As Kerala braces for the assembly election results on May 4, the battle for the chief minister’s post within the Congress has already erupted.
Opposition Leader V.D. Satheesan and former Opposition Leader Ramesh Chennithala are the strongest claimants among those who contested the polls. However, recent developments suggest that AICC General Secretary K.C. Venugopal—who did not contest the 2026 assembly elections—is also very much in the race, turning it into a three-cornered contest.
If the UDF succeeds in forming the government, a fierce “war of the roses” is likely in the election of the Congress Legislature Party (CLP) leader, with high command observers from Delhi expected to mediate between the three rival factions.
In this context, THE WEEK takes a look at patterns of missteps by the Congress high command in selecting chief ministers and managing internal frictions in states it won over the past decade—decisions that, in the long run, cost the party dearly.
In Rajasthan, after the Congress’s victory in 2018, the high command chose veteran Ashok Gehlot as chief minister over Sachin Pilot. Pilot was appointed deputy CM and PCC chief as a compromise, but the rivalry persisted. In 2020, Pilot led a rebellion with a group of MLAs, accusing Gehlot of authoritarian functioning; Gehlot, in turn, called him a “traitor” and “worthless.” The high command—despite efforts led by Mallikarjun Kharge during the 2022 crisis—failed to enforce a durable resolution. Gehlot even refused to convene a CLP meeting or step aside when he was considered for the party presidency. Though Pilot’s revolt was contained, the damage lingered, and the Congress lost power decisively in the 2023 elections.
A similar pattern played out in Madhya Pradesh. After the 2018 victory, the high command chose veteran Kamal Nath as chief minister, sidelining Jyotiraditya Scindia, who had played a key role in mobilising support. The leadership allowed Kamal Nath and Digvijaya Singh to dominate, ignoring Scindia’s claims. In 2020, Scindia rebelled with enough MLAs to topple the government. The high command failed to prevent the defections, leading to the fall of the government and long-term weakening of the party in the state.
In Chhattisgarh, following the 2018 elections, the high command favoured Bhupesh Baghel as chief minister over T.S. Singh Deo. A reported power-sharing arrangement—where the post would rotate after 2.5 years—was never formally confirmed or implemented. This ambiguity led to sustained friction, culminating in Singh Deo resigning from a key cabinet portfolio in protest, before being made deputy CM as a last-minute compromise ahead of the 2023 polls. The factionalism hurt the Congress in Singh Deo’s strongholds and contributed to its defeat.
In Punjab, amid a bitter feud between chief minister Captain Amarinder Singh and PCC chief Navjot Singh Sidhu, the high command removed Amarinder in 2021 and appointed Charanjit Singh Channi as a compromise chief minister. The move aimed to project a new face but failed to unify the party. Amarinder exited the Congress, while Channi struggled to stabilise governance and address law-and-order concerns. The result was a crushing defeat to the AAP in the 2022 elections. Though the high command attempted a course correction, internal chaos only deepened.
In Himachal Pradesh, the high command avoided repeating the missteps seen in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. It chose Sukhwinder Singh Sukhu—who played a key role in the party’s 2022 victory—as chief minister, despite a competing claim from Pratibha Singh, wife of former chief minister Virbhadra Singh.
However, the leadership has been unable to fully resolve the rivalry between Sukhu’s loyalists and supporters of the Virbhadra Singh family. This failure to heal factional divisions remains a lingering weakness, with observers noting that the high command’s inaction in quelling infighting has affected governance and demoralised the administration ahead of the 2027 assembly elections.
If the Congress-led UDF returns to power, the party’s high command may once again find itself at a familiar crossroads in Kerala. And experiences from other states suggest that ambiguous power-sharing arrangements, limited attention to the broader electoral mandate in leadership choices, and delays in taking timely decisions do not preserve unity—they instead sow the seeds of future rebellions.