efforts to revive the peace process. Yet, the region has seen far too many failed attempts.
The core challenge lies in the fact that the two key parties—Israel and Hamas—were not present at the signing table in Egypt and remain reluctant to pursue peace unless it aligns strictly with their respective terms. For the Israeli government, this means: no Hamas and no Palestinian state. For Hamas, it means no Israel. The Palestinian National Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank, remains only marginally involved.
Ehud Barak, the last Israeli prime minister to have dealt directly with the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, wrote after Sharm that the October 7 attacks created a critical need to ensure Hamas could never again control Gaza. He criticised Netanyahu’s push for total military victory as unrealistic, drawing parallels to failed US wars. While Israel achieved significant military success, including weakening Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, it came at a high cost. Controversial government rhetoric and actions in Gaza have led to accusations of war crimes, growing international isolation and rising antisemitism. Israel now faces boycotts and widespread global criticism. “A wave of hostility towards Israel has risen among the younger generation worldwide, along with doubts among young Jews,” says Barak. “The recklessness of Netanyahu's government has left a stain on Israel’s image that will be difficult to erase, even over a generation. For the first time since its establishment, question marks are being raised about the very legitimacy of the State of Israel.”
This is an accurate assessment, highlighting that the only path for Israel to achieve lasting redemption is by genuinely reviving the peace process.
Militarily, Hamas has been indisputably defeated—with ten per cent of Gaza’s population either dead or wounded, more than 80 per cent of structures destroyed or damaged and armed groups roaming the streets, while humanitarian aid arrives slowly. However, diplomatically and politically, Hamas has gained some advantage. Israel now faces international condemnation and the issue of Palestinian statehood has returned to the forefront of the global agenda. Israel is under pressure from nearly every corner of the world and has shifted from being a close ally of the United States to a de facto vassal state.
There are, however, a few positive developments—limited, yet crucial. All surviving hostages are back in Israel, though only a few of the deceased have been returned. Nearly 2,500 Palestinian prisoners have been released from Israeli jails. A ceasefire is in place and humanitarian aid to Gaza has been enhanced.
Yet much of what is happening is an elaborate PR spectacle, starring President Donald J. Trump, with broad international support and copious self-aggrandisement by leaders drowning in flattery.
The road to Sharm el-Sheikh
In late August, the US revoked the visa of President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, preventing him from attending the UN General Assembly debate on Palestinian statehood. Yet, 40 days later, Trump embraced him in Egypt as though he were a long-lost brother. However, Trump conspicuously avoided mentioning the Palestinian state in his many speeches.
The first time Hamas believed the US was genuinely presenting proposals was when they received information indirectly through an Israeli intermediary. The American envoy, Steve Witkoff, relayed the proposals to Hamas via Gershon Baskin, a left-wing Israeli peace activist with longstanding ties to non-terrorist Hamas sympathisers. Hamas distrusted both the US and Netanyahu, but placed surprising faith in Baskin’s word. They told him to tell Witkoff to proceed—and he did.
On September 8, Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner—making a first public appearance—met with Netanyahu’s chief negotiator and adviser, Ron Dermer, in Florida. All three are Floridians. They discussed a proposed 21-point plan, drafted by Kushner and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, with inputs from Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio. Dermer was not enthusiastic but promised to report back.
The next day, September 9, the Israeli Air Force conducted a bombing raid in Doha, Qatar. The apparent goal was to eliminate Hamas’s entire negotiating team. Netanyahu seemed determined to eliminate any chance for peace. Curiously, the bombs missed their targets.
Qatar panicked. Its leaders realised they might become targets themselves—especially amid a major Israeli police investigation into allegations that three of Netanyahu’s top advisers were on the Qatari payroll, with insinuations that Netanyahu himself might be implicated.
Qatar contacted Witkoff and Kushner, whose families maintain extensive business interests in the country. They also reached out to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both Qatar and Turkey are prominent Sunni Islamist actors. Erdogan, a close friend of Trump, saw a strategic opportunity to achieve two goals: to replace Iran’s Shia extremist influence in the region with a Sunni-capitalist bloc led by Turkey and Qatar, and to push Israel into diplomatic and political decline.
Many speculate that Israel would not have dared to strike Qatar without US permission. Yet Netanyahu claimed he acted independently. Trump needed to distance himself from the incident. In response, Turkey and Qatar persuaded 11 other Arab and Muslim nations—including Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country—to present a united front and offer inputs to Trump’s 21-point plan.
The rapid march towards Sharm
September 23: Trump meets with a dozen Arab and Muslim leaders and reaches agreement on the plan.
September 25: Netanyahu arrives at the UN General Assembly. Trump’s envoys meet him over three days and deliver the following instructions: When you arrive at the White House, the president will call the emir of Qatar, and you will make a public video apology. You will also promise that such actions will never happen again. Additionally, you will agree to Trump’s 21-point plan, which includes: no annexation, no settlements in Gaza, Palestinian rule in Gaza, IDF withdrawal, cessation of bombings and immediate release of all hostages.
September 29: Netanyahu arrives at the White House and complies.
October 3: Hamas responds to Trump’s message with a “yes, but...”. Israel perceives this as a rejection. Trump, however, interprets it as full acceptance, marking the beginning of a “final and just peace”. He secures commitments from Qatar and Turkey to keep Hamas in check—and they do. Hamas forgets the “but”.
October 6: Detailed negotiations begin in Sharm el-Sheikh.
October 8: Witkoff and Kushner arrive in Sharm el-Sheikh. Trump authorises direct communication with Hamas. They assure Hamas the US will prevent Israel from renewing hostilities. An agreement of sorts is reached. Israel and Hamas sign and commit to the first phase.
October 10: The signing ceremony is announced, to be hosted by Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
October 12: Trump visits Israel, then proceeds to Egypt. Israel is initially uninvited, then invited, then declines to attend the ceremony marking its own peace with Hamas. Hamas is also absent.
The next steps
More substantial steps are necessary: Hamas must be replaced by an inter-Arab force. A technocratic Palestinian government must be formed, supervised by an international steering committee led by Blair. A new security force must be created, into which Hamas’s heavy weaponry will be transferred, enabling Gaza’s reconstruction to begin. Israel insists on two conditions: No individual from Hamas’s military wing may serve in the new administration and the final withdrawal will only take place once security benchmarks are met.
This scenario is highly optimistic and can only materialise if certain conditions are met: Israel must form a government willing to allow political self-determination for Palestinians, ultimately paving the way for a two-state solution. Hamas must abandon all military ambitions, recognise Israel’s right to exist—as the PLO did in 1988—and renounce terrorism. Additionally, Trump’s resolve must endure; he must not grow frustrated and walk away.
From his sickbed, former President Joe Biden congratulated Trump. Few understand the difficulty of managing Middle Eastern tensions as well as Biden, who has been at it for 50 years in the Senate and the White House. Eighteen months ago, Biden proposed a similar—arguably even better—plan, which was rejected by all parties. Why did they accept it now and not then? Baskin has an explanation: Trump came with a bigger stick—and more carrots.
Now, with both Israel and Hamas having suffered severe setbacks from their closest allies, the same plan is back on the table. Israel has managed to snatch diplomatic and political defeat from the jaws of military victory. Hamas has quadrupled its casualties without securing much in return—except, perhaps, an end to the war. Maybe.
Without a significant shift in hearts and minds across all sides, success remains unlikely. Even if such a change were to occur, the process would still require a generation or two to rebuild trust and foster sustainable peace. Moreover, some of the current leading figures will need to be replaced. At present, there is too much ego, corruption, conflict of interest and the risk of widespread theft and exploitation. Internal politics in many of the countries involved are not conducive to a peace process. The world has become more nationalistic, less liberal. There is also an excessive influence of religion—across all denominations—dictating political realities.
I do not believe that bad actors will voluntarily step aside. Unfortunately, I fear that the Middle East currently lacks the essential foundational assets to launch a meaningful peace process.
However, I have been wrong before—more than once.
The author, a veteran journalist and businessman, was editor-in-chief of the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv.