The assassination of Ali Khamenei in a joint US-Israeli operation has plunged the Islamic Republic into its gravest crisis since its establishment in 1979. Khamenei, who fused clerical authority, military power and political control, balanced rival factions through patronage, coercion and ideological discipline for nearly four decades. His sudden removal has shattered that equilibrium.
Rather than a managed transition, succession is unfolding under sustained airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure and amid deep public exhaustion after years of sanctions, repression and economic decline. The question confronting Tehran is no longer simply who will succeed Khamenei, but whether the Islamic Republic in its present form can withstand the shock.
Under Iran’s constitution, the authority to appoint, supervise and theoretically dismiss the Supreme Leader rests with the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member clerical body elected every eight years. The constitution does not fix its size; the Assembly itself determines the number of seats. It began with 82 members in 1982 and has remained at 88 since 2006.
The Guardian Council, a 12-member body acting as ideological gatekeeper, vets candidates for the Assembly. Six members are Islamic jurists appointed directly by the Supreme Leader. The other six are legal experts nominated by the head of the judiciary, himself appointed by the Supreme Leader, and confirmed by parliament. This circular structure has long ensured institutional loyalty to the ruling establishment.
When the office of the Supreme Leader falls vacant, a provisional council assumes temporary charge of the government. It consists of the president, the head of the judiciary and a cleric chosen by the Guardian Council from among its members. The Assembly of Experts then convenes to select a permanent successor, requiring a two-thirds majority. Article 109 of the constitution stipulates that the leader must possess recognised religious scholarship, justice and piety, as well as political acumen and administrative competence. A 1989 constitutional amendment lowered the clerical threshold from Grand Ayatollah to a lesser rank, enabling Khamenei’s own elevation. That precedent now looms large.
Yet the decisive actor is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Even in peacetime, the Guards wield vast economic, political and military influence. In wartime, their leverage expands further. Hardliners within the IRGC can plausibly argue that only a security-first state, armed with sweeping emergency powers, can defend Iran against external assault and internal unrest. Such a shift would tilt the system towards overt military dominance, reducing the clerical establishment to symbolic cover and producing a more openly coercive order.
Reports before Khamenei’s death suggested he had increasingly relied on veteran insider Ali Larijani to coordinate national security affairs, bypassing formal executive channels in favour of regime preservation. That reliance reflected a narrowing circle of trust and a growing securitisation of governance.
The Assembly of Experts could choose a consensus candidate or establish a temporary collective leadership council to project unity. The aim would be to reassure the bureaucracy, the security apparatus and foreign observers that the state remains intact. Such an outcome would prioritise ideological continuity and depend on a tacit bargain between senior clerics and IRGC commanders: stability in exchange for preserving, and perhaps expanding, the Guards’ influence.
Another path would see the IRGC dominate the selection process without formally abolishing clerical rule, turning Iran into a security state draped in religious legitimacy. It could, however, deepen international isolation and intensify domestic resentment, particularly among the anti-regime population.
A final option is the overthrow of the existing order. Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu have openly urged Iranians to challenge the regime. Exiled opposition figures are manoeuvring for relevance. Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah, calls for a secular democratic transition rooted in popular mobilisation. Yet the regime’s security apparatus has historically demonstrated ruthless efficiency in crushing uprisings. A collapse would probably require fractures within the elite, especially between the clerical hierarchy and the IRGC.
Several figures are seen as potential successors.
Mojtaba Khamenei, the late leader’s son, maintains deep ties with the IRGC and the Basij militia and is reputed to wield significant influence behind the scenes. His elevation would raise uncomfortable questions about dynastic succession in a republic born of anti-monarchical revolution. He also lacks senior clerical standing and formal administrative experience.
Alireza Arafi, a senior cleric embedded in both the Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council, represents doctrinal continuity from Qom’s seminary establishment. He is regarded as a safe insider but lacks an independent power base within the security sphere. Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, the judiciary chief and long-time regime loyalist with a security background, could bridge clerical authority and coercive power.
Hassan Khomeini, grandson of Ruhollah Khomeini, could serve as a conciliatory figure if the regime seeks to defuse domestic anger or recalibrate internationally. But his moderate views may alarm hardline clergy. Hashem Hosseini Bushehri, a senior figure within the Assembly’s leadership, is institutionally well placed but politically low profile, a continuity option that may lack authority. Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, by contrast, embodies uncompromising religious conservatism. His ascent would signal a decisive turn towards ideological militancy.
Khamenei’s rule rested on calibrated repression and careful factional balancing. His death has upended that equilibrium. Whether the Islamic Republic adapts, hardens or fractures will depend less on constitutional procedure than on the calculations of men with guns and the clerics who seek to restrain them.