As if straining to remain relevant, outgoing interim adviser Muhammad Yunus, in his parting flourish, felt compelled to sketch a grand vision of “growth opportunities arising from regional connectivity.” Without daring to name India, he floated the idea of a sub-regional economic framework Bangladesh’s maritime access linking Nepal, Bhutan, and the so-called “Seven Sisters.” In his outgoing speech, Yunus declared that Bangladesh could reinvent itself as the central hub, the indispensable bridge between landlocked neighbours and global markets; that the country’s open sea was “not merely a geographical boundary; it is a gateway to the global economy.”
The timing, of course, was exquisite. On the very day, India and other neighbours were preoccupied with the formation of Bangladesh’s new government, led by the young son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and BNP Chairman Tarique Rahman, Mohammed Yunus chose to lob this unsolicited “vision.” His suggestion of independently connecting with India’s northeastern states, sidestepping sovereignty altogether, was enough to divert New Delhi’s gaze from Dhaka’s political transition. Instead of celebrating the generational shift in Bangladesh’s leadership, India found itself distracted by Yunus’s shadow play masquerading as an exit speech, but really just a last attempt to stay in the headlines.
His pointed reference to India’s northeastern states collectively known as the “Seven Sisters” while conspicuously omitting any direct mention of India itself, was a calculated act of strategic messaging, designed to project defiance and in doing so, inviting controversy.
This was not Yunus’s first foray into divisive posturing. Last year during his four-day visit to China in March, where Yunus met with Chinese President Xi Jinping he made similar controversial remarks. Referring to India’s northeastern states as “landlocked,” he cast Bangladesh as the “guardian of the ocean” for the region. His words were strikingly blunt: “Seven states of India, eastern part of India, called seven sisters... they are landlocked country, landlocked region of India. They have no way to reach out to the ocean. We are the only guardian of the ocean for all this region. So this opens up a huge possibility. So this could be an extension of the Chinese economy. Build things, produce things, market things, bring things to China, bring it out to the whole rest of the world.”
But both times Yunus’s rhetoric, couched in grand visions of connectivity, carry undertones of provocation, aimed at unsettling regional balances, especially effective as India seeks to refine relations with the newly elected BNP government. Yunus's statements about India’s ‘seven sisters’ not only undermines India's territorial integrity but also invite geopolitical concerns, as it positions Bangladesh as a potential intermediary for Chinese influence in the region, and is an attempt to align with Beijing’s strategic narrative.
In an earlier interview, former Indian diplomat Deepak Vohra bluntly branded Yunus the “duffer of Dhaka”, a label that others have echoed with their own variations, calling him Muhammad “useless” Khan. To many, his rise was no accident but the result of American engineering. There remains plausible speculation that Yunus was foisted upon the people of Bangladesh by Washington, eager to install a pliant figure. The logic was simple: America’s foremost adversary is China, and Hasina herself had claimed before her ouster that US officials pressed her to hand over St. Martin’s Island, a strategic outpost from which they could monitor Beijing and potentially establish a military base. Her refusal, she argued, sealed her fate. Yunus, brought in as the supposed American puppet, was expected to serve US interests. Yet once in power, Yunus veered off-script. He began courting Beijing, indulging in talk of connectivity with China, while simultaneously dabbling with radical, terror-linked Islamist factions domestically. Far from the neutral caretaker he was meant to be, Yunus chose sides provoking instability at home and suspicion abroad. With India, Yunus managed to drive relations to their lowest point in years.
In a parallel bid to mend ties with Pakistan, he fared no better. When the Pakistani foreign secretary visited Dhaka, the smiles and handshakes quickly gave way to hard demands: Bangladesh insisted on $4.5 billion, claiming it as its rightful share of undivided Pakistan’s pre-1971 assets, aid money, provident fund savings, and other instruments. His interim government then pressed Islamabad for a public apology for the anti-Bengali genocide of 1971, a stark reminder that Bangladesh has not overcome the trauma of its bloody birth.
Yunus’s gestures, meant to project statesmanship, instead underscore lack of diplomatic sensitivity in regional geopolitics.
In his February 16 exit speech, Yunus also sought to cast his tenure in triumphant terms, insisting that his administration had restored three pillars of Bangladesh’s foreign engagement – “sovereignty, national interests, and dignity.” The claim, however, rings hollow. His tenure was marred by allegations of stifling democracy and the legalisation of radical parties, leaving the nation’s political landscape volatile and deeply unsettled. Yunus had promised a government of reform, yet his leadership was defined instead by chaos, violence, and mismanagement. Behind the polished rhetoric of renewal lay a harsher reality: an administration failing to uphold its duties, plagued by extremism, communal unrest, and economic decline. Throughout 2025, Yunus faced mounting criticism within the interim government for repeatedly postponing elections. It was only under relentless pressure political parties uniting against his rule and demanding polls by December that he finally conceded to elections in 2026, more than 18 months after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s elected government.
Save for the few thousand jihadi sympathisers who still rally behind him, Yunus’s departure is sure to bring relief to the majority of Bangladeshis. And without naming any country, Yunus's departure is welcomed by Bangladesh’s neighbours.
The author is a strategic and economic affairs analyst.