Throughout the history of the two Asian giants which attained independence at around the same time, there have been very few times in the past when the India-China bilateral ties were as precariously poised as it is now.
Amid an ongoing churn and rearrangement of the global power order and waging war in Ukraine that promises further escalation in the days of winter to come, the cementing of President Xi Jinping’s position at the pinnacle of the Chinese establishment for another five years—unprecedented in China—is wrought with significance for India’s military establishment.
Xi’s anointment at the just-concluded Communist Party Congress (CPC) is taking place in the backdrop of both India and China undertaking huge reforms in their respective militaries.
While both are not making any secret of their global aspirations for dominant positions in the comity of the nations, rapid modernization of their militaries is being undertaken at a furious pace.
That India is strong on the Chinese radar has been underlined by the showing of a clip of the 2020 Galwan valley violence during the CPC. A series of key appointments of military officials with soldierly experience acquired at the India-focused Western Theater has further underlined the extant attitude towards India.
Besides current foreign minister Wang Yi, General He Weidong, General Zhang Youxia and General Xu Qiling—all of whom have been promoted to the politburo and the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) which Xi heads—are old India hands.
The immediate impact on India's military is obvious with Xi known to be the main architect of the ongoing military reforms that began in 2016.
In keeping with Xi’s plan of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," PLA wants to "basically complete" modernization by 2035 and be a "world-class force" by 2049.
At the same time, amid talk of the advent of an Asian century that will be defined by India and China, a possible scenario of cooperation also holds out although it is seemingly improbable at the moment.
On Wednesday, outgoing Chinese ambassador to India Sun Weidong posted in his farewell remarks on the embassy website: “China and India are important neighbours… It is only natural for China and India to have some differences. We should be aware that common interest of the two countries is greater than differences."
Notwithstanding the optimism, very broadly, three immediate military implications can be foreseen for India. First, the blurry land borders on the 3,488-km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India will be sought to be concretised by developing infrastructure on the disputed points. This strategy has already been given the force of law with China’s new land border law already being approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC) and effective from January 1, 2022. The new law comprises 7 chapters and 62 articles.
Developments across eastern Ladakh also point to the fact that the border lines have been fixed at least from the Chinese point of view.
This will result in Indian forces spreading out all across the border which will require huge spending for the infra push as well as for the logistics of realignment of forces and the deployment of new and upgraded weapon systems and platforms. Already about 60,000 Indian soldiers along with military equipment have been deployed along the often rugged and quite difficult LAC since May 2020. This deployment is set to become a permanent one.
Second, Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal will rise in keeping with the Chinese aim of establishing dominance in the waters. This will militate against Indian naval interests in the region.
In terms of sheer numbers, currently, the PLAN is already the largest navy in the world with a battle force of about 355 ships and submarines, including approximately more than 145 major surface combatants. The platforms are mostly modern multi-role platforms. PLAN aims to increase its strength to 420 ships by 2025 and 460 ships by 2030.
While India has also invested considerably in building naval platforms, China’s blistering pace in churning out warships will surely test Indian acquisition capabilities if the Chinese challenge is to be met headlong in the Indian Ocean.
Third, China’s strong focus on hybrid war which includes cyber and other cutting-edge niche technology in a whole-of-the-nation effort, and fast strides in missile technology will force India to frame counter strategies as well or at the most keep pace with the developments.
This will result in a considerable diversion of effort and scarce funds that could have been channelized into development to spur economic growth. In other words, with Xi continuing to hold the reins of power in Beijing, the military engagement with India will continue seamlessly.