AS THE STRIKES on Iran continue, and President Donald Trump issues increasingly restrictive and shifting statements, the United States appears to be operating without a clearly defined endgame. This is particularly striking for a president who, as a candidate, had emphasised avoiding “forever wars” and steering clear of regime change efforts. Yet the current intervention seems to drift between objectives—degrading Iran’s infrastructure, weakening its missile capabilities and signalling broader strategic resolve—without settling on a coherent definition of success.
In the absence of a fixed endpoint, the challenge is not just military, but political: how and when can victory be credibly claimed in a conflict that appears a war of choice rather than necessity, and is opposed also by large sections of Trump’s support base?
What makes the moment more consequential is the degree of American isolation. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 in solidarity with Washington. Even during the Iraq War in 2003, a sizeable coalition—despite disagreements—stood with the US. Today, that pattern has broken. Traditional allies have been notably reluctant to step in, including declining calls to secure the Strait of Hormuz, wary of becoming direct participants in a conflict they neither shaped nor endorsed. The result is a US that looks more solitary than at any comparable moment in recent decades, complicating its ability to frame the intervention as part of a broader international effort.
There is also a tendency to reach for familiar templates when thinking about how such a conflict might end. References to peace arrangements in the Middle East—particularly the Israel-Egypt Camp David Accords of 1978 or the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in 1994—offer a comforting sense of precedent. But these analogies obscure more than they reveal. Both agreements were the products of long-term geopolitical shifts, military exhaustion and changing strategic alignments—Egypt after the 1973 war, and Jordan following the Israel-PLO Oslo Accords of 1993. Egypt’s turn towards the US, for instance, followed the 1973 war and a broader recalibration of its global positioning. Nothing comparable is visible in Iran today. There is little to suggest a willingness to fundamentally alter its posture towards the US or accept Israel’s legitimacy, making any near-term diplomatic breakthrough unlikely. There are also no indications of any forward movement on the Israel-Palestine issue.
If the battlefield offers uncertainty, the domestic arena may prove decisive.
As the US political calendar advances, economic signals—oil prices, inflation and stock market performance—are likely to weigh heavily on decision-making there. While the US is less directly dependent on Gulf oil than countries such as India, China or Japan, it remains exposed to global price movements. Any sustained disruption in supply feeds into higher fuel costs, rising inflation and, potentially, a broader economic slowdown. For American consumers, the effects are immediate; for political leadership, the consequences can be swift. It is here, as much as on the battlefield, that the contours of success or failure may ultimately be judged.
Questions of preparedness further complicate the picture. It had long been anticipated that Iran, if pushed, might seek to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz—a critical artery for global energy flows. Yet the current situation suggests that contingency planning may have been inadequate. The fallout is already visible, with disruptions affecting not only oil-dependent economies but also US-linked infrastructure and investments across the Gulf. For regional partners, this raises uncomfortable questions about the reliability and long-term sustainability of US security guarantees.
There is, inevitably, an echo of earlier conflicts. The early phase of the Iraq war saw the declaration of “mission accomplished”, only for events on the ground to unravel over time, culminating in a costly and protracted disengagement. That experience lingers as a cautionary backdrop. While it would be premature to draw direct parallels, the risk of early claims of success being overtaken by more complex realities cannot be dismissed. The political consequences of such a trajectory, particularly for the US leadership, could be significant.
For countries navigating this evolving landscape, the lessons are clear. For India, in particular, the situation reinforces the importance of strategic autonomy. Deepening economic and technological engagement with the US remains valuable, but recent developments also underline the unpredictability and often coercive nature of US decision-making. Diversification of partnerships—especially with Europe and other major actors—becomes not just prudent, but necessary. In an environment defined by volatility, hedging is not hesitation; it is strategy.
Beyond the immediate conflict, the wider regional picture is becoming harder to read. Much will depend on Iran’s position once the current phase subsides, the economic and military resilience of Israel after prolonged engagement and how Gulf states recalibrate their relationships with both Washington and Tehran. New alignments may emerge, but so, too, might deeper fragmentation. Domestic political pressures across the region could add further layers of complexity.
For now, the only certainty is uncertainty. The conflict may not yet have redrawn maps, but it is already reshaping expectations—about American power, about alliance structures and about the limits of military force in delivering political outcomes.
The author is a former Indian ambassador to the US, France and Israel, and currently a senior fellow at Carnegie India.