As the tectonic plates of global geopolitics shift, creating deep fissures between rival power blocs, India finds itself performing one of the most delicate balancing acts in modern diplomacy. Nowhere is this balancing act more precarious—or more revealing—than in New Delhi’s relationship with Iran. Caught between American sanctions, China’s deepening economic embrace of Tehran, and an increasingly combustible Middle East, India’s Iran policy has become a stress test of its long-claimed but rarely scrutinised principle of strategic autonomy.
This is not merely a question of diplomacy with one difficult partner. How India manages Iran will signal whether it can operate as an independent power in a world that increasingly demands binary choices. Can India pursue its interests without becoming a satellite of any bloc? Or will structural pressures ultimately force it to choose sides?
For India, Iran is not just another country in West Asia. It is geography, history, energy security, and continental access rolled into one. As the geopolitical theorist Halford Mackinder once argued, geography does not forgive strategic neglect. While India has successfully deepened ties with Gulf monarchies and forged a formidable partnership with Israel, Iran offers something none of them can: a land bridge to Eurasia and a strategic depth that cannot be replicated by maritime routes alone.
The weight of history: A civilizational anchor
The relationship between India and Iran predates modern diplomacy by centuries. Long before passports and protocols, the Indus region and the Iranian plateau were connected by trade, culture, and ideas. Persian aesthetics shaped Mughal architecture; Persian became the language of administration and poetry; Sufi traditions crossed borders and blended seamlessly into the subcontinent’s spiritual landscape.
This shared civilizational memory continues to matter—not as sentimentality, but as diplomatic capital. It creates familiarity at elite levels and a habit of restraint during moments of strain. After Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, when much of the Western world chose isolation and hostility, India opted for engagement without endorsement. That choice preserved channels of communication and mutual respect, even when political systems diverged sharply.
Today, when India’s ties with Iran are buffeted by sanctions and global pressure, this historical goodwill acts as a stabiliser. It ensures that disagreements do not easily harden into hostility. In an era of brittle diplomacy, that is no small advantage.
The connectivity gambit: Chabahar and the gateway to the North
If history provides emotional ballast, geography supplies the hard logic of India’s Iran policy. Pakistan’s refusal to grant India overland access to Afghanistan and Central Asia has long been a strategic choke point. Iran offers the only viable alternative.
At the heart of this strategy lies Chabahar Port, India’s most consequential overseas infrastructure investment. Chabahar is not just about ships and cargo; it is about strategic escape velocity. It allows India to reach Afghanistan without crossing Pakistani territory and opens pathways to Central Asia and Russia through the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
In a region where China has poured massive resources into Pakistan’s Gwadar port, Chabahar represents India’s understated but purposeful response. It is not designed to compete dollar-for-dollar with Beijing, but to ensure that India is not locked out of the Eurasian landmass altogether.
The importance of Chabahar extends beyond India–Iran ties. It gives Afghanistan alternatives, offers Central Asia diversification, and positions India as a continental stakeholder rather than a purely maritime power. Abandoning or downgrading Chabahar would amount to a voluntary retreat from India’s northern strategic horizon.
The energy equation and economic realism
Energy is the quiet driver of India’s Iran policy. India imports the vast majority of its crude oil, and Iran—blessed with some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves—has historically been a natural supplier.
Before sanctions tightened, Iranian oil was prized by Indian refiners for its quality, proximity, and pricing flexibility. The now-suspended rupee–rial trade mechanism helped India conserve foreign exchange while giving Iran reliable demand. These arrangements were not ideological gestures; they were transactions rooted in mutual economic logic.
Sanctions have disrupted this flow, but they have not erased the underlying reality. India’s energy demand will continue to grow, and diversification will remain essential. Overdependence on any single region or supplier carries its own risks. In that context, Iran remains a dormant but vital option—one that India cannot afford to permanently write off.
The three-dimensional challenge: Sanctions, China, and conflict
If the case for engagement with Iran is strong, so too are the constraints. India’s Iran policy today is squeezed from three directions simultaneously.
First, there is the United States. Sanctions on Iran—reinforced by legislation such as CAATSA—have turned economic engagement into a minefield. Indian companies and banks face real exposure, and New Delhi’s expanding partnership with Washington, particularly in defence and high technology, raises the stakes of defiance. For an India seeking access to advanced semiconductors and critical military platforms, the cost of crossing the US on Iran is far from theoretical.
Second, China looms large. Tehran’s long-term strategic agreement with Beijing has shifted the balance inside Iran. Chinese capital, infrastructure, and political backing offer Iran insulation against Western pressure and reduce its reliance on partners like India. There is a growing risk that New Delhi could be relegated to the margins of a relationship it once assumed was structurally aligned with its interests.
Third, Iran’s regional behaviour complicates India’s positioning. Iran-aligned actors have been central to conflicts stretching from the Levant to the Red Sea. Disruptions to maritime trade—particularly in critical shipping lanes—directly affect India’s economy. Maintaining strategic silence in the face of such instability becomes harder as India seeks recognition as a net security provider.
The Afghan intersection
Amid these tensions, Afghanistan has emerged as a rare zone of convergence. India and Iran share concerns about extremist spillover, the rise of ISIS-K, and the long-term instability of the region. Neither is enthusiastic about the Taliban, yet both have opted for pragmatic engagement rather than isolation.
Chabahar has quietly enabled humanitarian assistance and limited coordination. This cooperation is neither flashy nor formal, but it reflects a shared understanding: a chaotic Afghanistan serves no one’s interests. In a fractured region, such low-key convergence may prove more durable than grand alliances.
Navigating the churn: A roadmap for equilibrium
If India is to maintain strategic space amid US pressure, Chinese expansion, and West Asian volatility, it must shed romanticism and embrace disciplined realism. Five principles should guide the way forward.
First, multi-lateralise strategic assets. Chabahar should not be framed as an India–Iran vanity project but as a regional public good. Greater integration with Central Asian partners and European stakeholders through the INSTC can dilute sanction risks and raise the port’s strategic cost for adversaries.
Second, pursue selective synergy. India should deepen cooperation in sectors less vulnerable to sanctions—pharmaceuticals, agriculture, humanitarian logistics, and capacity-building. These areas create a durable baseline relationship even when politics turns hostile.
Third, preserve West Asian balance. India’s ability to maintain productive ties with Iran, Israel, and the Gulf monarchies is not confusion—it is leverage. In a polarised region, being the only major power that speaks to all sides enhances India’s diplomatic value.
Fourth, prepare financial workarounds. Alternative payment mechanisms, digital settlements, and local currency frameworks should be refined quietly. When geopolitical conditions shift—as they often do—preparedness will matter more than intent.
Finally, protect Track-II diplomacy. Academic exchanges, cultural dialogue, and civil-society engagement must be insulated from political turbulence. Strategic relationships endure not only through contracts, but through sustained human connection.
Conclusion: The mark of maturity
India’s Iran dilemma encapsulates the central challenge of its foreign policy moment. Can a rising power pursue its interests without becoming captive to another’s agenda? Can it say “yes” to connectivity and “no” to destabilisation? Can it manage contradiction rather than fleeing from it?
Strategic autonomy is not neutrality. It is the capacity to decide independently, to absorb pressure without capitulating, and to engage without entanglement. Iran tests that capacity more than most partners.
In a world increasingly defined by absolutes, India’s effort to walk the Persian tightrope is neither naïve nor reckless—it is necessary. Success will not come from dramatic gestures, but from patient, calibrated statecraft. If India can sustain a functional, interest-driven relationship with Iran while safeguarding its broader partnerships, it will have demonstrated not just diplomatic skill, but strategic maturity.
For a country that aspires to be a Vishwa Mitra—a friend to the world without surrendering its own agency—there may be no higher proof.
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK)
(The writer was Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He has authored the book ‘A National Security Strategy for India – the Way Forward’)