In the current conflict in the Middle East, the Gulf nations appear better prepared; however, still not fully insulated from escalation. The conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States has already spilt into Gulf airspace, ports, bases and commercial shipping lanes. The Strait of Hormuz has again become the strategic centre of gravity for both regional security and the global energy market. At the same time, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has formally reiterated that the security of its member states is “indivisible.”
The Gulf defence preparedness at present is strongest in terms of air and missile defence. The Gulf countries have strategised a ‘layered security architecture’ built around American Patriot and THAAD missile defence systems, early-warning networks, and combat aircraft. Besides this, the Gulf states also follow close operational links with the United States and other Western partners. Saudi Arabia, in 2025, officially launched its first THAAD missile-defence unit. Further, in January 2026, Washington approved a $9 billion sale of additional Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement interceptors, along with a $3 billion F-15 maintenance package. These steps clearly indicate that Riyadh is not only trying to absorb the current hostilities but also to sustain a longer defensive posture.
At the broader regional level, there is also evidence of material readiness backed by fiscal capacity. SIPRI estimates that military expenditure in the Middle East reached $243 billion in 2024, with an increase of almost 15 per cent from 2023, with Saudi Arabia alone spending an estimated $80.3 billion on defence equipment, the largest total in the region. Even though it does not automatically translate into combat effectiveness, it still indicates that Gulf states entered this crisis with substantial procurement depth, advanced inventories and the financial ability to replenish key systems. Pragmatically, this means that Gulf preparedness is not only about existing air defence systems, but also about the financial capacity for sustaining and integrating them under pressure.
However, at the same time, this defence preparedness is uneven across domains. Air defence modernisation has advanced more rapidly than the creation of a genuinely unified Gulf command-and-control system. The GCC has time and again reiterated about collective defence, but the operational integration remains inadequate and political differences among member states still complicate the development of a seamless “Gulf shield.” Still, it cannot be ignored that the Gulf region is more coordinated than before, but not yet fully interoperable in the way a single integrated alliance would be.
Another concerning area is the maritime and energy security preparedness, where the situation is more complex. The Gulf monarchies understand that their vulnerability is not limited to direct military strikes, but it also includes attacks on tankers, offshore infrastructure, ports, oil and gas infrastructure and aviation hubs. The energy stakes are enormous. In 2025, about 20 million barrels of oil passed daily through the Strait of Hormuz, roughly 25 percent of global oil trade. Around one-fifth of global LNG trade also moved through it. In early 2025, these flows represented over a quarter of oil trade through the maritime domain and global oil consumption, highlighting Qatar’s LNG vulnerability. Saudi Arabia and the UAE still have limited bypass capacity through pipelines to the Red Sea and Fujairah; however, the alternative route capacity is only about 1.5 to 1.8 million barrels per day, far below normal Hormuz volumes.
This means Gulf preparedness in maritime terms is defensive but not transformative. It can mitigate disruption, not eliminate it. Further, GCC states are expanding maritime interconnectivity and participating in coalitions across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, which is important because the maritime challenge is no longer simply naval escort, but it includes defensive options for attacks through drones, anti-ship missiles, sabotage, insurance shocks and logistics disruption. Gulf states are increasingly alert to this wider security ecosystem, but the crisis shows that shipping lanes remain intrinsically hard to defend.
Also, the Gulf states have become more sophisticated in resilience and continuity planning. Recent reporting indicates that airports, oil zones and urban infrastructure have all come under stress, yet state systems have continued functioning. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, in particular, have learned from earlier attacks on their oil installations and urban targets. Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait have also had to adapt quickly because they host key military and logistical nodes. So, it seems that the Gulf states are not depending on deterrence alone but are also planning for continuity under attack.
Even so, the central limitation is sustainability. Missile defence is expensive, interceptor stocks are finite, and cheap drones can impose disproportionate costs on defenders. Gulf demand for air-defence, anti-drone and low-cost interceptor drone technologies show that regional actors are already looking for economical solutions beyond traditional high-end missile interceptors. This indicates that Gulf defence establishments are adapting to the economics of contemporary warfare and whether states can sustain those systems against repeated, low cost saturation threats.
In all, the Gulf states are trying to balance deterrence with strategic restraint as they do not intend a prolonged regional war, even though direct attacks on their territory have hardened their threat perceptions. Their posture reflects guarded alignment. They are strengthening defence ties with partners, especially the United States, while prioritising de-escalation, sovereignty, and regional stability. So, defence preparedness in the Gulf region is therefore not only military but also political, economic, and diplomatic.
The Gulf nations are reasonably adequately prepared for a limited-to-medium-duration crisis, especially in air defence, infrastructure protection and crisis coordination. They are less well prepared for a longer high intensity regional conflict. Their strongest assets are monetary strength, advanced imported systems, security architecture, and increasingly experienced crisis management. The Gulf states are more resilient than before, but the present crisis shows they are still secure only to the extent that regional escalation remains constrained.
The author is an Assistant Professor at Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Amity University, NOIDA.