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India reiterates its policy towards the Palestinian State, but is not ready for an active role

India's unwavering stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict consistently supports a two-state solution. However, despite humanitarian concerns in Gaza, India maintains a cautious, non-prescriptive approach to enhance its influence in the Middle East

Displaced Palestinians carry food parcels as they raid trucks carrying humanitarian aid in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip | AFP

As human sufferings in the Gaza Strip show no signs of an early end, India is doggedly committed to its position on the endgame. Its response to the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has retained certain key but constant fixtures. These were reiterated in the Lok Sabha last Friday: an unwavering and unqualified support for the Palestinian self-determination through the “establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine within secured and recognised borders, living side by side in peace with Israel.” This has been the Indian position since the normalisation of relations with Israel in January 1992.

For some time, India even joined hands with Arab and Islamic countries and desired East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state. At one time, the Modi government even supported the Qatari narrative that denied any Jewish links to the city of Jerusalem. India soon realised the unique, special, and unparalleled status of Jerusalem; it is not Berlin to be divided, Chandigarh to be shared, or Amravati Nagar to be rebuilt.

This realisation manifested in May 2017. Prime Minister Modi’s statement during the visit of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas skipped identifying East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state. As visualised in the UNSC Resolution 242, the final borders between Israel and the Palestinian State have to be worked out through negotiations and compromise, and not imposed by any outside power. At regular intervals, both within the country and in international forums, India has repeated this formulation.

The support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been the main plank through which India also seeks to further its interests in the wider Middle East. New Delhi is aware that the two-state solution is herculean and faces serious internal opposition on both sides. Some regional powers still have misgivings about coexistence with Israel. The failure of the Oslo process substantially drained the support for coexistence among the Israelis and Palestinians. Frustration with the Israeli and Palestinian leadership has also destroyed international hopes for coexistence.

Despite all the difficulties, hardships, and negative consequences, the two-state solution remains the only honourable, viable, and realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the borders and security arrangements should be worked out through negotiations, alternatives to a two-state solution are horrendous. One state solution, popular among a section of the Indian elite, denies the national rights of Jews as well as the Palestinians and visualises one complete assimilation of one with the other. Such a course is a national suicide.

At the same time, even while reiterating its long-term solution for the conflict, India has been consistent in framing the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel as terrorism and has frequently expressed its unequivocal condemnation. The escalation and intensification of the Israel-Hamas conflict led to a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and fears of mass starvation. Like other countries, India could not remain a mute spectator and has been urging all the parties for an early end to the conflict through an immediate ceasefire and massive humanitarian assistance to the people of the Gaza Strip.

However, as it seeks to enhance its influence in the Middle East, India has been cautious and less prescriptive. It realises its limited political capital with the conflicting parties and eschews any leadership aspirations. Thus, repeating the broad parameters of its endgame for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but without any active conflict resolution approach will continue to be the basic premise of India's policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rhetoric was useful when India had no political role or leverage; when it seeks to enhance its influence in the Middle East and beyond, talking less is essential and sensible.

The author teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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