The Iraqi parliamentary election of 11 November 2025 was not a moment for democratic renewal; rather, it was more of a managed, institutionalised ritual that re-entrenched the dominance of established political patronage networks. For Iraq’s vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities, including Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, Mandaeans, and Feyli Kurds, the electoral process confirmed an overpowering structural injustice: the mechanisms ostensibly designed to guarantee their representation are now the primary instruments for their systemic subordination and political co-option.
This pervasive discontent stems from the perpetuation of the muhasasa ta’ifia (sectarian quota system), an unofficial yet politically mandated arrangement that distributes principal state offices and governmental benefits, ranging from the premiership to ministerial assignments, along ethno-sectarian lines. Rather than promoting genuine inclusivity, this system has evolved into a framework that institutionalises corruption, fosters patronage, and cultivates political strongholds that actively resist scrutiny.
The 2025 electoral outcomes merely realign the balance of power among this entrenched elite, failing to address the fundamental structural underpinnings of corruption.
The way the constitutional quota system is set up is the only reason for this widespread issue of co-optation. Although this system reserves nine seats for these groups in the 329-member Council of Representatives, the actual election process undermines its intended goal. Since the electoral law allows all registered voters in those provinces to vote for the quota candidates, dominant ethno-sectarian groups can easily leverage their superior organisation and substantial financial resources, often involving widespread “political money” and vote-buying, to elect their own proxies.
These successful candidates are politically loyal to the majority party; for example, reports suggest that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has backed several minority quota winners. This gives them extra, reliable votes that they can later use during the crucial selection of the Kurdish-reserved federal presidency. So, instead of protecting minority political power, the quota system actually serves as an official channel for the ruling elite to extend their control right into the highest levels of minority governance, essentially allowing the majority to decide who gets to be the minority voice in Baghdad.
A deliberate act of electoral engineering compounded the injustice. The political establishment essentially reversed the 2021 electoral law, which had briefly allowed for smaller, single-district constituencies. This was a direct move to undermine the independent, non-affiliated political groups that emerged from the 2019 Tishreen protest movement. They reintroduced proportional representation in large, governorate-wide districts, utilising a modified version of the Sainte-Laguë formula with an unusual divisor. This technical change is crucial: it mathematically makes it much harder for smaller parties to win their first seat, unfairly consolidating power and essentially shutting out new, reformist minority figures who do not want to be part of the existing patronage system. To further ensure they could control the outcome, Baghdad also intentionally eliminated out-of-country voting, silencing a politically active diaspora, many of whom are minorities who fled persecution and who have historically backed opposition groups.
The structural manipulation inherent in the system has an inevitable consequence: a deep and pervasive political alienation among minority voters. This disillusionment was palpable. Christian and Yazidi leaders frequently described the election as a cynical, predetermined exercise, which led directly to organised apathy and widespread boycotts in their communities. Compounding this, the political fate of these groups is intrinsically tied to the disputed status of their homelands. In flashpoint territories like Nineveh and Kirkuk, the election results are far more than just votes; they become metrics in an ongoing, zero-sum struggle for regional influence among Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia power centres, where political parties backed by militias wield immense security and economic control.
In short, the 2025 Iraqi parliamentary election primarily served as a mechanism for elite consolidation. It starkly revealed that, two decades after the post-2003 political structure was put in place, its foundational elements, the electoral law, the party list system, and even the minority quota, are structurally designed to keep the existing ruling factions in power. The election results effectively formalised that the political voice of Iraq’s ethnic and religious minorities will continue to be marginalised, their political agency systematically subordinated to the interests of the powerful majority class.