A Legacy of Strategic Silence
India’s nuclear journey began in 1974 when it conducted its first test, codenamed 'Smiling Buddha'. That explosion signalled more than capability; it was a declaration of strategic autonomy in a world divided by nuclear monopolies. In 1998, the Pokhran II series followed; this time claiming the successful detonation of fusion bombs through a series of five tests. The tests achieved the main objective of giving the capability to build fission bombs with yields up to 200 kilotons. The message then was clear; India would decide its own strategic limits.
India then placed itself under a self-imposed moratorium on further testing and adopted a 'No First Use' posture. The logic was clear: deter adversaries without letting the strategic trigger finger become routine. That restraint built India’s image as a responsible nuclear power, distinct from proliferators in its neighbourhood. It also allowed economic engagement and global legitimacy while maintaining a credible minimum deterrent. For over two decades, this careful balance between power and prudence has shaped India’s strategic doctrine. For years, this posture underpinned India’s claim to a responsible power status and opened doors to civil-nuclear cooperation abroad.
A new global nuclear climate
The strategic environment has shifted. US President Donald Trump’s recent order that the United States resume nuclear testing, citing alleged underground tests by Pakistan and others, reflects a deeper reversal of nuclear norms. He claimed the U.S. must test “on an equal basis… immediately”. The flawed logic was based on insecurity and self-glory, perceiving threats from Russia and China's nuclear capabilities and power play.
If the United States restarts testing, other powers will not stay idle. Russia and China are already suspected of sub-critical and hydrodynamic experiments. One theory also says Pakistan tested its sub-critical tests on 10 May at the tunnels of Changi or in Kirana hills.
Credibility versus restraint
For India, the key question is capability credibility. The thermonuclear device tested in 1998 remains the subject of technical debate. Some scientists insist it achieved its design targets; others suggest the yield was lower than claimed. Over the years, India’s missile and submarine programmes have matured rapidly. The Agni-V, the Arihant class and the K-series missiles have expanded the deterrence spectrum. Yet, without a verified thermonuclear yield, a degree of uncertainty remains. Deterrence depends on belief. If adversaries think India’s weapons are less powerful than claimed, the psychological balance begins to shift.
That is the crux of the current debate. With Pakistan accused of covert testing and China pushing ahead with advanced warheads, India’s voluntary silence may start to look like a strategic disadvantage.
The cost of breaking restraint
A nuclear test by India risks triggering rapid responses from Pakistan and China. In South Asia, any display of nuclear escalation raises the stakes of miscalculation and crisis instability. India would open a new cycle of nuclear signalling and counter-signalling.
The influence of Trump’s directive
Trump’s comments add a new twist. His claim that the US must resume testing because others are doing so fails on facts and the strategic logic. It has been observed that China’s arsenal is still far smaller than that of Russia and the US, yet Washington worries not about numbers but about credible modern deterrence. For India, this signals two lessons. First, global power competition is now accelerating, and nuclear testing is once again on the table. Second, the old distinctions between restrained powers and testing powers may fade, meaning India may face pressure either to follow or be left out.
How India can reinforce deterrence without a blast
India does not need to test a hydrogen bomb to stay credible. For now, restraint still serves India better than reaction. The global nuclear order may be weakening, but not yet collapsing. A premature test would hand adversaries the narrative of aggression and risk economic damage far exceeding strategic gains. The path forward lies in reinforcing the deterrence architecture:
- Conduct advanced computer simulations and sub-critical tests to validate warhead reliability without violating moratorium norms.
- Further strengthen delivery systems: missiles with improved accuracy, survivable SSBNs, and secure command-and-control. Punishment capability and delivery confidence matter at least as much as yield.
- Strategic communication with China and Pakistan must remain firm and transparent. India should leave no ambiguity for misreading its intent or underestimating its capability. Regular readiness displays and a visible triad posture would reinforce deterrence in practical terms.
India’s better choice for now
Given the current environment, India should continue to hold its testing option in reserve while investing in everything else that builds deterrence credibility. Restraint remains a strategic asset provided India ensures the rest of the muscles are visible. If restraint becomes perceived as weakness, the balance swings.
In sum, the decision is not binary. India does not need to test now, but it must prepare as though it might, should circumstances demand. Technical groundwork must be ready, and the political narrative must reinforce that India’s strategic silence is a choice, not a constraint.
Conclusion
India’s nuclear posture has long stood for strength under control. The global signals now warn that the nuclear lid may be lifting. In that context, India must avoid both complacency and rash action. The wiser path now: sustain deterrence capability, maintain strategic calm, keep testing as a last resort, not a first. When the rest of the world shifts, India must be ready to respond but not provoked into reacting.