FEW FIGURES IN modern Bangladesh have evoked as much reverence, and as much suspicion, as Muhammad Yunus. Once the universally celebrated “banker to the poor”, the country’s interim chief adviser finds himself at the fulcrum of a national power struggle. Ten months after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Yunus finds himself steering an unelected regime through overlapping allegiances, foreign pressures and growing internal dissent.
According to insiders, Yunus’s central challenge stems not from a lack of vision—he has outlined reform, justice and elections as the way forward—but from his attempt to balance too many contradictions. At 84, with no formal political base and limited time, he is gambling on his moral authority and international profile to shape Bangladesh’s political future. But the forces he is relying on—student leaders, the Jamaat-e-Islami, former leftist and far-right ideologues within the interim setup and the United States, to some extent—are increasingly at odds with other pressure groups like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the Awami League, military and India.
For Yunus, the forces that are supporting him have been both a platform and a liability. The student leaders, Jamaat and far-right ideologues, for instance, have lent ground support to install the interim government, but their ideological volatility has made him a suspicious face in the international arena. The student leaders of the newly formed National Citizen Party are piggybacking on the interim government to find their feet electorally, because of which Yunus has been accused of being partisan and delaying elections.
On the other hand, Yunus’s relationship with the military, particularly with Bangladesh army chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman, has deteriorated significantly. Multiple plots have been attributed to the strained relation, resulting in the military, the BNP and the Awami League (if it is able to participate in the elections) being on the same page to ensure elections are held on time. India wants early elections, too.
Amid this churn, Yunus’s strategy has been to engage with multiple camps without becoming completely beholden to any of them. “Let’s not think Yunus doesn’t understand anything; he maintains active communication with different groups,” says an insider. “He is a brilliant person... he understands how to run an institution, because he built one of the biggest in this country. And he understands politics as well. Whenever he is making a decision, he mobilises or gets help from each group. But the problem is: everybody thinks Yunus is their card.”
Yunus has been part of a less-read, much less-deciphered chapter in Bangladesh politics. Parallels are being drawn with the ‘minus two’ doctrine, used to exclude Hasina and Khaleda Zia from the political process, and a failed attempt to install him as the caretaker head of state to oversee the 2008 general election. “There is a view that the US has long supported the Nobel laureate, both through civil society networks and diplomatic channels,” says Asif Bin Ali, doctoral researcher at Georgia State University in the US. But the political waters were muddy then and the tenure was short. “Yunus declined and a new caretaker government—led by Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, a former governor of the central bank—was sworn in. The outcome was unexpected for all quarters,” says Ali. The Awami League swept the elections and stayed in power for 15 years.
The remnants of the ‘minus two’ architects are still active and backing Yunus’s interim government, albeit in an ideologically reshaped avatar. This makes both the military establishment and the BNP not trust him completely. Moreover, the state machinery Yunus has unwittingly inherited is also not new. “The state machinery that is still in place was built under Hasina to suppress opposition and rig elections. It will take several reforms before it becomes credible and non-partisan,” says Ali. Till then, there is a fear that the machinery—part autocratic with a propaganda apparatus—can be turned inward to preserve the interim regime against calls for election and accountability.
Therefore, when Yunus says Bangladesh will head to polls in early April 2026, the BNP and other forces are not convinced, suspecting it to be a calculated move to delay the election process further and favour the NCP. In the absence of its archrival Awami League—banned and in exile—the BNP claims to represent the largest percentage of the country’s democratic movement. “The interim government’s credibility hinges on maintaining open communication with three essential pillars: the people, the armed forces and political parties, especially the BNP,” says Dr Ziauddin Hyder, adviser to the chairperson of the BNP and a former World Bank senior official.
Political courtesies have, meanwhile, been maintained by Yunus. He has met Khaleda and inquired about her health since her return to Dhaka. But the lack of transparency and a clear roadmap to implement reforms and hold the election has been fuelling confusion and creating an environment of mistrust, says Hyder. The Consensus Commission, set up to mediate and propose reform measures, is expected to deliver its final charter by mid-July. “Our commitment is to finalise reforms and impress upon all parties to demand elections be held by December,” says Hyder.
India, too, is supporting the BNP and military’s call for early elections. “India wants an election, Yunus wants time,” says an Indian government official.
Political observers in Bangladesh, meanwhile, are analysing the pros and cons of two scenarios. First, an extension of the interim government’s tenure will result in giving more time to the NCP to roll out its electoral plans and capitalise on its projection of “youth-led reforms”, breaking the cycle of a two-party system.
“The NCP will be happy with delayed elections as they are trying to buy some time because the party is still not registered and lacks grassroots support,” says Zillur Rahman, executive director of the Centre for Governance Studies in Dhaka. Sources said the NCP may also seek revision of the voter list and rally to bring down the voter age limit from 18 to 16 years to increase youth participation. This may, in turn, give it more time to explore the possibility of alliances to give the BNP a tough fight. “It is likely that the Jamaat and other Islamic political parties will form an alliance before the election,” says Zillur.
The downside to this scenario is that by sidelining the BNP and empowering far-right groups, Yunus may open the door to far-right resurgence. He is said to be aware of the risk, but the interim government has little room for manoeuvre as it remains dependent on the ground mobilisation capacity of this support base.
Second, if the elections are held earlier, the NCP’s electoral debut can be in jeopardy and while the Awami League may sit it out, it can tacitly allow the BNP to take the reins of power from Yunus. The BNP’s future course is now increasingly centred on Khaleda’s son Tarique Rahman, whose return could mark a significant shift in the electoral narrative and amplify calls for early polls. “His presence would certainly energise the party’s base. If arrangements are made, he could return before the elections,” noted a source.
The meeting between Yunus and Tarique on June 13 in London gains significance as there is growing realisation that both need to be on the same page going forward. “It is not just about election dates, but Professor Yunus needs to hear all political parties to be able to steer Bangladesh out of disarray and deadlock,” said a person familiar with the developments. “To that end, he can’t afford to be a lonely man who is cut off from others”. An understanding between Yunus and Tarique will be welcomed by most quarters in Bangladesh.
The Jamaat, on the other hand, is a survivor and has created enough room for itself to play ball in any court. “The Jamaat is supportive of the students and the Yunus regime, and would not lose any chance to reap electoral dividends, especially after it is back in the electoral fray with its registration as a political party being restored,” said an insider. “But it is also equipped to sit in opposition, if the need arises.” The Jamaat leadership has held meetings with the military, the BNP, and even the US and Chinese representatives.
In either of the scenarios, the road ahead is still riddled with uncertainties. “There will be many constituencies where the BNP will face tough competition from Jamaat-backed candidates, many of whom are local heavyweights with solid grassroots connections,” explains Mohammad Tanvir, political and human rights analyst. Another wild card is the Awami League voter base. If the die-hard Awami supporters simply opt out, their absence will change the dynamics in key constituencies. “Most critically, young voters and swing voters will play a decisive role. Their turnout and preference could tip the scales in unexpected ways,” says Tanvir.
From New Delhi’s perspective, Bangladesh needs a democratic structure and stability, the prolonged absence of which can make it a breeding ground for inimical forces. The urgency can be gauged from the fact that there is considerable worry in security circles over the next steps of Bangladesh’s national security adviser Khalilur Rahman on the passageway for Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh’s Cox Bazaar to Myanmar’s Rakhine state. The past few years have seen a rise in Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh after violence hit Myanmar’s Rakhine state. With the US and the United Nations prompting Dhaka to open a corridor to provide a passage to the Rohingyas, the intertwined strategic interests can no longer be ignored. Any passage, security sources said, cannot rule out the possibility of smuggling of weapons into the conflict region that shares borders with northeastern states like Manipur.
What is also not being ruled out is the direct benefit to extremist groups in Bangladesh from political and security relaxations that come along with a delayed transition of power to an elected regime. “It is true that global actors are watching closely,” says Hyder. “While alignment with international standards is critical, it must be done without compromising domestic priorities.”
Pressure is mounting on Yunus to realise that reforms and elections are inseparable. “Besides the armed forces, political parties, neighbours and international community, it is also the business community and common people who want peace, stability and inclusive elections,” admits Zillur. “We either achieve both, or we risk losing both.”
As Yunus’s balancing act gets frayed, his next moves will define not just his own legacy but the political roadmap of Bangladesh. If he is able to guide the country towards a peaceful transfer of power, he will rise as a stabilising elder, who may be given a golden handshake by the next elected government. But if he is trapped by his own alliances and overtaken by a movement he helped unleash, he may go down as a polarising figure in the most contested period of Bangladesh’s post-1990 history. For now, he has little choice but to brave a growing legitimacy crisis and the international crosswinds to reach the finish line.