Last Wednesday, the State Security Court of Jordan handed down prison sentences of varying lengths to nine individuals over their alleged links to the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Out of them, two were sentenced to 15 years for trying to manufacture missiles, with structures and warehouses set up in Amman and Zarqa. Additionally, the convicted individuals were accused of receiving training and financing in Lebanon to carry out “terrorist” attacks using rockets and drones on Jordanian soil.
The court’s decision comes against the backdrop of Jordan’s increased crackdown on MB-related individuals and assets, following its outlawing last April, after the group’s members were found to be associated with destabilisation efforts. Given the group's illegal status, the intensified crackdown should not be a surprise. However, the sentencing marks a major break in the monarchy's decades-long, love-hate relationship with the MB. The April ban affirmed that the Jordan chapter of MB (MB was originally founded in Egypt in 1928) was already dissolved by the country’s apex court, the Court of Cassation, when it failed to “rectify its legal status” in 2020.
Following the ban, Jordan’s state security apparatus is following a proactive strategy to clamp down on the group. In July, Jordanian authorities exposed a massive financial network run by the MB, involving about 30 million Jordanian dinars (US$42 million). Signalling zero tolerance for circumvention and active surveillance, security forces in August arrested several individuals gathered at a private home in Irbid. The alleged purpose of the meeting was to discuss the dissolved Muslim Brotherhood society.
The ongoing crackdown on the MB also involves continuous monitoring by authorities, who are actively scrutinising the activities and ownership structures of all affiliated associations and companies. In parallel, legal measures have been intensified against organisations, particularly those MB-linked companies accused of financial and regulatory violations. Recently, several organisations in the country faced legal action after being suspected of operating under the MB's "influence." While the serious nature of the charges leading to the MB's outlawing cannot be denied, it is essential to understand the underlying reasons behind the monarchy’s intolerance towards any MB-related individuals or activities, as evidenced in recent months.
Firstly, the Islamists in the country have underscored their relevance by capitalising on issues on which the monarchy has fallen short. For instance, MB’s political wing (though unofficial), the Islamic Action Front (IAF), emerged as the top party, securing 31 out of 138 seats in the 2024 parliamentary elections. This victory represented the Islamists' largest parliamentary representation since 1989 and nearly tripled their previous parliamentary representation (up from 10 in 2020). Conversely, pro-establishment parties like the National Charter Party and al-Eradah lagged, securing only 21 and 19 seats, respectively.
These remarkable parliamentary gains have heightened the monarchy’s anxieties about the resurgence of Islamism as a legitimate political alternative in the Hashemite Kingdom. The IAF achieved its best result in 35 years, thanks to the strong backing of the Jordanian Palestinians. Amman’s diplomatic stance vis-à-vis Israel did not align with public perception, which furthered their inclination towards Islamists who, raised the slogan “You either vote for normalisation or against normalisation”. As such, the state’s intensified suppression of the MB and its affiliates reflect a pre-emptive attempt to neutralise potential challenges to royal authority.
The second factor behind an increased crackdown stems from MB’s shift in its modus operandi, reflecting resilience and survival tactics. Despite being outlawed, the MB built a "complex" system using funds collected from various sources. This money was used not just for political and charitable activities inside Jordan but also for illegal operations abroad. Specifically, the group was found to be transferring funds out of the country and even using them to buy apartments outside Jordan. Authorities also noted that the MB exploited the Gaza war to illegally raise donations, though the final destination of those funds is unknown. MB was accused of diverting funds intended for charity to achieve its political goals, despite the ban. This adaptive fundraising system involving covert transfers and offshore investments blurs the line between legitimate civil society and transnational subversive activity. This blurring has compelled the monarchy to securitise the movement as an existential threat to both its internal stability and its regional alignments.
It is implausible that Jordan was unaware of the MB's political aspirations and only recently learned of them, as the expedited actions against the banned group might suggest. Conditions in Jordan have never been more favourable for Islamists since the Arab Spring, a reality known to both King Abdullah II. As such, the Jordanian regime would not tolerate any challenge to its legitimacy or risk the country falling into the hands of Islamists. It would be too soon to predict the IAF's future, as the party has never officially declared any affiliation with MB. While Amman may earn accolades from Arab brethren for its actions, the MB will likely shift its operational tactics in response to changing circumstances.
The author is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.