Like many other days, on November 2 too, the US President Donald Trump made an explosive claim. This time saying that Pakistan — besides Russia, China, and North Korea — was conducting nuclear tests secretly.
Trump said in an interview: “Russia's testing and China's testing, but they don’t talk about it. We’re an open society. We’re different. We talk about it… And certainly North Korea’s been testing. Pakistan’s been testing…”
The statement came after Trump ordered the US Department of War on October 30 to start testing nuclear weapons “immediately.” Over the decades, many countries have developed non-explosive techniques of testing like sub-critical testing and computer simulations.
While making a case for the US to resume nuke testing, the US President’s statement has set the cat among the pigeons, with a brewing debate in India about whether India too needs to resume its nuclear testing.
On November 10, India’s Foreign Ministry, stating that India has always drawn the attention of the world to these aspects of Pakistan’s record, said: “Clandestine and illegal nuclear activities are in keeping with Pakistan’s history that is centred around decades of smuggling, export control violations, secret partnerships, AQ Khan network, and further proliferation”.
A declared nuclear weapons power, India’s nuclear strategy is principally based on a credible minimum nuclear deterrence. It has two pillars — a voluntary and unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing since May 1998 and a no first use (NFU) stand with an assured second strike capability, meaning that nuclear weapons will be used only in retaliation to a nuke attack.
What is interesting and significant is that the nuclear restraint is a self-declared policy and not one that is obligated by a treaty. Nor is India a signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on the ground that the CTBT is discriminatory and instead supports universal, non-discriminatory, and a process of verifiable disarmament.
India stands to gain on several fronts if it resumes testing.
It will be able to better acknowledge the changes that have taken place on the geo-strategic front. Trump’s charge of Pakistan testing its nukes will also be addressed.
New tests would yield a body of critical data which, besides providing for validation, will be a force multiplier for its modern weaponry and platforms which have undergone lots of improvement and enhancements since 1998.
Enhanced nuclear weaponry will be of much deterrence value vis-à-vis China’s growing capabilities. In other words, the deterrence value will increase.
But there would be negative fallouts too.
For one, the looming possibility of a regional nuclear arms race will be stronger.
Collaboration with the US, especially after the 2008 Indo-US Civilian Nuclear deal was signed, will significantly decrease.
The positioning of India as a “responsible” nuclear power will suffer a big dent.
While pundits slug it over whether India needs to discard its moratorium, it is an opportune time for India to sit back and re-examine and review its nuclear doctrine and to hedge against any future developments.