The ‘short war’ in the Middle East has now entered its second month. Both sides remain engaged in mutual attacks despite rising financial and human costs, as the world faces recessionary pressures. China has, so far, stayed out of the conflict, only occasionally calling for peace through dialogue. However, Beijing has reached two important conclusions: first, the war has shown the operational limits of the US-led coalition and serious restrictions on its hegemonic reach. Second, Iran seems increasingly isolated and battered, maintaining a fragile control over a shrinking, though still damaging, capacity for retaliation.
China believes that the US President made two early misjudgements: first, that the Venezuela model could be copied, and second, that Iran’s regime would fall quickly through leadership decapitation. The mistake strengthened the regime, helping it solidify power by adopting a measured escalation approach, prolonging the conflict and gradually raising the costs of war. For Trump, the short campaign has become a strategic trap: military strikes yield decreasing benefits, while regime change and a clear exit plan remain out of reach.
Alliance failure has become a major concern as NATO remains distant, showing little interest in helping Washington with the Strait of Hormuz and increasingly refusing overflights and basing support. The Gulf states, despite suffering under Iran, have also stayed away from the offensive. Trump is left in this regional conflict without a broader coalition.
Attrition remains a concern as the US rapidly depletes missiles, rockets, radar systems, personnel, and naval assets, even drawing from inventories in the Indo-Pacific. Iran may attack with relatively inexpensive weapons, but it has suffered severe damage to infrastructure, vital services, institutions, and its defence and industrial sectors. Beijing views Tehran as maintaining its retaliatory ability, showing strong resilience under intense pressure, even though its control over the conflict remains fragile.
Domestically, Trump feels anxious as rising fuel prices, inflation, a financial meltdown, falling approval ratings, and an increasing number of conscientious objectors weaken his political room to manoeuvre. Even his MAGA base is questioning why an America First presidency is stuck in another prolonged Middle Eastern war.
As a result, the gap between the US and Israel has widened. Trump still advocates for a brief conflict, a quick declaration of victory, and a swift withdrawal. Nonetheless, Israel’s goals are much broader, motivated by regime-change ambitions and Netanyahu’s serious domestic issues, even as civilian casualties increase and air-defence interceptor supplies keep running low.
Beijing, therefore, concludes that despite Trump’s unease, Israel still needs America in this war. Trump, then, faces a tough reality: a war he cannot clearly win, cannot suddenly walk away from, and cannot end without seeming defeated. Naturally, Trump seems to be crafting political grounds to shift the blame onto Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth. By publicly stating that Hegseth was a strong supporter of military action and then reiterating that he also opposed ending the war, Trump is subtly associating him with the political blame-shifting strategy.
As the administration’s public face of the war, leading Pentagon briefings, projecting confidence, and justifying the rules of engagement, Hegseth has become closely associated with the conflict itself. His personal loyalty to Trump, limited influence within the Pentagon, and clear expendability make Hegseth, in Beijing’s view, the likely scapegoat if the war deteriorates and the administration seeks political cover before the midterms.
Chinese analysts further describe the ongoing diplomatic effort as both a fight and a talk. Washington’s 10-day pause in attacks on Iranian energy facilities, which lasts until April 6, and the 15-point proposal sent through Islamabad, have not built confidence in Tehran. Instead, Iran sees the pause as a tactical break for the US to strengthen its military power, solidify its regional position, and lower oil prices to protect US markets.
Iran prefers a credible agreement to end future military actions, maintain its missile capabilities, secure compensation for wartime losses, and keep leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Mistrust and mismatched expectations have continued missile and bomb attacks despite ongoing negotiations, shipping through Hormuz remains disrupted, and the global economy remains vulnerable to escalation risks.
Beijing notes that Washington mainly focuses on achieving a temporary ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while Tehran aims for a credible and lasting agreement. This difference in end goals continues to hinder the peace process. The Gulf states, for their part, remain deeply uncertain about Iran’s future actions and the trustworthiness of ongoing US security guarantees. Other major powers have stayed on the sidelines, weakening the process’s credibility and diplomatic influence. Unsurprisingly, diplomacy has not replaced war; instead, it has become another tool within it.
This war now indicates more mutual strategic exhaustion than a decisive victory. Neither side can accept defeat, but both face increasing limits on what they can sustain. A ground war still seems unlikely: Iran’s large size, population, and mountainous terrain make it a much tougher battlefield than Iraq, while current coalition troop numbers are clearly not enough. Even small-scale seizures of Gulf islands or energy infrastructure would require costly reinforcements and put a deeper quagmire at risk. Beijing’s view is that Trump cannot afford either escalation or an undignified exit. The only practical option is gradual de-escalation: reducing violence, restoring Hormuz traffic, and maintaining a fragile peace based on uneasy deterrence.
(The author is a fellow-National Security and China Studies with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.)