Following a full day of suspense on Sunday, Iran confirmed the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. While succession in the Middle East always draws fascination, in Iran’s context, it’s helpful to focus on ‘how’ and ‘what’ drives succession before asking ‘who’ would be the successor.
Constitutionally, Article 111 describes the modalities, starting with the creation of an Interim Leadership Council comprising the President (now, Masoud Pezeshkian), the Judiciary Chief (Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje‘i), and a senior jurist from the Guardian Council (Alireza Arafi). The 88-member Assembly of Experts then elects a successor who must be a notable jurist and a supporter of the velayat-e faqih doctrine.
Yet, there is often a gap between the written word and actual practice. Take the 1989 succession, where the constitution criteria disqualified many potential candidates. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, friend and confidant of Khamenei, emerged as the kingmaker. First, Rafsanjani reported a personal conversation with Khomeini where the latter expressed his preference for Khamenei as his successor. Second, Khamenei was elevated from the rank of Hojjat al-Islam (mid-level cleric) to that of Ayatollah overnight. Third, the constitutional amendment was introduced to reduce earlier requirements. Thus, while broad constitutional parameters may guide the current process, its outcome will likely bepersonally and informally driven.
When it comes to ‘what factors’ would drive the process, the current context is radically different. Amidst the ongoing war, massive domestic turmoil, economic woes, and fraying social fabric, regime survival has emerged as the paramount concern. While the successor would be required to galvanise the dismayed Iranians, a far more critical factor will be his ability to keep the armed forces (IRGC, Artesh, and FARAJA)firmly on the regime’s side. Even though there are already reports of desertion, the scale remains inconsequential. Khamenei’s iron-handed governance, solidified through decades of patronage, kept the military loyal, but the new Leader would have to step into those shoes quickly because without the military, there is no regime survival.
The third critical factor concerns how the successor remains rigid enough to ensure the regime’s long-term survival while also being flexible enough to address the current existential crisis. In other words, the regime requires a figure capable of steering a wartime and post-war Iran. Fourth, the Leader must be intimately familiar with and accepted by the clerical establishment in Qom. This does not necessarily demand impeccable clerical credentials, but rather a shrewd aptitude for internal court politics. Although there would be a question of broader Shia acceptance outside Iran, especially in the context of Najaf (Iraq), the emotional mobilisation following Khamenei’s death will likely override such initial challenges.
And finally, on the question of ‘who’ will emerge as the Leader, one must understand that unpredictability induced by the ongoing war has complicated an already opaque Iranian system, making predictions exceptionally difficult. While there are various contenders, it’s best to view them through a hierarchical lens. The first tier comprises ideological loyalists and strategic picks.
Alireza Arafi fits the mould as a second-generation hardliner who speaks English, is tech-savvy, and has the right family background. Currently, in his late 60s, Arafi previously served as President of Al-Mustafa International University, which Khamenei founded to export the regime’s ideology intellectually. He has headed the composite network of Iranian seminaries worldwide (since 2016), has been a member of the Assembly of Experts (since 2021), and the Guardian Council (since 2019). Although he lacks an independent political base, he is well-acquainted with the IRGC and the security establishment. His lack of popularsupport may limit his chances, but this weakness might work to his advantage.
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje‘i is another member of the Interim Council, and among the three individuals Khamenei reportedly shortlisted as his successor (alongside Hassan Khomeini and Ali Asghar Hejazi). An old-guard loyalist with deep IRGC ties, Ejei served as minister of intelligence (2005-09) and has headed the judiciary since 2021. Known for his ruthless suppression of the 2022-24 and 2026 protests, his domestic disapproval would be a critical obstacle if elected.
Due to his inclusion in the leaked list, some observers view Hassan Khomeini as a potential candidate. Though historically sidelined by the regime, his credentials as a moderate and as Khomeini’s grandson may make him a viable choice to help galvanise a fractured public. Yet, as a regime critic, he faces estrangement from the security and clerical establishments.
Mohammad-Mehdi Mirbagheri, a jurist and spiritual figurehead of the ultra-hardliner Paydari Front, represents the opposite extreme. Backed by the IRGC and ideological puritans, his elevation would mean a continued, and perhaps more aggressive, extension of Khamenei’s legacy.
The second tier includes institutional heavyweights with access to security apparatus. Asghar Hejazi, a veteran of the intelligence office in Beit-e Rahbari, is a compelling hardliner but lacks clerical legitimacy and thus is more of a shadow powerbroker. Ahmad Marvi is another cleric who wields economic influence as head of Astan Quds Razavi, one of the largest and wealthiest Shi’i shrines.
While it’s unclear if he survived the recent strikes, Mojtaba Khamenei has long been viewed as the heir apparent. If alive, Mojtaba would be institutionally and ideologically suitable, but his elevation as Leader would provoke fierce backlash and fatally undermine the regime’s credibility, and perhaps its survival.
A third tier comprises recognisable figures lacking cohesive political and clerical support, like Sadeq Larijani (Ali Larijani’s brother), who was once a prominent contender but had fallen out with Khamenei. Dark horses like Mohammad-Reza Modarresi-Yazdi could emerge at the last minute as compromise candidates.
While an ideological hardliner with close ties to the security establishment remains the safest bet, a political compromise in which a Leadership Council emerges (rather than a single successor) is a genuine possibility that would diversify risks and ensure regime survival.
Amidst the ongoing crisis and risk of domestic unrest, the succession can offer the regime a narrow opening. Domestically, the unpopularity of Khamenei and the top brass had become a liability, but a lesser-known successor could gain from a political reset. Externally, despite Trump’s unpredictability, US domestic pressure still favours a deal, and his willingness to speak to new leadership suggests a possible window. But such advantages are conditional, and without a clear shift in vocabulary and approach, any successor mirroring Khamenei will inherit the same constraints and possibly the same fate.
The author teaches at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.