The geography of the Siliguri Corridor, called ‘Chicken’s Neck’, is often dismissed as a mere cartographic anomaly. Yet, for those of us who have been at the frontlines wearing the uniform along these flanks, these lines are not abstract; they are lived realities. They pulsate with tension, history and the relentless churn of geopolitics. This narrow passage is not just a transportation artery, but a strategic lifeline, a vulnerability, and now, the very fulcrum upon which great-power ambitions pivot. Thus, the enduring truth remains: geography never retires from geopolitics. The corridor is currently enduring a confluence of simultaneous, multi-directional pressures, transforming it into a strategic theatre demanding a doctrinal transformation.
China’s grand strategy of encirclement
The challenge facing the Siliguri Corridor is layered, encompassing military, demographic, psychological, informational and infrastructural dimensions. It is important to unpack this layering from a threat-vector perspective. A revisionist China is tightening its grip across the Himalayas and the Bay of Bengal, employing a strategy of meticulous, expansive influence—a grandmaster playing patiently and methodically. The Doklam crisis revealed Beijing’s objective: positional advantage. This pursuit manifests in the strategic use of infrastructure, where roads, airstrips and “civilian projects” serve a military shadow function.
The concern over China’s involvement in redeveloping the Lalmonirhat airfield in Bangladesh—barely a breath away from India’s border—is not a consequence of paranoia but of sound military logic. Lalmonirhat secures a vantage point offering potential intelligence visibility and surveillance reach into India’s Eastern Air Command, which houses some of the Indian Air Force’s most advanced assets, including frontline fighters, missile systems and integrated air-defence grids. A dual-use facility so close to such critical infrastructure is a clear strategic signal. Beijing understands the strategic leverage of the northeast, and it is positioning itself around it.
Pakistan proxies: The incubation of insurgency
While governmental cooperation with Bangladesh has yielded significant security gains, notably the dismantling of insurgent safe havens, a quiet, persistent risk remains—most pertinent being the survival of extremist ecosystems. Having commanded counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations here, I know that extremist modules linked to transnational groups are building ideological depth and logistical staging in this region.
As counter-terror frameworks tightened in the Jammu and Kashmir region, and international scrutiny mounted in the west, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and its proxies recalibrated their strategy eastward. The northeast, once peripheral to their plans, is now seen as fertile ground for ideological grooming. Their operational success has been limited, but intent matters, and intentions are the earliest warning signs of future confrontation. These are not isolated actors. They are patient, structured networks building the ideological and logistical ligatures that can be activated when geopolitical conditions favour a larger confrontation.
The United States: A partner and an unpredictable variable
The US views the Bay of Bengal through the lens of its broader Indo-Pacific contest, creating a complex dynamic with India. Washington’s recent diplomatic signalling, including pressuring Bangladesh while simultaneously warming up to Pakistan, suggests a worrying resurgence of pre-Bush era mandarins in the White House. Reported hobnobbing of US agencies with strange bedfellows like the Jamaat in Dhaka, as the much-touted election approaches, is indicative of preparation for cosying up to any kind of regime post-election. These officials historically viewed Pakistan as the primary regional partner, relegating India to a mere balancing weight.
Furthermore, the US’s long-standing aspiration for access to St John’s Island, a critical node for monitoring the eastern Indian Ocean, reveals a core divergence in strategic imperatives. While Washington seeks an enduring forward presence to project power and contain rivals, this ambition often runs parallel to, yet risks undermining, the regional stability that is New Delhi’s immediate focus. Navigating this gap requires disciplined diplomacy, ensuring alignment without subordination.
From vulnerability to deterrence: India’s transformation
Critics often characterise the Siliguri Corridor as India’s “Achilles’ heel”. However, no nation is without its chokepoints or strategic dependencies. If Siliguri is India’s vulnerability, the world’s most crucial commercial artery—the Malacca Strait—is a single point of failure for numerous global economies. India, through the Andaman and Nicobar Command, sits as its sentinel. This perspective is vital. While defending the northeast and monitoring adversarial actors, one eye must always remain fixed on the Andaman and Nicobar region, as maritime events inevitably shape the land.
The doctrinal shift
India’s recent military realignments reflect a crucial doctrinal transition. The establishment of new garrisons at Dhubri, Kishanganj and Chapra represents more than a scaling-up of troop presence; it is a fundamental shift in strategic mindset. For years, the corridor was a weakness to be shielded. Today, the combined force of the Trishakti Corps, integrated air assets, and missile systems signals a shift from vulnerability management to area denial and deterrence. The corridor is now a fortified chokepoint capable of imposing costs swiftly and disproportionately.
However, military might alone is insufficient. Infrastructure is the hidden force multiplier. Logistical fragility—from landslides in Dima Hasao to flooding along the Lumding–Silchar line—can cripple strategy. Projects like the Shillong–Silchar Greenfield Expressway and multimodal corridors are not development gimmicks; they are strategic insulation. The singular corridor becomes resilient only when it is transformed into a network of options.
People as the vanguard
Having been deeply involved in counter-radicalisation work in Assam, I can attest that in these complex border regions, trust is a currency more important than surveillance. Community cooperation is the most effective early-warning tool. The emotional and ideological vacuums that extremist actors exploit are reduced by the state’s responsiveness, fair dispute resolution, inclusive governance and empathetic policing.
To truly insulate the Siliguri Corridor and the northeast, India’s response must move beyond conventional defence into a bold new phase of strategic resilience—a phase where realpolitik is at the fore of infrastructure and foreign-policy decisions.
The singular vulnerability of the current rail and road network should be eliminated. Infrastructure is the hidden force multiplier. India must urgently explore and accelerate alternate railway connectivity through Bhutan and Nepal. These mountainous alignments, while challenging, offer pathways that bypass the most exposed and easily interdicted sections of the current corridor. Furthermore, the idea of a strategic underpass or tunnel to the northeast must be moved from concept to a mission-mode project. This would offer a hardened, all-weather and strategically secured route, shielded from both kinetic and non-kinetic interdiction efforts.
Additionally, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project offers a crucial land–sea route, bypassing Bangladesh entirely and linking Mizoram to the Bay of Bengal via Sittwe Port in Myanmar. This project, which has faced chronic delays, must be completed, and its connecting road network inside Myanmar finished on priority. This requires dealing with all parties concerned in the region, including non-state actors, to secure the safety of the corridor. If India’s much-vaunted normative behaviour needs to be temporarily sacrificed at the altar of realpolitik to achieve this vital security objective, then so be it. Strategic necessity must trump ideological purity at this point.
India also holds leverage over its neighbours, which could be exploited. Given the current geopolitical climate, New Delhi could remind Dhaka that its provocations, or tolerance of adversarial influence, could be returned in kind, as Bangladesh has its own vulnerabilities across states like Tripura and Meghalaya. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma recently highlighted a much-needed reminder in this context. Some judicious military flexing or posturing across these points of vulnerability could also be explored to provide a necessary “wake-up call” to the government in Dhaka regarding the sanctity of India’s security red lines.
The corridor reimagined
For decades, we feared the Siliguri Corridor as the point where India could be severed. With foresight, discipline and strategic coherence, this fear can be inverted. The corridor can evolve from a chokepoint into a strategic launchpad, linking India not just to its northeast, but dynamically to southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. The strength of a corridor is defined not by its width on a map, but by the strength of the nation that guards it.
The author is a former DGP of Assam and currently the general secretary of the think tank, Society to Harmonise Aspirations for Responsible Engagement—SHARE.