The Gulf region’s policy today is best understood as a strategy of hedging in a world where power is more distributed, rules are less predictable, and global powers are simultaneously competitive. In the older frame, the Gulf region’s security was primarily rooted in a single external security provider, and Gulf diplomacy largely followed this alignment.
This scenario is still prevalent, but it no longer captures how Gulf states think or act. Hedging has become the tactic through which Gulf states are diversifying partnerships, dependencies and convert economic assets into geopolitical leverage, and preserving autonomy. Different states have different threat perceptions, economic models, and diplomatic priorities. In a unipolar environment, a shared patron can sometimes compensate for internal differences and in a multipolar environment, this differentiation becomes more pronounced.
There are three structural forces that have pushed the region in this direction. Firstly, the global transition towards multipolarity has created uncertainty about the reliability and bandwidth of a single security provider. Gulf states still value Western security cooperation; however, the shift in the external priorities has made these states look for other alternatives for domestic political reasons and sometimes due to competing theatres in the region. In multipolar settings, the alliances are becoming more transactional.
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Secondly, the global economy has moved in ways that expand the manoeuvrings for the Gulf states. Asian markets dominate marginal energy demand and are significantly dependent on Gulf trade and investment flows. At the same time, Gulf sovereign wealth funds, logistics hubs, and financial centres have become consequential instruments of statecraft. When Gulf states are building both inland and digital infrastructure and connectivity, they are not only diversifying their economies, but they are also building geopolitical relevance. The Gulf region presents itself as a commercial and diplomatic crossroads, a platform for capital, energy, and mediation. In multipolar politics, being indispensable is often more useful.
Thirdly, there is a security and technological angle that shapes this hedging. Gulf militaries have deep relations with the Western defence ecosystems, which are difficult to replace. As the hedging by the Gulf states is often asymmetrical, there is the possibility of wider diversification in economic partnerships and diplomatic engagements, but more constrained diversification in core operational security. Also, Gulf states do so in a way that avoids a sudden rupture with the already existing ties.
The easiest way to define contemporary Gulf strategy is that it is a “multi-vector alignment” rather than “realignment.” Gulf states engage the US and European partners for security cooperation and advanced defence capabilities, while simultaneously deepening economic and political linkages with China, sustaining dialogue with Russia, and expanding strategic partnerships with India, Japan, and South Korea. They work according to their national interests while also engaging non-Western platforms to maintain manoeuvrability. The aim is to avoid dependence on any single power.
The contestations in global politics has led the Gulf states to use the existence of alternatives to improve terms with established partners, which might increase the leverage for the Gulf states in negotiations. Hedging, therefore, becomes a form of strategic price discovery wherein the Gulf states test what each partner is willing to provide and calibrate relationships accordingly. Yet hedging requires constant calibration because the costs of miscalculation will increase as rivalries deepen. As rivalry between major powers grows, countries face increasing pressure to limit certain technologies, cut ties with some partners, or openly take sides on sensitive issues. For Gulf capitals, the challenge is their credibility with long-standing security partners and also the credibility with new or rising partners.
The shift is visible in how Gulf capitals manage regional disputes. The Gulf states are now increasingly prioritising de-escalation, power contestations and diplomacy. This indicates the shift from high-risk confrontation to controlled leverage. Mediation, Track II diplomacy, and transactional normalisation have become ways for reducing risk while expanding influence. In a multipolar setting, Gulf states can derive status from being credible actors who can talk to rivals. The Gulf region’s ambition to be a global hub which is open, connected, and investment-friendly must therefore be balanced with a careful screening of strategic sectors and the reputational risks.
Further, hedging is not uniform across the Gulf states. The Gulf region increasingly functions as a region of parallel strategies rather than a single strategic actor. This can be advantageous because it creates multiple diplomatic channels and enables flexible mediation, and it can also intensify the competition amongst Gulf states, especially when connectivity and economic hub status are significant for these states. The relationship between hedging and domestic transformation is crucial. Gulf states’ leaders are pursuing economic diversification, technological upgrading, and global ambitions. These domestic agendas are now shaping foreign policy. Hedging supports the foreign policy objectives by reducing external shocks and widening access.
Finally, hedging by the Gulf states is not a temporary tactic, but it is emerging as a robust grand strategy in an era of contestations. It reflects a moderate assessment that power is dispersed, and autonomy must be built, not assumed. The Gulf region is learning to convert wealth, geography, and connectivity into influence while operating within the constraints of entrenched security architectures and intensifying great power competition. In this context, this has become the most important strategic shift by the Gulf states to move away from dependency. The success of this approach will depend on whether Gulf states can capitalise and continue balancing relationships and whether they can translate multi-vector diplomacy into sustained regional stability rather than episodic tactical advantage.
The author is an assistant professor, Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Amity University, NOIDA.