Pakistan once again finds itself at the centre of a geopolitical moment it did not create, cannot control, yet is determined to leverage. Its projected role in ongoing US-Iran engagement is that of a facilitator. In reality, it is closer to a courier–useful, positioned, but ultimately constrained by forces far larger than itself. This is not diplomacy driven by strength; it is relevance manufactured out of necessity.
For decades, Pakistan has perfected the art of monetising geography. From Cold War alignments with Washington to its frontline status in the post-9/11 order, it has consistently extracted strategic rent from superpowers. That model, however, is now under strain. The external environment is more complex, the internal situation more fragile and the old playbook less reliable.
At the core of Pakistan’s predicament lies a deeply entrenched power structure, a hybrid of military dominance, feudal economics, and ideological signaling. This “fanatic fauji feudal class in fancy suits” is not merely rhetorical flourish; it is the organising principle of the Pakistani state. It thrives on controlled instability. Crisis, whether with neighbours, within borders, or across regions, becomes a tool to justify its centrality.
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As you have argued in the past “Pakistan today faces not just a political or economic crisis, but a deeper existential one. Its ideological foundations are crumbling, its governance model is unsustainable, and its strategic doctrine is outdated.”
This is the core of the problem. Pakistan is no longer merely navigating crises, it is being defined by them.
This elite has long prioritised regime preservation over national transformation. The consequences are stark: A hollowed-out economy, weak civilian institutions, and a polity oscillating between populism and coercion. Pakistan’s recurring balance-of-payments crises and dependence on external bailouts are not episodic, they are structural. And they sharply limit Islamabad’s strategic autonomy.
Yet Pakistan continues to tilt toward the United States, not out of ideological affinity but transactional compulsion. Financial lifelines, military cooperation and diplomatic backing remain essential. This alignment, however, yields diminishing returns as Washington recalibrates its regional priorities and struggles with credibility deficits, particularly in its dealings with Iran. The collapse in February this year of indirect negotiations mediated by Oman, reportedly near a breakthrough, underscores the volatility and mistrust that define US-Iran engagement.
Pakistan’s challenge is that it cannot afford to be seen as fully aligned against Iran. Geography imposes realism. A long and sensitive border, overlapping ethnic dynamics in Balochistan, and the risk of sectarian spillover constrain Islamabad’s options. While Pakistan is a Sunni-majority state with deep ties to Saudi Arabia, reducing its Iran policy to sectarian binaries misses the point. States act on layered interests, not singular identities.
That said, sectarian undercurrents do amplify strategic anxieties. Iran’s regional influence and ideological posture create unease within Pakistan’s security establishment. But the deeper issue is proximity combined with asymmetry, Iran is larger, resource-rich and assertive.
The nuclear dimension adds another layer of complexity. Pakistan remains the only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state, a status that carries symbolic prestige and strategic weight. While its doctrine is India-centric, the idea of another Islamic state approaching nuclear capability introduces a subtle recalibration in long-term threat perception.
Compounding these pressures are Pakistan’s commitments to the Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia. The 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement formalised decades of military cooperation and introduced a collective security clause, where an attack on one is treated as an attack on both. Yet, I have stated earlier, “the Saudi–Pakistan defence alignment is neither anti-Israel nor anti-Iran, nor does it represent a unified Islamic military alliance.”
This is a critical distinction often lost in popular narratives. The pact is less about unity and more about hedging, Saudi Arabia seeking diversification amid doubts about US guarantees and Pakistan seeking financial relief and strategic relevance.
Indeed, even Pakistani officials have framed the agreement as defensive rather than directed at any specific adversary, underscoring its ambiguity and limits.
The region itself is no longer defined by rigid blocs. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement, facilitated by China, led to the resumption of diplomatic ties in August 2023 after a gap of seven years and opened avenues for dialogue even as underlying rivalries persist. Similarly, Qatar’s pragmatic engagement with Tehran, anchored in their shared stake in the South Pars/North Dome Gas Field, illustrates how economic interdependence can override ideological divides.
Pakistan, however, struggles to operate with such clarity of interest. Its external policies are often reactive, shaped by immediate pressures rather than long-term strategy.
Its relations with immediate neighbours reinforce this pattern. With India, ties remain defined by mistrust, periodic crises, and an unresolved territorial dispute that continues to dominate Pakistan’s security doctrine. This fixation has imposed enormous economic and political costs, diverting attention from internal reform while perpetuating a security-centric narrative.
To the west, Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan is equally fraught. Despite years of influence, Islamabad now faces a regime in Kabul that is less pliable and increasingly assertive. Cross-border militancy, tensions over the Durand Line and the resurgence of non-state actors have exposed the limits of Pakistan’s long-standing “strategic depth” doctrine.
Then there is China. Much has been said about Beijing’s investment in Pakistan, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. But China’s approach is not sentimental, it is strategic hedging. It has deepened ties simultaneously with Iran and the Gulf, diversifying risk rather than committing exclusively to Islamabad.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s role in US-Iran dynamics appears less like strategic agency and more like constrained participation. It can facilitate communication and provide channels, but it cannot shape outcomes in any decisive way.
And yet, Pakistan will continue to project indispensability. Visibility on the global stage compensates for fragility at home. Acting as an intermediary offers relevance and the possibility, however limited, of extracting concessions.
But there is a deeper contradiction. A state cannot indefinitely project external importance while neglecting internal coherence. The “fanatic fauji feudal class in fancy suits” may sustain its dominance through cycles of crisis, but it cannot build a stable, prosperous, and credible nation.
The world is changing. Power is diffusing, alliances are fluid and economic resilience is increasingly the foundation of strategic influence. Pakistan’s traditional model, leveraging geography while deferring reform, faces diminishing returns.
The real question is not whether Pakistan can navigate current geopolitical tensions. It is whether it can confront the structural realities that constrain its choices.
Until it does, it will remain what it has long been: strategically visible, tactically useful, but fundamentally adrift.
The author is the Executive Director of the Delhi Forum for Strategic Studies (DFSS) and a geopolitical analyst with over three decades of experience in international business, strategic affairs, and Track 2 diplomacy across West Asia, Central Asia, and Eurasia.