A Mediterranean power’! This is how some depict the Islamic Republic. There is no geographic proximity between Iran and the Mediterranean, and Iranians would have to cross at least two sovereign states—Iraq and Syria—before reaching the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. However, such a big and dangerous claim reflects not only Iran’s political ambitions but also its strong presence in Lebanon, a Mediterranean littoral state, through its proxy, Hezbollah, the Party of God.
Experts and specialists alike conveniently ignore the deep-seated dichotomy and the contest between the Shia militant group and the Lebanese state. Yes, the Shia militant group was formed with the political and ideological support of the Islamic Republic as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. For nearly two decades, Hezbollah has been at the forefront of the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli occupation, and the unilateral Israeli withdrawal of May 2000 was a victory of Hezbollah. When even Arab countries could not reverse the Israeli occupation, the militant group emerged as a role model, especially for the Palestinians.
The Islamic Republic, which is instrumental in the formation, consolidation, and solidification of Hizballah, has benefited from the resistance label and has used it to advance its regional interests. Hezbollah thus serves as the pivot of Iran's Mediterranean ambitions. As the prime voice of Lebanon's Shia community, the militant group has consolidated its influence through electoral politics and alliances and has become a political force independent of the Lebanese state and its policies.
What is conveniently forgotten in the victory narrative is that the Israeli withdrawal removed the raison d'être for the resistance tag. Much to the discomfort of several states and non-state actors in the region, the UN has recognised that the Israeli action fulfilled the withdrawal demand in UNSC Resolution 425. Still, even after Israel pulled out of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah and its supporters continue to view the militant group as a force of resistance.
Thus, Hezbollah became immune to the key demand of the 1989 Taif Accord, which ended the 15-year Lebanese civil war: the disarmament of all militant groups in the country. The militant group was not ready to relinquish the ‘resistance tag’ after 2000 and pursued an Iran-directed policy vis-à-vis Israel, which contributed to periodic retaliation and violence. Weakened by the civil war, consociationalism, and periodic external interference, the Lebanese state lacked the political will and military capacity to disarm Hizballah. Thus, the militant group became an Iranian proxy, furthering Iranian interests rather than Lebanon’s national interests.
In recent years, Israeli strategy vis-à-vis Iranian proxies has changed fundamentally. For a long time, it focused on fighting Hezbollah and, of late, the Houthis of Yemen. Its operations against these groups gave Israel only a limited breather before the next round. Hence, rather than confining itself to fighting the proxies, it sought to go after their patron directly. This manifested in last year's 12-day war and in the current violence that began on 28 February. From a military standpoint, downgrading the larger patron's capacity is preferable to fighting the smaller, dependent proxies.
At the same time, Iran was able to use Hezbollah more effectively by capitalising on the latter’s geographic proximity vis-à-vis Israel. Tied down to multiple fronts—Arab and non-Arab targets—Iran used Hezbollah to strike Israel with lethal effect. Unable to develop an effective strategy against non-state actors, Israel pursued its policy of targeting Lebanese civilian infrastructure in the hope that this would drain support for the militant group.
Contrary to the views of a segment of Middle Eastern scholarship in the country, there is significant disagreement over Hezbollah and its actions. Hezbollah is not Lebanon, and it does not even represent all the Shias of that country. Rather, it represents Iranian interests in Lebanon, which often run counter to Lebanon's national interests. Indeed, amid the war in the Gulf, Lebanon declared Iranian ambassador Mohammad Reza Shibani persona non grata and asked him to leave Lebanon by 29 March for his ‘interference’ in Lebanon's domestic affairs. Tehran openly defied this demand and insisted that he remain at his post. Tehran respects only its own sovereignty, not others’. Can an Arab diplomat be so defiant and remain in Tehran?
For over three decades, all efforts to disarm Hezbollah and domesticate it have failed. Though the Lebanese state still lacks the means to enforce its national demands, popular discontent and anger vis-à-vis the militant group over its role as the agent of an external power have grown. Not just Christians and Sunni Muslims, but also a section of the Lebanese Shia are aware of the disastrous consequences of this Iranian proxy. The fragile Lebanese ceasefire and ongoing diplomatic negotiations in Washington signal a long-held Lebanese yearning: Good or bad, let the Lebanese decide their fate.
The author teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi