The United States has formally unveiled the next stage of President Donald Trump’s ambitious attempt to reshape Gaza’s future. Announced by US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff yesterday, Phase II of the administration’s 20-point plan is expected to move the territory beyond a fragile ceasefire towards demilitarisation, technocratic governance and reconstruction. If phase I was about stopping the bleeding through humanitarian aid and the return of living hostages, phase II is about redesigning how Gaza is run.
At the heart of the plan is the establishment of a transitional body known as the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, or NCAG. Designed as a 15-member technocratic Palestinian authority, it is meant to take over civil administration from Hamas without immediately resolving the deeper question of Palestinian statehood. The committee will be led by Ali Shaath, a former Palestinian Authority deputy minister known for his work on industrial zones, signalling an emphasis on economic management rather than revolutionary politics.
The composition of the committee reflects that intent. Its members include figures from Gaza’s private sector and civil society, such as Ayed Abu Ramadan, who heads the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, and Omar Shamali from the Palestine Telecommunications Company. There are also more overtly political choices, including Sami Nasman, a retired Palestinian Authority security officer who has been a vocal critic of Hamas. The list has not been without controversy. Within Israel, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir reportedly objected to Shaath’s past ties to the PA, but the Shin Bet ultimately approved the roster, insisting that none of the members have links to Hamas.
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The NCAG is not meant to operate independently. Oversight will come from a so-called Board of Peace, chaired by Trump himself. On the ground, coordination is expected to fall to Nickolay Mladenov, the former UN Middle East envoy, who will act as the board’s representative in Gaza. Security during the transition is to be provided by an International Stabilisation Force, tasked with training and supporting vetted Palestinian police units. The Palestinian Authority has cautiously endorsed this arrangement, framing it as a step towards restoring “one system, one law, and one legitimate weapon” across both Gaza and the West Bank.
That slogan points to the central and most contentious demand of Phase II: full demilitarisation. The plan calls for the disarmament of all “unauthorised personnel”, a formulation that leaves little doubt that Hamas and other militant groups are the primary targets. Hamas has agreed, at least in principle, to hand over civil governance to a technocratic body, but it has long argued that its weapons are non-negotiable unless and until a Palestinian state is established. Its leaders are currently in Cairo discussing the transition, and while some spokespersons have described the plan as a “positive development”, there is no clear mechanism for enforcing disarmament if the group refuses to comply. Washington has warned that failure to meet these obligations will bring “serious consequences”, though what those might entail remains deliberately vague.
Reconstruction is the other pillar of Phase II, and the scale of the task is daunting. The process is expected to take around three years, assuming the ceasefire holds. Shaath has floated ambitious, and controversial, ideas for dealing with the mountains of rubble left by the war, including pushing debris into the sea to create new land and artificial islands. More immediately, the committee faces the grim reality of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians still living in tents through winter, dependent on aid that remains restricted. Humanitarian agencies warn that despite the ceasefire, Gaza continues to face an acute risk of starvation, compounded by limits on equipment needed to clear debris and rebuild basic infrastructure.
Within Israel, Phase II has also reopened painful domestic arguments, particularly over the fate of Ran Gvili, a 24-year-old police officer whose remains are the last still held by Hamas. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted that Gvili’s return remains a top priority and has described the move to Phase II as largely symbolic, arguing it does not undermine efforts to recover his body. The Hostages and Missing Families Forum strongly disagrees, accusing the government of surrendering vital leverage and condemning Gvili to permanent disappearance. In response, Israel has kept the Rafah border crossing closed, using it as pressure on Hamas.
Mediators such as Egypt, Qatar and Turkey have welcomed the launch of Phase II, hoping it will consolidate the truce and prevent a slide back into war. Yet critics argue that the process is tilted heavily in Israel’s favour and that Palestinian rights risk being obscured by the Trump administration’s peacemaker narrative. Others warn that without a full Israeli withdrawal or a credible path to political resolution, Gaza could drift into a prolonged limbo, neither at war nor at peace.