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Thrissur firework unit blast: Did Kerala fail to learn from past lessons?

Investigations are focusing on the recurring presence of banned chemicals like potassium chlorate, pointing to systemic failures in safety protocols and enforcement across manufacturing, transport, and storage

Firefighters douse fire after an explosion at a fireworks manufacturing unit at Mundathikode village, in Thrissur, Kerala | PTI

On May 4, 2006, seven people were burnt to death when a fireworks storage unit belonging to the Paramekkavu Devaswom at Padukkad, a few kilometres from the city, exploded ahead of the Thrissur Pooram. The accident occurred on the eve of a sample fireworks display. A group of journalists had visited the site earlier to report on that year’s fireworks specialities.

Cut to April 21, 2026—an eerily similar sequence, but with far greater destruction and loss of life. This time, the explosion occurred at a fireworks manufacturing unit of the Thiruvambady faction at Mundathikode, about 16km from the city, just hours after journalists had visited to report on this year’s display.

So far, 14 people have been reported dead, with more than a dozen others missing. A total of 110 workers were employed at the unit; around 40 had reported for duty on Tuesday. At the time of the accident, some workers had already left after finishing their shift, while a few others had stepped out for tea.

Over the past two decades, Kerala has witnessed at least a dozen major fireworks-related accidents, resulting in nearly 200 deaths. The 2016 explosion at Puttingal Devi Temple in Kollam, which killed 110 people, remains the deadliest.

Investigations into past incidents have often pointed to the presence of potassium chlorate—a banned chemical in fireworks manufacturing—as a recurring risk factor. A senior forensic official indicated that its possible presence is being examined in the current case. Forensic teams are currently inspecting the site.

According to experts, standard gunpowder composition consists of 75 per cent potassium nitrate, 10 per cent sulphur, and 15 per cent charcoal. However, in practice, cheaper oxidisers such as potassium chlorate are sometimes used. “Once potassium chlorate is mixed, it is no longer just a firecracker—it technically becomes a bomb,” the official said.

An oxidiser increases the oxygen supply, accelerating combustion. In fireworks, potassium chlorate can make mixtures highly unstable. Unlike more stable oxidisers, it can ignite due to minor friction, impact, or heat during handling or mixing.

Experts note that, since the latest accident occurred during manufacturing, multiple factors could be involved. “During mixing, accidents can occur due to overconfidence or negligence. Ignition sources such as matchsticks should never be present, but lapses do happen. When potassium chlorate is involved, even slight heat can trigger an explosion,” the official said. Some experts also point to high ambient temperatures as a possible contributing factor.

They add that, though safety protocols mandate strict segregation of materials and minimum distances between storage and mixing areas, these norms are not always followed. The systemic failure to enforce such norms in the manufacturing, transport, and storage of fireworks has contributed to many past accidents. This time too, the explosion did not occur within the premises of a licenced fireworks manufacturing facility.

The manufacturing of fireworks materials, preparation of mixtures, and drying processes are all highly flammable stages. Under legal norms, these must be carried out only in licensed factory sheds, with approvals from the District Collector and the relevant explosives safety authority. However, in the current case as well, fireworks materials were reportedly produced at an unlicensed facility, in violation of explosive-related regulations.

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