On 28 September 2025, the E3 powers—the UK, Germany, and France—invoked snapback sanctions against Iran, underscoring that the latter had been in “significant non-performance” of its commitments under the now-defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in 2015.
Consequently, sweeping UN economic and military sanctions were reimposed on Iran after ten years. The E3 action was in response to the Islamic Republic suspending International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear facilities—an obligation under the JCPOA—after Israel and the US targeted several of Iran's nuclear sites during the 12-day war in June 2025.
Subsequently, the European Council announced the reimposition of a number of sanctions pertaining to Iran’s nuclear activities.
The reimposed sanctions pertain to a travel ban and asset freeze for individuals, the import, purchase, and transport of hydrocarbons, the sale and supply of precious metals and diamonds, and an asset freeze of major commercial banks in Iran, in addition to preventing access to EU airports for Iranian cargo flights.
The reimposition of the UNSC sanctions has evoked an expected response from Iran, which has called it “unfair, unjust and illegal”, and warned of a firm response.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called the sanctions under the snapback clause “psychological warfare”, and stated that Iran should focus on its “Look East” policy and work with neighbours, especially “countries in the Global South". President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran would not “bow down” to sanction pressures.
The status of Iran’s nuclear programme remains shrouded in ambiguity after several of its facilities—including Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow—were targeted by Israel in June. Hence, it is challenging to assess the impact of the snapback sanctions on the nuclear programme. Nonetheless, the sanctions are likely to destroy the Iranian economy further and isolate it geopolitically.
Despite the Iranian economy being able to survive the sanctions for over four decades, the reimposition of sanctions has the potential to create internal unrest.
The economy is in a state of disrepair, with inflation exceeding 40 per cent and the Iranian Rial declining in value. There is a notable level of disenchantment among the people, as evidenced by their declining participation in recent presidential and parliamentary elections. The Islamic Republic has also witnessed a series of internal protests, and the snapback sanctions have the potential to incite more. Morale is also already low due to the massive harm caused by the Israeli attacks of June 2025.
The snapback sanctions also have the potential to make Iran withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The government indicated its disillusionment with the efficacy of the IAEA in ensuring the safety and security of its nuclear structures when Israel targeted them.
A draft resolution related to this has been tabled in the Iranian parliament. However, the Pezeshkian government faces a tough choice, considering the probable repercussions.
Iran has few friends and needs more external partners for its economic growth and development. Russia and China are close to Iran but are unable to extend much help, given the continued sanctions.
Bilateral alternate payment mechanisms and the BRICS payment initiative are helpful to an extent, but Tehran needs to expand its circle of friends. Looking east towards the Central Asian and South Asian economies—as well as looking towards African and Latin American countries—is a smart move, but it needs more momentum.
Iran’s focus on multilateral institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, also reflects its quest to address the sanctions-ridden economy.
Iran views the SCO as a platform to voice its concerns, as well as a means to reach out to Central Asia.
BRICS reflects its proximity to Russia and China, aligning with its anti-West rhetoric.
Central Asian economies are natural partners and are mutually dependent on Iran, while BRICS+ economies constitute 44 per cent of the global economy.
Iran has already been reeling under the unilateral US sanctions since US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA in 2018 during his first term.
Although President Joe Biden promised to renew the JCPOA before his election, during his term in office, the hope for any possible US-Iran rapprochement did not materialise.
The October 7 attacks on Israel and the subsequent developments in the region—especially the Israel-Iran confrontation in June 2025—further diminished any hopes of a resolution of the impasse over the Iranian nuclear programme.
The E3 invoking snapback sanctions is another blow to Iran's hope for reconciliation with Europe in the near future.
The additional sanctions are likely to add extra pressure on the struggling Iranian economy and create greater challenges for the Iranian leadership, which is already facing serious external and internal challenges.
The author is an Associate Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.