After the first day of the war in the Middle East, predictions range from grim to cautiously optimistic. The joint operations led by Israel under the Operation Roaring Lion and the US’s Epic Fury have come after almost two months of mobilisation in the region. The Iranian response was expansive, targeting Israel as well as the US bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. Though the current situation appears extraordinary, its roots lie in choices made over the course of decades.
From the Iranian standpoint, the war is again likely to be dubbed as “imposed”, much like the war with Iraq (1980-88). The Islamic regime often harkens back to the Mossadegh episode (1953) and even to the Tobacco Revolution (1891-92) to portray the 1979 Revolution as a victory of the Iranian people against foreign intervention and American hegemony in the region. Over time, these historical experiences were institutionalised into a security doctrine that externalises conflict away from Iranian territory by pursuing “strategic depth” rather than direct confrontation.
Iran formalised this philosophy into the “Forward Defence” strategy, which for a long time worked effectively until it was confronted militarily. The Israeli campaign after the October 7 massacre has severely weakened the so-called Axis of Resistance militarily as well as politically to the point that no Islamic country seems inclined to openly support the actions of Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis or even the Iranian regimeitself.
Over the last four decades, the military capability of Iran hasbeen built through heavy investment in missile technology, drones and small-scale explosives like IEDs or rapid deployable artillery solutions like loitering munitions. Coupled with this, the undisclosed nuclear programme has generated latent and manifested fears among Israel, the US and the Arab states. In particular, the Gulf states have viewed Iran with suspicion, given its support for coup attempts and statements by top Iranian leadership challenging the legitimacy of the monarchies. Iran has also sought to foster an utterly antisemitic rhetoric under the political cover of anti-Zionism that has regularly involved genocidal remarks like “wiping Israel off the map.”
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While the development of unconventional military capabilities by Iran was a critical success of its indigenous defence industry, their distribution to its proxies gave Iranian threats and narratives a practical form. In regional perception, capability and behaviour are rarely inseparable. For this reason, the technical threshold for nuclear breakout becomes secondary, given that the programme has been viewed and assessed by regional states in conjunction with Iran’s regional conduct and its non-accommodative statements. Even after the 12 Day War last June, the continued insistence on not giving up enrichment rights tells the Iranian adversaries that strategic intent matters more than technical timeline, no matter the already questionable fatwa on nuclear weapons, whose credibility remains highly contested outside Iran.
Military and political aspects aside, the regime, since 1979, has cultivated the cult of martyrdom under its larger velayat-e faqih doctrine, where the Supreme Leader is the epicentre of the revolutionary expansion. This has enabled Iran to gain ideological legitimacy and a steady rationale for external mobilisation despite economic and diplomatic constraints. The sponsorship and cultivation of proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria were thus not viewed in the region as defensive measures but as instruments of ideological expansion through its constitutionally enshrined policy of the “Export of the Revolution.”
Furthermore, the regime has projected a narrative that exaltedIranian supremacy in the region, as evidenced by statements like Iran controlling ‘four Arab capitals’ or its uninterrupted influence from the ‘Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea’. Such statements have reinforced anxiety among its neighbours, despite post-facto clarifications by Iran that themeasures are defensive. As a result, the regional states (aligned and unaligned with Israel) have consequently shifted from caution about Iranian expansionism to a more explicit willingness to act against what they described as “Shia Crescent.”
While many observers are supportive of the idea that the current situation would become a long-drawn conflict, citing the Iran-Iraq War as an example of Iranian resilience, there are two critical problems with this comparison. First, in the 1980s, the revolutionary regime was nascent with no anti-incumbency or baggage. Public sympathy consolidated behind Ruhollah Khomeini, which is unlikely with the current dispensation. Second, while Saddam Hussein was supported by the West politically and militarily, the Iranian regime now faces a coalition with overwhelming airpower and surveillance superiority. The current Iranian capabilities, especially in dealing with a combined aerial campaign by the US and Israel, are uniquely uneven. In addition, real-time information flows and social media have altered the dynamics of wars to the extent that ideological mobilisation or misdirection of the domestic audience is increasingly difficult. Radical methods from the Iran-Iraq War, like sending children to the battlefield to clear minefields, cannot be used tosacralise sacrifices at that scale.
To the Israelis and Americans, the Iranian posturing and narratives alongside its military capabilities have posed acrisis that they can no longer manage indefinitely. While the US, cognisant of its experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, alongside Trump’s “no new wars” position, is disinclined to deploy ground troops, Israel also has little intention of prolonged territorial engagement. For the Jewish State, the implementation of the Gaza Peace Plan and expansion of the Abraham Accords are a larger foreign policy agenda in the region. Thus, for both, the prolonged conflict is undesirable. In this context, the regime change in Iran appears to be the best-case outcome, while a severely weakened Islamic Republic that many eventually succumb to domestic pressure is a minimally accepted outcome.
All sides are now in a position where de-escalation is difficult because of publicly stated positions, existing fears, and uncertainty about the post-war order. Observers read the first wave of Iranian strikes on Gulf countries as playing into the hands of its adversaries, as the very countries that reportedly prevented Trump from carrying out a strike in January are now condemning and aligning with the US and Israeli war effort. However, there is another way to see this. By prioritising targeting of Gulf states, Iran hopes to raise the regional cost on the first day to achieve early cessation of hostilities while keeping proxies for later stages. Moreover, by not engaging proxy groups in its campaign early on, Iran seeks to project itself as the lone defender against overwhelming adversaries, potentially recreating Hussein’s stand at Karbala in 680 CE.
Domestic support for the US operation is not necessarily bipartisan, but observers have flagged that Trump’s approach could be more calculated, with initial strikes to decapitate hardline leadership, leaving residual leadership to negotiate a deal. In Israel, the opposition in the Knesset and the security establishment have displayed a uniform support. But, in Iran, the situation seems more partisan, as reflected in contested claims on social media, with clips of Iranians celebrating as well as condemning the strikes.
Whether the strikes would lead to regime change or the Islamic regime could withstand a revolution is perhaps not a good question to ask. As the popular quote goes, “All revolutions are impossible until they happen; then they become inevitable.” What remains certain is that the current situation is a reaction to years of the Iranian regime’s proxy strategy, which calcified through indirect interventions and power projections in the Middle East. Effectively, a strategy meant to keep war at bay has invariably returned home.
The author teaches at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.