Egypt stands at a critical juncture between two of the world’s most devastating humanitarian crises. In the south, the Sudanese civil war, a conflict that has recently escalated after the horrific fall of El Fasher to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has unleashed a new wave of humanitarian concerns. Alongside, in the Northeastern border, the war in Gaza continues, and the ongoing blockade of the Rafah crossing creates an “appealing” and unbelievable condition.
To an outside observer, Egypt’s response seems contradictory given its stance on accepting refugees. It has taken in a staggering number of refugees from Sudan, with estimates reaching as high as 1.5 million people since 2023. According to the UNHCR, as of 31 October 2025, Egypt hosts 806,946 Sudanese refugees. However, it sealed the border with the Gaza Strip, refusing any large-scale exodus of refugees and calling such movement an existential “red line.” This contradiction is rooted in three core calculations: existential national security, non-negotiable geopolitical red lines, and fundamentally different historical relationships. The ongoing tensions did not change these policies, but hardened them.
Firstly, the recent escalation in Sudan, marked by the RSF’s bloody capture of El Fasher last month, is viewed as a profound humanitarian and political threat. It risks the total collapse of the Sudanese state, which Cairo considers its strategic backyard. The refugees fleeing the conflict are overwhelmingly seen as civilians. The influx places an immense socio-economic strain on Egypt, which has responded by tightening visa rules and maintaining a “no-camp” urban integration policy. However, it is not viewed as a direct military threat, but rather a problem of absorption and management.
Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the situation is an existential and military threat. The primary concern is not about the civilians, but about Palestinian militants. Egypt just concluded a brutal, decade-long counterinsurgency against an ISIS-affiliated branch in the North Sinai. Cairo also views Hamas as an offshoot of its primary domestic political adversary and even enemy, the Muslim Brotherhood. For Egypt, a mass refugee influx from the Gaza Strip would invariably include militants who could reactivate the Sinai insurgency and create instability.
Secondly, the Sudanese crisis, for all its horror, is a conventional civil war. The international community, including Egypt, is pushing for a truce with the shared goal of reunifying Sudan and eventually returning refugees to their home country. In the case of Gaza, it is the opposite. Like other Arab countries, Cairo also views the mass displacement of Palestinians into the Sinai Peninsula as the “liquidation of the Palestinian cause.” It directly refers to the 1948 “Nakba,” when thousands of Palestinians fled Mandate Palestine and were never allowed to return.
Supporting this view, accepting a mass of Palestinian refugees would make Egypt complicit in what it considers their permanent expulsion. For Egypt, the occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israel would effectively transfer responsibility for the estimated 2.3 million Gazans, which would end the Palestinian dream of statehood and the “Right to Return” to their homes.
The rejection could be seen from the response of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in the Extraordinary Arab Summit “Palestine’s Summit,” who reiterated their “absolute rejection” of any forced displacement. For Cairo, the suffering in the Gaza Strip must be solved inside Gaza. Sealing the border is paradoxically seen as the only way to protect the future responsibility of a Palestinian state.
Thirdly, the historical and cultural ties between the two populations are different. With Sudan, the relationship is described as “one people, two states.” They are bound by the Nile River, a shared “Wadi al-Nil” (Nile Valley) culture, and a long history of intermarriage and movement. A large Sudanese diaspora was already integrated into Egyptian cities long before this war, creating established networks for new arrivals.
The Gaza Strip, on the other hand, is more fraught. Cairo administered the Strip between 1948 and 1967, but never annexed it or granted its population “citizenship.” Since the 2007 Hamas takeover, this relationship has become exclusively security-oriented. The border became part of a joint blockade with Israel, and the population is viewed as a security “ward” and not as kin.
Egypt’s divergent politics are not contradictory but are strained by recent events. The fall of El Fasher and the confirmed famine in Sudan led to a worsening humanitarian crisis. This prompts Egypt to continue its policy of management and absorption, rooted in historical ties and a desire for regional stability. Conversely, the fragile ceasefire in Gaza Strip, chronic air blockades at Rafah, and continued Israeli strikes are viewed as an existential security and geopolitical trap. For Cairo, this escalation reinforces its “red line” to prevent a mass displacement, which it fears would liquidate the Palestinian cause.
The author is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.