Early Friday morning, Israel struck Iranian nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, alongside the top military leadership and nuclear scientists, killing IRGC chief Hossein Salami, nuclear scientist Mohammad-Mehdi Tehranchi, and former chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Fereydoon Abbasi. After two months of diplomatic ping-pong and speculative media leaks, the Iranian nuclear question has entered a decisive phase.
A day earlier, the nuclear watchdog IAEA’s Board of Governors (BoG) stated Iran’s failure to comply with NPT obligations, constituting the most significant censure since September 2005. In response, Iran announced a new undisclosed nuclear facility with plans to begin enrichment imminently. Meanwhile, the US expressed hesitations with the talks as President Trump warned of a possible strike on Iran, which came exactly a day after Trump’s two-month deadline issued on 12 April. The US decision to pull non-essential US personnel from the region and place the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain on high alert earlier forewarned a strike, but instead of the US, Israel carried out the strikes. To that end, four dynamics require close attention to understand the context of Israeli strikes and how they could recalibrate the Iranian nuclear question.
First, the question of enrichment itself. Iran argues that its programme is "peaceful" as it frequently cites Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa on nuclear weapons being haram (forbidden). Yet, the secrecy and scale of the programme, dating back to the 1990s, have only fuelled distrust. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of negotiations since 2002 have focused on limiting Iran’s capabilities to enrich uranium (in quality and quantity) well below the threshold of weapons-grade.
Before his letter to Khamenei, which kicked off current rounds of talk, Trump had been unequivocal about “zero enrichment.” Trump’s approach towards the talks has been interesting as it stems from his long-standing criticism of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that the Obama administration brokered. Denouncing it as a “bad deal,” Trump exited the deal in 2018, arguing that the deal enabled unjustifiable concessions to Iran without constraining its nuclear ambitions, contentious missile programme, or destabilising regional behaviour.
Predictably, Iran used Trump’s withdrawal as a legal and political pretext to enrich uranium beyond the permissible limit of 3.67 percent to 60 and, in some cases, 90 percent. Earlier, in June, Khamenei announced in his speech the unacceptability of zero enrichment, recalling enrichment as Iran’s right. The generals have echoed the Supreme Leader, adding a military threat to any attempt to change the status quo on enrichment. However, as it turns out, the redlines have become the trigger for the strikes, leaving the remaining leadership in Iran to reassess its nuclear posture.
Second, over the years, domestic polarisation in Iran and the West has limited manoeuvre options, calcified the red lines and left more extreme options on the table to resolve the deadlock. The inability of the negotiating parties to compromise on redlines under domestic pressure has pushed military options from the background to the forefront. Trump came to office promising to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours and resolve the Gaza crisis but has not delivered on either. As such, under growing public expectations, the foreign policy win is essential for substantiating his image as the deal-maker.
Facing mounting economic hardship and social fatigue, Iran suffers from growing public discontent. Even lights are turned off in Khamenei’s office amidst prevailing electricity shortages. As such, the regime’s policy of fostering proxies has cost the exchequer dearly that could have served urgent domestic needs. Nevertheless, after more than 20 years of foreign interference – Syria is without Assad, Hezbollah is without Nasrallah, Iraq is unstable, and Houthis are becoming a liability – the public is asking hard questions about what Iranian proxies achieved for the Iranians. Thus, while both sides came to the talks with red lines, they carried domestic baggage. The strikes transformed the dynamics for the US, Iran, and Israel differently, building pressure on the Iranian regime to retaliate.
Third, the question of military strikes has lingered for years. Since day one, Trump has retained the “military option” on the table, and its timely enforcement showcases the impending concerns in Israel/US to carry out the strikes. Reportedly, Prime Minister Netanyahu signed the decision to strike on 2 June. With its impressive dismantling of Hezbollah leadership and weakening Iranian proxies, Israel rightfully saw a strategic opening. The Islamic countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, have long viewed Iran’s nuclear programme with trepidation. Therefore, they tacitly supported the potential strikes against Iran after the breakdown of talks. Now, it would be interesting to see the role they will play in the near future.
That being said, the strikes also carry two obvious challenges: the Iranian nuclear infrastructure is vast and widely dispersed, making it difficult to target all facilities at once, leaving room for an Iranian retaliation. Moreover, a strike could be used by the regime to further the narrative that Iran needs to pursue nuclear weapons. In such a sense, the restrain or attack was a strategic decision contingent on cost-benefit calculation. The Israeli decision to attack indicated that the risks of nuclear Iran outweigh the risks of escalation, making the Friday strikes an easy strategic choice.
Finally, carrot or stick? The conclusion of JCPOA in 2015 was hailed as a feat of diplomacy, but as much as it may appear intuitive, the Iran nuclear deal is not an example of diplomacy triumphing over war. On the contrary, the threat of war has induced the parties over the years to pursue a diplomatic solution, which, in fairness, is messy and chaotic, but it is the best deterrence against all-out regional conflict. Trump has used the “military option” as the stick while dangling the carrot of sanctions relief and opening trade relations with Tehran. Iran’s position to not pursue nuclear weapons or its willingness to come to the table is the carrot, and the use of proxies has served as the stick.
Essentially, the Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear programme have placed Iran’s nuclear programme in unfamiliar territory, marking the most precarious position for the regime since 1979. Deal or no deal, escalation or de-escalation, one thing is clear – diplomacy might be the method, but coercion is the language that will ultimately define the trajectory of the Iranian regime and its nuclear programme in the coming months.
(The author teaches at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)