On 10 November 2025, Delhi was shaken by a brutal reminder that terrorism in India is neither diminished nor geographically confined. A car bomb exploded near the Red Fort, killing 12 and injuring many more. The most disturbing element was the profile of the accused: a group of Kashmiri-origin medical professionals working at a Faridabad college. These were not infiltrators slipping through the Line of Control—they were well-educated, well-integrated individuals embedded within India’s social and economic mainstream.
Investigators found that the primary suspect, a doctor, drove into Delhi that morning, surveyed potential targets throughout the day, and detonated his vehicle at 7 pm. Arrests in Kashmir and Faridabad uncovered a significant weapons cache, revealing the scale of a broader conspiracy. The episode exposed an uncomfortable truth: despite major improvements in counter-terror operations, India continues to face blind spots in detecting radicalisation within educated, urban networks.
The attack followed the massacre of tourists in Pahalgam earlier this year, traced to Pakistan-backed groups. India responded with Operation Sindoor, a forceful military blow across the LoC. But Delhi’s bombing demonstrated something more insidious—a shift in Pakistan’s strategy. By outsourcing operational roles to Indian citizens, Islamabad reduces its visible footprint, making attribution harder and retaliation more diplomatically complicated.
If India is to prevent this from becoming the new face of terrorism, it must adopt a long-term, whole-of-nation strategy. Episodic retaliation, however forceful, cannot counter a decades-old proxy war that has adapted across technology, ideology, and geography. What India needs is sustained pressure—ideological, financial, diplomatic, technological, and security-driven—applied simultaneously.
Below is a 10-point national framework India must put in place.
1. Counter the “Indian Operative” Proxy Shift
The Delhi attack marks a return to a dangerous trend: Pakistan cultivating Indian citizens as terror operatives. This internalisation of terrorism makes detection harder and escalation management more complex.
India’s response must be multi-pronged:
First, address political alienation. Disaffection among youth—whether in Kashmir or other sensitive regions—creates fertile ground for exploitation. Governments must proactively engage with communities, resolve grievances, strengthen political outreach, and ensure developmental equity. Alienation is Pakistan’s opportunity; inclusion is India’s antidote.
Second, modernise intelligence against digital radicalisation. India must establish a Digital Surveillance & Counter-Radicalisation Unit—a specialised, multilingual intelligence team trained in behavioural analytics, dark-web tracking, and online infiltration. Radicalisation today is algorithm-driven and often invisible. Early indicators appear in anonymous forums and obscure social feeds. Detecting these requires digital agility, not just human intelligence.
Third, strengthen social resilience. Moderate religious leaders, educators, and community elders must be supported to counter extremist ideology. Radicalisation thrives where counter-narratives are absent. The community must become the first firewall; the state, the second.
2. Codify the “Punitive Deterrence Doctrine”
India’s responses to terrorism—from the 2016 surgical strikes to Operation Sindoor—have demonstrated resolve. But deterrence cannot depend on political will alone. It must be formalised.
A Tri-Service Punitive Deterrence Doctrine should clearly define:
- thresholds for military retaliation
- escalation ladders
- coordinated civil–military decision-making
- consequences not just for terror camps, but for the state enabling them
A formal doctrine gives clarity to India’s armed forces, consistency to India’s diplomacy, and predictability to India’s adversaries. For a country that thrives on ambiguity and deniability, predictable consequences are a powerful deterrent.
3. Weaponize Financial Attrition and FATF Pressure
Terrorism runs on money—hawala, narcotics, charities, shell firms, and foreign donations. Disrupting these networks must become a central component of India’s strategy.
India should convert the Terror Finance Fusion Cell into a permanent counter-terror finance command, integrating the RBI, FIU, Enforcement Directorate, and international banking partners. Its responsibilities should include:
- mapping all money-laundering routes
- shutting narco-terror pipelines feeding Kashmir and the Northeast
- scrutinising foreign funds to suspicious institutions
- coordinating with global financial oversight bodies
Diplomatically, India must keep Pakistan under constant FATF scrutiny. Grey-listing and the threat of blacklisting have previously choked Pakistan’s access to international finance. Financial pressure is not symbolic—it constrains Pakistan’s ability to fund its strategic assets.
4. Establish a Permanent NIA Cadre with Global Reach
The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has matured into India’s premier counter-terror investigative arm. Yet its heavy reliance on officers on deputation limits continuity and expertise.
India must create a Permanent NIA Cadre with specialisations in cyber forensics, encrypted communication, drone-enabled terror, narco-terror financing and international liaison operations, among others.
Given that many terror logistics networks operate in the Gulf, Southeast Asia, and East Africa, the NIA must develop long-term partnerships abroad—mirroring the FBI’s global liaison model.
5. Overhaul Intelligence Coordination
India’s intelligence apparatus—IB, RAW, NTRO, NIA, state ATS units—has strong capabilities but uneven coordination. The Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) is an improvement, but real-time integration remains weak.
India must establish a Digital Intelligence Integration Hub (DIIH), an AI-driven fusion system that continuously ingests and correlates data from communications chatter, drone sightings, suspicious financial transactions, cross-border movement, open-source intelligence, travel anomalies, and so on.
The aim is predictive intelligence—identifying patterns before an attack occurs. Terror groups operate in small, compartmentalised cells; India’s intelligence cannot operate in silos.
6. Optimise and Coordinate Specialist Counter-Terror Units
India has elite forces—NSG, Para SF, MARCOS, Garud—but their integration with state ATS units remains inconsistent. Terrorism does not respect state boundaries; India’s response must be equally seamless.
India needs a National ATS Reform Programme with:
- mandatory continuous training
- NSG-led standards for urban warfare and close-quarter battle
- uniform digital forensics training
- central funding for modern equipment
- national protocols for drone and counter-drone operations
State ATS units are the first responders. Their strength determines the speed of India’s counter-terror success. Coordination with elite national forces ensures both rapid response and operational precision.
7. Prioritize Counter-Drone and Counter-Swarm Defence
Terror groups increasingly use inexpensive drones for reconnaissance, smuggling, and attacks. During Operation Sindoor, India successfully neutralised hostile drones—highlighting both capability and vulnerability.
India must deploy standardised multi-layered counter-drone systems across all critical infrastructure:
- soft-kill: jammers, RF takeovers, spoofing
- hard-kill: Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), lasers, modified air-defence guns
- Mission Sudarshan Chakra, aimed at producing indigenous DEWs, must be accelerated. Counter-drone systems should not be optional—they must be mandatory security architecture.
8. Leverage Resources for Global Narrative Control
Terrorism today is also a battle over narratives. After the Pahalgam massacre, Pakistan attempted to shape global opinion with misinformation. India’s response was factual but slow.
India must create a Global Information Operations Cell that:
- counters misinformation in real time
- engages media houses in key capitals
- influences policy discourse in Western democracies
- amplifies factual accounts of Pakistan’s terror role
Educated and influential Indians abroad can be force multipliers if guided, coordinated, and mobilised as positive influencers.
9. Close the Gaps in Border Security and Technology
While the LoC is heavily secured, India’s vulnerabilities lie elsewhere—especially along the Myanmar and Bangladesh borders and parts of the coastline. Instability in Myanmar has turned its territory into a corridor for arms, drugs, and insurgent movement.
India must shift to Smart Border Management, deploying AI-enabled surveillance towers, subterranean sensors, autonomous patrol vehicles, integrated communication grids, drone-based patrols and rapid-response teams.
Technology—not manpower—must be the primary deterrent along India’s most porous borders.
10. Use Economic Attrition Through Strategic Diplomacy
Military operations deliver immediate punishment but cannot alone reshape Pakistan’s long-term calculus. Economic pain, however, forces strategic reconsideration.
India’s decision to suspend certain provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty after Pahalgam showed that diplomatic and economic leverage can be powerful tools.
India must: build international coalitions that isolate terror sponsors, push for targeted sanctions, restrict market access for companies linked to terror financing, and use visas, trade, technology access, and investments as calibrated pressure.
When terrorism becomes economically unaffordable, it ceases to be a viable strategy.
Conclusion
India’s post-2025 security landscape is defined by hybrid threats—digital radicalisation, cross-border terror networks, drones, information warfare, and financial conduits. A single retaliatory strike, however decisive, cannot eliminate a problem that has evolved over decades.
India needs a comprehensive, multi-domain counter-terror strategy rooted in deterrence, intelligence integration, social resilience, technological superiority, and diplomatic leverage. Just as important, counter-terrorism is a political challenge. Addressing alienation, strengthening institutional capacity, and ensuring bipartisan consensus are critical.
Terrorism aims to weaken the Indian state. India’s response must strengthen it—across every domain.
(The writer was Vice Chief of the Indian Army.)
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of THE WEEK.)