undersea-cable-wars-how-submarine-cables-became-a-geopolitical-target

Sat Mar 28 17:49:21 IST 2026

It was the day of the Blood Moon—a total lunar eclipse. But Sunday, September 7, 2025, marked another kind of eclipse: an internet failure that caused digital darkness in parts of India, south Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The reason: the severing of submarine cables in the Red Sea.

Whether accidental or deliberate, the incident revealed a reality that remains largely unknown to the wider world: a war seems to be brewing in the depth of the oceans. Governments across the world are waking up to a stark vulnerability—one capable of crippling communications, financial systems and information flows within seconds. And there is not much the governments can do, because submarine cables have never been designed for war situations.

Escalating tensions in the Middle East have sharpened this realisation. Two strategic choke points—the Strait of Hormuz (between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman) and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden)—carry a dense web of strategically important submarine cables.

The threat is amplified by geography: the Hormuz Strait is relatively shallow, barely 150-200 metres deep, while the Bab el-Mandeb Strait remains under the influence of Houthi forces in Yemen. Narrow sea lanes, the risk of mines and volatile geopolitics have together created such a fragile environment that any submarine cable disruption could now take very long to resolve.

One of the most disruptive incidents for India happened in 2008, when submarine cables in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf were severed. There were suspicions of sabotage, but they were never officially confirmed.

“Nearly 60 per cent of India’s Europe-to-India connectivity was affected in the form of slow internet and greater latency due to the re-routing efforts required,” said Soham Agarwal, a submarine cable expert and associate fellow at National Maritime Foundation, Delhi.

More recently, in March 2024, multiple cables in the Red Sea corridor were damaged amid rising hostilities in the region. Fingers were pointed towards the pro-Iran Houthi rebels, who had been targeting ships since November 2023. With Iran now directly engaged in conflict with the US and Israel, the risks have risen manifold. Major undersea cables to India—such as Google’s Blue-Raman, Bharti Airtel’s 2Africa and Sea-Me-We 6, and Reliance Jio’s India-Europe Xpress—all pass through the Red Sea.

Nearly 99 per cent of global communication—supporting everything from military operations and financial transactions to health care and education—flow through these undersea cable networks. These cables are the exposed arteries of our digital civilisation—carrying an estimated $10 trillion in daily financial transfers, enabling 400 million voice calls per minute, and facilitating 15 million video conferences.

Said Vice Admiral Sanjay Vatsayan, vice chief of the Indian Navy: “The Navy is fully aware of the challenges that are increasingly coming up. There have been instances of disruptions and we are looking at it from the Navy’s perspective—as to what are the capabilities we would need. Most of them are unmanned underwater capabilities, as the cables are located deep.”

In India, submarine cables and the networks are looked after by the department of telecom under the ministry of communications. “Undersea cables are certainly part of the critical infrastructure of the country,” said Rear Admiral Monty Khanna (retd). “Any resource on which a nation has high dependency, the denial of which would adversely impact its economy and security, is a potential target in combat—even in situations short of war. It is therefore imperative for us to take necessary steps to mitigate this vulnerability.”

But these cables remain remarkably exposed. Roughly 600 in number, they stretch over 1.4 million kilometres—enough to circle the earth nearly 38 times. Covered with layers of steel, rubber and polymer to withstand tremendous deep-sea pressure and marine activity-related hazards, the cables cannot be fully buried, hidden or guarded across their entire length.

There are several reasons why undersea cables are preferred over satellite links—higher bandwidth and data-carrying capacity, faster transmission, and lower costs being the main ones. Satellites are largely used as a backup for telecommunications. With demand for both data storage and bandwidth continuing to rise exponentially, this dependency on submarine cables is only expected to increase. Experts anticipate a 48 per cent surge in cable kilometres by 2040, which will only magnify the existing risks.

In March 2025, reports emerged that China had developed a deep-sea cable-cutting device capable of operating at a depth of 4,000 metres. Compact, precise and designed for submarine integration, the device reportedly has a 150mm, diamond-coated wheel that does 1,600 revolutions per minute. More than just a technological milestone, this development signals the potential weaponisation of undersea infrastructure.

Deep-sea cable wars have precedent. During the Spanish-American war of 1898, US forces severed the submarine communication cables that connected Spain with its colonies. It led to the gradual decline of the Spanish empire and the rise of America—underscoring the strategic importance of such networks.

The first submarine cable was laid in 1850 across the 33km-wide English Channel connecting England’s Dover with France’s Calais. Eight years later, in 1858, the first transatlantic telegraph cable was laid across the Atlantic Ocean to connect Ireland’s Valentia Island to Trinity Bay in Canada’s Newfoundland. The vulnerability of the cables has ever since been a concern.

“The biggest challenge in securing undersea infrastructure from sabotage is in determining the actor, and the intention of the actor,” Agarwal told THE WEEK. “Even if the AIS (automatic identification system) data helps corroborate the vessel, establishing the intention of parties is extremely challenging, as it can often be attributed to accidental damage.”

The fact is, most causes of cable damage are often accidental—that is, from bottom-trawling fishing and anchoring. Even the modus operandi for acts of sabotage often corresponds to dragging an anchor along the seabed.

“Therefore, it is difficult to say whether an incident truly is sabotage,” Agarwal said, adding that the recent incidents involving the Nord Stream pipelines in Europe and submarine cables off the coast of Taiwan suggest that disruptions have geopolitical causes and consequences.

These cable networks that crisscross the sea floor to connect continents, countries and geographies make them a prime target. The biggest concentration of these submarine cables is in the Atlantic, through which the communication between North America and Europe takes place.

“The deep-sea cables are left unattended in international waters while 99 per cent of cyber communication happens through them,” former National Security Advisory Board member Anshuman Tripathi told THE WEEK. “Any misadventure by any state or non-state actor can have very serious consequences. It is thus imperative that self-protecting and reporting technologies in these cables be upgraded and made more sophisticated to discern sabotages from accidents.”

A 2021 study by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) listed several objectives of a sabotage. “Severing a cable might achieve: cutting off military or government communications in the early stages of a conflict, eliminating internet access for a targeted population, sabotaging an economic competitor, or causing economic disruption for geopolitical purposes,” it said. This necessitated enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the maritime domain.

Reports already indicate that criminal actors are increasingly gaining access to high-end technologies like self-propelled underwater weapons, torpedoes, and even chemical and laser weapons. There are also growing possibilities of the deployment of autonomous weapons lying dormant or moving undetected along the vast seabed, only to activate at a predetermined time and place.

Another aspect of the vulnerability is the growing possibility of cyberattacks by both state and non-state actors. Such attacks could result in the immediate compromise and theft of user data, as well as the loss of control over network and management systems.

While rapid technological advances in the domain of underwater operations are increasingly available to adversarial actors, there remains a significant gap in awareness and preparedness to counter these evolving threats. This persistent vulnerability in critical infrastructure poses a clear threat to national security and commercial interests.

Submarine cables typically run along the seabed at depths of around 2,000 metres. While damaged cables can be repaired in most cases, it may take weeks for a ship and crew to reach the affected site and begin recovery and repair. By then, disruptions could result in economic losses amounting to trillions of dollars.

Estimates suggest that the average cost of repairing a submarine cable ranges from $1 million and $3 million, with the average repair time of 20.6 days—excluding restoration costs.

At depths exceeding 1,000 metres, nearly 90 per cent of cable faults remain undetected for 6-8 hours, during which a lot of damage would already have taken place. On top of it, at any given time, only about 35 per cent of global cable routes are under active monitoring.

Recent incidents point to a troubling rise in suspected sabotage. Between October 2023 and the end of 2024, more than 11 cables in the Baltic Sea were damaged, leading to suspicions in the west of deliberate interference by Russia.

These incidents have alarmed NATO, prompting it to launch a dedicated mission called ‘Baltic Sentry’ to protect undersea cables in the region from both state and non-state threats. After a meeting with leaders of Baltic nations allied with the west in January 2025, NATO secretary general Mark Rutte said, “Across the alliance, we have seen elements of a campaign to destabilise our societies through cyberattacks, assassination attempts and sabotage, including possible sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea.” Frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones have since been deployed across the Baltic maritime area to enhance surveillance and deterrence.

Concerns were raised earlier about submarine cable vulnerabilities. In 2017, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence warned of increasing risks because of “heavy reliance on undersea cables, increasing data volumes, and technological advancements to cable systems that have created new vulnerabilities”.

In February 2023, the Netherlands’ military issued a warning that Russia had begun espionage activities and appeared to be “preparing operations for disturbance and sabotage” of underwater infrastructure in the North Sea, including gas pipelines.

In December 2023, a Telegram channel affiliated to Houthi forces posted a map of submarine cables in the Red Sea, although they had earlier denied allegations of attacks on cables. Along with the map, the Houthi-affiliated group posted a message underscoring the strategic importance of Yemen as far as submarine cables were concerned.

Cable damage is not uncommon. More than 150 faults occur globally each year. Damages are mainly caused by a range of factors, including fishing and shipping activity (which accounts for about 60 per cent of the incidents), natural calamities and equipment failure. But the disruptions it can lead to can be significant.

For instance, on December 26, 2006, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake off the southern coast of Taiwan triggered massive underwater mudflows extending more than 245km. It caused submarine cables to break at 22 points, disrupting communications and slowing the internet for nearly 50 days, despite 11 cable repair ships working overtime.

Today, however, the most serious threat remains deliberate sabotage, where warring parties target each other’s undersea cable networks.

To address these growing challenges, a 40-member International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience that includes India was set up in 2024. Jointly launched by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), the advisory body “aims to strengthen the resilience of submarine cables, which are essential to the functioning of the global digital economy”. The advisory body held its inaugural virtual meeting on December 12, 2024, and followed it up with a physical meeting at the Submarine Cable Resilience Summit in Nigeria’s Abuja in February 2025.

India hosts about 17 international subsea cables across 14 landing stations— where submarine cables meet the terrestrial networks—in Mumbai, Chennai, Kochi, Thoothukudi and Thiruvananthapuram. With rapid strides in technology, the data-carrying capacity of these cables have increased from hundreds of megabits per second (Mbps) to hundreds of terabits per second (Tbps).

In India, Mumbai and Chennai have the highest concentration of submarine cables. New locations are being set up in Digha in West Bengal and Mahuva in Gujarat.

Submarine cable systems are typically financed either through private ownership or consortium models, where multiple members incur the total cost of building and operating the landing stations. Globally, a small group of companies dominates cable-laying and maintenance, including SubCom (US), Alcatel Submarine Networks and Nexans (France), Prysmian Group (Italy), NKT (Denmark), NEC (Japan), and Huawei Marine Networks (China). They collectively operate 51 cable-laying vessels.

In India, major operators include Tata Communications (five cable landing stations in Mumbai, Chennai and Kochi), Global Cloud eXchange (formerly Reliance Globalcom, with stations in Mumbai and Thiruvananthapuram), Reliance Jio (Chennai and Mumbai) and Bharti Airtel (Chennai and Mumbai), Vodafone and IOX (which is building a landing station in Puducherry). Sify Technologies and BSNL are also operating cable landing stations.

The global undersea communications cable market size is projected to reach $41 billion by 2028, with India expected to record the fastest growth in the Asia-Pacific region.

With each passing year, safeguarding submarine cables are becoming more critical. “India’s services exports in 2023-24 stood at $341 billion, with the vast majority of such services traversing through just 17 undersea cables,” Khanna said. “Our dependence on these is anticipated to increase, as India’s services exports are projected to rise to $618 billion by 2030, surpassing even our exports in merchandise.”

securing-the-seas-how-irans-cable-threats-highlight-the-need-for-maritime-security

Sat Mar 28 17:42:08 IST 2026

IT WAS WIDELY reported on March 23 that Iran threatened to target undersea internet cables in the Red Sea region. This development was reminiscent of the threats issued by the Houthi rebels in Yemen in early 2024, when they launched a sustained campaign targeting merchant ships passing through the Red Sea. Last September, several countries across West Asia and South Asia, including India, experienced significant internet disruptions owing to damage to undersea cables in the region. Although the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) attributed the cuts to accidental causes, suspicion of Houthi involvement in potential acts of subversion persists.

Against this backdrop, Iran’s targeting of merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, which has already elevated concerns over a global energy crisis, suggests that any deliberate attack on undersea cable networks in the Red Sea has the potential to cause major disruptions to internet traffic. This evolving dimension of the West Asia crisis shifts the spotlight to the depths of the oceans, where vast networks of undersea cables are increasingly becoming targets of subversion.

Around 99 per cent of global internet traffic passes through a vast network of about 500 undersea cables spanning more than 1.7 million square kilometers. These networks have virtually become the nerve centre of the information-driven globalised world. However, this very dependence has made them susceptible to sabotage and grey-zone warfare. Their vulnerability is evident from the growing instances of damage to undersea cables, especially in maritime regions that are either near zones of armed conflict or are theatres of territorial contestation or geopolitical competition. This is particularly evident from the increasing instances of damage to undersea cables in regions such as the Taiwan Strait, the Baltic Sea and the Red Sea over recent years.

There are essentially three factors that make undersea cables easy targets for grey-zone warfare. First, the unprotected and ungoverned nature of the high seas, where much of these cable networks are located, makes it easy for malicious actors to damage them. Second, they can be damaged with relative ease by employing rudimentary tactics, such as using a commercial vessel to drag its anchor over the cables. Third, malicious actors can carry out such actions with anonymity and deniability, as these cables are mostly located in remote locations and are vulnerable to accidental damage by regular shipping activity.

NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry, launched in January 2025, presents a viable operational template for protecting undersea cables against acts of subversion on the high seas. This operation involves the navies of seven European countries, which have collectively deployed warships and other naval assets in the Baltic Sea with a mandate to secure undersea cables in the region. This deployment serves three key objectives. First, it aims to deter malicious actors by establishing a visible naval presence along key Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs). Second, it seeks to establish sustained monitoring of the region through multi-layered surveillance using various naval assets, including warships, aircraft, submarines and maritime drones. Third, it facilitates information sharing and data collation among the participating navies, thereby collectively enhancing their Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA).

Operation Baltic Sentry, however, also demonstrates how securing undersea cables can be a highly resource- and technology-intensive effort involving multiple naval platforms and advanced surveillance technologies. It is here that the advent of new-age maritime technologies, such as Autonomous Surface Vehicles (ASVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), can play a crucial role. Operation Baltic Sentry, as well as the UK’s Atlantic Bastion Programme launched in December, has been extensively utilising these technologies to continuously monitor undersea cables and pipelines.

At India’s first International Subsea Cable Systems Conference in Delhi last year, the chairman of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) highlighted the need to rapidly expand the country’s undersea cable infrastructure to meet its growing data demands. In this context, envisaging robust operational and policy frameworks to protect these cables becomes imperative for safeguarding India’s critical data infrastructure.

India can assume a leadership role in partnering with other key stakeholders in the Indian Ocean to pool naval resources and technical capabilities to secure undersea cables in the region. While this can serve as a deterrence strategy akin to Operation Baltic Sentry, India must also initiate efforts to build greater resilience in this domain. This includes the acquisition of dedicated cable-laying and repair vessels, which India currently lacks and for which it relies on foreign ships to undertake repairs.

In March 2025, China unveiled a powerful deep-sea cable-cutting device, raising concerns among several nations, including India. This device underscored how such technologies could enable nations to discreetly damage critical undersea cables and thereby disrupt global communications. Iran’s latest threats, if true, also have the potential to cause wide-ranging internet disruptions affecting many nations, including India. These developments are indicative of the urgent need to protect undersea cables in an increasingly tumultuous global environment.

Vignesh is associate fellow with the Military Affairs Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA).

persian-gulf-under-threat-the-economic-ramifications-of-blocked-shipping-lanes

Sat Mar 28 17:37:21 IST 2026

THE ISRAELI ATTACK on Iran’s gas field in South Pars on March 20 marked a dangerous escalation in the war which erupted on February 28. This was followed by Iranian retaliation across the Gulf, in which a number of oil and gas installations in the Gulf states were hit. This included the Ras Laffan plant in Qatar. The plant, which was already shut down, suffered further damage.

Qatar said the repair work would take up to five years. US President Donald Trump distanced himself from the Israeli strike and said that neither the US nor Qatar had any knowledge of it, and Iran did not know this. Trump added that he had advised Israel against attacks on energy installations in future. The price of Brent crude, an international benchmark, jumped to $106.41 per barrel. It has since come down to $99.46 per barrel. The Indian crude oil basket has crossed $157 per barrel. It was trading at $70.86 per barrel on the eve of the war. An increase of $1 per barrel adds Rs14,000 crore to India’s annual import bill.

The second oil price shock was triggered by the loss of 10 per cent of global production in 1979. We may now be seeing the beginning of the third oil price shock. Its effect will be much worse since this time global gas supplies are also affected. The closure of the Ras Laffan plant has resulted in a loss of 20 per cent of the world’s LNG supply.

As the war has progressed, a rift has appeared in the Trump administration. The US counter-terrorism chief Joe Kent has resigned. In a post on X, he said Iran posed “no imminent threat” to the US. He added that the Trump administration “started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby”. Tulsi Gabbard, the director of the US national intelligence, in a testimony to the US Congress, said that “Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme was obliterated” in the US strikes last June. She added that “there have been no efforts since then to try to rebuild their enrichment capability”. She stopped short of contradicting Trump and did not give a direct answer to the question of whether Iran posed any imminent danger to the US. She said that this determination could only be made by the president.

Much the same was said by Oman’s foreign minister Badr al-Busaidi, who was the mediator in the US-Iran negotiations. He said in an interview on February 27 that a “peace deal is within our reach”. Israel and the US launched their attack against Iran the following day. The assassination of Iran’s supreme leader and exhortations to the Iranian people to rise against the government made clear that the aims went beyond the nuclear issue to regime change. The disastrous consequences have affected not only the countries in the region but also the entire international community.

Trump asked China, NATO countries, Japan, South Korea and Australia to send naval units to work with the US Navy to open the Persian Gulf. He also announced that measures would be taken to bring down insurance rates for ships and cargo transiting the Persian Gulf. But nothing happened. China remained non-committal even though Trump announced postponing his visit to that country. Nor has NATO come forward to provide naval units. Germany’s defence minister declared that this is not “our war”. Japan, South Korea and Australia have also refused to provide contingents to open up the strategic waterway. The quickest way to open the Persian Gulf for international navigation is to stop Israeli and US bombing of Iran. It is unrealistic that one side can continue the war while the other side will exercise restraint.

In order to check the steep increase in oil prices, Trump has announced two far-reaching concessions. The US lifted sanctions on the supply of Russian crude oil on the high seas. The supreme irony is that the US also had to lift sanctions on Iranian crude oil while it is at war with that country.

The closure of the Persian Gulf is not simply a result of kinetic action by Iran. Seven of the largest insurance companies have stopped providing war-risk insurance cover to ships and cargo transiting through the Gulf. This situation is worse than the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. At the time, rates went up, but war-risk coverage was still available.

On March 21, Trump gave a 48-hour ultimatum to Iran to open the Persian Gulf, failing which he threatened to bomb Iran’s power plants. Iran said it would hit power plants in Gulf countries. Trump has since announced his decision to postpone the attack for five days and also offered to negotiate. A 15-point US offer has reportedly been submitted to Iran via Pakistan. Iran, which has its own conditions, has denied that it has agreed to negotiate.

Indian ships have been allowed by Iran to cross the Hormuz Strait. But External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has stated that India does not have “blanket” permission. India gets 30 per cent of its crude oil and 25 per cent of its LNG from the Gulf. The latter presents a far more grim situation. Unlike oil, where India has strategic reserves, LNG storage poses problems. Supply of gas to industry has been cut. A partial hike in petrol prices has also been announced. India imports 60 per cent of its LPG requirement from the Gulf region. The loss of supply has been partially offset by increasing domestic production by changing the product mix of refineries.

Differences have also surfaced between US and Israeli war aims. While Trump is looking for an off-ramp, Israel has intensified its bombing against Iran, as well as against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

There is a need for an immediate end to the war and the opening of the Persian Gulf to international navigation. This has to be followed up with the resumption of negotiations on the nuclear issue from where they were left off in Geneva on the eve of the war.

The author was ambassador to Iran and director, GAIL.

himalayan-challenge-the-high-stakes-of-nepals-parliamentary-polls

Sat Feb 28 15:46:42 IST 2026

KATHMANDU

Across the rugged mountains, lush valleys and teeming cities, Nepal is preparing for parliamentary elections scheduled for March 5. At first glance, the preparations resemble the familiar rhythm of democracy: volunteers handing out sample ballots in rural villages, banners fluttering across city streets and the local media reporting on rallies and speeches. Yet beneath this surface, the election is more than a routine political exercise. It is a test of Nepal’s institutions, a measure of governance and a reflection of generational change.

In small villages, volunteers are moving from house to house, explaining the mechanics of voting and patiently answering questions from citizens. “It is important that every citizen understands how to cast a valid vote,” says 22-year-old volunteer Ritu Shrestha. “If you stray outside the box, your vote will not count.” The effort reflects a broader initiative by the election commission to reduce invalid votes and foster civic engagement.

Meanwhile, in urban centres such as Kathmandu, Pokhara, Biratnagar and Jhapa, the tone is different, with Gen Z emerging as a politically engaged and digitally connected electorate. Students are livestreaming debates, fact-checking party manifestos and sharing clips of campaign speeches on social media. Political discussions have migrated from the narrow alleyways of old city neighbourhoods to the endless feeds of digital platforms. This generation approaches politics with scepticism and curiosity, demanding accountability and transparency. They question promises, challenge inconsistencies and are quick to compare rhetoric with past performance. Their engagement is both a reflection of their aspirations and a reminder that Nepali democracy is entering a new, digitally mediated era.

The elections are also a test of security and state capacity. Home Minister Om Prakash Aryal has emphasised that safety and order are central to the electoral process. Since the dissolution of parliament, authorities have deployed the army, the police, and the national investigation department under an integrated security plan. Provincial and district command posts monitor potential threats daily, and special attention is being given to residual risks from the Gen Z movement last year, during which prisoners escaped and weapons were looted. Officials report that most of these weapons have been recovered and that escaped prisoners no longer pose a significant threat, yet sporadic clashes continue to remind citizens of the fragility of security.

Complicating the security environment is Nepal’s open border with India, which is vital for trade, energy and the movement of people. It also presents risks of cross-border crime, smuggling and political influence. Intelligence-sharing mechanisms between the two countries help monitor potential threats and ensure the smooth conduct of elections. Political parties walk a fine line, emphasising sovereignty publicly while relying on regional cooperation to maintain stability and secure logistics. This dynamic illustrates how Nepal’s domestic politics are deeply intertwined with regional geopolitics, creating layers of complexity that extend beyond the ballot box.

Economic ambition is also dominating party platforms, yet the feasibility of these promises raises questions. Nepal’s current GDP hovers around 6.1 trillion rupees, or roughly $40 billion. The Communist Party of Nepal (UML) pledges to expand it to 100 trillion rupees in five years and 200 trillion in ten. The Nepali Congress targets 115 trillion rupees in five years, emphasising large-scale mobilisation of both public and private investment. Achieving sustained high growth will require structural reforms: expanding industrial capacity, developing hydropower resources, diversifying exports, streamlining infrastructure projects and ensuring policy continuity. Historical growth rates of 4–5 per cent over the past decade highlight the magnitude of the challenge.

The stakes are particularly high for education and employment, which are central to the concerns of young voters. The Nepali Congress promises to allocate 20 per cent of the national budget to education, reform university governance and ensure the timely distribution of textbooks. The CPN-UML emphasises employment-oriented and digitally integrated curricula under a framework it describes as “earn while you learn”. The Rastriya Swatantra Party seeks to depoliticise schools and universities, removing party affiliations from teachers while introducing inclusive modern educational institutions across provinces. For young voters, education is not merely a domestic issue; it is a pathway to international opportunities and a hedge against the need for migration, which has long shaped Nepal’s labour and social dynamics.

Employment promises are equally ambitious. The Nepali Congress projects the creation of 1.5 million jobs over five years, while CPN-UML targets 500,000 annually, including positions in the burgeoning information technology sector. The Rastriya Swatantra Party emphasises digital employment, remote work and programmes to attract foreign talent and facilitate cross-border services. Yet millions of Nepalis still depend on remittances from labour migration. Reducing reliance on foreign employment without creating viable domestic opportunities could intensify economic pressures on families and communities.

Health care and social welfare also feature prominently in party manifestos. Health insurance, province-level speciality centres, integration of mental health services and capped private hospital fees are recurring themes. Social security initiatives encompass pensions for farmers, allowances for mothers, disability support and programmes targeting vulnerable age groups. Implementation, however, remains a formidable challenge. Fiscal constraints and administrative limitations could hinder the expansion of these programmes.

Representation and inclusivity are central yet contested issues. Women and marginalised communities often remain underrepresented despite public commitments to equity. Ticket allocation frequently favours politically connected elites, reflecting patterns that persist even among newer political parties.

Nepal’s institutions like the judiciary, bureaucracy and police are facing intense scrutiny during this electoral cycle. The judiciary is perceived as politicised, with appointments often reflecting party allegiance. Bureaucrats are sometimes partisan, undermining neutral policy implementation. Police practices remain uneven, particularly with regard to dalits and other marginalised communities, reminding citizens that law enforcement continues to grapple with legacy issues of bias. Economic growth, social reform and democratic legitimacy hinge on the effectiveness and impartiality of these institutions.

Social media, digital campaigning and Gen Z activism have transformed the electoral landscape. Youth engagement is increasingly digital. While digital platforms offer unprecedented opportunities for accountability, they also magnify the risks of misinformation. Security agencies are coordinating with regional partners to monitor potential threats, reflecting the transnational nature of modern electoral oversight.

Nepal’s relationship with India, youth activism, economic uncertainty and institutional weaknesses have converged to make this election more than a contest for parliamentary seats. It is a referendum on governance, institutional integrity and the nation’s capacity to meet the expectations of its citizens. Volunteers distributing sample ballots may appear minor, yet they symbolise the lifeblood of democracy, connecting citizens with the process, the promises and the possibilities of political participation.

Nepali democracy has always been fragile, shaped by complex geography, historical legacies and regional interdependencies. This election, characterised by the interplay of economic ambition, generational activism, institutional performance and regional diplomacy, could define the nation’s trajectory for decades.

The stakes are particularly high for Gen Z voters who bring digital literacy, global awareness and scepticism to the political process. Their engagement may determine whether the promises of political elites are scrutinised, challenged and ultimately delivered.

The true story of this elections will be written in the years that follow, in whether Nepal can convert the energy of a digitally connected youth, the vigilance of civil society and the commitment of institutions into enduring progress. The ballots themselves are a tool, but what they produce—equity, growth, accountability and opportunity—will determine the future of the nation.

The writer is a journalist in Kathmandu.

power-of-resistance-rebuilding-bangladeshs-parliamentary-pillars-rashed-al-mahmud-titumir

Sat Feb 28 15:39:45 IST 2026

AS BANGLADESH enters a new political phase after prolonged authoritarian rule and the election of a new government, attention has focused on the transfer of power. History offers a hard lesson. Democracy does not consolidate because rulers change. It stabilises only when institutions function. Among these, none is more essential than a responsible parliamentary opposition.

The mass uprising of 2024 did not merely remove a regime. It created a structural opening to rebuild the state. Political reform, constitutional redesign and electoral integrity have since dominated debate. Yet one foundational question remains. Parliament cannot become the centre of democratic life without an institutionalised, empowered and responsible opposition.

Democracy is defined not by the strength of government alone, but by the balance between authority, scrutiny, mandate and accountability. Opposition is not an accessory, but rather a structural pillar. Without it, parliament risks becoming formally intact but substantively hollow.

The structural roots

Bangladesh’s political history reveals a recurring paradox. Opposition has existed, but rarely within parliament in a meaningful way. Instead, political contestation has repeatedly moved to the streets. This pattern is not cultural. It is institutional.

The first cause is the systematic marginalisation of the opposition inside parliament. Parties have historically lacked guaranteed procedural rights and meaningful roles. Their influence depended less on constitutional entitlement and more on executive tolerance. Legislation routinely passed with minimal scrutiny. Opposition amendments rarely shaped outcomes. Parliamentary committees, the backbone of oversight in functioning democracies, often reduced opposition participation to a formality.

This imbalance has deep roots. Bangladesh inherited a highly centralised state under colonial rule, designed to command compliance, not to ensure democratic deliberation. Independence transferred political authority but did not transform institutional logic. Parliament remained structurally subordinate to the executive. Over time, the imbalance intensified. After 2008, parliament increasingly took on one-party characteristics. Electoral legitimacy itself became deeply contested. Parliament continued to function as a legislative body in form but not in substance.

The second reason is Bangladesh’s inheritance of resistance politics. Street mobilisation, including protests and civil disobedience, historically resisted authoritarianism and restored democratic openings. These methods were necessary and effective. But when parliamentary institutions fail to provide meaningful channels for contestation, opposition parties rationally revert to extra-parliamentary methods.

The costs are clear. Political confrontation disrupts economic activity, weakens investor confidence and burdens workers and small enterprises. Institutional fragility translates directly into economic and social insecurity. The solution lies in institutionalisation.

The institutional imperative

The July Charter marked a historic recognition that democracy cannot endure without an empowered opposition.

First, the Charter guaranteed opposition leadership of key parliamentary oversight committees, particularly those reviewing public finance and administrative performance. Oversight cannot be credible if those being scrutinised control the scrutiny itself. Second, it secured protected parliamentary space for opposition business. The right to question policy, propose alternatives and initiate debate must exist as an institutional guarantee, not a discretionary concession. Third, it emphasised structured consultation with opposition leadership on matters of national consequence, including constitutional reform, emergencies and major strategic decisions.

Democratic stability requires not only electoral competition but shared institutional responsibility. A responsible opposition does not merely resist. It proposes. It does not merely criticise. It offers alternatives and demonstrates readiness to govern.

Beyond Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s democratic trajectory matters far beyond its borders. As one of South Asia’s largest economies, its institutional stability shapes regional investment, economic integration and democratic confidence. Democratic erosion in one country weakens confidence across the region, while consolidation strengthens it. Institutionalising a responsible opposition is a safeguard against democratic relapse. The opposition must demonstrate to the masses that it is a government in waiting.

Democracy matures when the government and opposition recognise a shared objective. A strong government and a responsible opposition are not adversaries. They allow the republic to endure. They are co-stewards of its future.

The author is adviser to Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman.

india-us-trade-inward-looking-trade-approach-likely-to-persist-beyond-trump-richard-rossow

Sat Feb 28 15:28:51 IST 2026

Interview/ Richard Rossow, senior adviser, Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies

The US sent a relatively modest delegation to the AI Impact Summit in Delhi, but corporate America was highly visible through prominent displays and CEO-level participation. Coming to India in the backdrop of the US supreme court’s scrutiny of tariffs and its impact on the India-US trade framework, Richard Rossow, senior adviser at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, says the road ahead can be bumpy as structural anxiety remains. Excerpts from an interview:

Q/ How significant is the US supreme court’s scrutiny of tariffs for India?

For US-India trade, the direct impact may be limited. Tariffs were initially deployed as leverage, but India had already moved towards a more pro-trade posture in recent years, signing agreements with multiple partners. Despite headline tariffs of 50 per cent, US-India goods trade rose by roughly 16 per cent over the past year before tapering slightly. There were several carve-outs that softened the blow.

The larger concern is uncertainty. If tariffs are imposed, struck down and then reintroduced under different legal authorities, businesses struggle to plan. That unpredictability may deter long-term investment more than the tariffs.

Q/ India’s chief negotiator was to visit Washington to finalise the trade framework. How do you view the delay, and what are the sticking points?

We are all waiting for clarity on what exactly will be included in the agreement. Important questions remain: what kind of market access will the US get in agriculture? What commitments will India make to purchase more American goods? Beyond broad announcements, the legal text and details will matter. If we can get the agreement across the finish line, it could unlock the next significant wave of American trade and investment in India.

Agriculture remains politically and socially sensitive in India. On staple grains and products tied to the minimum support price system, it is difficult to imagine major concessions. American agriculture is highly efficient and globally competitive, supported by advanced supply chains. Indian smallholder farmers, often operating with limited infrastructure and few alternative employment options, cannot compete on equal terms. That makes deep liberalisation unlikely.

Q/ You’ve argued that President Trump’s political appeal is rooted in structural economic anxiety. Do you expect a more inward-looking US trade policy to persist beyond his presidency?

Yes. President Trump’s appeal is grounded in communities that feel left behind by globalisation, industrial restructuring, trade agreements and immigration. I grew up in Michigan, once the heart of the American auto industry. Many of the manufacturing jobs that sustained entire towns no longer exist. When people believe economic change has directly harmed their livelihoods, they look for clear explanations. If trade and immigration are the only explanations consistently articulated, they will rally behind that message. It may not represent a majority of Americans, but in two of the past three elections it has been enough to bring someone to power. Because that structural anxiety remains, a more inward-looking trade approach is likely to persist as a feature of US politics, even beyond Trump.

Q/ Beyond goods trade, what emerging areas could define US-India ties under Trump 2.0?

Hydrocarbons are likely to feature prominently. The US runs roughly a two-to-one goods trade deficit with India. Expanding US exports of oil and gas could help rebalance trade flows. Defence cooperation will remain central and enjoys bipartisan support in Washington. Another potential area is encouraging greater Indian investment in the US, particularly in regions that have experienced deindustrialisation. Expanding the footprint of Indian firms in those communities could align with US domestic priorities.

Q/ How does AI intersect with the trade relationship?

AI will intersect with trade, but not primarily through traditional goods trade, which is the focus of the current agreement. There is some overlap in areas such as data centres. India has signalled its ambition to become a major data centre hub, supported by tax incentives in the recent Union budget. Several US-based multinationals have already begun investing in data infrastructure.

However, much of the AI partnership will sit outside the formal trade deal. Export controls are an important factor. Towards the end of the [Joe] Biden administration, tighter restrictions were placed on advanced AI compute chips, and India was not included on the most trusted-access list alongside NATO allies. If strategic trust deepens, India could see fewer restrictions in the future.

Q/ India has emphasised “sovereign AI.” How realistic is it, and how does it align with US interests in open data flows?

True sovereignty in AI hardware is extremely challenging. India does not currently produce advanced AI chips and is unlikely to compete at the cutting edge of foundational models. Sovereignty is crucial in national security applications such as intelligence analysis and signal processing, where reliance on foreign platforms poses risks. But beyond those areas, the AI ecosystem is deeply interconnected. Access to advanced semiconductor chips depends heavily on the US and Taiwan, and the most advanced large language models are largely developed by American companies.

If India wants access to the most powerful systems, partnership will be necessary. At the same time, India’s recent policy measures—including long-term tax incentives for data centres serving global markets—signal that it wants to remain open and integrated into global data flows, even while preserving sovereignty in sensitive domains.

Q/ Could AI become a strategic export for India, particularly to the Global South?

Yes. It could become one of India’s most significant diplomatic and economic tools. India does not export large volumes of high-end defence equipment, and its development assistance budget is modest. But affordable, scalable AI tools that enhance governance and public service delivery could be deployed across Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. India’s multilingual experience provides an advantage in building adaptable AI systems. If executed effectively, AI could position India as a development partner of choice for the Global South.

india-needs-more-than-a-summit-to-open-the-doors-to-ai-glory

Sat Feb 28 18:01:03 IST 2026

If the AI race were a Bollywood potboiler, India ended up with a ‘happily-ever-after’ with February’s India AI Impact Summit jamboree in Delhi.

Some embarrassments apart, the event was a success—lakhs of people thronged venues like the Bharat Mandapam, there was breathless media and public interest from around the world, and there was a line up of dignitaries and tech tycoons ranging from French President Emmanuel Macron to ChatGPT’s Sam Altman flanking Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the dais. It seemed like India had arrived on the global AI arena. The New Delhi Declaration at the end of the summit saw 91 nations and two international organisations signing up to work for an inclusive, secure and sustainable AI ecosystem.

Unfortunately, the AI race is more like a long-running web series than a quick movie climax. And if the initial seasons are anything to go by, the world’s most populous country is only playing a supporting role as a big consumer market, and still needs a plot twist to rise up to a starring role.

That is a hard knock for a nation that had gotten used to being the top dog in the tech pack, mainly as an IT services powerhouse. The sudden turn in technology towards AI has exposed India’s Achilles heel: its sore lack of skills, scale, capability and know-how, which could hurt its power and position en route to Viksit Bharat 2047.

The alarm bells have been ringing for a while in the corridors of power, with Modi himself making it clear during the AI Impact Summit: “We are approaching this not as a future problem but as a present imperative…. AI presents both a tremendous opportunity and a challenge for the IT sector. My vision is that India should be among the top three AI superpowers globally, not just in consumption, but in creation.”

He has a point. There was much fanfare when an Ernst & Young report put India’s AI adoption score at 53, way higher than the global average of 34, or when Stanford University recently placed India at no. 3, just after the US and China, in what it mysteriously calls an AI ‘vibrancy’ index. But the reality is a wake-up call: Indians are using a lot of AI, but are not creating anything cutting-edge in the space.

ChatGPT’s highest user base outside the US is in India, at more than 10 crore. This probably weighed on the mind of Sam Altman, CEO of its parent company OpenAI. After having billed India’s chances in the AI race as ‘hopeless’, he changed his stance just before his appearance at the summit, saying that India had the potential to be a ‘full stack AI leader’.

The odds are stacked against it right now. For one, the dominance of foreign players (US and China) is too significant, considering the heavy entry barrier ranging from computing power and requirement of resources—from electricity to water—that data centres and chip plants are thirsty for. The current geostrategic scenario means that India has access to just 38,000 high-performing graphic processing units (GPUs) that are central to the computing required for AI and large language models (LLM). Information Technology Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw announced at the summit that India will get access to an additional 20,000 GPUs in the coming weeks.

Then there is the question of skills and the knowledge base itself. Despite the plethora of ads for AI skills and crash courses, experts estimate that India might only have a few hundred qualified AI engineers. India spends a paltry 0.7 per cent of its GDP on research and development, compared to AI rivals like South Korea (above 5 per cent of GDP) and Japan (around 3.5 per cent).

“A lot of us are concerned about how India will fare in the AI era,” said India’s chief economic adviser V. Anantha Nageswaran. “The issues are… data centre resource consumption, the kind of financial requirement for the LLMs in the current ecosystem of the western world, greater localisation for domestic value creation, of course the macro question of mitigating labour market impact, navigating geopolitical constraints to hardware access including chips and, importantly, for geopolitical and security perspectives, can we continue depending on foreign models in public administration and critical sectors.”

The stakes go way beyond just getting a share of AI’s technological rewards. Perhaps like oil in the last century and the internet in the early years of this one, AI is poised to be the building block of the next wave of development, and that means the cost of losing this race would be existential. As Srinivas Padmanabhuni, CTO of AIEnsured, an AI testing platform, said, “In today’s geopolitical context, leading in AI means shaping the laws and ethics of the future. To reach the top, India must strengthen key areas: build deep AI academic capacity with large-scale cloud infrastructure, position itself as the AI voice of the Global South; create a multi-billion-dollar risk capital pool to back high-impact startups, and launch a national AI skill mission.”

How is that possible? The way out, said Kalyan Sivalenka, MD at Hyderabad Angels Fund, is to not try to outspend the US or China, but out-specialise them by using resources effectively. “We need deeper public-private partnerships to subsidise compute access for startups. The ‘AI Mission’ must move from policy to physical hardware on the ground,” he said. “We need to see more domestic family offices and tier-1 venture capitalists moving away from ‘fast-exit’ mindsets and toward ‘deep-tech’ bets. The government’s recent announcement of Rs1 lakh crore for deep tech startups is a good move.”

The government is on it. The IndiaAI Mission is at the core of the efforts to develop indigenous models and spur a domestic innovation boom, with budgets over the last couple of years allocating more and more for this space. In fact, this year’s Economic Survey mentioned AI nearly 400 times, saying, “There is no time to waste.”

Calling AI a core economic strategy instead of being just a technological race, the Economic Survey also suggested a way for India to jump in and gain a foothold on the AI gravy train: forgo the western model of top-down heavy investment in AI models, and instead focus on specific models that run on frugal expenses using local hardware and are aimed at solving uniquely Indian problems, ranging from agriculture to health care, and more. It is a theme that popped up over and over at the AI Summit as well.

“AI demands responsible adoption: it is critical for India to build a governance framework for the benefit of people, policy, and most importantly, country. Else it could derail and destroy both value and ethics,” warned Padmaja Ruparel, co-founder of IAN Group, India’s largest angel investor network.

The potential is there, with enterprise use cases showing a steady trickle that could turn into a torrent of innovation in the coming months and years. Take, for example, multinational biggie Dassault Systemes’s ‘Virtual Twins’ model that is already at work in India in firms like L&T. “Virtual Twin is a live digital version of a product, plant or project that learns from real‑world data,” explained Deepak N.G., MD, Dassault Systemes India. “AI looks at patterns in that data and gives practical suggestions like ‘this part may fail soon’, ‘you will need more of this material next week’, or ‘send this truck on a different route’, so Indian businesses can design better, run smoother and take smarter decisions every day.”

India’s challenges are fundamentally two-fold: manoeuvre within the constraints of funding and technology to come up with innovations that will take it to the next level in the AI sweepstakes, even while dealing nimbly with the question of job losses and re-skilling. “It is imperative that citizens are upskilled for AI, else we will see job losses. Transitioning into new technologies is required, and this programme will need to be scaled up across the country,” said Ruparel.

Said Vinay Maheshwari, an entrepreneur, investor and business transformation strategist: “India’s trajectory is promising, but structural gaps need urgent correction. The next 18 to 24 months will determine whether India remains a large AI market or [transforms into] a global AI innovation leader.”

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Sat Feb 28 17:58:46 IST 2026

Interview/ Anne Neuberger, former deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, the US

HER GRANDPARENTS survived the Holocaust while her parents were among passengers saved by Israeli commandos in the Entebbe hijacking. Today, Anne Neuberger teaches the world how to survive the threats of the future, be it cyberspace or the questions raised by AI. A deputy NSA for cyber and emerging technology during the Joe Biden presidency, Neuberger is a distinguished visiting fellow at Stanford University. She spoke to THE WEEK about where India could find its sweet spot in AI. Excerpts:

Q/ We first thought AI was about information, about an easy way of doing things. Now we realise it’s going to change industry, economy, governments, everything. How do nations approach that?

I think countries are starting to grapple with the promise and the perils of AI. For example, when you think about the promise in the area of drug discovery, that’s huge. And when you think about some of the risks, it is likely that AI will accelerate and scale different kinds of cyber attacks and we have infrastructure that’s not quite ready for that.

So, I think countries are starting to think about how they promote the innovation, ensure that people get trained, get comfortable using AI, [and] ensure that regulations [are] updated.

Q/ AI is going to change the way wars are fought. That involves a major strategy reboot for governments. Do you think all nations are prepared for this?

First, AI changes intelligence. There’s so much intelligence collection and analysis, there’s so much data, and that’s traditionally been a challenge. You need to make sense of it. So, the goal is to [make] AI help countries generate intelligence faster and better to prevent attacks.

And then the second piece is, countries are starting to incorporate AI in their military operations. To coordinate a set of drones, for example, or to train them on where to go based on imagery, a location or a path.

Some of the tension is around what AI systems are allowed to do autonomously and how different countries make those decisions. In countries like India and the US, for example, as democracies, we say we want to make sure a human is in the loop.

Those are the areas where policies, international agreements don’t yet exist, [but] the technology is moving very quickly.

Q/ Cyber attacks are borderless. Now with AI, do we need a new kind of understanding between nations?

Digital space has no borders. And I think cyber [warfare] and digital space is going to change to being machine against machine. It is too fast and too scaled [to have] a human defender making real-time decisions against a system. So, as a result, I think what countries need to focus on is: [have] rules around not disrupting critical infrastructure in another country.

Q/ AI raises cybersecurity threats to a new level in a country like India with a massive internet user base, but which probably doesn’t have the safeguards of western Europe or the US.

The India stack (collection of government-operated digital infrastructure systems) is a real strength in AI, because you have a digital public infrastructure system where people can do secure transactions tied to identity. Those are foundational trust roots that you can build an AI stack on top of. So, that’s the first piece.

The second piece is educating the public to be both AI savvy for all the promise it has, but also to be aware, for example, about deepfakes. It will be very important that citizens trust our law enforcement systems.

Q/ How unequal is the world going to be with AI?

When Mukesh Ambani talks about competing on tokenisation so that the costs are [affordable] and with some of what India has done with the Bhashini language models (to translate Indian languages) with making health care and agriculture models available, the key will be what it takes to scale. I’m a big believer in small language models, because I think they’re more purposefully built.

And India built a communications infrastructure as a foundational piece to scaling that.

That’s the path India has decided to take. Particularly, for example, when you’re thinking about a farmer trying to diagnose crop disease, that’s rather focused and purposeful. When the approaches are people-based, we can measure progress by how much difference a particular AI application makes, and then [think of] how to scale it.

india-bangladesh-relations-have-reached-their-lowest-point-mostafa-sarwar-farooki

Sun Feb 15 19:45:22 IST 2026

Interview/ Mostafa Sarwar Farooki, filmmaker and cultural adviser, Bangladesh

Growing up in Nakhalpara, a middle-class neighbourhood in Dhaka where storytelling was a daily ritual, Mostafa Sarwar Farooki first picked up a video camera to capture fragments of his childhood. One frame, still vivid in his memory, is of him unconsciously copying a famous photograph of the renowned filmmaker Satyajit Ray at work, an image rooted in the shared cultural imagination of India and Bangladesh. Cinema and cricket, cultural spaces shared by the two countries, shaped Farooki’s imagination and helped his films travel across borders, resonating deeply in India. Yet he has not visited the country for three years.

After the 2024 student-led protests, Farooki was appointed cultural adviser in the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus. Today, he finds himself in an unusual place for a filmmaker. He works from Sheikh Hasina’s former residence, overseeing its transformation into a museum documenting the July uprising. The long road, flanked by manicured gardens with scattered sculptures on its edges, which once led into Hasina’s residence, now opens into an ordinary office. This is where Farooki sits, guarded by armed security personnel in police fatigues. “Although this is not the regular office of the cultural minister, I have to sit here as I am also working as the curatorial director and chief planner of the museum,” he says, in an exclusive interview with THE WEEK. On ties with India, he says recovery is possible only through honest introspection. Edited excerpts:

Q/ As a filmmaker who has brought real-life experiences to the screen, how do you see society in Bangladesh changing today?

Any mass uprising or revolution is essentially a cultural event to me. Yes, it has a political expression and political results are the apparent goal, but it is the cultural fault lines that cause the political earth to shake. Big uprisings offer people an opportunity to reflect, to think about who they are, where they have come from, how they have reached here, and where they need to go from here. In this process, many things come out which were probably swept under the carpet for years. This is a challenging phase, to process all this and find a balanced path for the future.

Q/ Cinema is largely influenced by the society we live in. How has it shaped your storytelling?

If I look back and try to understand my creative process of making a film, it starts from a trigger point. It can be a singular image, a key moment in a story, or a certain condition of a character. When I am moved by these, it starts giving me anxiety and sleepless nights. I let this anxiety grow in me. After a period, if it fades and doesn’t give me pain anymore, I know I don’t need to make a film out of it. If the pain or anxiety or emotional distress still stays with me, I know I have to make the film and transfer the pain onto the audience’s shoulders. This is my way of self-healing. Which is why I think my films are like my diaries. All my characters seem to have popped straight out of the world I live in, interact with, or come to know about.

Q/ Bangladesh has a powerful history shaped by language, resistance and liberation. Today, edifices that once defined it have crumbled.

We have a long history of living under oppression. We lived under double colonialism—of the British and the zamindars. We saw how the dream of an independent state of Bengal was shattered and Bengal was divided, which left us with a singular option of having an independent state of our own, Pakistan. Soon, we realised that ‘freedom’ was still a far cry. So our history has been a complex one. However, in recent years, we were forced to accept a one-sided narrative of what actually happened. After the uprising, it naturally resulted in some chaos, as has happened in many countries. But at the same time, it is also true that Bangladeshi people took control of things quickly, which is a sign that we are heading towards evolution. We will go through rough rides, but we will get there.

Q/ Talking about freedom, how do you see assaults on freedom of expression, journalists, artists and others?

Freedom of expression is fundamental for any society. However, societies often struggle to ensure this. For example, the country you come from has long struggled on this front. Even societies that appear modern have their own limitations. As for attacks on singers, journalists and the freedom of the press, it is difficult to answer if you do not specify. If you are referring to the heinous arson attacks on Prothom Alo and The Daily Star, they are absolutely despicable, and the government has already arrested a large number of accused persons. Press freedom is not under any sort of threat under this government. Yes, there have been a few incidents where some Baul programmes (the mystic folk music tradition of Bengal) were initially stopped, which we later organised.

The fact is that Bangladesh has seen unprecedented cultural activity over the past year in terms of diversity, inclusivity and variety. From musical performances at shrines to Baul programmes, rock and rap, there has never been a better time in terms of cultural programmes organised by the ministry of cultural affairs. For the first time in Bangladesh’s history, all ethnic groups came together and joined the central Noboborsho rally at Shahbag, creating the biggest and most colourful rally in our history. Earlier, it was reserved only for the dominant Bengali population. The ministry has celebrated Eid, Buddha Purnima, Durga Puja and Christmas again, for the first time.

You know about Lalon, right? Probably the most influential philosopher, poet and musical maestro this land has ever produced. His verses gave a new meaning to humanity, beyond race, caste and religion. His questions challenged the religious status quo in many ways. This great maestro has long been admired by the people, but the state and establishment never dared to accommodate him due to perceived sensitivities. The interim government has declared his death anniversary as the highest-level culturally important national day, alongside Tagore and Kazi Nazrul. We organised programmes in all districts, with Kushtia and Dhaka being the main centres. The Kushtia Lalon Mela saw an unprecedented one and a half million visitors celebrating Lalon songs, which are among the most secular in nature.

On Victory Day, December 16, songs from Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (the clandestine radio station during the 1971 war) were performed in all 64 districts to celebrate the victory in our Liberation War. So, contrary to the propaganda narrative being circulated, culturally the interim government has proved to be more active and inclusive.

Now let me return to the main point. Arson attacks on newspaper offices did not begin during our term. Attacks on Bauls, for that matter, have not happened for the first time either. No attacks are justified in any way. But my problem lies with how this is being narrated. It is being presented as if all these changes began after the fascist fled to India or as a result of the interim government’s complicity. That is not true. Newspapers like Shongram and Amar Desh had their offices burned down by the fascist government. Bauls have regularly come under attack over the years. Does that mean we are complicit in unlawful activities? No. Should this continue as it did before? No. But you must recognise the challenges this government is facing.

Q/ What challenges are you referring to?

We inherited a system that was completely broken. The entire police force went into hiding after the fall of the fascist regime. There was virtually no police presence for a couple of weeks. Rebuilding a police force that had been heavily accused of mass killings during the July uprising was not an easy task. I would say it will take several more years to make it fully functional.

If you look at the history of popular uprisings and revolutions around the world, you will see that they come with their own challenges. People tend to take matters into their own hands because uprisings make them aware of the power they wield—the same power that toppled a tough ruler. Uprisings and revolutions are therefore not normal times. However, occasional lapses in law and order should not be attributed to the uprising itself. They should instead be attributed to the system of repression built by fascist regimes. That system was bound to collapse, creating chaos and a vacuum. It takes time to fill that void and restore order.

Despite this, we managed to keep things moving and are approaching a democratic transition. I hope and believe that history will judge us fairly.

Q/ The strongest thread of shared culture between India and Bangladesh seems to have come under strain. How do you see this relationship changing in the coming days?

Nations are often obsessed with their past. However, diplomatic relations and friendships between countries are mostly driven by the present. Nations become friends based on shared interests and mutual respect in the present. We had a war with Pakistan; does that mean we should forever exchange hatred? India–Bangladesh relations have reached their lowest point, let us accept that. Let us also identify and accept the reasons that brought us here. Only then will we find a way forward.

The starting point of Bangladesh–India relations should be acceptance of the people’s will, as expressed through the July uprising. India is currently hosting those who fled Bangladesh following the uprising. What are Bangladeshis’ main grievances? I would ask you to put yourself in our position and reflect. As an Indian, you would not welcome interference from another country. Bangladeshis want the same simple thing. We want friendship with our neighbours, but that friendship must begin with mutual respect and a genuine commitment.

Q/ Bangladesh chose to pull out of the T20 World Cup, leading to a major controversy that also involved Pakistan. What possible steps can be taken to salvage the situation?

To be honest, cricket lost big time. Bangladesh sought a change of venues citing valid reasons. In the past, India, Pakistan and Australia have made similar requests and had them granted. Bangladesh, however, was denied the same consideration. As a result, trust in the idea of fairness has taken a serious hit. I do not know exactly how this can be repaired, but restoring that trust has to come first. There is no doubt that India is the biggest player in the cricket economy. But that position also comes with responsibilities. I hope India plays its part and helps restore confidence in the cricketing world by placing the principle of fairness above everything else.

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Sat Feb 14 15:21:21 IST 2026

Over the past decade, India–UAE relations have acquired a rare quality in today’s turbulent geopolitics: stability combined with steady deepening. The UAE has emerged as India’s anchor partner in the Middle East, a status reaffirmed by the visit of UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) last month. The visit was rich with outcomes, underscoring the maturity and strategic depth the relationship has attained. Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to the UAE in 2015, this was the 11th leadership-level engagement—testimony to the priority both sides attach to the partnership.

What makes the relationship distinct is its generational continuity. The visits of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed in September 2024 and Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum in April 2025—both at the prime minister’s invitation—were not merely symbolic. They produced concrete outcomes across defence, nuclear cooperation, energy, education and economic engagement, reinforcing the sense that India–UAE ties are being future-proofed.

India’s vital stakes in the Gulf are well recognised in New Delhi. Nearly nine million Indians live and work in the region, while bilateral trade with the Gulf accounts for close to $180 billion. Against this backdrop, inviting MbZ as chief guest for India’s Republic Day in 2017 was a strategic signal. That visit culminated in the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, laying the foundation for the rapid expansion of ties. The momentum accelerated further with the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2022—the UAE’s first CEPA and India’s first in the Middle East. The accompanying vision document outlined an ambitious, forward-looking roadmap.

High levels of trust have encouraged both countries to experiment with new, and often pioneering, initiatives. Education is a case in point. The UAE became the first country to host overseas campuses of India’s premier institutions, with IIT Delhi in Abu Dhabi and IIM Ahmedabad in Dubai now fully operational. These campuses enhance the global profile of Indian higher education while serving the aspirations of the Indian diaspora. Financial and technological cooperation have been equally innovative. The UAE was the first country to build its domestic debit-card system, the Jaywan Card, on India’s RuPay platform, and the first major trading partner with which India agreed to conduct trade in national currencies. Already, over 9 per cent of bilateral trade is settled in rupees and dirhams.

People-to-people and cultural ties have also been institutionalised. To serve the needs of 266 CBSE-affiliated schools with more than 4.7 lakh students in the Gulf, the CBSE opened its first overseas office in Dubai in 2024. The inauguration of the BAPS Hindu Temple in Abu Dhabi by Modi in 2024—the largest in the Middle East—stands as a powerful symbol of the UAE’s inclusive ethos and the confidence underpinning bilateral ties.

MbZ’s recent visit added further substance. Outcomes ranged from a defence cooperation framework and a joint space initiative to a $200 billion bilateral trade target, collaboration on artificial intelligence, data embassies, infrastructure investment, small modular nuclear reactors, a supercomputing cluster in India and a ten-year LNG supply agreement. Particularly significant was the signing of a letter of intent towards a strategic defence partnership, a timely development given the evolving security architecture in the region.

The UAE’s role as a long-term investor in India’s growth story is now firmly established. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority’s $1 billion commitment to India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Master Fund in 2017 was an early signal of intent. Since then, the UAE has emerged as India’s seventh-largest source of foreign direct investment, with cumulative inflows exceeding $22 billion, much of it directed towards infrastructure.

CEPA’s early results have been encouraging. Bilateral trade has grown by 37 per cent since 2022–23, prompting leaders to set an ambitious target of $200 billion by 2032. With India’s exports to the UAE rising 28 per cent last year to $36 billion and imports increasing 41 per cent to $64 billion, the target appears achievable. At a time when unilateral tariffs by the United States threaten to dampen export growth, deeper engagement with reliable partners like the UAE provides a valuable buffer. Beyond numbers, CEPA has strengthened trust between businesses and investors, generating positive spillovers in investment and supply-chain integration.

New trade-facilitation initiatives further reflect this pragmatic ambition. Bharat Mart at Jebel Ali is expected to give a major boost to Indian MSME exporters seeking access to global markets. The proposed Bharat–Africa Setu aims to leverage DP World’s logistics footprint across Africa with India’s export strengths, spanning West Asia, Africa and Eurasia. The Virtual Trade Corridor announced during Sheikh Khaled’s visit is close to becoming operational, with potential benefits not only for bilateral trade but also for broader connectivity initiatives such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.

Cooperation in civil nuclear energy marks another strategic frontier. Building on the MoU signed in September 2024, both sides have agreed to explore partnerships in advanced nuclear technologies, including large reactors, small modular reactors, plant operations, maintenance, and nuclear safety. With the UAE generating nearly a quarter of its domestic electricity from nuclear power—the only GCC country to do so—the complementarities are evident. This collaboration aligns well with India’s clean-energy commitments and recent legislative initiatives.

The significance of President MbZ’s visit, however, goes beyond the announced agreements. Intra-GCC political dynamics, which have dominated headlines in recent weeks, carry implications for India’s interests. Navigating the Middle East requires constant recalibration—deepening ties without becoming entangled—guided by India’s principles of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. In this complex landscape, the UAE has consistently proved to be a trusted, all-weather partner.

The writer is distinguished fellow, JSW School of Public Policy, IIM Ahmedabad and former ambassador to the UAE and the Maldives.

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Sun Feb 08 11:25:38 IST 2026

Days after the European Union and India concluded the largest free trade agreement either has ever negotiated, Finland finds itself at the crossroads of multiple opportunities with India. As Prime Minister Petteri Orpo prepares to visit New Delhi for the AI Impact Summit, and India gears up to host the World Circular Economy Forum in partnership with Finland’s Innovation Fund Sitra, Helsinki is positioning itself as a key bridge between Europe and India. In an exclusive interview with THE WEEK, Ambassador Kimmo Lähdevirta outlines how the new FTA will reshape economic ties, how Finnish clean-tech and circular economy solutions can help Indian cities and the opportunities for Indian students and professionals in Finland. Edited excerpts:

How do you see the free trade agreement reshaping economic ties between India and Europe, particularly Finland?

Well, I think concluding the negotiations on the free trade agreement was a historic milestone. It is actually the largest trade deal that either side has made so far. It is obviously important for both parties, for both India and the EU.

We strongly believe that the agreement will increase trade and investment in both directions and deepen political ties between India and the EU as well. What is also important in the present-day world is that it increases stability and predictability.

At the moment, trade in goods and services between India and Finland is about €3 billion altogether, counting both imports and exports. Considering the benefits the FTA will bring, I think we should aim to double trade by 2032, as has been estimated could happen.

Which sectors between India and Finland stand to gain the most from this deal?

Finland mostly exports industrial goods to India. We have strong areas such as machinery, including energy production, and telecoms manufacturers like Nokia. Everything related to those sectors will be important, but there are also many other sectors that we see as benefiting.

Beyond tariffs, how does Finland view India as a long-term supply chain partner?

India is becoming increasingly important for us and for Europe as a whole. I see good prospects for further cooperation in this area because, in the present-day world, we need to make supply chains more resilient. As mentioned earlier, increasing stability and predictability in this sector is very important today.

Stepping back to the broader relationship, how would you describe India–Finland ties today, and what are Finland’s top priorities for the next five years?

I would say that the relations are strong and growing. We already have 75 years of diplomatic ties behind us, and trade, as I said, is now about €3 billion annually.

We have over 100 Finnish companies doing business in India and about 20 Indian companies in Finland. There are direct flights between our capitals, and tourism and business ties are expanding.

Over the next five years, we will continue to promote our DESI+M approach, increasing cooperation especially in these areas. Another important priority is to fully utilise the potential provided by the free trade agreement. Doubling bilateral trade would be a good goal.

This year, in particular, we also have a very important goal, as India will host the World Circular Economy Forum towards the end of the year in cooperation with Finland and the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra.

You have travelled widely across India. Which states matter most for Finland, particularly in manufacturing?

Most Finnish companies are present in Maharashtra, West Bengal, Gujarat and, of course, the Delhi region. These are the main hubs.

This is also reflected in where we have our diplomatic missions or honorary consulates. The most recent addition was in Ahmedabad in June, where we appointed Mr Kulin Lalbhai as our honorary consul.

Finnish companies also operate more widely across other states, in a variety of sectors.

You often refer to the DESI+M framework. Why were these pillars chosen, and which are delivering results today?

We feel these areas leverage our core strengths. The pillars stand for digitalisation, education, sustainability and innovation, and we now also add M, meaning mobility.

These align well with India’s ambitious national initiatives such as Digital India, Skill India and Clean India.

We have active projects, for example cooperation between the Government of Punjab and the University of Turku in teacher training. I also mentioned the World Circular Economy Forum, which will be hosted in India, with the Central Pollution Control Board as the executing agency.

On innovation, we have Slush in Finland, one of the leading global startup financing events, and strong cooperation with Indian startup communities. We also have business-to-business partnerships in technology manufacturing, with companies such as Nokia, Wärtsilä and Kone.

Regarding mobility, India is one of our most important partners under the Talent Boost programme, through which we aim to attract talent from India to Finland. We are finalising an MoU on migration and mobility.

In areas such as AI, 5G and 6G, where do you see the most practical collaboration emerging?

Our cooperation is moving beyond traditional trade towards a shared mission for a sustainable future. The World Circular Economy Forum is a good example.

We see opportunities to bring Finnish expertise and innovations to scale in India. Artificial intelligence and 6G are areas where Finland has considerable expertise.

It is not just about faster networks, but about providing digital tools for many other applications, including the circular economy. Advanced technology and sustainability go hand in hand in building a greener and more resilient world.

Where can Finnish clean-tech and circular economy solutions most realistically help Indian cities?

First, it is important to identify sources of pollution. We have advanced monitoring technologies and clean-tech sensors that can locate pollution sources in real time.

We also offer solutions in waste management, renewable energy and decarbonisation, including reducing emissions in construction. Finnish companies are partnering with Indian firms to convert agricultural waste into bioenergy and plastic waste into new packaging. These solutions work best when paired with local urban planning and circular economy principles.

India and Finland signed a defence MoU in 2020. How has that progressed?

There has been relatively limited progress in practice so far, but several Finnish companies have expressed interest in India.

We do our best to ensure they have relevant information about the market and regulatory environment. This area is interesting for both sides, especially now that the EU and India have agreed on a security and defence partnership, which provides a solid basis for further cooperation.

Since joining NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, what has changed in practical terms for Finland’s security?

We see NATO as a source of security. A regular poll conducted last year showed that about 75 per cent of Finns feel NATO membership strengthens their sense of security.

Our security rests on four pillars: national defence capability, NATO deterrence and defence, defence cooperation, and total defence involving the whole of society.

Since accession, we have increased personnel in NATO structures, strengthened coordination mechanisms and conducted joint military exercises in Finland and abroad. We have also approved eight NATO treaties within one year, including the Status of Forces Agreement and the Paris Protocol.

What is Finland’s position on the Russia–Ukraine war, and what does it consider a ‘just peace’?

We continue to condemn Russia’s illegal and unjustified war of aggression and support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Only Ukraine can decide what conditions it considers just.

We call for a full, unconditional ceasefire to allow space for meaningful talks and to end human suffering.

Finland will continue its unwavering support for Ukraine. Since February 2022, our assistance has exceeded €4 billion, including humanitarian aid and military support. Around 48,000 Ukrainians are living in Finland under temporary protection.

Given India’s ties with Moscow, what role does Finland expect India to play?

We see India as an important global player, with the ability to be heard across the West, the East and the Global South. We hope India continues to use its contacts with Russia to help bring the war to an end.

Are high-level visits between India and Finland expected in the near future?

We are looking forward to Prime Minister Petteri Orpo’s visit to India this month to attend the AI Impact Summit in New Delhi, accompanied by a business delegation. This will highlight Finland’s expertise in AI and give Finnish companies direct access to Indian decision-makers.

President Alexander Stubb and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have remained in contact, and both sides have expressed interest in deepening political and economic ties. Prime Minister Modi has invited President Stubb to visit India, although no timeline has been finalised.

As more Indian students and professionals look to Finland, what steps are being taken to ease mobility and long-term integration?

We actively seek Indian talent through the Talent Boost programme. The number of Indian students in Finland is rising, with around 2,000 currently enrolled.

We aim to make mobility simpler and mutually beneficial. Finland offers over 600 bachelor’s and master’s programmes in English, along with competitive tuition fees and scholarships.

For long-term integration, learning local languages alongside English is helpful.

Finland consistently tops the global happiness rankings. What can India and Finland learn from each other?

Happiness does not happen by accident. It reflects strong social systems built over many years. Trust, good governance, education, gender equality, social justice and work-life balance all matter.

India has much to offer through yoga, meditation and its cultural diversity. What I find especially inspiring are the strong community bonds in such a fast-paced world. There is much both countries can learn from each other.

how-will-pm-modi-navigate-trumps-board-of-peace-and-us-india-relations

Fri Jan 23 19:34:42 IST 2026

President Donald Trump, never short of rhetorical flourish, has unveiled what he calls a “historic and magnificent” initiative to bring peace to the Middle East through the creation of the Board of Peace, described as a “transitional governing administration”. With himself as chairperson, the Board aligns with his 20-point Gaza plan announced last September and the Sharm el-Sheikh peace summit held the following month. Theoretically, it is consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted on November 17, which endorsed the establishment of an International Stabilisation Force to secure Gaza. A smaller Gaza Executive Board, composed of technocrats, will support the Board.

The goals and composition of the Board reflect the characteristics of the maverick president. Its “charter” is dictated, not negotiated, by the Trump administration and states that “dozens of world leaders” would be asked to join. As some analysts have noted, the publicly available text of the charter does not directly mention Gaza.

The charter calls for “shared burdens and commitments”. Describing the Board as an international organisation, it claims to promote stability, restore reliable and lawful governance and secure lasting peace in regions affected or threatened by conflict. Such a broad scope has raised concerns that the Board, under Trump’s exclusive tutelage, intends to usurp or replace the functions of the UN Security Council. A member of the Board is appointed only through an invitation from the chairman, Trump. Membership begins upon notification that the state has agreed to be bound by the charter, in accordance with Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.

All decisions of the Board will be taken by a majority vote but remain subject to the approval of Trump, who also has a casting vote. As the inaugural chairman of the Board, Trump has exclusive authority to create, modify or dissolve any subsidiary deemed necessary or appropriate to fulfil the Board’s mission. In short, the Board is another Trump enterprise, but with international funds and legitimacy. The three-year tenure of the Board ends in early 2029, aligning neatly with Trump’s presidency.

Several countries, including Australia, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey, have already been invited to join. Some countries willing to contribute to the International Stabilisation Force may also receive invitations. Membership lasts three years and can be renewed by Trump. However, countries donating a billion dollars in “cash funds” will become permanent members.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also received an official invitation to join. What are his considerations, challenges and options?

The membership fee is astronomical, and New Delhi is likely to think twice before making such a huge financial commitment. Indeed, India’s financial assistance to the Palestinians through UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) since the early 1950s would amount to only a fraction of the sum Trump is demanding. There is also an awkward twist: if Iran, Hamas or Hezbollah were willing to pay, would Trump invite them to join the Board?

While the Trump plan dominates headlines, jumping on the Trump bandwagon does not serve Indian interests. Beyond his handpicked advisers, Trump enjoys little genuine support. Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly unhappy over the inclusion of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Qatari ruler Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani. Although Modi may disagree with Netanyahu over Qatar, both leaders share concerns about Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. Most importantly, the Board is unlikely to improve conditions for Palestinians in Gaza, let alone bring meaningful peace to the Middle East. Yet saying no outright could prove politically suicidal for Modi. He already has several points of friction with Trump over tariffs, Russia, Iran and immigration. Why add more fuel to the fire?

If Modi is prepared to act, several options are available. He could graciously accept the invitation and send a generous thank-you note to Washington. When appropriate and without entering into specifics, Modi could shower lavish praise on Trump’s leadership qualities. Ego-massaging is easy and cost-effective.

When physical meetings take place, a senior diplomat or a junior minister rather than the prime minister himself could represent India. Modi could follow the Sharm summit model where India was represented by Kirti Vardhan Singh, minister of state for external affairs.

Modi could also indirectly blame Trump’s tariff policies for India’s inability to pay the exorbitant membership fee. Since Netanyahu is also unhappy with the Board, largely because of the inclusion of Qatar and Turkey, India could explore Gaza reconstruction through the I2U2 (India, Israel, US and UAE) framework, even without the United States.

India should highlight the reconstruction of Gaza and the Palestinian territories as a key factor for the success of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC). New Delhi should actively collaborate with the UAE to promote partnerships and utilise India’s economic support for the Palestinians. It should consider hyphenating the Palestinian National Authority with Jordan, formalising a triangular arrangement and strengthening relations with both. India should also work closely with Israel to ensure the long-term viability and survival of its aid and assistance to the Palestinians.

As tangible steps, India could announce 500 scholarships through the Indian Council for Cultural Relations for Palestinian students over the next five years and commit a US$250 million financial contribution to UNRWA over a ten-year period.

Trump’s Board of Peace does not serve Indian interests. Yet it offers an opportunity to develop and articulate a fresh Indian approach to the Middle East. The question is whether Modi is prepared to bite the bullet.

The author teaches contemporary Middle East at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

trump-greenland-and-the-future-of-nato-why-the-alliance-will-survive-but-be-diminished

Fri Jan 23 19:30:36 IST 2026

Yes, NATO is under threat. But it is not going to be extinct even if Donald Trump takes over Greenland through military means. NATO will remain, though significantly diminished, as the Europeans have no option but to put up with Trump’s high-handedness, illustrating once again what Thucydides wrote in the 5th century BCE: The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. Both Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and French President Emmanuel Macron quoted Thucydides without mentioning him by name.

To understand the rather complex issue confronting Europe, it is good to clarify Trump’s obsession with Greenland and raise a few questions. The general impression in the media—Indian as well as western—that Trump’s motivation stems from the real estate tycoon in him is only partially correct.

Since 1867, when the US purchased Alaska (1.5 million sqkm) from Tsarist Russia for $7.2 million, inter-departmental discussions have taken place in Washington about the desirability of acquiring Greenland. In 1916-17, when Washington purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark for $25 million, secretary of state Robert Lansing made a declaration recognising the sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland. During World War II, when Denmark fell to Hitler in April 1940, the Greenlanders sought and obtained protection from the US under a treaty signed by the Danish ambassador in Washington. After the war ended, there was some dispute between Copenhagen and Washington over Greenland. President Truman offered $100 million to Denmark. The 1951 treaty gave the US extensive rights to have bases and more.

Though Trump has been highlighting the security angle, his argument does not hold water. His motivation is by and large real-estate-driven. Is there delicious irony in that Trump, who has consistently denied climate change, is availing himself of it to claim Greenland? According to the United States Geological Survey, Greenland holds 1.5 million metric tonnes of rare-earth elements, roughly comparable to what the US has, whereas China has about 44 million metric tonnes.

If Washington wants to invest in Greenland to extract the rare earths, neither Greenland nor Denmark will object. But such investment will be subject to terms to be agreed by Denmark and Greenland. Obviously, Trump, who might have plans to engage his family business in the matter, would prefer a free hand.

We in India should note that Trump’s keenness to get closer to Pakistan is partly because Islamabad has signed contracts with World Liberty Financial, a recently formed company with 60 per cent equity owned by the Trump family.

Has European diplomacy responded to Trump’s plans for Greenland adroitly? Hardly. What they have done so far is a study in flawed diplomacy.

Trump is unique as a US president and it is necessary to study him in depth. Let us call such a study Trumpology. Europeans have not invested in Trumpology. When Trump embarked on his tariff war in April last year, it never occurred to the European Union, with a GDP of $28 trillion, compared with $30 trillion of the US, to take the diplomatic initiative of talking with Canada, Mexico, Japan and others to build a united front. It is not being suggested that Brussels should have made a public announcement about forming a united front. Classical diplomacy provides for secret and discreet consultations to be followed by a public announcement, if needed, at the right time.

The EU and the UK were intimidated, and adopted a policy of pretending to be courtiers in King Trump’s court. The NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, 58, once called Trump “daddy”. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer arranged for a second royal invitation for the American president to the UK, which was rather unprecedented.

The European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen went and met Trump to finalise a trade deal while he was playing golf in Scotland. The EU exports to the US will be charged at 15 per cent for cars, pharmaceuticals and others, whereas steel and aluminium will be charged at 50 per cent. According to Trump, there will be no duty on American exports. Additionally, the EU will invest $600 billion in the US and buy an extra $250 billion of energy from the US a year.

In short, the EU surrendered without a fight, though it had prepared a list of tariffs costing $107 billion on US exports in case there was no settlement. Europeans have now realised that they should stand up.

Coming to the fate of NATO, let us remind ourselves why it was established in 1949. Lord Ismay, a close aide to Mountbatten in India and the first secretary-general of NATO, said the idea was to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.

When the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed and eastern Europe adopted western democracy in 1990-91, NATO could have been dissolved and a European system of security based on cooperation of all states in Europe including Russia could and should have been seriously considered. When Gorbachev, as president of the Soviet Union, agreed to withdraw troops from East Germany so that Germany could be united, US secretary of state James Baker assured him on February 9, 1990 that NATO would not expand eastwards “not even an inch”.

Why did Washington and the rest of the west decide to dishonour the assurance? Was Russia under Boris Yeltsin posing a threat to Europe? No.

The most important reason for the expansion is that Americans had ignored the warning given by president Dwight Eisenhower, who was earlier the supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe during World War II. He had in his farewell address warned about the danger posed by the military-industrial complex.

What can stop Trump from taking over Greenland? He is not going to buy it as there is no seller. If Trump orders the Pentagon to take over Greenland, no external force can stop him. The key question is whether American democracy is able to self-correct itself as it celebrates its 250th anniversary. Only Congress and the supreme court can stop him. As of now we do not see any clear sign.

Trump has threatened that he will impose a 10 per cent tariff on countries opposed to his Greenland push, which will go up to 25 per cent from June 1. His intention is to complete the takeover on time to declare on July 4 that he has added more than 2 million sqkm to America and will do more for MAGA.

NATO will survive in a diminished form. Europeans who have demonised Putin have no option. The beginning of the end has started.

Post-Trump there is likely to be a change in Washington’s policy. But by then Europeans might have moved on with their ten-year plan for a European NATO.

Trump is heading towards his Waterloo in the mid-terms and he is scared of impeachment. He does not care for NATO. His only interest is to sell weapons to Europe.

The author is a retired diplomat.

the-new-indo-pacific-how-a-us-shift-to-spheres-of-influence-is-reshaping-global-power

Fri Jan 23 19:26:28 IST 2026

As recently as 18 months ago, the Indo-Pacific appeared to be a very different region. China and the US were locked in a growing competition for influence and resources, but their rivalry remained largely confined within accepted norms of international conduct.

The US was focused on strengthening alliances with Japan and South Korea, while building new structures such as the Quad (US, Japan, India & Australia) and Aukus (US, UK & Australia) as additional geopolitical enablers of American power in the Indo-Pacific. Its withdrawal, in 2017, from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) was a disappointment to its partners. Nevertheless, Washington continued economic engagement through bilateral channels and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

China, meanwhile, took the lead on economic integration by steering the Indo-Pacific states into a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Yet, its wolf warrior diplomacy and demonstrably assertive behaviour towards neighbours, including the Philippines and India, proved equally disappointing for regional states. Broadly speaking, the balance of power between the US and China ensured a degree of stability and predictability in Indo-Pacific affairs. India, too, appeared comfortable with this equilibrium—balancing China by leaning towards the US, even as maintaining close ties with other Indo-Pacific states.

When President Donald Trump was re-elected there were expectations from the region that he would leverage American power in a more overt and forceful manner. Demands on Japan and South Korea to pay more for American security guarantees, scrutiny of Aukus commitments made by the previous administration, and trade concessions sought from regional states—though distasteful—were all par for the course. Individually, the Indo-Pacific states re-negotiated their bilateral equations with Washington. However, there was a prevailing assumption that the broader geopolitical framework—anchored in a robust American presence counterbalancing China—would endure. These assumptions are now eroding rapidly.

In October 2025, the RAND Corporation published a study that was subsequently withdrawn following public scrutiny for allegedly reflecting the Trump administration’s strategic thinking. The gist of the report was to recommend that Washington retrench its security presence in the Indo-Pacific by reaching a new modus vivendi with Beijing—one premised on accepting the Chinese Communist Party’s political legitimacy and agreeing on shared organising principles for global politics. It suggests a radical departure from established US policy in many ways.

First, it removed the ideological element from the US’s China policy; communism was no longer to be unfavourably contrasted with American democracy. Second, it proposed a reordering of global politics with China. Finally, it argued that reducing America’s Indo-Pacific footprint would yield better outcomes than persisting on the path of ‘late-imperial exhaustion’. The subsequent release of the National Security Strategy in November, followed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s press conference in December, confirmed suspicions that the RAND report functioned as a blueprint for a new American strategy—one rooted in the concept of ‘spheres of influence’.

The ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine spells out the domination of the western hemisphere as America’s priority—a far cry from the claim of former secretary of state Madeleine Albright that the US was globally the ‘indispensable nation’. It has subsequently demonstrated this in practice in Venezuela in the first week of 2026. A narrower definition of core interests also implies a less ideological foreign policy, based on the assumption that the US no longer possesses the capacity to dominate everywhere.

Rubio’s remarks—describing China as a wealthy and powerful country, and the Communist Party as a geopolitical actor with whom the US can work together—reflect this recalibration. The logic of spheres of influence suggests a willingness to regard China as an equal power. History will recall that in 1878, the British empire and its European allies sought to similarly accommodate a fast-rising Germany through arrangements formalised as the Congress of Berlin. Thirty-six years later, in 1914, the world went to war.

The Indo-Pacific states are rightly concerned about whether the US might seek an accommodation with China that permits Beijing greater freedom of action in the region in return for continued access and influence, and what this could mean for regional geopolitics in the near to medium term.

The Trump administration insists that engagement with China will not undermine its regional partnerships. Yet, in reality, both the Quad and Aukus have been weakened. The US decision not to take sides in a Sino-Japanese dispute over Taiwan, and the stagnation in ties with India for reasons unrelated to bilateral relations, have only deepened these doubts.

While Beijing may not immediately respond to Washington’s overtures, China is an opportunistic power that will exploit any opening to expand its regional dominance. Indo-Pacific states should, therefore, anticipate greater Chinese assertiveness and renewed efforts to dilute the influence of balancing powers such as India, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.

From India’s perspective, two things are clear. First, the tilt towards the US has faltered yet again for the second time in two decades. While Indo-US ties remain critical for regional stability, expectations on both sides must be tempered. Second, the Quad may endure, but it is unlikely to generate the trust required for India to enable the US power against China.

India’s Indo-Pacific strategy rests on its self-image as a maritime power with influence stretching from the South China Sea to the Red Sea. Progress in Indo-US ties will remain critical for the region’s growth and security, but expectations on either side about the other’s readiness to go that extra mile, to help secure their interests, must be more realistic. Two, the Quad might yet survive, but it is not likely to engender the kind of trust that allows India to move in the direction of enabling American power to effectively deal with China. Deeper commercial integration with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, Australia and the GCC should anchor policy, alongside broader security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region.

India must also prepare for an inevitable Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean by strengthening maritime capabilities, infrastructure and partnerships with key littoral states. Finally, as India recalibrates its foreign and security policy amid Indo-Pacific shifts, sustained public shift will depend on clearer strategic communication that links policy choices to citizens’ everyday concerns.

Gokhale, former foreign secretary of India, is the author of four books on China, including The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India.

why-trumps-foreign-policy-isnt-new-a-200-year-history-of-us-intervention

Sat Jan 17 12:45:40 IST 2026

When the United States launched its first major military intervention abroad, it was a fledgling republic barely 25 years old. In 1801, president Thomas Jefferson decided that America would no longer follow the European custom of paying protection money to North African Barbary states to keep Mediterranean trade routes safe. Instead, he sent the US Marines to war.

The campaign against Tripoli also included an ultimately unsuccessful covert expedition led by William Eaton, the US consul general in Tunis, aimed at overthrowing Tripoli’s ruler and installing a more pliant alternative. Jefferson’s cabinet defended the operation by arguing that the president required “no specific statutory authority” to do so. More than two centuries later, the same logic propels Washington’s justification for the dramatic capture of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. Many described the January 3 operation as shocking and unprecedented. The brazenness of the Maduro operation and its openly transactional character, particularly the emphasis on oil, may appear new. But the underlying logic is not. For more than 200 years, the US has repeatedly acted alone, used force without international approval and justified intervention as necessary to protect its interests.

The broader framework for intervention in the Americas emerged in 1823 with the Monroe Doctrine declaring that the western hemisphere would be treated as a US sphere of influence. Over time, it became a licence for intervention. In 1904, president Theodore Roosevelt made this explicit through his ‘Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine’, claiming the right for the US to act as an international police force in Latin America when governments were deemed corrupt, unstable or incapable.

Donald Trump has openly embraced this tradition. His justification for removing Maduro fits neatly into this worldview. Venezuela was framed not as a sovereign state with internal problems but as a “criminal narco-state posing a direct threat to American society”, while China’s growing influence there was treated as intolerable. Trump made clear he would not allow the United Nations or any other global body to stand in his way. “The UN Charter’s restrictions on the use of force have never functioned as binding legal constraints on presidential decision-making. International law lacks a sovereign authority, a court with compulsory jurisdiction, and reliable enforcement mechanisms for violations,” writes John Yoo of the American Enterprise Institute.

This logic produced a long record of interventions in Latin America, often driven as much by economic interests as by ideology. Republican administrations were particularly active. In 1954, president Dwight Eisenhower authorised a coup in Guatemala that overthrew the democratically elected Jacobo Árbenz. His land reform programme threatened the United Fruit Company, a powerful American corporation with deep ties in Washington. The operation was publicly justified as a defence against communism, but its real purpose was to protect corporate interests.

Ronald Reagan was another champion of unilateral action. In 1983, he ordered the invasion of Grenada to remove a Marxist government, without UN approval. Reagan’s foreign policy also relied heavily on covert operations. His administration secretly backed Contra rebels fighting Nicaragua’s Sandinista government in the 1980s. At that time, Iran-backed groups in Lebanon were holding American hostages. To secure their release, US officials sold weapons to Iran at inflated prices and diverted the proceeds to fund the Contras. The Iran–Contra scandal exposed deception and illegality at the heart of the administration, yet Reagan escaped impeachment or prosecution.

The pattern continued under George H.W. Bush. In 1989, he ordered the invasion of Panama to capture its leader, Manuel Noriega, who had been indicted in the US on drug trafficking charges. American forces dismantled Panama’s military, seized Noriega and flew him to Florida for trial. Like the Maduro operation, the invasion lacked UN approval and was widely condemned, but it set a clear precedent: the US military could be used to arrest a foreign head of state.

After the Cold War, disregard for international institutions became even more pronounced. Following the September 11 attacks, president George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan without explicit UN authorisation, arguing that the US had the right to self-defence. Two years later, his administration invaded Iraq without a specific UN Security Council mandate, assembling a “coalition of the willing”, and justifying the war as a pre-emptive strike against weapons of mass destruction that did not exist. Saddam Hussein was portrayed as a rogue leader beyond redemption, much like Maduro today. After the invasion, the US established a provisional authority to govern Iraq, a model Trump has explicitly cited when discussing Venezuela’s “transition”.

Democratic presidents have also contributed to this record. In fact, it was a Democrat who launched the first American invasion of the 20th century. In 1915, Woodrow Wilson sent US Marines to Haiti after the country’s president was killed by a mob. The intervention, presented as stabilising, became an occupation designed to protect American financial interests and block German influence. In 1961, John F. Kennedy approved the Bay of Pigs invasion to overthrow Fidel Castro. Four years later, Lyndon B. Johnson sent more than 20,000 troops to the Dominican Republic to prevent what he described as a communist takeover.

Even presidents who spoke the language of multilateralism often acted alone. In 1993, Bill Clinton ordered missile strikes on Iraq after intelligence agencies concluded that Iraqi operatives had plotted to assassinate George H.W. Bush in Kuwait, a few months after he left office. Clinton also led NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbia without UN approval. Barack Obama’s intervention in Libya in 2011 began with a UN mandate to protect civilians, but it evolved into a regime change operation that ended with the overthrow and killing of Muammar Gaddafi.

Against this backdrop, Venezuela looks less like an exception than the latest chapter in a long story. What perhaps makes the current moment different is Trump’s bluntness. Previous presidents often gave better speeches and cloaked intervention in the language of democracy or human rights. Trump made little effort to do so. He openly described the Venezuela operation as transactional, saying America would run the country and take its oil to recover costs. In stripping away the moral cover, he revealed the logic that has long underpinned US interventionism.

There is, however, a line that even this history has rarely crossed. Modern US interventions have generally avoided permanent territorial expansion. If Trump were to pursue control of Greenland by force, it would mark a real break with post-war practice. Greenland is a semi-autonomous territory of Denmark, a founding NATO member. Using force against it would amount to attacking a treaty ally. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has warned that such an action would effectively end NATO by destroying the principle of collective defence.

For America’s allies, this raises unsettling questions. If Washington is willing to bypass international law and pressure even its partners, sovereignty begins to look conditional. Security guarantees appear transactional, exchanged for access to resources or strategic advantage. Europe, already divided, looks especially vulnerable.

Yet, the fear that the rest of the world will “balance” against American power looks unfounded because of the sheer asymmetry of the existing global order. “The American consumer market rivals the combined size of the markets in China and the eurozone,” writes Michael Beckley of Tufts University. “Half of global trade and nearly 90 per cent of international financial transactions are conducted in dollars, funnelled through US-linked banks—giving Washington the power to impose crippling sanctions.” Exports account for just 11 per cent of US GDP, compared with a global average of 30 per cent, while around 70 countries depend on US protection through defence pacts.

No wonder Trump made a stark warning about taking over Greenland while speaking to the New York Times on January 7. “Ownership is very important. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty,” said Trump. And he is prepared to use force. “I would like to make a deal the easy way, but if we don’t do it the easy way, we’re going to do it the hard way.”

Greenland is very much in play.

from-viking-sagas-to-a-new-cold-war-understanding-the-greenland-denmark-us-triangle

Sat Jan 17 12:40:33 IST 2026

WITH THE AMERICAN attention on Greenland, the island is becoming a flashpoint in transatlantic relations. The history of Greenland is intertwined with that of Denmark. The Nordic outreach to the region dates back to Erik the Red, who founded the first European settlement in the region in the 10th century. However, Greenland was formally colonised by Denmark in the early eighteenth century, although the Inuit societies had inhabited the island for millennia. Throughout the colonial period, Denmark exercised administrative and economic control. In 1916, the US recognised Denmark’s rights to Greenland as part of a deal that transferred control of the Danish West Indies to America.

After World War II, the United Nations pushed for decolonisation in Greenland. In 1953, Greenland became a part of Denmark under the Danish constitution, marking the beginning of a gradual process of political integration. However, this constitutional revision was contested because Greenlanders were not consulted during the process. Between 1953 and the introduction of Home Rule in 1979, Greenland remained under this framework. The period saw the implementation of modernisation policies that integrated Greenland into the Danish economy and global markets.

The Home Rule in 1979 granted Greenland its own parliament and control over some of its domestic affairs. This was followed by the 2009 Self-Government Act which further deepened autonomy and recognised the right to self-determination of the Greenlanders under international law. However, Copenhagen retains control over matters related to monetary policy, citizenship, judiciary, security and defence, constitutional affairs and foreign policy. While Greenland have control over policies related to taxation, education, health, fisheries and natural resources, it relies on Danish financial support and institutional infrastructure. Interestingly, on the issue of self-determination, an opinion poll highlights that “56 per cent of Greenlanders would vote yes to Greenlandic independence if a referendum were held today, 28 per cent would vote no, and 17 per cent do not know what they would vote for”. All Greenlandic political parties are in favour of independence, but they differ on how and when to achieve it.

Socioculturally, Denmark-Greenland relations are a complex mix of citizenship and lingering historical legacies. While Greenlanders are Danish citizens and participate in democratic processes, historical experiences related to forced relocations and assimilationist policies remain ingrained in the psyche of the citizenry. Historical social experiments such as the “Little Danes experiment of 1951”, in which Inuit children were removed from their families to be re-educated as model Danish citizens, led to the loss of their language and culture. Another one was ‘Coil Campaign’, which refers to the forced sterilisation of Greenlandic women and girls by Danish doctors since the 1960s. While Denmark has issued formal apologies for these incidents, many in Greenland believe that the apologies were long overdue, and the demand for justice and reconciliation continues.

In the past few years, Greenland has experienced a revival of Inuit culture, which is marked by the emphasis on its language and traditions. This revival has further fuelled the demand to reclaim Inuit identity and self-determination, with increasing momentum for independence and for building a distinct national future.

Denmark has responded to Greenland with several reconciliation efforts, including an apology for the past injustices and systemic discrimination. A historical investigation by Denmark and Greenland was launched in 2024 to understand “the decisions, actions and processes that have shaped Greenland’s development and the relationship between Greenland and Denmark over the past decades”.

Politically and strategically, Greenland occupies a pivotal position in the Arctic and the transatlantic security architecture. Its location between North America and Europe makes it vital for defence systems, early warning systems and control of North Atlantic sea lanes. The US has maintained a military presence in Greenland since World War II when, after Nazi Germany’s occupation of Denmark, the Americans invaded the island and established military and radio stations. The 1951 defence agreement with Denmark granted the US the right to build and maintain military bases.

With the melting of the Arctic ice and the intensification of great-power rivalries in the region, Greenland’s strategic and resource potential has become salient. The island is rich in natural resources, including iron ore, graphite, palladium, vanadium, zinc, gold, uranium, copper and oil. Greenland ranks seventh in the world for rare earth reserves, with 1.5 million tonnes, and is home to the largest reserves of two rare earth deposits in the world. However, due to the harsh climate, no mining activity has taken place on the island.

President Donald Trump first offered to buy the island from Denmark in 2019 as a “real estate deal”. In his second term, however, he has redoubled his efforts to take over the island despite the push back from Denmark, Greenland and other European leaders. Trump has justified his actions on national security grounds rather than on the island’s untapped resources, as it is situated at a critical chokepoint for surveillance in the Arctic region. He has emphasised that the US needs to “own” Greenland to prevent Russia and China from doing so, and that the US “will do it the easy way or the hard way”.

Despite renewed threats and increasing pressure from the US, Greenland lawmakers have stressed that Greenland is “not for sale”. The Greenlandic government issued a statement saying it could not “accept under any circumstances” the American desire to control the territory. Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said, “Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark and part of NATO through the Commonwealth. This means that our security and defence belong in NATO. That is a fundamental and firm line.”

Greenland underscores another sticking point in the unravelling transatlantic relations. While its strategic location anchors it within NATO’s northern defence architecture, on the other hand, the aggressive posture of the US exposes the asymmetry of power in the alliance. Greenland’s evolving relations with Denmark and the US capture emerging shifts in contemporary geopolitics, where geography, competition for resources and great-power rivalry increasingly intersect with questions of alliance, sovereignty and self-determination.

The author is assistant professor, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi.

Fires and fables

Greenland is where myth and history fuses. It is the only place in the Nordic realm where Viking myths, saga-literature, folklore, archaeology and even Christianity overlap. Till the medieval times Greenland was the edge of the known world for the Norse. Mothers made naughty children fall in line warning them of the wrath of Kolgrim. Condemned to death by burning in Hvalsey for sorcery in 1407, he was one of many spirits, giants and cursed families that were rumoured to prosper in Greenland by the mainlanders due to its proximity to the unknown.

At the crossroads

Erik the Red, who ended up on a frozen island while on an exploration after being banished from Iceland for murder, called it Greenland merely for brand purposes. He wanted to attract settlers. In 985, he led a fleet of 25 ships to establish Norse foothold that would last for nearly 500 years. While Erik was a pagan, his wife, Thjodhild, was Christian, and she built the New World’s first church. Their son Leif Erikson converted the Norse population before turning Greenland the base for the first European landing in North America.

Sagas in the snow

It was the arrival of the Thule People around 1200–1300 that clothed the land in a new fur. With their whale-hunting tools, kayaks and large ‘umiak’ boats, the coastal belts of the frostbound barrens became hospitable again. The Thules, after a long march from Alaska and Arctic Canada behind them, never collapsed. Their descendants, eight centuries later, survived to be called Inuits, and offered $100,000 per head by Trump to sell and leave.

Mission possible

Norwegian missionary Hans Egede sailed to Greenland in 1721. He earned the name ‘The Apostle of Greenland’ as he managed to give wings to Scandinavian colonial dreams by evangelising the Inuits. He founded Godthåb which later become Nuuk, the modern capital of the island. The 1700s witnessed more settlements coming up and the gradual return of European economic and civic life.

—boxes by Bechu S.

beyond-oil-was-venezuelas-cultural-diplomacy-a-threat-to-us

Sat Jan 10 16:36:13 IST 2026

Beneath the daring attempt at regime change in Venezuela lies a deeper motive of the United States: salvaging its self-esteem. A serious blow was dealt to American national pride by Venezuela in the early years of the new millennium—an episode in the recent history of continental America that those in New York or Washington, who run or own the United States, seldom discuss. It has remained under the carpet, eluding the glare of the mass upsurge called Make America Great Again (MAGA), yet it was never forgotten and has continued to rankle policymakers in the US. Just as the hostage-taking at the US embassy in the nascent Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 continues to rankle Washington, so does the memory of Venezuela’s challenge. If President Donald Trump successfully brings the sixth-largest country in South America under American influence, he will have avenged this national humiliation at Venezuela’s hands.

The episode began in 2005. Unbeknown to most economists and bankers at the time, the United States was hurtling towards the economic meltdown that would occur three years later. Some symptoms were clear in hindsight—rising poverty levels and a sharp increase in the number of Americans reliant on food stamps, which provide food and basic necessities—but the underlying illness was not diagnosed.

José Enrique Serrano, a congressman representing one of the poorest districts in New York’s Bronx, took an unconventional step to prevent his constituents from freezing during the approaching winter. Many elderly and ill residents could not afford heating oil. Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s socialist president, was in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, and Serrano took him to the Bronx to show him the hardship. I was part of the media entourage that went to the Bronx with Chávez, who was astonished that Americans could be so poor. He immediately ordered Citgo—the US subsidiary of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.—to provide free heating oil to 75,000 poor New Yorkers.

Shortly after a CIA-supported coup briefly ousted Chávez in 2002 (for 47 hours), he appointed Bernardo Álvarez Herrera as Venezuela’s ambassador to Washington. Herrera, an academic with strong American connections, recognised the political impact of Citgo’s generosity. After watching the soaring support among poor Americans for the free heating oil programme, he tapped the Kennedy family for a similar initiative in their home state of Massachusetts. Former congressman Joseph Patrick Kennedy II, eldest son of Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to head the programme in Massachusetts through his NGO, Citizens Energy Corporation.

By the winter of 2008, free heating oil supplied by Venezuela reached residents in 23 US states and members of 65 Native American tribes—almost half the United States—which was deeply embarrassing to the American establishment. It was a huge embarrassment, especially for wealthy Americans who were used to telling their children that the US was the “greatest country on earth”.

The popular perception was that Chávez was an enemy of the US. At the height of the programme’s popularity, I once went to see him at a church in the largely Black neighbourhood of Harlem in New York, the same church that the late Cuban leader Fidel Castro used to visit whenever he went to the UN. Chávez was cheered and feted by the local people like a rock star.

Establishment efforts to end the programme failed after Herrera legally distanced the Venezuelan government from it, arguing that Citgo, an American company, was administering the initiative and that Venezuelan heating oil was no different from the millions of litres of Venezuelan petrol sold at American pumps, the only difference being that the oil was given away free. The programme was suspended in 2009 after global oil prices crashed from $147 per barrel to around $48, making it unaffordable for Venezuela.

The second significant setback for the United States at Venezuela’s hands has a personal dimension for Trump. Despite his wealth, the Trump family has never belonged to the same cultural elite as the Rockefellers, Carnegies, Vanderbilts or Guggenheims—America’s great patrons of art and culture. Trump has long coveted such recognition. In December, he secured it through the back door using raw presidential power: the Kennedy Center became the Donald J. Trump and John F. Kennedy Memorial Center for the Performing Arts. Trump got his name emblazoned on the imposing façade of Washington’s biggest centre of culture with worldwide name recognition.

Venezuela, however, entered the American cultural sphere long before Trump. In 2010, Chávez launched a major cultural initiative in the United States to counter negative perceptions of his country. The vehicle for this effort was the Simón Bolívar Symphony Orchestra, an institution founded in 1978 by the Venezuelan music legend José Abreu, which has few parallels anywhere in the world.

Composed largely of children from impoverished backgrounds who had been trained in music, the orchestra became a symbol of social transformation. It drew packed audiences at the Kennedy Center and elsewhere in the United States, earning widespread critical praise. Yet it also stirred discomfort among some American conservatives, who felt that Venezuela’s soft power challenged traditional cultural hierarchies. Its conductor, Venezuelan maestro Gustavo Dudamel—later appointed music and artistic director of the New York Philharmonic—eventually turned against the regime of Nicolás Maduro after orchestra members were killed during protests.

Maduro’s capture by the United States is a serious challenge to India’s foreign-policy principle of multi-alignment. India’s statement on January 4 expressed measured concern, consistent with decades of diplomatic caution, as evidenced by past responses to the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet India’s role as host of the forthcoming BRICS summit complicates matters, as Venezuela’s situation will inevitably feature in discussions. A delayed Quad summit in New Delhi may also see US demands for support for Trump’s actions, placing India’s diplomats in a dilemma. Multilateralists at the ministry of external Affairs must be relieved that India is not an elected member of the UN Security Council this year, thus avoiding an immediate vote. Nevertheless, Trump’s aggressive intervention will test India’s diplomatic balance.

India and Venezuela also compete in an arena seldom examined by foreign-policy analysts: the Miss World competition. Since its inception in 1951, the two countries have contested the title closely, with both holding six crowns each.

The author was a foreign correspondent in Washington.

trial-in-us-is-only-way-to-get-rid-of-maduro-mercedes-baptista-guevara

Sat Jan 10 16:30:39 IST 2026

Interview/ Mercedes Baptista Guevara, attorney and diplomat

Mercedes Baptista Guevara is an attorney and diplomat based in Spain. Born in Caracas, Venezuela, she closely follows political developments in the Latin American country. In an exclusive interview with THE WEEK, Guevara discusses the current political situation in Venezuela, the role of the United States, Europe’s cautious response, and the future of other countries in the region that are in Donald Trump’s crosshairs, such as Cuba, Colombia and Mexico. Excerpts:

Q/ What is your assessment of Maduro’s ouster? What impact will it have on Venezuela?

A/ The impact will be positive. Many of the six million Venezuelans who left the country because of the regime’s cruelty will return.

Q/ President Donald Trump has suggested that the US will “run” Venezuela and rebuild its oil infrastructure to recoup costs. Are you concerned that this level of direct US involvement might undermine the sovereignty of a future democratic government?

A/ At the moment, no one really knows what will happen with the new government. It appears to be highly provisional. The new president, Delcy Rodríguez, is extremely close to Maduro.

Q/ With Rodríguez currently acting as interim president and claiming that the US has “kidnapped” Maduro, how serious do you think the risk of domestic civil conflict is?

A/ Rodríguez is not someone who can be trusted. There are rumours that she was the person who demanded the $50 million reward [for information leading to Maduro’s capture], and that she facilitated intelligence about where Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were hiding.

Q/ What role could Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado and opposition leader Edmundo González play? Does it concern you that the US administration has expressed scepticism about their domestic support?

A/ Machado and González are extremely important and are playing the right role. I believe the Trump administration’s scepticism is merely a strategic posture. Rodríguez has no real power and is essentially a temporary puppet.

Q/ Can a criminal trial in New York deliver the justice Venezuelans have sought for years?

A/ A trial in the United States is the only way to finally rid Venezuela of a dictator who completely destroyed the country’s justice system. Justice in Venezuela disappeared under Chávez and Maduro. There are around 800 political prisoners who have been tortured, deprived of food, denied basic rights and held for years in appalling conditions simply because they think differently from the dictator.

Q/ How do you view the contrast between the US administration’s forceful intervention and Europe’s more cautious, legalistic response?

A/ Europe is deeply divided. For example, there are allegations that the current Spanish government is implicated in illegal activities involving Maduro and his associates. There is strong evidence of close links to illegal gold trading and trafficking involving former Spanish prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who is reportedly a partner of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s government in deeply troubling activities. Reports by the respected NGO SOS Orinoco describe horrific abuses in southern Venezuela, where indigenous communities are tortured and killed to extract information about the location of gold and other precious metals.

Q/ Is Venezuela trading a socialist autocracy for a foreign-managed protectorate?

A/ Personally, I feel reassured by the US presence, particularly the deployment of naval and air forces in the Caribbean to control drug trafficking and monitor oil shipments that were being sent to Cuba free of charge in support of the Cuban government. Cutting off fuel supplies to Cuba may finally cause that fragile regime to collapse, which I see as good news.

Q/ Do you think Trump’s attention is now focused on countries such as Colombia, Cuba and Mexico?

A/ That statement was clearly a direct message to Colombia and Mexico. It could help resolve some of the region’s long-standing problems in what the US considers its own ‘backyard’.

Q/ Finally, what about the legality of American action in Venezuela?

A/ American action in Venezuela was the only remaining option after all attempts to negotiate with Maduro failed. The regime refused to halt drug trafficking, illegal gold extraction and unlawful oil trading—activities that benefited only a small group of individuals and not the Venezuelan people.

from-chavez-lawyer-to-shadow-ruler-how-cilia-flores-shaped-maduros-venezuela

Sat Jan 10 18:05:53 IST 2026

Reports surrounding the capture of Nicolás Maduro have reignited a long-standing question among Venezuelans: who really ruled Venezuela?

Much of the online commentary has portrayed Maduro’s wife, Cilia Flores, as collateral damage—a hostage to her husband’s crimes. That interpretation, however, ignores decades of political reality inside Venezuela.

Cilia Flores was not a passive first lady who rose quietly alongside power. Venezuelans knew her long before Maduro ever reached the presidency, and many regarded her as the real power behind the throne.

She is six years older than Maduro and a trained lawyer, widely considered one of the country’s most formidable political operators. When they met in the early 1990s, Maduro was a bus driver with no formal higher education. Flores, by contrast, was already a prominent attorney and a key figure within Hugo Chávez’s inner circle.

It was Flores who led the legal team that successfully secured Chávez’s release from prison after a failed coup attempt. At the time, she was married with three children, while Maduro had one son. Her proximity to Chávez and her legal influence were already firmly established.

Those close to the regime have long described Flores as possessing a fierce and dominant personality. Chávez reportedly managed her career carefully, ensuring that she and Maduro rose in parallel, never too far apart. When Maduro became head of the National Assembly, Flores followed. When Chávez designated Maduro as his successor in 2013, Flores became his official wife that same year.

Her influence extended beyond formal politics into the darker machinery of the regime. In 2015, two of her nephews were arrested while attempting to traffic 800 kilograms of cocaine. They were extradited to the United States, convicted in New York in 2016, and sentenced to 18 years in prison each.

In 2022, they were granted clemency by president Joe Biden and exchanged for seven Americans detained in Venezuela—a move that quietly underscored how deeply criminal networks and geopolitics had become intertwined.

The idea that Cilia Flores was merely an accessory to Maduro’s rule does not withstand scrutiny. If anything, the evidence suggests she was instrumental in shaping his ascent and consolidating power around him.

There is a saying that behind every powerful man stands a powerful woman.

In this case, it may be more accurate to say that she not only built his career, but may also have sealed his fate.

And if a full forensic reckoning of Venezuela’s collapse is now under way, Flores will not be a footnote. She will be central to the story.

how-bangladeshs-army-safeguarded-democracy-in-2024

Sun Jan 04 14:22:33 IST 2026

ON AUGUST 5, 2024, Bangladesh hovered on the edge of civil war as protesters surged towards Gono Bhaban, the prime minister’s residence. The police system had broken down, streets were ruled by anger and violence spread faster than any order from above. In that moment of collapse, the Bangladesh army made two decisions that would define the day. It refused to fire on the protesters and it moved Sheikh Hasina out of the country to safety before announcing her resignation and the formation of an interim government.

Since then, the army’s role has been fiercely debated. Many Bangladeshis are angry that the same institution which refused to protect citizens from state violence in July now protected the prime minister as she fled. Others argue that in the chaos of that day, preventing her assassination was the only way to avoid an even bloodier spiral of revenge. The debate is not merely emotional. It goes to the heart of what kind of political actor the army wants to be in the new Bangladesh now struggling to emerge.

Here, history matters. Bangladesh is a country where the killing of heads of government is not theoretical. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding president, was assassinated with most of his family on August 15, 1975. Only his two daughters, Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, survived; they were abroad at the time. A few years later, president Ziaur Rahman, the founder of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was murdered in a military mutiny in Chittagong in 1981. These memories are not distant; they shape every elite calculation about regime change and personal safety in Bangladesh.

Seen from that angle, the decision to let Hasina leave the country alive, rather than be dragged out of Gono Bhaban by an enraged crowd, was not a small thing. It limited the risk of Bangladesh adding a third political assassination to its already heavy history. It also created the conditions for a more orderly transfer of power to an interim government headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, appointed just two days later.

Of course, saving Hasina’s life did not, and should not, erase questions of accountability. A UN-backed fact-finding report and Bangladesh’s own tribunals now speak of between 800 and 1,400 people killed during the July–August crackdown on protesters. Hasina herself has since been sentenced to death in absentia for crimes against humanity. The fact that she is alive and sitting in India does not protect her from legal scrutiny; it simply avoids turning justice into revenge. From a democratic standpoint, that distinction matters.

The central political question today is, therefore, not whether the army escorted her out. It is what the army has done since. Did it behave like so many militaries before it, using a moment of civilian collapse to seize power? Or did it try to act as a temporary referee, helping to manage an unavoidable transition and then stepping back?

To answer this, we have to look at the longer pattern of civil-military relations in Bangladesh. There are, broadly speaking, two traditions. The first is the seizure of power by uniformed rulers. General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, then army chief, ousted president Abdus Sattar in a bloodless coup in 1982, imposed martial law and ruled as a military dictator until he was forced to resign in 1990.

The second tradition is quieter but no less important: moments when the army refuses to be the regime’s last line of defence, yet does not itself turn into the new ruler. In 1990, during the mass uprising against Ershad, the then army chief, Lieutenant General Nuruddin Khan, declined to back the dictator’s attempt to crush the protests. Instead, the military signalled that Ershad had to go and a neutral caretaker arrangement under Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was created to organise the 1991 election that restored parliamentary democracy.

The events of 2024-26 sit within this second tradition. General Waker-Uz-Zaman became the chief of army staff in June 2024, just weeks before the uprising reached its peak. General Zaman is Sheikh Hasina’s cousin-in-law. At the time of his appointment, many accused him of benefiting from nepotism and assumed he would continue supporting his relative and her rule. However, it appears that the general has remained professional and fulfilled his role as army chief rather than acting as Hasina’s cousin-in-law. On August 5, the army chief did not declare martial law. Instead, he publicly confirmed Hasina’s resignation and pledged support for an interim civilian government. Since then, the army leadership has repeatedly insisted that elections must be held within a clear timeframe and that it has no intention of ruling the country. In an interview in September 2024, the army chief publicly backed the interim government, saying he would “stand beside it, come what may”, and, for the first time, suggested that the transition to a democratic government should be completed within about 18 months.

At the same time, the army has been blunt with the Yunus government. It has warned that keeping soldiers on the streets indefinitely is bad for both democracy and the military itself. Long deployments in internal security roles, generals know from experience, breed corruption, human rights abuses and political temptation. That is why General Zaman has overseen the forced retirement or dismissal of several senior officers accused of past abuses and handed over a group of officers to face charges over enforced disappearances. For a force once seen as untouchable on such issues, this is not cosmetic. It is a signal to both rank-and-file soldiers and civilians that the old culture of impunity cannot simply continue under a new banner.

Yet the picture is not simple and it would be naive to romanticise the army’s role. The same institution that refused to massacre students in August had been deployed across the country since July, after the police effectively collapsed, and there are credible allegations that soldiers stood by while violence took place in some localities. The longer the military is entangled in day-to-day law and order duties, the harder it becomes to maintain the line between ‘guardian of stability’ and ‘arbiter of politics’.

The regional context adds another layer of complexity. After Hasina fled to India, and especially following the assassination of student leader Sharif Osman Hadi last month, anti-India sentiment surged in Bangladesh. Attacks on Indian-linked institutions, such as the Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre, and on media outlets like the Daily Star and Prothom Alo followed. Some groups openly called for confrontation along the India-Bangladesh border. Here, too, the army sits in a delicate position. It must manage genuine security concerns and cross-border tensions while resisting the temptation to ride a wave of nationalist anger.

Looking beyond Bangladesh helps clarify what is at stake. In Tunisia in 2011, the army’s refusal to shoot at protesters forced Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from power and allowed for a real, though fragile, move towards democracy. In Egypt, the army let Hosni Mubarak fall but later took control again, with General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ushering in a new period of military rule. Sudan offers an even starker warning. The military removed president Omar al-Bashir in 2019 after mass protests, only to stage another coup and plunge the country into war.

These cases show that a military’s first decision not to shoot can be heroic, but it is never the last decision. The real test comes later: will generals accept a loss of influence when civilians argue, quarrel and sometimes mismanage the transition? Or will they decide, once again, that only they can ‘save’ the nation?

Today, Bangladesh’s army stands at a crossroads. On the positive side, it has followed the Nuruddin Khan example rather than the Ershad one: refusing to be the regime’s last defender, supporting an interim civilian government, pushing for elections within a clear timeline and beginning to confront its own human rights record. On the negative side, the army still wields immense power. Politicians seek its input on almost every major decision. Once a military grows accustomed to being the final judge, it is difficult to accept the disorder of real democracy, where leaders make mistakes, protests erupt and outcomes are rarely tidy.

For citizens, the goal is not simply to support or oppose the army. It is to set clear expectations that, after a fair election, the armed forces must return fully to their professional duties under civilian control. Anything less risks repeating the cycles that have plagued the country since 1975.

The July uprising opened a narrow and costly window for Bangladesh. Students and ordinary citizens took enormous risks to force that space open. The army’s choice not to crush them, and not to seize the state for itself, helped prevent total breakdown. That deserves recognition.

Asif Bin Ali is an Atlanta-based geopolitical analyst and doctoral fellow at Georgia State University.

india-bangladesh-relations-a-50-year-saga-of-animosity-and-pragmatic-engagement

Sat Dec 27 14:51:08 IST 2025

Half a century ago, a plot to kidnap Indian high commissioner Samar Sen in Dhaka was foiled by the timely intervention of his security personnel. A leaked Wikileaks cable describes what happened on that fateful morning on November 26, 1975, when six young men, disguised as visitors, pulled out revolvers and moved towards Sen as he stepped out of his car in front of the Indian High Commission in Dhanmondi, an upscale neighbourhood. Security guards rushed in, exchanged fire and secured Sen, beating back the assailants.

Following the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in August 1975, the first wave of anti-India sentiment began to emerge in Bangladesh. The coups and counter-coups that finally brought General Ziaur Rahman to power gave fresh ammunition to a section of the post-liberation leadership—consisting largely of leftist groups and radical freedom fighters—to vent against pro-India policies and the country’s alleged influence on Bangladesh’s foreign policy and politics. This sentiment resulted in Zia’s consolidation of power, opening space for all parties, including Islamist outfits such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and secular parties like the Bangladesh Awami League, while realigning Dhaka’s foreign policy to improve diplomatic ties with the Islamic world as well as Islamabad.

For the ordinary Bangladeshi, resentment towards India continued to grow, driven by high prices of Indian goods, excessive use of water from rivers flowing into Bangladesh and a trade imbalance in India’s favour. New Delhi, in turn, was upset with the persecution of religious minorities in Bangladesh and insurgent groups on its borders finding safe havens on Bangladeshi soil.

It took deft statecraft by prime minister Morarji Desai and Zia to turn hostility into constructive engagement. Zia had barely shed his military uniform when he visited New Delhi in December 1977, setting the stage for a friendship that brought some cheer to people on both sides. A joint communiqué noted that the historic Farakka Treaty on the sharing of Ganga water, signed in November, was made possible “because of the spirit of mutual accommodation and understanding shown by the leaders of the two countries”. It also listed a string of efforts to improve relations, including the creation of a joint commission on irrigation water allocation, boundary disputes, proposals for the exchange of small enclaves and even the sale of cement, urea fertiliser and other products to India. Beyond business, Zia’s public gesture of visiting the samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi at Rajghat and the Dargah-e-Sharif of Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti at Ajmer struck a chord.

Equal warmth was displayed during Desai’s visit to Dhaka in 1979, when he underlined good neighbourly policies as the way forward for the two countries bound together by geography, tradition and culture. Interestingly, it was during this phase of de-escalation that India facilitated the return of Sheikh Hasina, living in exile after her father’s assassination, to Dhaka after she was elected president of the Bangladesh Awami League.

“Over time, successive regimes have used the anti-India sentiment for political gains, yet chose engagement over isolation,” says Asif Bin Ali, a doctoral fellow at the Georgia State University. “The lessons have been foundational. While Bangladesh’s internal politics can be adversarial towards India, its governance cannot be, because economic and regional stability are intertwined with functional ties with Delhi.”

In the last 50 years, Bangladesh’s relationship with India has suffered three distinct phases of animosity running through regime changes: Zia’s takeover, Begum Khaleda Zia’s government and the incumbent interim government run by Muhammad Yunus. The outcomes of the first two ranged from pragmatic cooperation to deepening ties. The outcome of the third will stand the test of time and reflect the vision of its leaders as Bangladesh races towards parliamentary elections on February 12.

After Zia’s assassination in 1981, the Delhi–Dhaka relationship remained largely dormant until Sheikh Hasina signed the Ganga water treaty in 1996 with prime minister H.D. Deve Gowda. A red carpet was rolled out for Gowda during his first visit to Dhaka, celebrating the “soft diplomacy” of his foreign minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, extending beyond the Ganga. Hasina signed the peace treaty on the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 1997 to curb insurgent activity and ease long-standing tensions.

The pragmatic relationship between the two countries continued into the 1990s, but India resisted the temptation to pick favourites. While it enjoyed close ties with Hasina, it continued engaging the opposition. “Our outreach was to every section of society. We remained friendly with whoever was in opposition,” says a former Indian official posted in Bangladesh.

Ironically, it was Hasina’s tilt towards India that triggered the second anti-India wave and brought the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to power in 2001. Yet, India’s pragmatic approach paid dividends. Despite tensions between the two countries, the first high-profile visit to Dhaka was by Brajesh Mishra, then national security adviser to prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who arrived with an explicit message that New Delhi would engage Bangladesh regardless of who occupied power.

Bridging the distrust, however, was not easy. Anti-India elements argued that Delhi would always favour the Awami League. “Commerce was high on the agenda and negotiations began on export items,” says an official, “but the talks collapsed over rules of origin as Bangladesh sought to export goods not even manufactured locally, routing Chinese products into India.” The breakdown of trust between Dhaka and Delhi created a second opening for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, say security experts, to expand its footprint. Bangladesh then entered a dark phase under the BNP-Jamaat coalition, further restricting Delhi’s room for manoeuvre.

Delhi’s options are again limited with the interim government holding power in Dhaka since August 2024. “Since it is an interim government, there is no time for major initiatives,” says a senior diplomat. “At the same time, substantive engagement should begin with successive governments.”

The challenge, again, is the systematic rise of anti-India sentiment. While the exclusion of the Awami League and Hasina’s exile in India is seen as the primary reason for prolonged unease in the relationship, often bordering on suspicion and anger, there is more to it than meets the eye. Attacks on the Indian High Commission, media houses and cultural institutions ahead of the elections demonstrate New Delhi’s narrowing options.

“The direction of anger towards the Awami League and India has become a characteristic feature of post-2024 politics, often the two becoming synonymous, serving the purpose of both Islamists and their patrons,” says Smruti Pattanaik, research fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. “Such insinuations against India and the Awami League free the interim regime of responsibility and accountability for the large-scale arson that followed.”

Disengagement, meanwhile, has its own dangers. While there may be little substantive content in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations, there is significant mischief potential. Historically, Pakistan has exploited anti-India sentiment through Islamist networks and insurgent proxies. That risk, Indian officials believe, has not disappeared.

Therefore, while the catalysts pushing the Delhi-Dhaka relationship to the edge may be different this time, the answer may still lie in revisiting Delhi’s old Bangladesh playbook. New Delhi needs to engage the Bangladeshi political spectrum for precisely the reasons it finds it difficult to do so. Students who led the 2024 protests are now organised under the National Citizen Party. The Jamaat’s street muscle and mass mobilisation capacity have been demonstrated repeatedly. Finally, the BNP’s primary seat in the opposition makes it a contender for the Awami League’s space when elections are held. “Given Bangladesh’s grim history of political transitions marked by violence, broad engagement will leave the door open for sharing common concerns,” says Ali.

Once a new government is elected in Dhaka and rapprochement becomes a priority, India has a range of instruments to build popular goodwill in Bangladesh. “India could lift restrictions on visa issuance as well as transhipment rights through Indian seaports. Both countries could also revive negotiations towards a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement,” says Constantino Xavier, senior fellow at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress, New Delhi. “To counter negative perceptions, India might also announce a new package of lines of credit and grants to support health and education projects. India can also announce a unilateral extension of all rights under the Ganga water treaty, set to expire in 2026.” Xavier believes the most symbolic measure would be India acceding to Bangladeshi demands on the Teesta water and renewing the 2011 package vetoed by West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.

Internal politics has always influenced cross-border ties. With West Bengal holding assembly polls in 2026, the BJP’s performance could pave the way for new economic connectivity and bilateral water and energy initiatives. Politics aside, it is imperative for Delhi and Dhaka to engage on economic issues.

Each year, lakhs of people cross the India-Bangladesh border, including students, patients, traders, pilgrims, tourists and families living across the divide. Delhi and Dhaka cannot afford further delay. For nearly two years, the world’s first and eighth most populous countries have seen no significant dialogue between policy researchers, academics or industrialists. “Think tanks, universities and economic actors need to do a better job of sustaining track-two dialogues, not just when all is well but especially when the Indian government is facing difficulties with neighbouring countries,” says Xavier. “Dhaka, too, has been missing in action.”

the-resurgence-of-jamaat-e-islami-how-the-2024-uprising-rewrote-bangladeshs-political-future

Sat Dec 20 16:20:25 IST 2025

Bangladesh’s political landscape has undergone a dramatic transformation since the August 2024 uprising. Several political parties that once played secondary or supporting roles have seen an unexpected surge in public support. Many of these emerging forces—previously aligned with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—have now become serious contenders. Their rise has reshaped political expectations, introducing both uncertainty and opportunity into the country’s future.

Understanding this shift requires looking beyond electoral numbers. Years of frustration with entrenched rivalry, governance failures and political stagnation created fertile ground for alternative actors to gain momentum. These parties present themselves as fresh, reform-oriented forces capable of delivering accountability, institutional integrity and a departure from the dysfunction of the past decade.

Among them, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami stands out. Despite its controversial history and its role in the BNP-led coalition government from 2001 to 2006, the Jamaat has regained notable support since the uprising. Its resurgence demonstrates organisational resilience and strategic repositioning at a moment of national volatility. This renewed relevance has compelled observers to reassess assumptions about Bangladesh’s political trajectory.

REWIRED BY A HISTORIC UPRISING

The upheavals of 2024 thrust Bangladesh into uncharted territory. What began as a student-led protest erupted into a nationwide demand for accountability, sweeping aside a government once seen as immovable. The uprising reaffirmed something fundamental: when Bangladeshis reach a breaking point, they reshape their political destiny.

As the country now attempts to rebuild democratic institutions, restore public trust and redefine the political order, one of the most striking developments is the Jamaat’s re-emergence as a political force that cannot be dismissed.

JAMAAT’S 41-POINT REFORM PLAN

In October 2024, the Jamaat unveiled a sweeping 41-point reform plan—a roadmap covering governance, judicial independence, electoral oversight, policing, public employment, culture and foreign relations. It is an ambitious document, clearly intended to signal seriousness in a political landscape where many parties are still recalibrating.

The proposals—from reinstating the caretaker government to creating an independent police commission and enforcing strict timelines for court proceedings—tap into widespread public frustration. For a generation disillusioned by corruption and institutional decay, such ideas resonate strongly.

But perhaps the clearest sign of the Jamaat’s renewed momentum came from an unexpected arena: the universities.

A SHOCK ON CAMPUS

In a development few would have predicted, the Jamaat’s student wing, the Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir, won students’ union elections at four major public universities. These victories have energised the party’s base and captured national attention. For many Bangladeshis who had long written the Jamaat off as a relic, the wins signalled something new: the party was once again a relevant political actor.

The Shibir also adopted a more collaborative strategy, forming inclusive panels by accommodating candidates with shared political values. This stood in stark contrast with the rigid factionalism that has defined student politics for decades.

The result has been a notable shift: the Jamaat’s influence among young voters now extends beyond traditional supporters, hinting at a broader appeal.

JAMAAT’S FIRST HINDU CANDIDATE

In another unprecedented move, the Jamaat nominated a candidate from the Hindu community—a step that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. This gesture signals a deliberate effort to project political inclusivity and challenge long-held perceptions about the party’s ideological boundaries. Even sceptics acknowledge that the move has forced a reassessment of the Jamaat’s political strategy in a rapidly evolving landscape.

TESTING DEMOCRATIC RELEVANCE

The fall of the Awami League created a rare political vacuum. The Jamaat now speaks the language of institutional reform and national unity with a confidence that would have been inconceivable even a year ago. Supporters highlight the party’s history in the 2001–2006 coalition government, when two Jamaat ministers were credited with administrative transparency and effective governance.

Whether this legacy is strong enough to reassure sceptical voters remains uncertain. But the momentum is undeniably with the Jamaat.

THE HARDEST QUESTION

Still, the party faces a significant challenge: its historical position during the 1971 liberation war. For many Bangladeshis, this remains a defining issue of national identity. In this context, a recent development has drawn national attention. Jamaat chief Dr Shafiqur Rahman publicly offered an unconditional apology regarding the party’s role and stance in 1971—a gesture unprecedented in the Jamaat’s political history. While reactions remain mixed, the move signals a key shift. It suggests that the Jamaat may be attempting to confront long-standing grievances rather than evade them.

Whether this apology will be accepted or deemed sufficient is up to the public. But, symbolically, it represents a step towards reconciliation—and potentially an effort to win the trust of an electorate that now prioritises accountability and historical clarity over rigid political loyalties.

BNP’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY

In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Awami League, it was widely assumed that the BNP would rise effortlessly to power. As the largest opposition force, the BNP appeared positioned to inherit the national leadership by default. But Bangladesh’s politics rarely follows expectations. The Jamaat, meanwhile, is trying to project something very different this time: discipline, cohesion and purpose.

Its leadership spent months supporting families of those killed in the July movement and assisting the injured. The party framed this not as politics but as a moral duty—a message that resonated with communities abandoned by traditional power-holders. This contrast between the BNP’s predictive politics and the Jamaat’s discipline has been pivotal in reshaping voter perceptions.

END OF OLD BINARIES

Bangladesh today is undergoing a democratic reset. Voters are no longer anchored to the traditional Awami League–BNP binary. Instead, they are evaluating parties based on behaviour, credibility and organisational capacity.

In this emerging landscape, the BNP appears inconsistent, undermined by ethical lapses. The Jamaat appears steady, defined by discipline and strategic clarity. This does not guarantee a Jamaat victory—its historical burdens remain heavy, but it has positioned itself effectively in a moment when Bangladeshis are searching for credible alternatives.

A PUBLIC IN FLUX

Recent surveys confirm this turbulence. With the Awami League out of the race due to its suspension, voters are navigating a political landscape they have not seen in more than a decade. The BNP leads with 30-33 per cent support, but it is a soft, fragile lead. What is most striking is the Jamaat’s surge to 26-29 per cent, a level of support unimaginable just a year ago. The Jamaat’s rise does not necessarily reflect newfound popularity; rather, it signals a polity searching for alternatives in a vacuum created by the collapse of the dominant party. Smaller parties are also benefitting, suggesting a broader political realignment.

Bangladeshis are not simply voting for parties—they are voting against the failures of the old order.

THE FINAL QUESTION

The uprising of 2024 shattered Bangladesh’s political status quo. It forced voters to reassess their expectations and compelled political actors to rethink their strategies. Whether the Jamaat’s resurgence will endure remains uncertain. But one reality is undeniable: at a moment when credibility matters more than rhetoric, voters are turning towards discipline over disorder.

Bangladesh’s next chapter will be written by parties that can meet its demands for accountability, integrity and democratic renewal.

The author is a Dhaka-born political and human rights analyst based in the UK.

instc-and-northern-sea-route-how-india-russias-new-routes-will-reshape-global-trade

Sat Dec 13 16:57:21 IST 2025

IT WAS NEITHER the military pacts nor the shifting geopolitics of energy that drew attention as documents were exchanged between the Indian and Russian sides at Delhi’s Hyderabad House on December 5. As President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi looked on, what created a mild flutter was Shipping Minister Sarbananda Sonowal stepping forward to swap documents with Russia’s Transport Minister Andrey Nikitin.

For those following India’s maritime resurgence this moment was anything but surprising. How India—a nation with more than 11,000km of coastline and a seafaring tradition from the Harappans to the Cholas—managed to fall so far behind in the maritime sector has long been a mystery. Determined to correct that course, the Union ministry of ports, shipping and inland waterways is at the forefront of a renewed push to reclaim India’s place on the high seas.

Guided by a robust framework of Maritime India Vision 2030 and Amrit Kaal Vision 2047—which aims to transform India into a maritime superpower by the time it becomes a $30 trillion economy—the government has set in motion an ambitious plan involving investments of up to 80 lakh crore. Against this backdrop, the maritime understandings concluded during the Modi–Putin summit had particular significance.

The first pillar of this new cooperation seeks to expand logistics networks by developing “stable and efficient” transport corridors on three routes: the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the Chennai–Vladivostok (Eastern Maritime) Corridor, and the Northern Sea Route.

Of these, the 7,200 km INSTC stands out as a significant alternative to the Suez-dependent route that geopolitical shifts have repeatedly disrupted. Connecting India and Russia through Iran via a multimodal network of sea, rail and road routes, this corridor will cut cargo transit from St Petersburg to Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust in Mumbai to just 25 days, compared to the 40-day transit around the Suez.

“INSTC is the most important of the three routes,” Admiral (retd) Sunil Lanba, former chief of the Indian Navy told THE WEEK. “It gives us access to the Central Asian market for Indian goods, and cuts cost by around 30 per cent and transit time by about 40 per cent as compared to the traditional route through the Black Sea. It will be a big boost to Indian exports, especially pharmaceuticals, food, etc.”

The Chennai-Vladivostok Corridor, he said, aligns India’s Act East Policy with Russia’s Eurasia policy. “It will boost India-Russia relations, give India access to energy resources, minerals and connectivity to Mongolia,” he said. “It will also give India geostrategic and geoeconomic heft in the region.”

Said Captain Suresh Bhardwaj, director of the Chennai-based MASSA Maritime Academy: “The INSTC offers an alternative trade route, especially relevant with present geopolitical shifts.”

Commodore (retd) R.S. Vasan, regional director of the National Maritime Foundation, said the INSTC would complement the expansion of India’s trade through Central Asia and provide the connection from Chabahar port in Iran. “With the good relations between Russia and Iran, India can leverage this for advancing its trade interests,” he said. “As nothing can go through Pakistan, India needs alternate routes.”

The second pillar of the cooperation focuses on shipping, ports, joint mineral exploration and research and development. Modi highlighted the shipbuilding partnership in particular. “Our strong cooperation in shipbuilding has the potential to further strengthen ‘Make in India’,” he said. “It is yet another excellent example of our win-win partnership, which will enhance jobs, skills and regional connectivity.”

The third focus area involves Russia training Indian seafarers to operate ships in polar waters through specialised programmes. India already holds observer status in the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental forum formed in 1996 to promote cooperation among Arctic states.

“Indian seafarers have no experience of operating in polar region whatsoever,” said Lanba. “We also do not have ships that have the capability to operate in the polar region. Russia has the largest number of icebreaker ships, including nuclear-powered ones. The training will definitely help Indian seafarers gain from the knowledge Russia possesses.”

Bhardwaj said the collaboration was a significant step in operationalising India’s Arctic policy, especially given the increasing navigability of the Northern Sea Route because of climate change. “This route is approximately 40 per cent shorter than the Suez Canal route between Europe and Asia,” he said.

A founding member of the Arctic Council, Russia controls the largest share of the Arctic. “The region has significant potential for fossil fuels,” said Vice Admiral Rajesh Sudhakar Pendharkar (retd). “A partnership with Russia to exploit these resources could help India substantially in securing its energy requirement. It could help lock in long-term access to Russian hydrocarbons, coal and critical minerals along routes less exposed to western pressure.”

Vasan points out the human resources dimension. “As of now Indian seafarers are about 14 per cent of all global seafarers. This MoU would add to the skill levels and increase our global presence,” he said. “With the increased use of additional Arctic routes the demand for expert sailors will increase.”

trump-migrants-and-guantanamo-bay-a-new-chapter-in-a-troubled-history

Sun Dec 14 10:35:34 IST 2025

It may have been Hurricane Melissa, which exploded into a Category 5 storm on October 27, that inadvertently saved 18 undocumented immigrants from the Guantánamo Bay detention centre. As the storm swept across the Caribbean, the American National Weather Service issued warnings that it could reach Cuba, prompting officials to evacuate the group quietly. They were flown by a special aircraft to Guatemala and El Salvador, their names and nationalities withheld. The operation, conducted in secrecy, also allowed the Trump administration to wriggle out of a legal crisis. It came just days before a federal court hearing that could redefine the legal boundaries of offshore migrant detention.

Guantánamo Bay has returned to the headlines as the Trump administration has started using it to detain undocumented migrants. President Donald Trump signed a memorandum in January this year, instructing the expansion of the Migrant Operations Centre at Guantánamo to full capacity. The memorandum directed the secretaries of defence and homeland security to detain high-priority criminal aliens. Trump claimed that the base could hold up to 30,000 people, presenting it as part of his promise to carry out the largest deportation in American history.

The move drew immediate condemnation from human rights organisations. They argued that it exploited the base’s peculiar legal status—technically outside US territory but under American control—which allowed migrants to be held in a jurisdictional gap with limited access to legal counsel and courts. The American Civil Liberties Union launched a legal challenge, arguing that the practice was unconstitutional and violated international law.

Central to the debate is whether migrants detained at Guantánamo have the same legal rights as those held on US soil. In Gutierrez v. Noem (2025), two Nicaraguans who had been held in immigration detention at Guantánamo argued that they do have the same rights. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is considering class action status, which would allow the ACLU to represent all migrants held at the base. The ACLU says the government’s use of Guantánamo is a deliberate attempt to bypass domestic due process protections. “The government is effectively disappearing these people into a legal black hole,” said Lee Gelernt, deputy director, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project. “The lawsuit is not claiming they cannot be detained in US facilities, but only that they cannot be sent to Guantánamo.” On December 5, Judge Sooknanan denied the Trump administration’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, allowing the legal challenge to proceed.

Since February, the Trump administration has detained roughly 710 migrants at Guantánamo, far below the tens of thousands envisioned initially, reflecting both logistical constraints and growing legal scrutiny. The first detainees—ten men allegedly connected to Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua gang—were flown in from Texas on February 5. At its peak, the migrant detention operation held 178 Venezuelans, on February 19. But most were repatriated or relocated quickly. Currently, there are no migrant detainees. Officials insist the detentions comply with longstanding US maritime and migration policy, which since the 1990s has allowed the holding of migrants intercepted at sea. The ACLU, however, argues that these migrants were detained on American soil, rather than intercepted at sea.

LONG BEFORE it became synonymous with barbed wires, orange jumpsuits and legal ambiguity, Guantánamo Bay was a quiet American outpost amid the turquoise waters and green hills of southeastern Cuba. Guantánamo’s modern history began in 1898 during the Spanish-American War, sparked by US intervention in Cuba’s struggle for independence from Spain. Tensions were already high when the explosion of an American warship in the Havana Harbour propelled the US into war. Fighting spread across the Caribbean and the Pacific, from Cuba and Puerto Rico to Guam and the Philippines. By the end, Spain lost its remaining overseas empire and Cuba came under temporary American occupation.

The US Marines who landed at Guantánamo Bay quickly recognised its military value. It offered a deep, sheltered harbour near sea routes linking the Atlantic with the Caribbean and, later, the Panama Canal. Following Spain’s defeat, the Treaty of Paris (1898) formalised Cuba’s independence, but the US was allowed to intervene in Cuban affairs to “preserve order and independence”. It also permitted the US to buy or lease Cuban land for naval stations, allowing the establishment of the American base at Guantánamo.

While recognising Cuban sovereignty, the agreement gave the US complete jurisdiction and control over the territory. The Guantánamo Bay Naval Station is now the oldest American military installation on foreign soil, serving as a refuelling and repair hub. For decades it was the winter training base for the Atlantic Fleet.

In 1934, under president Franklin D. Roosevelt, the US repealed some of the most interventionist clauses of the earlier agreement with Cuba, but left the Guantánamo lease intact. The new treaty stipulated that it would remain in force until both nations agreed to modify or terminate it, ensuring its near-permanent status. The US agreed to pay an annual rent of $2,000 to Cuba, later increased to $4,085.

For much of the 20th century, relations between the base and surrounding Cuban communities were relatively stable. This changed with Fidel Castro’s revolution. In 1958, fighters under Fidel’s brother Raúl briefly captured 29 American sailors near the base, foreshadowing tensions to come. Since Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba has refused to cash the rent cheques, arguing that the US presence is an illegal occupation. By 1961, the US had withdrawn its embassy, and in 1964 Cuba cut Guantánamo’s water supply, forcing the base to become entirely self-sufficient.

From then on, Guantánamo has operated as an island within an island. It generates its own electricity from fossil fuels, solar panels and wind turbines and produces water through a desalination plant. A fortnightly barge from Jacksonville, Florida, delivers food and goods, while twice-weekly flights bring fresh produce. Over time, Guantánamo has become a self-contained American community of several thousand people, with schools, churches, a post office, sports fields and fast-food outlets, including McDonald’s—the only one on Cuban soil.

Throughout the Cold War, even as Cuba and the United States stood opposed to each other, everyday life carried on in oddly ordinary ways on Guantánamo: families barbecued, children played baseball and American and Cuban soldiers sometimes traded music or exchanged brief waves across the fence. The base formed its own isolated ecosystem in the tropical heat, best known for its banana rats and its iguanas, strictly protected under US environmental rules. These quirks heightened the sense of absurdity: a fortified outpost where wildlife regulations were rigorously upheld while international legal norms often felt conspicuously absent.

In the early 1990s, as the Cold War drew to a close, Guantánamo took on an unexpected humanitarian role as Haitians and Cubans fled their countries by sea. Following a military coup in Haiti in September 1991, thousands attempted the dangerous crossing to escape political instability. By the end of that year, more than 6,000 Haitians were housed on US Navy ships and in makeshift camps at the base. In 1994, a task force was set up to process over 40,000 Haitian migrants.

That same year Guantánamo became the site of the world’s first and only prison camp for people with HIV, where more than 300 Haitian refugees, including children, were held behind razor wire. “These were refugees fleeing slaughter in their country, whose credible fear of persecution US officials acknowledged, yet they were held for no reason other than their HIV status. When they protested detention, the response was brutal,” Pardiss Kebriaei, senior staff attorney at the New York-based Centre for Constitutional Rights, told Voice of America.

The ambiguity deepened after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, when Guantánamo transformed from a quiet post to the centre of America’s campaign against terrorism. The George W. Bush administration wanted a site to detain and interrogate suspects captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Guantánamo, under complete US jurisdiction yet outside the reach of civilian courts, was chosen for its isolation and unique legal standing. With the new detention camp, it shifted overnight from a sleepy Caribbean outpost to a cornerstone of the war on terror.

Its unusual sovereignty arrangement provided justification for detaining foreign nationals without constitutional rights. On November 13, 2001, Bush authorised the detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism. Within weeks, refurbishment of old refugee compounds and construction of new prison blocks began. By January 2002, the first 300 detainees arrived from Afghanistan and were placed in the hastily built Camp X-Ray.

Images of hooded, shackled men in orange jumpsuits shocked the world. Pentagon photographs became symbols of the post-9/11 era. Camp X-Ray was intended as temporary while permanent facilities were built, yet it set the tone for Guantánamo’s reputation.

Legal challenges gradually eroded claims that Guantánamo lay beyond justice. In Rasul v. Bush (2004), the US Supreme Court ruled detainees could challenge imprisonment. Later decisions, including Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) and Boumediene v. Bush (2008), reinforced those rights, yet many prisoners remained detained despite favourable rulings due to bureaucratic and political obstacles. By the late 2000s, Guantánamo had become a political and moral burden. Barack Obama pledged to close the facility in 2008, describing it as incompatible with American ideals. Yet Congress blocked transfers to the mainland, and the prison remained open with a declining population.

When THE WEEK visited Guantánamo Bay in 2013—the only Indian publication to be allowed access—it found that the prison remained fully operational despite Obama’s promise. Guantánamo was a virtual fortress. Barbed wire, watchtowers and cameras encircled the site, while armed patrols monitored roads and the coastline. Guards were identified by numbers rather than names to preserve anonymity and prevent personal contact with detainees. Escape was impossible. Motion and sound sensors guarded the US perimeter, while the Cuban side was sealed off by mines and a 13km cactus barrier. Even senior Pentagon officials required multiple security clearances to enter.

At the time of the visit, Guantánamo held detainees from 48 countries. The prisoner population reflected the chaotic nature of the early detentions. Hardened militants were held alongside farmers, clerics, journalists and teenagers. Case files revealed that at least 17 detainees had been under 18 at capture, with two as young as 14. Many had endured years of interrogation before being declared innocent and released. One interpreter told THE WEEK that the greatest injustice was that many at Guantánamo had never been tried, while convicted terrorists elsewhere had received legal hearings.

Military officers admitted that several prisoners were victims of mistaken identity or opportunism. During the early years of the ‘war on terror’, US forces distributed leaflets across Afghanistan and Pakistan offering rewards of $5,000 for captured terrorists. This bounty system led to numerous false arrests as Afghan warlords and Pakistani soldiers sold innocent men for profit. One Afghan, 19-year-old Obaidullah, was imprisoned because bloodstains were found in a van. It was later revealed that it belonged to his wife, who had given birth inside it. Others were detained for owning the Casio F-91W watch, which US intelligence wrongly believed was used as a bomb timer by al Qaeda recruits.

The detention complex was divided into several camps. Camp Iguana, which once held minors, housed three Chinese Uyghurs who had fled persecution and been sold for bounties. Camps 5 and 6 contained most of the 164 detainees. Camp 5, a maximum-security block, confined inmates for up to 22 hours a day in small, monitored cells. Of its 58 detainees, 46 were classified as indefinite, meaning they could be held without trial or release. Camp 6 provided slightly improved conditions, allowing compliant prisoners up to nine hours outdoors. Their cells held a bed, a metal sink and a toilet, and they were permitted a Quran, writing materials and books. Even so, detainees arrived blindfolded and were subjected to intrusive searches when entering or leaving the compound.

Fifteen high-value prisoners were kept in the secretive Camp 7. Among them was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the self-proclaimed architect of the September 11 attacks, who was reportedly waterboarded 183 times in a single month. Another detainee, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, al Qaeda’s former third-in-command, misled interrogators about Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts for years. Interrogation rooms were painted blue to induce calm, but accounts described degrading methods including sexual humiliation by female interrogators who touched detainees or smeared fake menstrual blood on their faces.

The psychological toll was severe. The prison hospital treated inmates daily for depression, psychosis and hallucinations. At least seven suicides had been recorded. One detainee, Adnan Latif, a Yemeni cleared for release twice, died of a medication overdose in Camp 5.

THE WEEK was shown a small room with a television, and was told that detainees who comply could watch shows, but they would be shackled to rings on the floor. And, television is not just entertainment, it is an intelligence gathering tool, too. “They watch live satellite television. So, they are very appraised about world developments,” Captain Robert Durand, the facility’s spokesman told THE WEEK. “When you look at strategic intelligence, it is a question of association—people who they went to school with, people who they trained with.... So, there is utility to it [giving access to TV to prisoners.].”

While commanders insisted that prisoners were treated humanely, Amnesty International condemned Guantánamo as “a gulag of our times”, highlighting the injustice of indefinite detention without charge. Of the 164 detainees held in 2013, at least 84 had been cleared for release, yet bureaucratic deadlock prevented their departure. The US state department sought to persuade foreign governments that these men posed no threat, while the justice department argued in court that they could still be detained because of suspected terrorist links.

Officials at the base admitted that rehabilitation was not a goal. The aim was simply to keep detainees off the battlefield. Preparations were under way for the first US war-crimes trial in 50 years, to be held at Camp Justice, a temporary courtroom complex of more than a hundred tents. For all the defences offered, THE WEEK concluded that Guantánamo remained a symbol of moral and legal paralysis, suspended between security and justice and contradictory to the principles it claimed to uphold.

Since 2002, about 780 men have passed through the detention facility. Under president George W. Bush, around 540 were transferred, mostly to their home countries. The Obama administration continued the process, arranging the repatriation or resettlement of about 200 detainees. During Donald Trump’s first term, only one man was moved, to a prison in Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration repatriated 13, transferred 11 to Oman and released one, leaving just 15 men still held at the base as of November 20, this year.

Today, Guantánamo Bay stands as an unresolved paradox. It is a functioning naval installation, a diplomatic irritant, a legal anomaly and a moral question. “Guantanamo was a mistake. History will reflect that,” said Major General Michael R. Lehnert, the first commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo. “It was created in the early days as a consequence of fear, anger and political expediency. It ignored centuries of rule of law and international agreements. It does not make us safer and it sullies who we are as a nation.”

FROM THE ARCHIVES

When THE WEEK went to Guantánamo Bay

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entire-bangladesh-is-waiting-for-tarique-rahman-dr-ziauddin-hyder

Sat Dec 06 12:17:24 IST 2025

Interview/ Dr Ziauddin Hyder, adviser to the chairperson of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party

SENIOR LEADERS LIKE former prime minister and Bangladesh Nationalist Party chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia have served as stabilising anchors for Bangladesh as the country emerges from the violent breakdown of its democratic system after the student-led protests of 2024. Khaleda, who rose to prominence after the turbulence that followed the 1981 assassination of her husband, president Ziaur Rahman, is passing her political legacy to her son Tarique Rahman, who has lived in exile in London since 2008. The shift to a new generation places Tarique at the centre of public expectations. His return to Dhaka will determine how effectively he can turn widespread frustration into political direction ahead of the elections in February. Dr Ziauddin Hyder, adviser to the BNP chairperson, says the whole country is waiting for him. He says the BNP’s poll campaign will begin with a rally to honour the 1971 liberation war, Ziaur Rahman’s role and the sacrifices of thousands of freedom fighters. Excerpts from an exclusive interview:

Q/ How is Begum Khaleda Zia’s health, and how are people in Bangladesh coping with the concern surrounding her condition?

Our leader, Khaleda Zia, has been suffering from multiple health issues and her condition remains critical and fragile. But, from the sources I know, most of her indicators improved from the day before yesterday to yesterday. We are hopeful that soon she will be able to travel to London to join her family—her son, our leader and acting chairman, and daughter-in-law, Dr Zubaida—who have both been working 24 hours to ensure that Mrs Zia’s treatment is well coordinated. They are drawing on expertise from around the world, including doctors from London, doctors from the US, and her personal medical team in Dhaka.

Q/ Who are the immediate family members with her in Dhaka, and are there plans for Tarique Rahman to return given his mother’s health and the upcoming elections?

Her brother, sisters-in-law, nieces and nephews are in Dhaka. She has her personal medical team, coordinated by Dr Zahid Hossain, who is also a member of the BNP standing committee. As our standing committee member Salahuddin Ahmed noted, Tarique Rahman, our acting chair, may return anytime soon. The entire country is waiting. But of course, the final decision will be made by the family.

Q/ Tarique Rahman has hinted at uncontrollable factors delaying his return.

Of course, there are multiple reasons. And I am sure there are substantive reasons for him to make his decision. Nobody ignores the security threat, not even the government. The government has to do everything to ensure there is enough confidence and that unforeseeable and unknown risks are controlled.

Q/ The political landscape is shifting rapidly with the Jamaat-e-Islami projected as a close second in some polls. When will the BNP start its full election campaign?

The BNP is the largest political party in the country. And the BNP is a pro-people, pro-election party. We believe that as soon as the schedule is declared, the campaign will begin in every constituency. Once the campaign begins nationwide, many of the ongoing rumours will fade away. The entire country will move onto the election track, and we look forward to a peaceful, participatory election in the first half of February.

Q/ What is Tarique Rahman’s reform vision?

Tarique Rahman launched the 31-point reform agenda in 2022, which includes all the reforms that the interim government has tried to spearhead. After months of campaigning, we realised that while people value institutional, constitutional and electoral reforms, what they value most is what will happen in their daily lives.

They want to know how health care will improve, what will happen to their children’s education and employment, how the country will tackle climate change, how farmers will benefit and how women will be empowered. Under Tarique’s leadership, the BNP prioritised eight sectors—health, education, employment, agriculture, social protection, environment and support for imams, war veterans and religious leaders.

The BNP’s campaign will be future-oriented, positive and development-focused. We want to explain to people how the BNP will add value to their lives—bringing primary health care close to their homes, reducing catastrophic health expenses, improving specialised care through public–private partnerships, reforming education to align with industry needs, prioritising women’s needs, upgrading skills for youth and global job markets, planting 25 crore fruit and medicinal trees, improving irrigation through canal-digging and more.

Q/ The people demand participatory and transparent elections. How can this be ensured, especially with the Awami League leadership under trial?

The Awami League and the trial of Sheikh Hasina are matters under the judiciary. I do not want to comment because the verdict has already been declared, and we do not know what the next steps will be. But if Awami League leaders are charged with atrocities, murder and crimes against humanity, I don’t think people will support them. The government has already declared that Awami League cannot conduct political activities until all trials are completed, criminals brought to justice and verdicts delivered. So I do not want to comment on their political participation before that due process is completed.

Q/ The Jamaat-e-Islami is attempting to rebrand itself.

I recall the Jamaat chief Dr Shafiqur Rahman at an event in the US apologising to the people of Bangladesh for their actions since 1947. But I don’t think that statement is clear enough. It has to be more precise. They must clearly explain what the Jamaat did in 1971 during our war of liberation, the war crimes committed, and present a clear apology to the nation. A general statement is not sufficient, especially for the new generation, who will not be convinced.

Q/ There are concerns about rising extremism. How do you balance protecting secular culture with accommodating religious practices?

Historically, Bangladesh is a secular country. We have a long history of coexistence among Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and Christians. I don’t see how Bangladesh can move away from that deeply rooted cultural and social fabric. Yes, there are isolated incidents, but if we remain united and ensure a peaceful transition to democracy, we can avoid such threats.

Q/ There are reports of increased Pakistani engagement, especially a revival of military ties.

I am not aware of deeper military engagement with Pakistan. But in general, Bangladesh believes in balanced, issue-based relationships with all neighbours. There is no open ticket for anything; everything depends on diplomatic engagement, and it must remain balanced.

Q/ How do you see the student leaders of the July uprising shaping politics now?

The July uprising included a huge number of participants from the BNP’s student wing, Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dal. Another large section came from non-political backgrounds. After the uprising, some joined the government and others formed the National Citizen Party. We believe in fair opportunity for everyone. The BNP will support the democratic transition.

Q/ How prepared is the interim government under Professor Muhammad Yunus for elections in early February?

Professor Yunus has repeatedly said that he wants to see the best election in Bangladesh’s history. I want to believe him. We are hopeful that there will be a fair, participatory and peaceful election in the first half of February.

Q/ Since the July–August 2024 events, what has changed in Bangladesh’s political climate?

The first big change is that now I can say what I feel without fear of being abducted at night. People can write without fear. Another major change is people’s expectations, especially the youth. They no longer want negative politics. They want positive politics.

Q/ How significant is 1971 for Bangladesh, especially amid claims made during the student-led protests that Bangladesh’s history begins in 2024?

1971 remains the major pillar of our country. The 1971 liberation war and the sacrifices of our president Ziaur Rahman come together. That is why we decided to begin our campaign with the Bijoyer Mashe Bijoy Mashal victory rally to highlight 1971, Ziaur Rahman’s contributions and the sacrifices of thousands of freedom fighters. 2024 is important, but comparing it with 1971 would be inappropriate.

why-a-shift-in-hearts-and-minds-is-crucial-to-resolve-israel-palestine-conflict

Sat Oct 25 15:26:14 IST 2025

TEL AVIV

Is the Middle East entering a new dawn of peace, or is this merely another diplomatic fata morgana—a mirage that often deceives many, even leaders, in the hot and arid lands of this region? The answer remains elusive.

A few days after the fanfare at Sharm el-Sheikh and the Knesset, the most we can hope for is that this might mark another milestone in the ongoing efforts to revive the peace process. Yet, the region has seen far too many failed attempts.

The core challenge lies in the fact that the two key parties—Israel and Hamas—were not present at the signing table in Egypt and remain reluctant to pursue peace unless it aligns strictly with their respective terms. For the Israeli government, this means: no Hamas and no Palestinian state. For Hamas, it means no Israel. The Palestinian National Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank, remains only marginally involved.

Ehud Barak, the last Israeli prime minister to have dealt directly with the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, wrote after Sharm that the October 7 attacks created a critical need to ensure Hamas could never again control Gaza. He criticised Netanyahu’s push for total military victory as unrealistic, drawing parallels to failed US wars. While Israel achieved significant military success, including weakening Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, it came at a high cost. Controversial government rhetoric and actions in Gaza have led to accusations of war crimes, growing international isolation and rising antisemitism. Israel now faces boycotts and widespread global criticism. “A wave of hostility towards Israel has risen among the younger generation worldwide, along with doubts among young Jews,” says Barak. “The recklessness of Netanyahu's government has left a stain on Israel’s image that will be difficult to erase, even over a generation. For the first time since its establishment, question marks are being raised about the very legitimacy of the State of Israel.”

This is an accurate assessment, highlighting that the only path for Israel to achieve lasting redemption is by genuinely reviving the peace process.

Militarily, Hamas has been indisputably defeated—with ten per cent of Gaza’s population either dead or wounded, more than 80 per cent of structures destroyed or damaged and armed groups roaming the streets, while humanitarian aid arrives slowly. However, diplomatically and politically, Hamas has gained some advantage. Israel now faces international condemnation and the issue of Palestinian statehood has returned to the forefront of the global agenda. Israel is under pressure from nearly every corner of the world and has shifted from being a close ally of the United States to a de facto vassal state.

There are, however, a few positive developments—limited, yet crucial. All surviving hostages are back in Israel, though only a few of the deceased have been returned. Nearly 2,500 Palestinian prisoners have been released from Israeli jails. A ceasefire is in place and humanitarian aid to Gaza has been enhanced.

Yet much of what is happening is an elaborate PR spectacle, starring President Donald J. Trump, with broad international support and copious self-aggrandisement by leaders drowning in flattery.

The road to Sharm el-Sheikh

In late August, the US revoked the visa of President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, preventing him from attending the UN General Assembly debate on Palestinian statehood. Yet, 40 days later, Trump embraced him in Egypt as though he were a long-lost brother. However, Trump conspicuously avoided mentioning the Palestinian state in his many speeches.

The first time Hamas believed the US was genuinely presenting proposals was when they received information indirectly through an Israeli intermediary. The American envoy, Steve Witkoff, relayed the proposals to Hamas via Gershon Baskin, a left-wing Israeli peace activist with longstanding ties to non-terrorist Hamas sympathisers. Hamas distrusted both the US and Netanyahu, but placed surprising faith in Baskin’s word. They told him to tell Witkoff to proceed—and he did.

On September 8, Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner—making a first public appearance—met with Netanyahu’s chief negotiator and adviser, Ron Dermer, in Florida. All three are Floridians. They discussed a proposed 21-point plan, drafted by Kushner and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, with inputs from Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio. Dermer was not enthusiastic but promised to report back.

The next day, September 9, the Israeli Air Force conducted a bombing raid in Doha, Qatar. The apparent goal was to eliminate Hamas’s entire negotiating team. Netanyahu seemed determined to eliminate any chance for peace. Curiously, the bombs missed their targets.

Qatar panicked. Its leaders realised they might become targets themselves—especially amid a major Israeli police investigation into allegations that three of Netanyahu’s top advisers were on the Qatari payroll, with insinuations that Netanyahu himself might be implicated.

Qatar contacted Witkoff and Kushner, whose families maintain extensive business interests in the country. They also reached out to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both Qatar and Turkey are prominent Sunni Islamist actors. Erdogan, a close friend of Trump, saw a strategic opportunity to achieve two goals: to replace Iran’s Shia extremist influence in the region with a Sunni-capitalist bloc led by Turkey and Qatar, and to push Israel into diplomatic and political decline.

Many speculate that Israel would not have dared to strike Qatar without US permission. Yet Netanyahu claimed he acted independently. Trump needed to distance himself from the incident. In response, Turkey and Qatar persuaded 11 other Arab and Muslim nations—including Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country—to present a united front and offer inputs to Trump’s 21-point plan.

The rapid march towards Sharm

September 23: Trump meets with a dozen Arab and Muslim leaders and reaches agreement on the plan.

September 25: Netanyahu arrives at the UN General Assembly. Trump’s envoys meet him over three days and deliver the following instructions: When you arrive at the White House, the president will call the emir of Qatar, and you will make a public video apology. You will also promise that such actions will never happen again. Additionally, you will agree to Trump’s 21-point plan, which includes: no annexation, no settlements in Gaza, Palestinian rule in Gaza, IDF withdrawal, cessation of bombings and immediate release of all hostages.

September 29: Netanyahu arrives at the White House and complies.

October 3: Hamas responds to Trump’s message with a “yes, but...”. Israel perceives this as a rejection. Trump, however, interprets it as full acceptance, marking the beginning of a “final and just peace”. He secures commitments from Qatar and Turkey to keep Hamas in check—and they do. Hamas forgets the “but”.

October 6: Detailed negotiations begin in Sharm el-Sheikh.

October 8: Witkoff and Kushner arrive in Sharm el-Sheikh. Trump authorises direct communication with Hamas. They assure Hamas the US will prevent Israel from renewing hostilities. An agreement of sorts is reached. Israel and Hamas sign and commit to the first phase.

October 10: The signing ceremony is announced, to be hosted by Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

October 12: Trump visits Israel, then proceeds to Egypt. Israel is initially uninvited, then invited, then declines to attend the ceremony marking its own peace with Hamas. Hamas is also absent.

The next steps

More substantial steps are necessary: Hamas must be replaced by an inter-Arab force. A technocratic Palestinian government must be formed, supervised by an international steering committee led by Blair. A new security force must be created, into which Hamas’s heavy weaponry will be transferred, enabling Gaza’s reconstruction to begin. Israel insists on two conditions: No individual from Hamas’s military wing may serve in the new administration and the final withdrawal will only take place once security benchmarks are met.

This scenario is highly optimistic and can only materialise if certain conditions are met: Israel must form a government willing to allow political self-determination for Palestinians, ultimately paving the way for a two-state solution. Hamas must abandon all military ambitions, recognise Israel’s right to exist—as the PLO did in 1988—and renounce terrorism. Additionally, Trump’s resolve must endure; he must not grow frustrated and walk away.

From his sickbed, former President Joe Biden congratulated Trump. Few understand the difficulty of managing Middle Eastern tensions as well as Biden, who has been at it for 50 years in the Senate and the White House. Eighteen months ago, Biden proposed a similar—arguably even better—plan, which was rejected by all parties. Why did they accept it now and not then? Baskin has an explanation: Trump came with a bigger stick—and more carrots.

Now, with both Israel and Hamas having suffered severe setbacks from their closest allies, the same plan is back on the table. Israel has managed to snatch diplomatic and political defeat from the jaws of military victory. Hamas has quadrupled its casualties without securing much in return—except, perhaps, an end to the war. Maybe.

Without a significant shift in hearts and minds across all sides, success remains unlikely. Even if such a change were to occur, the process would still require a generation or two to rebuild trust and foster sustainable peace. Moreover, some of the current leading figures will need to be replaced. At present, there is too much ego, corruption, conflict of interest and the risk of widespread theft and exploitation. Internal politics in many of the countries involved are not conducive to a peace process. The world has become more nationalistic, less liberal. There is also an excessive influence of religion—across all denominations—dictating political realities.

I do not believe that bad actors will voluntarily step aside. Unfortunately, I fear that the Middle East currently lacks the essential foundational assets to launch a meaningful peace process.

However, I have been wrong before—more than once.

The author, a veteran journalist and businessman, was editor-in-chief of the Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv.

jaffnas-mass-graves-how-ghosts-of-sri-lankas-civil-war-continue-to-haunt-the-youth

Sat Oct 25 15:15:11 IST 2025

JAFFNA

As shovel hit bone, ghosts of the past awakened.

This February, labourers brought in to start work on a cemetery in Jaffna’s Chemmani area dug up what appeared to be human bones. Alongside skeletons, they also found school bags, toys and, as per one report, even a baby bottle.

The site was near a civil war-era mass grave, one of the largest on the island, but the locals did not expect more remains. This site is 250m from the place the bodies were found years ago.

In 1998, Sri Lankan soldier Somaratne Rajapakse, on trial for rape and murder of schoolgirl Krishanti Kumaraswamy, had claimed that bodies of hundreds of Tamils killed by the military were secretly buried at Chemmani. The first excavation began, uncovering 15 bodies, and the then government declared the digging complete.

But it seems dead men do tell tales. By September 1, when President Anura Dissanayake visited, 200 skeletons had been dug up. “The third segment of the second phase of excavations is going on now,” said lawyer V.S. Niranchan, one of the members supervising the excavation.

This was in late August, when THE WEEK visited the site. The huge iron gates were locked from inside, three army men stood guard, and men and women in protective gear sat next to a huge pit. “With today’s recovery,” said Niranchan, “excavations carried out over 48 days have brought to light 191 fully exhumed sets of skeletal remains.”

The findings offer some degree of closure to the families of those who went missing during the conflict. The Sri Lankan civil war, between the Sinhalese-dominated government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, lasted more than 25 years and reportedly claimed close to one lakh lives. Said Lawyer Ranitha Gnanarajah, who works with more than 600 Tamils looking for their lost kin: “The scanned area is three times larger than the site that has been excavated. Many Tamils were displaced in 1995 from Jaffna.”

There is muted hope among the families in the area, especially among those who lived through the years of strife, as past investigations have not led to much. But Gnanarajah and her team continue to fight, helping the administration in any ways they can.

The story of the youth is different. A lot of them were not affected by the war and have no idea why the grave is being dug now. “I don’t want to go there or even hear about it,” said 19-year-old Somika Thampirajah, a front-office worker at a Jaffna hotel. “Won’t it be haunting to see the skeletons there? I don’t know if there was a war here. I have heard my parents talk about it. I know only YouTube, my phone and my job here.” She looked at her computer, as if closing the chapter.

Her colleague, 20-year-old Sugenthiran Rajanayagam, is from Mannar district, but has never visited. His parents took him to Thoothukudi in Tamil Nadu when he was two, and they only returned when he was 17. “I want to live in India, because we have money and also a stable internet connection to watch Reels,” he said.

Asked about the LTTE and its chief Prabhakaran, he shrugged and smiled. “People say he is from Valvettithurai. I live there only,” he said, adding that he didn’t want to know about the difficult times his parents faced.

About 120km away, at Viusvamedu in Mullaitivu district, seven-year old Dakshin Niranjan climbed an old, torn sofa to sit on his mother’s lap. He is in class two, studying both Tamil and Sinhala in a nearby government-run school. His mother, Dharmila Antony Niranjan, wants to ensure that she passes on the past to the future generation. Her elder son, 12, is at a boarding school in Jaffna. “I have told him all my stories, but my younger son doesn’t know. I will tell him as well,” she said. Dakshin has heard about her days in the Vanni jungle. “I like hearing those stories. She used to say how they would hide inside the bunkers, how she got trained as a soldier,” he said. But Dakshin doesn’t know what a bunker looks like. A huge neem tree and a jackfruit tree now stand on the bunker where Dharmila and her parents used to hide during the war. “We closed it after we got government support to rebuild our house,” said Dharmila. Her husband, Antony, also part of the LTTE once, is now a carpenter in Dubai.

Dharmila’s neighbour Pavitha Maruthaveeran was eight when the war ended. She lost her family and had to move to an army camp for two years. “We were at peace when the LTTE was around. The boys never used to abuse the women. But now the boys are into drugs, they watch porn on their phones and it’s not very safe,” said Maruthaveeran, who heads the local youth club and is part of an NGO that works with the youth of the area. “The young generation only want to make merry. They do not know the difficult times their parents faced.”

Her friend Madhumitha Jayaseelan, 19, does not fall in that group. “I was only four when the war ended, but we were in the Chettikulam camp for more than two years,” she said. “My mother used to tell me everything. She was forced to join the LTTE when she was 15, but she used to say that she loved her job.”

Her 12-year-old sister Asmita also heard those stories, but she was not as impressed. “She used to say how they felt like being in heaven those days, but I don’t feel any difference,” she said. “I want to complete my studies from Jaffna and go abroad. I want to earn as much as I can to live a lavish life.”

A few hundred metres away, at Red Paana, 44-year-old Tharmaprakasan Yogeswari and her 20-year-old son Vaseegaran recalled the LTTE days. Yogeswari—Mala in the LTTE—fought between 2002 and 2009. Her husband was her senior in her battalion. Now divorced, Yogeswari works for an NGO supporting war widows. Vaseegaran, who has a diploma in mechanical engineering, is looking for a job. “I have heard all the stories from my mother. If such a situation happens now, I will go fight for the Tamils,” he said. “But life has to move on. If I get a job abroad, I will take my mother and we can live a comfortable life.”

His friend Muthukumar Nandan was not so enamoured by the past. “I don’t know Prabhakaran or Tamil rights. What is going to change for me by celebrating the past? I like to watch YouTube, go around with friends and spend time in the fields,” he said. After completing his A level, Nandan, 21, worked with his mother to clear weeds in the fields. He later worked for an NGO to clear landmines. No job, he said, could earn him enough to support his family.

Said Dharmila: “Before 2009, we depended only on radio news aired by the LTTE sympathisers. This generation are YouTubers and Instagram-mers, and do not know about the scars of the war. They do not want to get into any altercation even with the local police for any issue. Most of them do not have fighting spirit. Everything has changed now. I don’t know if it’s for good or bad. But I know that we Tamils are still marginalised in this country.”

Today, the modern A9 highway connects north Sri Lanka with the south. AC trains carry more than 500 people every day from the south to the north and vice-versa. Star hotels, resorts and cafes have come up in Jaffna, and even smaller districts such as Vavuniya and Mullaitivu have opened for tourists.

On September 1, when Dissanayake visited Jaffna, he promised a society where Sinhala Buddhists, Tamils and Muslims live in unity.

“But bringing an international cricket stadium [to Jaffna] or expanding the Myliddy harbour may not appeal to the people of the north [as they want political solution more than infrastructure],” said Jaffna MP Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam. “There is a strong disappointment among the Tamil-speaking people as there is no tangible progress on the confidence-building measures promised by the ruling NPP (National People’s Power).”

But Ponnambalam did agree that Dissanayake’s party won in north Sri Lanka only because of the divisions within the Tamil political parties that did not educate the youth on their past. This led to an increasingly apolitical generation.

More important, the underlying issues that led to the civil war remain largely unchanged. The attempts to reform the constitution remain futile. There are no jobs for those in the north, except those in a few tourist attractions. “While there were promises of [full implementation of] the 13th amendment (decentralisation of power to provincial councils), there are no discussions on a political solution,” said Batticaloa MP Shanakiyan Rasamanickam.

The digging of graves might finally answer some long-held questions, but the future path of the Tamils in Jaffna is anything but clear.

india-must-engage-with-more-afghan-voices-not-just-taliban-mahbouba-seraj

Sat Oct 18 12:54:54 IST 2025

Interview/ Mahbouba Seraj, Afghan women’s rights activist

Mahbouba Seraj, niece of King Amanullah Khan, was 55 when she created the radio show ‘Our Beloved Afghanistan’ in 2003. It was an exciting time as women would gather to discuss corruption, jobs, higher education, press freedom and, of course, war and peace.

More than two decades later, a weary Seraj sat in Kabul and watched Taliban foreign minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi telling the media in Delhi that no one’s rights, men or women, should ever be denied.

What angers her is Taliban’s exclusion of women in the social and political landscape of Afghanistan—insiders reveal that secret online schools are desperately trying to educate girls in the hope of a better future. And while women’s voices are frowned upon, the men who support them have also been thrown in jail for their “activism”.

Matiullah Wesa, founder of the non-profit Pen Path, spent seven months in jail in 2023 and lives under threat of being persecuted again. His organisation has worked under the radar to educate 7,300 girls in rural and far-flung districts, and, notably, it has also been helped by some Pashtun chieftains who want to blunt the narrative that the tribes resist women’s education.

“Afghanistan has a long and rich history of women in leadership and public life,” says Wesa. “In reality, Afghan culture, history and Islam support the active inclusion of women in society. Afghans not only respect their own women, but also support the rights and dignity of women worldwide.”

Seraj attributes these cycles of inclusion and exclusion to the failure of not just the Taliban, but of the international community that has let down Afghan women in its race for military, diplomatic and narrow political gains.

The way forward is tricky, and Delhi should engage but remain watchful. “As a white-haired Afghan woman, I don’t want any kind of involvement with any government with their soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan. We really are okay as far as giving an answer to Pakistan (there have been recent clashes). Taliban can do that. They are capable people as far as that is concerned.

“But at the same time, it’s like standing on a big branch of a tree and taking a hammer and breaking that branch. When it breaks, everybody’s going to fall.” Excerpts from an interview:

Q/ India is looking to upgrade relations with the Taliban government. What are your concerns?

A/ I really don’t want another disagreement in the world over Afghanistan. It always starts for some reason that has little to do with our country. India often steps back whenever the Taliban are around. But this isn’t really about Afghanistan alone; it’s about how Pakistan treats Afghanistan and how Afghanistan interacts with them. That’s where India comes in.

I don’t look at these things with an open heart because I know there are hidden games at play. And honestly, that’s annoying. The world thinks we, the people, won’t understand, but we do. Everyone—the US, Europe, Russia, China, Pakistan—is playing games. If they could just stop and be honest, it would benefit everyone.

I am happy our relationship with India is back on track. Our friendship goes back centuries. Their support for education, universities and hospitals makes life easier for Afghans. But at the same time, there have been instances that are worrisome. When Muttaqi visited India, no women journalists were allowed to meet him [at the briefing] the first time.

It was heartening to hear that they were included the next time—that gives me hope. But will things change? No. These conversations can happen only outside Afghanistan, like in India. Back home, our heads would be chopped off for saying these things. The reality for women is devastating. Girls are allowed to study only up to primary school, and beyond that, education simply ends. Even short-term vocational programmes in nursing, midwifery or community health care have been completely stopped since the Taliban returned to power.

In the past four years, they’ve issued around 157 edicts restricting women’s lives. It’s unbelievable. Women can’t step outside their homes freely, can’t visit parks, and now, even going to a restaurant with family has been banned. Even their voices are not allowed to be heard. Not on the radio, not on television.

And India, a country known for women who have always stood up for equality and human rights, is now engaging with these people. Why? There’s such double-speak in foreign policy. They say it’s not deliberate exclusion, that they respect women’s rights. But that’s a lie. The official who first said women journalists shouldn’t enter, he was the one telling the truth. Everyone else is pretending.

Q/ India has insisted on a truly inclusive government in Afghanistan. How does that fit within the Taliban’s current approach?

A/ A “step forward” today doesn’t mean the same as before. Acceptance of the Taliban is tricky. The lack of inclusivity, particularly of women, is unacceptable. Indian women are rightfully upset; they will raise their voices, and they should. How can a government be inclusive if 50 per cent of the population is excluded?

Q/ How do you see Pakistan’s role with the Taliban, and what about the influence of the US?

A/ I don’t want to speculate, but recent events show interference. A bomb two nights ago came from Pakistan. Does this mean anyone can just send bombs now? This isn’t acceptable. The US is involved, too, trying to show the Taliban they can align with India and ignore Pakistan. But agreements between countries should be country-to-country. India should recognise its responsibility as a powerful nation. Their actions affect the whole region. India must engage with a wide spectrum of Afghan voices, not just the Taliban or the previous government. We have people who love this country and are working for it; India should talk to them, too.

Q/ How difficult is it to raise issues like secondary education for women?

A/ Completely impossible. We’re losing ground in every sense, and the international community ignores this. Everyone talks, but talk is cheap. Atrocities in Afghanistan didn’t start with the Taliban; they’ve been ongoing since 1978 (Afghan War).

Q/ Could India’s renewed engagement with the Taliban open doors for trade or development?

A/ There is a silver lining, yes, but it’s fragile. India must act with open eyes and consider the potential backlash. The animosity between India and Pakistan, and Pakistan and Afghanistan, is long-standing. Poor Afghans always pay the price.

Many Afghans still don’t accept the Taliban. Isolation strategies hurt ordinary people more than the Taliban.

Q/ How are women coping in daily life?

A/ We live in darkness. Decisions are made by a few hundred for 40 million. It’s suffocating. Women are busy supporting their families. Generations are losing direction, opportunities and hope. Social infrastructure is collapsing. There are heavy controls on communication.

Q/ You have been accused by a section of women of being pro-Taliban.

A/ These women dislike me for insisting on speaking about what’s really happening in Afghanistan. I don’t deny the atrocities, but I believe they’ve been committed by many sides. During the Mujahideen era, after the Russian invasion, the treatment of women was terrible. Under Ashraf Ghani’s presidency, too, corruption and abuse of power were rampant. I spoke against those governments, too, but people forget that.

In 20 years, Taliban stopped a huge army without boots, just with slippers on mountains. That’s power. But power should be used for the country’s benefit. And now, after the deal with the US was signed in Doha, we’re stuck.

And yes, I was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2023, and again this year. I didn’t win, of course, but the smear campaign has been terrible. The truth is, Afghanistan has suffered under every regime. The poor country, the poor women, are paying the price.

pakistan-saudi-arabia-defence-deal-more-symbolic-than-strategic

Sat Sep 27 12:54:07 IST 2025

THE PAKISTAN-SAUDI ARABIA “Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement” signed on September 17 came close on the heels of the Israeli airstrike on Hamas leaders in Doha. Although full details of the agreement are not known, the operative portion has been quoted as stating that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”.

Defence agreements are traditionally struck between a major power and one or more smaller powers, or when a group of nations brings together the collective military might through a structure like NATO. There is always a big power as the anchor, without which such agreements carry little weight. Viewed in this light, the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia agreement seems symbolic rather than one of strategic military value.

Any alliance in West Asia must factor in the US military bases across Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. These bases, with over 40,000 US troops, support air and naval operations, logistics and intelligence gathering. Saudi Arabia’s and the region’s security dependency on the US is significant.

The reliability of this dependency has, however, been repeatedly tested in recent years and the geopolitical realities of US security guarantees are beginning to look doubtful. The 2019 drone strikes by Iranian proxies on Saudi Arabian oil facilities attracted only a muted US response. Six years later, Trump’s pledge to “protect” Qatar, after it committed billions of dollars of investment in the US, proved of little use. Within months of this assurance came the first-ever direct Iranian strike and the first-ever Israeli strike on a Gulf state. Iran struck the US Al-Udeid air base in Qatar on June 23, followed by Israel’s strike on Hamas in the heart of Qatar on September 9.

These events have shaken West Asia’s confidence in existing security guarantees and caused immense embarrassment. US military bases are becoming more of a liability than an asset. Adding to the discomfort is the absence of any global condemnation, China maintaining a safe distance, Europe missing in action and Russia busy mopping up Ukraine.

From Pakistan’s perspective, the only military threat it faces is from India. Consider a scenario where, in retaliation for another Pakistan-sponsored terror attack, India launches Operation Sindoor-2. Would Saudi Arabia abandon its economic and diplomatic relations with India and become a direct party to an India-Pakistan war that Pakistan itself may have triggered? Would it risk destroying the diplomatic linkages and the image of a responsible global player that it has carefully built over decades, for little in return? Saudi Arabia’s military capacity and track record also make such a scenario highly improbable.

Even with the newly minted defence agreement in place, Saudi Arabian assistance to Pakistan in a war with India is unlikely to extend beyond some additional oil supplies, financial aid and mediatory diplomacy.

Decision dilemmas of this kind may explain why the full text of the agreement has not been released. It is possible that while the signing ceremony was rushed through for optics, the complexities of the body text are still being worked out. It would also be important to see how the agreement addresses aggression that may be precipitated by one of the signatories themselves.

The timing of the agreement suited Pakistan. Suddenly, it gains relevance in West Asia, something it has long sought. The deal gives Pakistan a larger-than-life image. Domestically, it strengthens the institutional weight of the army, deepens the military’s grip on governance and expands its role in foreign policy. The erosion of Pakistan’s democratic institutions and civilian authority continues.

The agreement reportedly includes defence industry collaboration, technology transfer and co-production. These aspects could bring access to funds and useful outcomes for Pakistan’s defence industries. This may be the only tangible benefit for Pakistan, apart from the image makeover.

In the Saudi Arabia-Israel context, it is unlikely that Riyadh perceives a direct threat from Israel, even in the form of a Doha-type strike. Nor is there any realistic scenario in which Saudi Arabia perceives a nuclear threat to itself. Its greater dilemma lies in reconciling its earlier overtures to Israel and its assertion that Palestine was not a priority. It must now balance this to maintain credibility as the Islamic world’s leader. Outwardly, the agreement provides good optics for Saudi Arabia, showing strategic autonomy and signalling displeasure with the US and Israel. It also conveys a subtle message of potential access to nuclear weapons if ever needed, especially given Saudi Arabia’s past financial role in Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Yet speculation about a Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Saudi Arabia is unrealistic, given that Pakistan possesses only a minimalist first-strike nuclear capability.

Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Iran, combined with active non-state actors operating from their territories, have made Saudi Arabia’s neighbourhood chaotic. These entities pose significant threats to its security. Problems could also arise from the mass Gaza exodus. One cannot rule out the emergence of trouble spots in and around Saudi Arabia, similar to Turkey’s Kurdish regions. Pakistan may be willing to assist Saudi Arabia in countering such challenges along its borders.

The only scenario in which the agreement looks militarily relevant is the Saudi Arabia-Iran context. The deal delivers a diplomatic and tactical blow to Tehran, Saudi Arabia’s main adversary. For Pakistan, however, it creates difficulties by deepening mistrust with its neighbour Iran.

This raises a question: is the agreement an American-engineered ploy with an eye on Iran?

Beyond the military sphere, Pakistan’s economy is a mess. Even maintaining its armed forces is proving financially burdensome. The country urgently needs an economic lifeline. An “on-call Wagner group” arrangement for its army may be one way to generate revenue.

Given the military capabilities of the signatories and the impact on regional power dynamics, the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defence agreement appears more symbolic than strategic.

What is of greater importance is the writing on the wall: the existing security structure in the region has collapsed. The million-dollar question is what shape the new structure will take and how long it will take to emerge.

The author served as deputy chief of Army staff.

Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Mutual Defence Pact: Highlights

Core commitment

* Any aggression against either country would mean aggression against both

* Could extend to Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities

* Formalises decades-long defence cooperation

Saudi motivations

* Response to regional security breakdown after Israeli strike in Doha

* Reduce reliance on the US, diversify alliances

* Views Iran and Israel as threats, uses Pakistan’s nuclear status as deterrence

* Ambition to chart independent security path

ADVANTAGE PAKISTAN

* Cementing historic ties with Saudi Arabia

* Securing Saudi commitment in case of an Indian attack

* Likely Saudi financial support for Pakistan army

* Bolstering geopolitical standing

The India angle

* Makes cross-border operations against Pak risky

* Pact embeds Pakistan in West Asian security architecture

* Potential risk of a broadened anti-India alliance

* Saudi Arabia, however, maintains strong bilateral ties with India

* Pact reflects West Asian regional dynamics, not Indo-Pak conflict

TEXT: AJISH P. JOY

myanmar-elections-junta-india-myanmar-geopolitics

Sat Sep 13 13:41:30 IST 2025

When Myanmar’s military junta, the State Administration Council (SAC), announced in January that it would hold national elections by December this year, the declaration was met with more scepticism than surprise. For a country torn apart by civil war since the 2021 coup, the idea of staging a credible election sounds almost farcical. After all, how does the junta plan to conduct a national poll when barely 40 per cent of the country is under their control, resistance forces are tightening their grip on highways and arms factories and large swathes of rural Myanmar remain no-go zones for government officials? Against this backdrop, the proposed elections seem less a democratic milestone and more like a political theatre.

The Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) retains nominal control in cities and urban centres, and its grip on the hinterland is tenuous. Resistance groups, once fragmented, now operate with remarkable coordination. In the south and southeast, they have displayed impressive strategic acumen, making steady advances towards capital Naypyidaw. Their latest push across the Sittaung River valley and into the Pegu Yoma range brings them closer to the Mandalay–Naypyidaw–Yangon highway, one of Myanmar’s two critical arteries.

Meanwhile, in the north and northeast, groups have seized control of strategic chokepoints on the Pathein–Monywa highway, a route linking several key ordnance factories vital to the Tatmadaw’s war machine. With these supply lines choked, the junta’s military position grows increasingly precarious. Resistance networks, particularly the Arakan Army and allied forces, now exercise control over regions that once sustained the Tatmadaw’s logistics.

The junta is locked in an existential war, so diverting resources to elections could further weaken its battlefield position. Moreover, without secure access to rural areas, the mechanics of voting become unworkable. Resistance leaders have made it clear that any attempt by the SAC officials to enter their territories will be fiercely resisted. Should the junta push ahead, the elections risk being accompanied not by ballots but by bullets.

Public sentiment is equally hostile to the plan. A 2024 survey shows that over 93 per cent of the people back the National Unity Government (NUG), the shadow administration formed by ousted lawmakers and resistance leaders. The NUG has already denounced the election as a sham. As a result, even in urban centres where the military still holds some sway, enthusiasm for voting appears minimal. What the SAC envisions as an assertion of legitimacy is more likely to be read as another desperate ploy to cling to power.

Why, then, is the Tatmadaw so determined to persist with its electoral plans? The answer may lie in the regime’s need for constitutional veneer. The SAC, established by force rather than through popular will, lacks the ability to amend Myanmar’s constitution. A staged election, however hollow, could provide the façade of parliamentary procedure, enabling the junta to push through amendments. Among the most worrying possibilities is an amendment that would legalise the deployment of foreign forces in Myanmar, read Chinese. This could open the door to Chinese intervention on behalf of the Tatmadaw. Thus, the junta’s desperation to project legitimacy also creates space for Beijing’s manoeuvring.

For Beijing, whose strategic and economic stakes in Myanmar are immense, propping up the junta with superior firepower may appear attractive. Chinese investments in Myanmar include pipelines, ports and special economic zones. Myanmar also provides an alternate access point to the Indian Ocean region, thereby easing President Xi Jinping’s so-called Malacca dilemma. Constitutionally sanctioned foreign troop deployments would allow China to formalise its support for the Tatmadaw. Chinese forces, equipped with superior technology and resources, could tilt the battlefield balance decisively.

Yet, the costs are equally clear. Such a move would clash with the deep anti-China sentiment now running through Myanmar’s populace, raising the risk of backlash similar to that which doomed the Myitsone hydropower project. Also, the Chinese Communist Party is unlikely to absorb battlefield losses without political repercussions at home. For now, Beijing appears cautious, preferring to arm and advise from the sidelines while waiting to see which way the war turns. Still, the mere possibility of China embedding itself militarily in Myanmar is enough to alarm security planners in New Delhi.

For India, Myanmar’s turmoil is an urgent neighbourhood crisis that reverberates across multiple domains. Peace and stability across the border directly affect security in India’s northeast, where insurgent networks often seek shelter inside Myanmar’s porous frontiers. These include groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland and its offshoots, United Liberation Front of Asom and Manipuri rebel outfits. Destabilisation across the border could undermine years of hard-won stability in the northeast. The crisis also carries a humanitarian dimension, as refugees continue to flow into Mizoram and Manipur. Ethnic affinities, particularly between the Mizo and the Chin, make deportation politically and socially sensitive, yet unchecked migration threatens to inflame fragile demographic balances, leading to instability and widening fissures between communities within India’s borders, as in Manipur.

Equally pressing are India’s connectivity ambitions. Flagship projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway were designed as the arteries of India’s Act East Policy, anchoring India’s physical and economic integration with southeast Asia through the northeast. Ongoing instability in Myanmar puts these ventures in jeopardy, and their failure would hand China a decisive advantage in the competition for regional influence. Myanmar’s mineral wealth adds another layer of urgency: access to rare earths, oil and jade is critical for India’s high-tech and defence industries, as highlighted at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. Not of less concern for a civilisational power like India is that Myanmar is also a neighbour with whom it shares deep historical and ethnic ties.

Beyond material and civilisational concerns lies the larger geopolitical balance. The deeper China embeds itself in Myanmar, whether through infrastructure projects, naval access in the Bay of Bengal or potential troop deployments, the narrower India’s strategic space becomes in its own neighbourhood where it cultivates hegemonic ambitions.

Finally, there is India’s normative credibility. Having already drawn criticism for endorsing Bangladesh’s widely discredited 2024 elections, India cannot afford to be seen as complicit in Myanmar’s sham polls. By notionally supporting the Bangladesh polls, India signalled that strategic compulsions trump democratic principles. The cost has been reputational. Repeating the same playbook in Myanmar would double the damage. Its image as the world’s largest democracy and as a normative power leading the Global South depends on striking the right balance between hard strategic interests and principled commitments.

So far, India has adopted its well-honed policy of strategic ambiguity. Faced with a web of interests, it has maintained lines of communication, overt and covert, with both the junta and the resistance, while resisting western calls to isolate the regime. India’s approach has been one of calibrated neutrality, publicly avoiding entanglement but privately ensuring that its core interests are protected. This balancing act has preserved room for manoeuvre. In doing so, the mandarins in India’s foreign office have echoed the diplomatic dexterity for which Indian foreign policy was once renowned. However, the approaching election, however farcical, will test the limits of this strategy.

India’s stakes in Myanmar are far too significant to be gambled on short-term political shifts. Until the country finds its way back to stability, New Delhi must remain steady, patient and always mindful of the high costs of miscalculation.

—The author is a strategic consulting and national security expert, and a governing body member of SHARE (Society to Harmonise Aspirations for Responsible Engagement).

national-prayer-breakfast-in-kyiv-uniting-global-faith-for-ukraine-peace

Sat Aug 30 11:14:38 IST 2025

Diary of Resilience/ Mridula Ghosh/Kyiv

Faith and freedom, one may say, are mutually exclusive. The first presupposes a certain degree of unconditional acceptance and lack of questioning, the latter is the opposite. It honours critical thinking and choice. However, the notion of freedom emerges from the connection between the human will and supreme reality. To this end, all religions in the world profess tolerance and respect towards each other, a fact reinforced during the National Prayer Breakfast held on August 25 in Kyiv under the patronage of the president of Ukraine. The meeting serves as a space for sincere dialogue on values, faith, freedom, responsibility and the power of collective prayer in the darkest moments of history.

This year, the event culminated in a global interfaith 24-hour prayer initiative beginning on Ukraine’s independence day, August 24. Attending the prayer meeting, I felt that the entire world came together for Ukraine. Of the 1,200 participants, around 350 were international guests from over 50 countries.

The format originates from the first prayer gathering initiated by Jesus Christ on the shores of the Sea of Galilee with his apostles as recorded in the Gospel of Luke. The modern tradition of prayer breakfasts for internal harmony began in the US in 1953 when president Dwight Eisenhower attended, establishing a precedent followed by his successors and later other countries. Today prayer breakfasts are held in more than 70 countries across Europe, Asia and Africa. The Ukrainian diaspora in the US played a crucial role, establishing the Ukrainian Prayer Breakfast in Washington and the Ukrainian Week in Washington held annually. Ukrainian parliamentarians have been attending these since the late 2000s.

Christian parliamentarians started the National Prayer Breakfast in Ukraine in 2009, which soon became a yearly tradition. Last year, it was held under the patronage of President Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time. In 2025, it continued as a tool of Ukraine’s “soft power”, becoming more interdenominational and inclusive, uniting Orthodox, Greek and Roman Catholics, Protestants as well as Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and others. Politicians of all stripes also participated. Civil society organisations such as the Ukrainian Bible Society, Caritas Ukraine, ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency) Ukraine and Ukrainian foundations like Good Samaritan and Nadiya are part of this breakfast. They help wounded soldiers, their families and children, provide humanitarian aid and support reconstruction of war-affected communities. Both national and international media covered the event held in Kyiv.

Religious leaders from across the world sent messages of support. Pope Leo XIV expressed hope that the war would end and prayed for a just and lasting peace. “I ask the Lord to expedite the return of civilians, POWs and children who were deported or forcibly separated from their families, to heal wounded families, comfort those who lost loved ones and bring spiritual renewal to the entire Ukrainian people.” Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and the Archbishop of York Stephen Cottrell highlighted the spirit of unity and hope that brings together clergy, government officials and friends of Ukraine worldwide to pursue peace and justice, support those who have lost family members or homes, honour the armed forces and spiritual leaders and promote reconciliation among people of faith.

Underscoring the difficult peace process, US special presidential envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg stressed the plight of the civil population and the more than 19,000 abducted children. Speaking to a television channel, he expressed hope that by Ukraine’s next independence day, the country would celebrate under a peaceful sky. Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said that despite the teachings in holy books, the war unleashed death, disrespecting life. “We know Putin can end the war now, this moment, but we have to support the struggle of Ukraine with our resources, morale and prayers.”

Volunteers, chaplains, people who lost their relatives, survivors of Russian torture cells as well as the best professional performers were on stage, weaving a canopy of the effects of the war and paving the road for reconciliation. We could hear prayers by the Mufti of Ukraine Sheikh Akhmed Tamim and the Rabbi Moshe Reuven Azman, songs by famous singer Tina Karol and poetry by Artur Dron, poet and frontline fighter. US spiritual leader Mark Burns prayed and pointed out the divisive and aggressive rhetoric of the Russian Orthodox Church calling it a “holy war” against Ukraine. Clergy from occupied territories at the breakfast confirmed the horrors committed by Russian church personnel. One table was set aside for the soldiers who were killed, with their personal belongings like caps and pens reminding the world of their supreme sacrifice.

Zelensky appeared at the end and summed up the meeting by saying that there will be victory in this battle between good and evil, and that victory would come not only because of the immense material and defence aid, but also spiritual support. Looming large was the critical need for more resources and the Norwegian and Canadian prime ministers as guests at the meeting could conclude several tangible agreements that were beyond the programme of the breakfast.

For some hours there were no air alert sirens. The most poignant moment came when each participant was asked to pray for a child killed in this war, whose name was given on a paper. My paper read “Victoria, 9 years, Kyiv”. I lifted up a candle and prayed for her peace. Her name might speed up the victory, I thought. Definitely the morale, spirit and patriotism of the people are boosted by such events, a much needed element in these dark times. In the words of the national poet of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko, “Love your Ukraine. Love her in fierce times of evil. In the last, most difficult moment, pray to God for her.”

Mridula Ghosh, formerly with the UN, is associate professor of international relations in Kyiv.

us-should-continue-to-welcome-top-talent-from-other-countries-anantha-p-chandrakasan-provost-mit

Sat Aug 23 18:11:51 IST 2025

NEW YORK

Interview/ Anantha P. Chandrakasan provost, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Anantha Chandrakasan, the newly-appointed provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was once rejected as a graduate applicant to the very same institution, which counts among its faculty 105 Nobel laureates. His story is one of perseverance, focus and quiet determination. Today, as provost, Chandrakasan serves as MIT’s chief academic and budget officer. He also co-chairs the Financial Scenarios Working Group, which deals with the Trump-era ‘endowment tax’—an 8 per cent levy on annual investment returns.

In an exclusive interview with THE WEEK, Chandrakasan says he sees himself as an enabler for the Indian community at MIT, so that they can continue to make extraordinary contributions and impact. On President Donald Trump’s policy measures curtailing academic freedom, he says MIT’s ability to produce groundbreaking innovations depends on its ability to be self-governing. Edited excerpts:

What does it mean to you to be the first person of Indian origin to be appointed provost at MIT?

I really see myself as an enabler for our community—which includes faculty, students and postdoctoral staff—so that they can continue to make extraordinary contributions and impact, whether it is in scholarship, educational innovation or entrepreneurship. My role is to promote excellence in academics, research and entrepreneurship, and I would like to deliver on the promise of enabling excellence.

Could you tell us about your formative years in Chennai, and how they shaped the person you have become?

Every experience in life matters. India had a profound impact in shaping who I am. I grew up in Chennai and was there through the 11th grade. At the end of 11th grade, I came to the United States to visit my mother, Gowri Chandrakasan, who was on a Fulbright scholarship. While in Chennai, my mother worked at the Central Leather Research Institute in Chennai. She used to take me to her laboratory, and I would watch her perform experiments and talk about science and the importance of advancing it. Her work ethic, her energy—just seeing her work—was amazing. She published a very important work on collagen and wound healing, so I would say that she was a major inspiration for me. I studied at Vidya Mandir in Mylapore, an excellent school in Chennai. Before that, I attended St Michael’s Academy in Adyar. One particular experience that stayed with me from those days was meeting a senior colleague of my mother’s, who tutored me in mathematics. He had a big influence on me. He would come home and teach me even when I was itching to go out and play cricket. But he was persistent. It is a reminder that one dedicated individual can ignite a passion and instil the confidence a student needs for long-term success.

I always try to pay that forward. I receive so many emails from prospective applicants, and until recently, I used to respond to them directly. It has now become overwhelming, but I do my best. I was not always perfect, but I believe everyone needs a little encouragement. It does not take an army; it just takes one person. So always remember that you can make a difference in someone’s life.

How did your Indian education and early career experiences prepare you for this challenging role?

Indian education is intense, it requires hard work and persistence. Even though I was there only until the 11th grade, I experienced that rigour. Later, while I was an undergraduate student at UC (University of California) Berkeley, I applied for an internship at a wireless company that specialised in low-power design. That is an area that became central to my PhD. I was not selected for the internship. But then my adviser, Robert Brodersen, offered me a summer research opportunity in his lab. That had a profound impact on me and made me want to pursue research.

So again, it is about persistence. Years later, when I became a faculty member, I became head of the department of electrical engineering and computer science at MIT. I created a programme called SuperUROP (Super Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program), inspired by my own experience. MIT already had UROP and SuperUROP took that to the next level. It enabled undergraduates to publish papers in top journals. That was me replicating my own journey—persistence, mentorship and the values I learned growing up in India.

When I applied to graduate school after Berkeley, I was rejected by MIT. I remember calling the admissions office and speaking to them for an hour. I got quite emotional. But that was not the last chapter in my relationship with MIT. I eventually did my doctoral work with the same mentor who had once given me that summer research opportunity. I ended up working on low-power design, and the resulting paper with my adviser became one of the most cited in the IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits. That paper played a key role in my becoming a faculty member.

What do these experiences say about you, and about MIT?

Not everyone gets accepted into selective programmes with limited space. There is a lot of talent out there. The key is persistence. I had a wonderful PhD experience at UC Berkeley, and my advice to students is: make the most of the platform you are given. That is the most important thing. Better opportunities will follow. So many students I talk to do not get admitted to MIT or other institutions, but I tell them that is not the end. There is still so much they can accomplish.

How do you plan to strengthen MIT’s partnerships with industry?

During my eight years as dean, I led the creation of many interdisciplinary programmes, focusing on new models for how academia and industry work together to accelerate the pace of research. This resulted in the launch of initiatives, including the MIT Climate and Sustainability Consortium, the MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab, the MIT-Takeda Program, the MIT and Accenture Convergence Initiative, the MIT Mobility Initiative, the MIT Quest for Intelligence, the MIT AI Hardware Program, the MIT-Northpond Program and the MIT-Novo Nordisk Artificial Intelligence Postdoctoral Fellows Program.

As MIT's inaugural chief innovation and strategy officer (CISO), working closely with our president Sally Kornbluth, I helped launch the MIT-GE Vernova Energy and Climate Alliance, the Generative AI Impact Consortium (MGAIC) and the MIT Health and Life Sciences Collaborative (MIT HEALS). In each case, we are helping industry allies connect with faculty whose work is of interest, and creating mechanisms, including seed funds, to inspire new faculty collaborations across academic disciplines as well as with people in industry and hospitals focused on related problems. Our industry collaborations are also key to supporting research excellence and the next generation of talent. The industry collaboration allows us to scale our solutions rapidly for impact. Expanding our industry connections is a high priority for me. This is particularly true in areas such as AI, biotechnology, semiconductors, quantum computing and manufacturing.

What is your approach to integrating the humanities with STEM at MIT?

MIT has an incredibly rich history of incorporating the humanities in undergraduate education. I only see the importance of the humanities, arts and social sciences growing. The humanities play a central role shaping our STEM students today. As CISO, I co-led the creation of the MIT Human Insight Collaborative (MITHIC). It fosters an ecosystem of individual excellence and cross-cutting collaboration in humanities research, as well as providing the substrate for collaborations between the humanities, arts, and social sciences and STEM.

Collaboration with scholars in our human-centred disciplines has already led to important new initiatives at MIT. The Social and Ethical Responsibilities of Computing (SERC) in the MIT Schwarzman College of Computing draws on expertise from across the Institute to integrate social and ethical considerations into our computing curriculum. With new courses like Ethics of Computing, co-taught by a philosopher and a computer scientist, our aim is to ensure those who will create and deploy new computing technologies do so responsibly and in the public interest. MIT is launching a new graduate programme in music technology and computation this autumn. This programme is truly multidisciplinary, with faculty, labs and curricula coming from the Music and Theatre Arts Section and the School of Engineering.

For MIT to have the greatest impact, we must continue to champion this interdisciplinary and human-centred approach to educating the leaders of tomorrow, conducting research and solving challenges.

What steps are you taking to protect academic freedom, especially in light of President Trump’s criticisms of universities?

MIT’s ability to produce groundbreaking discoveries and innovations depends on its ability to be self-governing—and on the freedom of our faculty, research staff and students to pursue the directions in research that they deem most important and fruitful. These are bedrock principles and we stand by them.

What kind of support will you offer Indian students in these difficult times, especially with regard to visa challenges?

I was an international student, and I have been through those kinds of processes, so I understand what it feels like from the other side. How do we maintain MIT’s success and leadership? By being a magnet for the finest talent from around the world. Bringing in diverse perspectives to solve problems is essential. We must understand how people around the world think. I believe in that more than anything. It is a top priority for me to support our graduates in ways that maximise their global impact, whether they remain in the United States or return to their home countries. I believe very, very strongly that the United States should continue to encourage top talent from other countries. That has helped build the US economy in the past, and it will do so in the future. I will work hard to ensure that everyone who joins the MIT community feels welcome and valued.

Could you tell us a bit about your family and your interests outside of MIT?

Someone once asked me what my hobby is, and I said, “MIT!” It feels like that sometimes. But outside of MIT, I enjoy watching sports, especially American football. It is something I am very passionate about. I have three children—two daughters and a son—and they all have different interests, which is great. Honestly, the roles I have held are very intense, and I am deeply committed to supporting our community, so I do not get a lot of time for other activities. I am a vegetarian and I enjoy food from all over the world, including Indian cuisine, of course. I do go back to Chennai, though not as often as I would like. I certainly plan to visit more often.

Finally, what personal quality do you consider most important in dealing with the challenges you face? What do you think you uniquely bring to the role?

There are a couple of things. One, I do not always show it, but I am very empathetic. I try to put myself in someone else’s shoes and understand their perspective. At the same time, I enjoy solving problems and getting to solutions quickly. So really understanding other perspectives is something I try to do consistently. But this is also a very fast-paced role, so you have to be decisive and act quickly as well.

Lavina Melwani is a New York based journalist and blogs at Lassi with Lavina.

trump-putin-alaska-summit-ukraine-peace-process

Sat Aug 23 14:22:56 IST 2025

Diary of Resilience/ Mridula Ghosh/Kyiv

Trump-Putin summit in Alaska was deemed futile by many, yet it triggered a meeting of European leaders and Ukraine’s president in Washington, signalling the beginning of a peace process

Ne-LaskAva Alaska!”, which means “unwelcoming Alaska”, has become a meme that describes the summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Many in Ukraine also recalled a Russian proverb, “there is but a single step from love to hate”, pointing to the swing of US–Russia relations along the love–hate pendulum. To cap it all, a Russian tank in the occupied zone of Zaporizhzhia was seen flying both the US and Russian flags until they were shot down.

For decades, Russia poured hatred towards America, threatening to reduce it to radioactive ash. Watching the red-carpet welcome for Putin at a US military base in Anchorage, while fighter planes circled above, it was clear that Putin fears neither NATO nor the US. Rather, he lies awake at night because of Ukraine and the Ukrainians.

Digging into history, no analogy could be found. It was not a new Yalta, where Stalin met Roosevelt and Churchill to carve out the future map of Europe after the defeat of Nazi Germany, although the USSR had first signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler and started the war by attacking Poland in 1939. Nor was it totally similar to the 1938 Munich Conference, where the fate of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland, with its strategic fortifications, was decided without Czechoslovakia being present.

Beyond protocol and procedure, the Alaska summit was unlike the Geneva or Reykjavik meetings of the mid-1980s when Gorbachev and Reagan met and the Cold War began to thaw. There were no clear results and the media corps were visibly upset, as neither Trump nor Putin entertained their questions. Their statements were loud and promising but without detail. So why was this summit needed at all? Certainly not just to discuss Ukraine without Ukraine.

Both the US and Russia had their benefits. For Putin, it was a way to break isolation and gain acceptance by none other than the US, despite the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity. For Trump, it was a chance to show genuine readiness to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. He threatened Russia with fresh sanctions while insisting on a ceasefire, with a deadline that kept shifting. The Russian economy could not withstand further sanctions.

This was precisely what brought Putin to Alaska. He managed to secure a postponement of both ceasefire and sanctions that hung in the air. He repeated his familiar narrative about the root causes of the Ukrainian conflict, avoided the word “war” and demanded that Ukraine cede four regions, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, even though none are fully occupied by Russia.

As details of the August 15 Alaska summit emerged, it became clear that instead of six or seven hours as planned, there were only two and a half hours of talks. A luncheon and wider discussions were cancelled. One may conclude that there were still points of disagreement. On the same day, Russian law was changed to allow US company ExxonMobil to re-enter the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project, which it had quit in March 2022. Sakhalin-1 had never been directly targeted by US sanctions.

One of the striking elements of the summit was a letter given to Putin by US First Lady Melania Trump, appealing for the return of abducted children to Ukraine. This was a masterstroke of US public diplomacy, showing that the deal was not about territory swaps or rare earth minerals, but about human values.

Three days later, on August 18, a historic summit in Washington gathered leaders of the EU, NATO, France, Germany, Finland, Italy, the UK and Ukraine to discuss peace prospects. While all agreed that Trump had made this breakthrough possible and that the killings must stop, a central issue which was discussed was the need for unambiguous security guarantees for Ukraine, to avoid a repeat of the failed Budapest Memorandum (1994). Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni proposed collective defence modalities similar to Article 5 of the NATO charter, but without Ukraine becoming a NATO member.

The issue of abducted children was raised by all leaders, particularly Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer all said that peace could not begin without a ceasefire. Finnish President Alexander Stubb recalled Finland’s war with the USSR in 1944, referring to Ukraine’s possible decisions regarding territories. At the same time, leaders stressed that borders cannot be changed by force.

If Ukraine were to sacrifice Donbas, it would lose a fortified area that Russia has failed to capture in 13 years. Fresh estimates from UK Defence Intelligence suggest that, at the current pace of fighting, Russia would need about 4.4 more years to seize full control and would likely suffer around 1.9 million casualties.

Crimea remains another bone of contention. Trump said Ukraine was not “getting back Obama-given Crimea in 2014, without a shot being fired”. Any formal recognition of Crimea as part of Russia would contradict the US Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, which Trump himself signed in his first term, barring recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea. Trump was also the first US president to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine in 2017, during a war that began in 2014, so it was never really “Biden’s war”.

A further meeting in trilateral or multilateral format between Russia, the US and Ukraine will be organised by Trump, although details are awaited. Meanwhile, China’s role is crucial. Many assumed that Trump might have tried in Alaska to wean Russia away from China, but in reality, ties have deepened. When the Chinese foreign minister said while visiting Europe that China was not interested in Russia’s defeat, it was a signal that Beijing would continue to support Moscow. Whether China will be invited to any future summit is unclear. India, as a non-aligned state, is welcome, as Zelensky said in his Independence Day message to Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Overall, apart from the discontent over territorial concessions, human rights activists and ordinary Ukrainians are disappointed that there was no mention of Russia’s genocide against Ukrainians, no discussion of punishment for crimes against humanity and no plan for reparations to Ukraine as the victim of aggression. Many are shocked that the aggressor and the victim are put on equal level.

As the summits took place, Ukraine continued to bleed. Massive missile and drone attacks killed and injured people in Kharkiv, Odesa, Kremenchuk, Pavlohrad and Kherson and destroyed the university campus in Sumy. Ordinary people in Ukraine want the killings to stop. They want abducted children and adults to come home. The question remains: will summits help?

Mridula Ghosh, formerly with the UN, is based in Kyiv, and teaches at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

india-ukraine-strategic-ties-relations-peace

Sun Aug 24 09:06:51 IST 2025

Ukraine and India/Dr Oleksandr Polishchuk, Ambassador of Ukraine

Strengthening international security, ensuring food and energy security and safeguarding freedom of navigation fully align with India’s core interests. India will advance these goals if it uses its considerable influence on Moscow to stop the war

In August, the Republic of India and Ukraine traditionally exchange greetings on the occasion of their respective independence days. In his message this year, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted the contribution of our countries and peoples to the struggle for freedom and dignity. The president also emphasised several promising areas of mutually beneficial Ukrainian–Indian cooperation, such as science, technology, trade and culture.

The profound historical roots of the ties between our nations reach back to the era of Aryavarta, the legendary “land of the noble Aryans,” which, according to some researchers, was located on the territory of present-day Ukraine.

Ukraine’s independence and the end of empire

Modern history of Ukraine began on August 24, 1991, when our parliament adopted the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. The Act was subsequently endorsed by a nationwide referendum on December 1, 1991, in which more than 90 per cent of Ukrainian citizens voted in favour. The centuries-long aspiration of Ukrainians for freedom and independence was ultimately realised in a democratic manner, echoing the principle of non-violence proclaimed by Mahatma Gandhi.

It is worth noting that the regions currently under temporary Russian occupation strongly supported Ukraine’s independence in 1991. The referendum results were: Donetsk region-83.9 per cent, Luhansk region-83.86 per cent, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea-54.19 per cent and Sevastopol-57.07 per cent, in favour of independence.

Ukraine’s independence was swiftly recognised worldwide. On December 2, 1991, Poland and Canada were the first ones to extend recognition, followed within days by Hungary, the Baltic states and many others. On December 8, 1991, the Belavezha Accords, signed by Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, formally declared the dissolution of the Soviet Union. India recognised Ukraine’s independence on December 26, 1991. Diplomatic relations were established on January 17, 1992, with the embassy of India in Kyiv formally opening in May, and the embassy of Ukraine in New Delhi commencing operations in February 1993.

Building Ukrainian–Indian relations

The interstate dialogue initiated in those years was marked by an active exchange of high-level visits: three presidents of Ukraine paid official visits to India, while two presidents of India visited Ukraine. A natural continuation of this bilateral dialogue was the transition, in December 2012, to cooperation within the framework of a Comprehensive Partnership.

By 2021, before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, bilateral trade had reached nearly $3.4 billion, marking one of the highest levels in the history of our economic relations. Cooperation in the military-technical sphere helped India to strengthen its defence capabilities, particularly in the naval component. Space cooperation contributed to India’s development of the LVM3 launch vehicle, which in July 2023 carried the Chandrayaan-3 lunar module into orbit. People-to-people exchanges were equally significant: more than 20,000 Indian students annually pursued higher education in Ukrainian universities.

After a long pause, the first meeting between the president of Ukraine and the prime minister of India took place in November 2021 on the margins of the Climate Summit in Glasgow. Since May 2023, such meetings and telephone conversations have become regular.

The historic visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Ukraine on August 23, 2024, opened a new chapter in bilateral relations. It affirmed the aspiration of the leaders of both democracies to advance towards a strategic partnership. Today, the foreign ministries and diplomatic missions of both countries are working diligently to implement this shared objective. A roadmap for strategic partnership may be signed during the upcoming visit of President Zelensky to India.

India’s role in global peace

India is not neutral in Russia’s war against Ukraine but consistently advocates for diplomatic dialogue. This position was reiterated by Prime Minister Modi during his meeting with President Zelensky in Kyiv. The prime minister’s statement that “this is not an era of war” has become a guiding articulation of India’s stance and efforts to promote a just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

On the eve of the US–Russia summit in Alaska on August 15, India’s ministry of external affairs emphasised that such dialogue gives hope for ending the conflict. In his telephone conversation with Kremlin’s leader on August 18, Prime Minister Modi underlined India’s consistent position in favour of a peaceful resolution through diplomacy and dialogue, reiterating India’s support for all efforts in this regard.

Unfortunately, the Alaska meeting coincided with massive Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukraine, causing civilian deaths and injuries. As Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrii Sybiha stated, despite tireless US efforts and Ukraine’s readiness for a just peace, Russia continues to terrorise civilians, ignores deadlines and shows no genuine interest in ending the war.

President Zelensky emphasised that Ukraine is ready for genuine decisions that can bring peace, but Ukrainians cannot agree to surrender their land to invaders. For any nation, territorial integrity is the foundation of sovereignty—a principle that resonates strongly with India. As External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar aptly noted in an interview with the Netherlands-based broadcaster NOS: “No country negotiates a part of its territory.”

The global stakes

Will Russia be ready to embrace a just and lasting peace in Ukraine? Some insights come from the memoir of former US deputy secretary of state and ambassador to Russia (2020-2022) John J. Sullivan, Midnight in Moscow: A Memoir from the Front Lines of Russia’s War Against the West (2023). Sullivan argues that Russian aggression under Vladimir Putin aims not at dismantling liberal democracy directly, but at overthrowing the international order established after World War II—a system built precisely to prevent aggressive wars. Putin envisions a world where Russian power—essentially his personal power in the tradition of tsars—is unconstrained by international norms, rules or obligations.

The seasoned diplomat warns: if the international system painstakingly built after 1945 is overturned, what will replace it? A world of unchecked aggression, where “might makes right”? If so, humanity will have effectively turned the clock back to 1939.

Shared responsibility, shared values

If Ukraine lays down its arms without clear security guarantees and a ceasefire, it will cease to exist as a sovereign state. If Russia stops its aggression, the war will end immediately. This is why the key to peace lies in sustained pressure on Russia, including strong economic sanctions.

We fully respect India’s right, as that of any sovereign state, to build relations according to its national interests. Yet strengthening international security and law, ensuring food and energy security and safeguarding freedom of navigation fully align with India’s core interests. India will advance these goals if it uses its considerable influence on Moscow to stop aggression and achieve peace.

In Indian society, the protection and care of children is one of the most fundamental principles. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted by Russia. India could play an important role in bringing them back to their families. This is not about politics, it is about universal human values and moral principles.

After two years of serving as Ukraine’s ambassador to India and engaging with hundreds of Indian colleagues and friends, I have come to a firm conviction: alongside the undeniable love of peace, what unites our nations is the readiness to defend independence and the determination to resist any attempts to turn history backward. Today, our peoples are convincingly demonstrating this shared resolve.

bangladesh-democracy-transition-after-protests

Sat Aug 09 20:32:23 IST 2025

The Brahmaputra is replenished after the rains, bringing relief to both man and hearth. There is hope once again, for fresh, clean pastures to nurse the seeds of a new beginning. In Bangladesh, where the Brahmaputra is called the Jamuna, it brings quiet rejoicing.

On the first anniversary of the mass protests across the country, which toppled Sheikh Hasina’s long-serving government and forced her to flee to India, renowned economist and Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, who heads the interim government, has announced that national elections will be held before Ramadan in February 2026. “On behalf of the government, we will extend all necessary support to ensure that the election is free, peaceful and celebratory in spirit,” he said.

The student-led uprising a year ago cost precious lives and changed the political landscape, but Bangladesh has since moved through anger, grief, reflection and calm. The interim government has worked to address public demands for constitutional, political and legislative reform. It is time for catharsis.

At a crossroads, Bangladesh looks towards its political forces, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the National Citizen Party, Jamaat-e-Islami and even the banned Awami League, to uphold democracy, justice and the rule of law. Hope, after all, is the beginning of the end of despair.

bangladesh-election-integrity-yunus-transition

Sat Aug 09 20:28:54 IST 2025

Ayear ago, I was a working journalist. I had been editing and writing stories for years, often tucked away in the back of a newsroom. Then one day, history erupted around us, and I found myself at the very centre of it. I broke the story for Agence France-Presse that Sheikh Hasina had fled to India.

That single dispatch changed my life overnight. Within hours, the world was reading my words, but within days I was no longer only a reporter. I was asked to become the press secretary to the chief adviser of the interim government, the 2006 Nobel Prize winner, Prof Muhammad Yunus. The change was almost surreal.

I went from being a fairly anonymous editor to becoming the face of the government. Shop owners greeted me on my morning rounds. Rickshaw drivers would call me by name when I walked through Dhaka’s streets. Neighbours I had scarcely spoken to before suddenly asked me about the direction of the country. It has been the honour of a lifetime to serve in this role and to work closely with men and women of true vision.

The people who gathered around Prof Yunus in those early days were not career politicians or hardened bureaucrats. They were citizens who simply wanted to help. Many of them abandoned secure jobs or took leave from professions in law, medicine and teaching. They gave up weekends and evenings with family. They put their personal safety at risk. I saw ordinary citizens transform themselves into statesmen and women, into advocates and negotiators, into reformers and administrators.

When I think back to those terrifying July days last year, I remember the brutality unleashed by the Sheikh Hasina regime. The crackdown claimed hundreds of young lives. Mothers searched morgues for their children. The temptation to answer violence with violence was everywhere.

But it was Prof Yunus who stepped forward with the calm of a moral leader. His voice carried both compassion and authority. He called upon the nation to rise above vengeance and to focus instead on building a democratic future. He possessed the international credibility that the moment demanded. When he spoke, the world listened, and when the world listened, Bangladesh was given the breathing room to survive.

Many feared that once the regime fell, Bangladesh would spiral into lawlessness. We had every reason to expect chaos, but instead something remarkable happened. Citizens rose to the occasion. Courts opened. Schools resumed. Markets stayed stocked. Volunteers patrolled neighbourhoods. Police units returned to duty under new oversight. Far from collapsing, Bangladesh showed the world a resilience that even its own people had doubted. Over the last 12 months, we have secured real achievements.

Billions of dollars in financial support have been pledged by multilateral institutions and by foreign partners. International investors who once looked at Bangladesh with suspicion now see a country committed to transparency and reform. Inflation, which many predicted would surge uncontrollably, remained stable and is now declining fast.

Perhaps most significantly, negotiations with the United States led to the reduction of a proposed 37 per cent tariff on exports down to 20 per cent. That decision alone has saved hundreds of thousands of jobs and has given breathing space to our most important industry. Inside the country, we have tried to tackle the suffocating bureaucratic gridlock that strangled public administration for decades.

Thousands of government employees have finally received overdue promotions. Transfers have been made on merit rather than party loyalty. Disciplinary actions have been taken against officials who abused their positions. This may sound technical and uninspiring, but in practice, it means citizens receive services more quickly and fairly. It means files no longer gather dust for months in a forgotten drawer. It means that competence matters more than allegiance.

Diplomatically, the government has reopened doors that had been slammed shut under the previous regime. Relations with Pakistan have been revived on a footing of mutual respect. Our ties with China have been rebalanced to focus on investment in infrastructure and industry. These moves have diversified our foreign policy and have also created opportunities for trade, employment and technological transfer.

Yet I remain aware of how fragile it all is. The Hasina years did more than corrode institutions. They bred distrust among citizens and fear of authority. Undoing 15 years of politicisation is painstaking work. The commissions set up to examine electoral reform, constitutional reform and anti-corruption measures have been working without rest, but true change will take time and patience.

Our greatest responsibility is to ensure that when elections are finally held in February 2026, they will be free and fair. As I reflect on the year, I realise how far I have travelled personally. From a quiet editor of wire reports, I have become a public voice for a government of transition. At times I wonder how history will remember me. I suspect I will fade back into anonymity once elected representatives take over. We will hand this government to leaders chosen by the people.

When that happens, we will step back into the crowd, proud of the service we gave. I will remember the courage of those who stood beside me, the vision of Prof Yunus and the resilience of ordinary Bangladeshis. I will remember the pain of the past and the promise of the future. Above all, I will remember that we chose to rise above anarchy, and by doing so, we gave Bangladesh a chance to begin anew.

The author is press secretary to the chief adviser of the interim government of Bangladesh.

bnp-vision-transform-bangladesh-tarique-rahman-reform-agenda

Sun Aug 10 09:57:37 IST 2025

Bangladesh today stands at a historic crossroads. It has been a year since the interim government, led by Prof Muhammad Yunus, assumed office, ushering in a period of cautious optimism amid complex challenges. Under Yunus’s leadership, the government has made some progress in curbing rampant corruption, depoliticising the civil service and ensuring media freedom.

However, concerns persist regarding the slow pace of economic recovery, delays in implementing much-needed institutional reforms, rising youth unemployment and insufficient attention to critical social sector reforms in health, education and agriculture. The government now faces growing public demand for the establishment of a people-centred, democratically elected government, along with urgent expectations for tangible improvements in livelihoods, social protection and service delivery that directly affect ordinary citizens.

Decades of economic growth may have transformed the country’s skyline and urban landscape, but this growth has been unevenly distributed. The rich have grown richer, the poor have become poorer and the once-promising middle class now bears the crushing weight of economic stagnation and rising living costs. Beneath the surface of glittering infrastructure lies the harsh reality of widespread poverty, poor health, malnutrition and a crumbling education system that continues to betray the hopes of millions.

The cries of mothers who fear losing a child to curable illnesses, the frustration of young people deprived of meaningful education and employable skills, the dismay of families trapped in intergenerational poverty—these are not isolated experiences but the lived realities of countless Bangladeshis. They want leaders who listen, policies that uplift and a governance system that serves, not exploits. They demand a Bangladesh where the human spirit is nurtured and every individual is given the tools to thrive in an increasingly competitive world.

At the centre of this national yearning lies a simple yet urgent proposition: investing in people, not just infrastructure. Despite GDP growth over the past two decades, Bangladesh ranks 129th on the Human Development Index and continues to suffer from deep deficits in health, nutrition and education. More than 24 per cent of children under five remain stunted, around 29 per cent of women of reproductive age are anaemic and nearly 58 per cent of ten-year-olds cannot read and comprehend a simple age-appropriate text. These failures are not incidental, they are structural weaknesses that threaten to derail Bangladesh’s aspirations for middle-income status and beyond.

People seek a health system where no one lives in fear that illness will lead to financial ruin or an untimely death. They yearn for a nation where no child is too weak or malnourished to learn, where every woman is freed from the preventable scourge of anaemia and poor nutrition and where no family is condemned to poverty because of inadequate health care. They dream of an education system that equips the youth with practical skills, digital literacy and global competencies to thrive in an increasingly competitive world.

Realising these aspirations demands more than rhetoric; it calls for transformative leadership, a coherent and bold strategy and an unwavering political commitment to put people first. Only through such a purposeful and people-centred approach can Bangladesh unlock the full potential of its citizens and build a society grounded in dignity, opportunity and justice for all.

The people of Bangladesh aspire to live in a country where no one dies for lack of quality treatment and where universal health care is a reality. They envision a nation where every woman and child is freed from the grip of malnutrition through an integrated approach that links health, education and social protection in a cohesive national strategy. In education, people dream of a system where the word ‘dropout’ becomes a relic of the past and every child, regardless of background or circumstance, completes their education equipped with the skills, confidence and competencies needed to thrive in a modern, dynamic economy.

Tarique Rahman, the acting chairperson of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-BNP, has outlined a vision to transform Bangladesh by investing in health, nutrition and education, which are areas proven globally to drive equitable development. His 31-point state reform agenda draws on successful models from both Bangladesh and abroad, where integrated, community-based approaches have effectively reduced poverty and improved human well-being. This vision emphasises the importance of professional expertise, transparency and institutional integrity to ensure reforms are efficient, equitable and impactful. At its core, it aspires to build a Bangladesh where no one is left behind, youth and women are empowered and every citizen has the opportunity to lead a life of dignity and prosperity.

The author is adviser to Tarique Rahman, acting chairperson of the BNP, and former World Bank senior leader.

bangladesh-political-crisis-yunus-regime-awami-league-persecution

Sat Aug 09 20:17:59 IST 2025

This week marked the start of the trial of Sheikh Hasina at the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh (ICT). The Awami League categorically rejects the shameless political charges brought against its leadership by an unelected and illegitimate regime, using a kangaroo court. The so-called interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, no doubt hopes that the ICT show trials will distract from the mess that Yunus himself is currently presiding over.

But Bangladeshis are not fools. They want what the interim government refuses to give them: accountability for its actions and free and fair elections. And they are tired of the incompetence, corruption and victim-blaming that have become hallmarks of the Yunus regime. Our country has experienced an almost total collapse of governance, amid unchecked mob violence, rampant extortion, political persecution and attacks on previously protected minorities.

The consequences are wide-reaching and disastrous. Since the interim administration took over, Bangladesh’s previously high-growth economy has been downgraded twice by the International Monetary Fund. Factories are closing, livelihoods are threatened and public sector protests paralyse commercial as well as civic life. In addition to economic turmoil, violence pervades ordinary life. Crime levels have soared, while offenders go unpunished. The interim government is turning a blind eye to insidious violence perpetrated against religious and ethnic minorities. Teachers, lawyers, members of the armed forces live in fear of arbitrary persecution, with no access to justice, all because of their political allegiance. At every administrative level, members of the Awami League have been targeted, facing fabricated charges from a weaponised judiciary intent on extracting vengeance and removing the party from the political landscape. More than two dozen of the Awami League’s supporters have died in custody over the past year, and hundreds more have faced arbitrary detention.

The decline of the rule of law and the assault on Bangladesh’s constitutional norms and pluralistic political culture are probably the greatest threats posed to our republic’s future by the current regime. This government was not elected and has precisely no legitimate mandate. At every turn, it has sought to obfuscate and delay elections, disenfranchising the people. Even if elections eventually happen, they will not be the free, fair and participatory elections the people of Bangladesh deserve and on which our independence was founded in 1971. Because against the recommendations of the United Nations, the interim government has banned the Awami League, Bangladesh’s biggest political party.

Dr Yunus is manifestly out of his depth. The kindest thing one can say about him is that he is an intellectual. But being a wise leader and a statesman requires qualities besides just intellect: it requires the courage to make tough decisions, and the patience to build consensus and balance competing interests.

Nobody in the current administration remotely possesses these qualities, and even Yunus’s star is diminishing. On a recent visit to Europe, he notably failed to secure meetings with either British Prime Minister Keir Starmer or French President Emmanuel Macron. World leaders once feted this Nobel-winning economist, but now they shun him because of his democratic backsliding and because they know his regime is sinking into corruption, human rights abuses and questionable international alliances.

In the UK, Yunus was met by protesting members of the Bangladeshi diaspora, with thousands complaining about the injustices facing their friends and kin at home. He came back with nothing more to show for his London escapade than an eye-watering Dorchester Hotel bill, accrued in the manner of a third-world dictator and paid for by Bangladeshi taxpayers. History shows that the men and women of our country cannot be denied their rights by illegitimate regimes. Sooner or later, taxpayers and citizens will demand accountability for the actions of this interim government. They will not be satisfied by distraction techniques such as the ICT. As we reflect on the past year, we cannot allow justice to be selective, history to be rewritten, and democracy to be eroded.

The author, a former minister, is a spokesperson for the Awami League.

ukraine-youth-anti-corruption-protests

Sat Aug 02 12:23:44 IST 2025

KYIV

ANGELINA, 25, holds her cardboard tight and paints the letters carefully: “Repeal law no. 12414. We need a real transparent Ukraine.” Nearby, her friend Svitlana has finished writing hers: “My dad did not give his life for this mess. Make Ukraine free from corruption.”

Since July 23, emotional protests led by young people have rocked the war-torn country’s major cities. They held up cardboard placards―hundreds of them―filling the square before the Ivan Franko Theatre in Kyiv. It is a place close enough to the presidential office that President Volodymyr Zelensky could watch them from his window. This was an important change: the traditional choice for protests is Maidan Nezalezhnosti or Independence Square, which lies a bit farther away.

Who are these activists defying martial law, risking themselves? Many describe themselves as innocent young people with dreams of a free and prosperous Ukraine. Some say they are at the beck and call of certain forces. A deeper look reveals that most of them are teenagers or those in their mid-20s, with strong opinions and views. This is the generation formed in the crucible of war, having grown up amid the howl of sirens and devastation of missiles.

The cardboard placards were handmade and raw, and some slogans bordered on the edge of decency. Some used vulgar slurs and abuses, reflecting the non-conformism and insolence of the youth. The slurs put off many parliamentary politicians, who avoided joining the agitation or aligning with it. This marked the “Cardboard Revolution” as a unique grassroots protest not orchestrated by any organised political group.

The reason behind all this: on July 22, Zelensky signed decree no. 12414 into law, stripping two key anti-corruption bodies of their independence―the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office (SAP). It made them subservient to the prosecutor general’s office. Set up in 2015 as an executive body with special status, NABU engages in detecting, preventing and investigating cases of corruption.

Now, why did Ukraine need these anti-corruption bodies? First, it was an offshoot of the Revolution of Dignity of 2013. Second, it has a direct relation with Ukraine’s future accession to the European Union and visa-free travel for the Ukrainians. Taking away the independence of these bodies―which enjoy solid international support―will have far-reaching implications that could jeopardise the architecture of western aid for Ukraine.

Questions have been raised about the performance of these bodies, and they form the raison d’être of law no. 12414. After signing the law hastily the same day it was passed by parliament, Zelensky said the bodies were ineffective and that they would now function without “Russian influence”.

“Cases which are pending should be investigated,” Zelensky said. “For years, office-holders who fled Ukraine are comfortably living abroad―without any legal liability. This is not normal. There is no rational explanation why criminal lawsuits involving billions in embezzlement are hanging fire.”

But if Zelensky had first initiated a discussion on the performance of the anti-corruption bodies―and not just hastily passed a law―the protests could have been averted. Many activists think that it is essential to audit these bodies and change their leadership.

NABU, for its part, has often pointed fingers at Ukraine’s unreformed judiciary as the reason for stalled prosecutions. An audit of NABU, which was carried out for the first time in a decade, found its performance to be moderately effective.

Earlier this year, NABU brought charges against more than ten MPs from the president’s own party and three ministers, including a deputy prime minister. From June until the law’s passing in July, Ukraine’s internal security agency conducted nearly 80 searches targeting NABU, SAP and affiliated individuals, accusing them of being under “Russian influence”.

No sooner had the ink on the signed law dried than the protests erupted. Demonstrations spanned the country―from Kyiv, Lviv and Odesa to the frontline cities of Kharkiv, Sumy and Dnipro, despite continuous drone and missile strikes.

In this backdrop, any internal discontent jeopardising Ukraine’s EU integration has the potential to escalate to a full-blown upheaval disintegrating the country. The 2013 Maidan revolution started because the then president Viktor Yanukovych did not sign the EU association agreement and the memories are still fresh. Of course, 2025 is not 2013, and everyone agrees that Zelensky is no Yanukovych. He has managed to steer his great country through terrible times of the pandemic and the war.

Realising the political, international and security risks therein, Zelensky responded like a mature politician. He paid heed to the protesters and, on July 24, announced his decision to present a new law, reinstating the independence of the anti-corruption bodies. “We heard what people are saying these days, to each other and on the streets. These are not in vain,” he said.

On the same day, Yulia Svyrydenko, the newly appointed prime minister, met ambassadors and international partners to explain the steps Zelensky and the government will take to protect the independence of the anti-corruption bodies. Zelensky, for now, seems to be happy with submitting a new draft bill, which is scheduled to be considered on July 31. It remains to be seen whether he would overhaul the independent bodies. The protesters are waiting to return on July 31 to ensure that all ends well.

Such seemingly anarchic protests in Ukraine are a regular affair. With deep, centuries-old roots, they are innately Ukrainian. Most importantly, they are fully nonviolent, something rare in most protests even in peaceful, developed democracies.

The author, formerly with the UN, is a professor of international relations at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

syria-landmine-removal-daraa-women-demining

Sat Jul 26 17:35:14 IST 2025

DARAA

In the searing sun of a village in Daraa, Syria, Anja Mahameed kneels in the mud, holding one end of a measuring tape. The exercise is part of non-technical survey training for landmine disposal—work that appears simple at first sight but could mean the difference between life and death on the field.

Mahameed is among the many people in Daraa who have decided to take up this line of work following the overthrow of president Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. From the start of the revolution in 2011, Assad, with the support of Russia, had launched massive aerial warfare campaigns on his people to crush dissent. Today, large swathes of land have been polluted by unexploded ordnances (UXO) used primarily by his forces.

Though the 14-year civil war has ended, dangers lurk in the form of these UXO. According to a February 2025 report by the NGO Humanity and Inclusion (HI), up to 3,00,000 UXO may be littering various parts of the country.

“I saw a lot of people lose their legs, hands, eyes. And people lost their lives, too, because of war remnants,” says Mahameed. “Plus, there are places you can’t enter or use because they are polluted, so [many] people lost their houses, because you can’t use them.”

The HALO trust, an NGO that carries out extensive demining operations in Syria, is training 40 people here in Daraa, eight of them women. In 2016, Mahameed worked with HALO when Daraa was rebel-held, and even conducted mine disposals, but was forced to give up her work when Assad’s forces recaptured the area and shut them down. In the few years prior to December 2024, HALO’s operations were limited to the opposition-held governorate of Idlib.

The HALO website says that, from December 2024 to May this year, more than 1,020 adults and children were killed or injured by UXO. There are multiple organisations that conduct demining operations in Syria. HALO, the Syrian Civil Defence, and Mines Advisory Group are some of the key players in the field.

Following the overthrow of Assad, HALO’s area of work expanded unprecedentedly, and they opened a new training centre in Daraa, widely considered as the cradle of the Syrian revolution.

In 2011, during the Arab Spring, a group of teenage boys spray painted the words “Your turn has come, doctor,” on the walls of a school in Daraa al-Balad, or Daraa old town, a clear reference to Assad, who was an ophthalmologist. The boys were arrested and tortured, and the event is seen by many as what sparked the decade-long war.

The only thing that demarcates Daraa al-Balad from Daraa al-Mahatta, which was Assad-held, is a large chasm. Daraa al-Mahatta is a town, complete with traffic, mosques, schools and the occasional restaurant. Its visual contrast with Daraa al-Balad is jarring. Dust envelops the skeletons of buildings, settling firmly into the bullet-ridden walls.

We stop and step out of the car to see some Ottoman-era ruins and I hesitate to move forward, fearful that I would step on a mine. Our driver, Abu Yousef, reassures me and helps me tackle the mud slope to enter the centuries-old structures which have weathered both time and war. Later, we drive up to a vantage point from where we can see the town in its full destruction.

“Don’t get too close, there might be mines,” cautions Abu Yousef.

Mahameed’s training is in the courtyard of a villa that HALO has rented in Daraa, about a 15-minute drive from Daraa al-Balad. Inside, HALO posters are plastered over the walls. On the roof, an expert teaches trainees about how to identify and dispose of UXO. They use an emptied out shell as a sample for the trainees.

While demining, survey teams usually collect data about the polluted area, often using detectors to help find the mines. They conduct risk assessments, and then put together a plan to dispose of the item. Sometimes, the item is destroyed in situ, and in other cases, they are collected and disposed of en masse.

Downstairs, a group of adults sit on plastic chairs around a room. They are part of the explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) team, where they teach civilians and children how to react when they see unfamiliar objects in their environments. Often, HALO receives reports from civilians about potential UXO, prompting them to clear the area.

Among the students is Rama Abu Nabbout, who took up the task of working with HALO because of her own war experiences. The 24-year-old was displaced from her home during the war, and is unable to return after the toppling of Assad despite it seeming intact, because of a fear of UXO. She explains how it is disheartening to still be living in an unfamiliar place, despite the war having ended.

Nabbout believes that working in this field is a way for her to help her society—the very society that sometimes raises eyebrows at her unconventional choice to work with war remnants. Her eyes well up when she talks about her struggles as a woman, and later asks me whether I experience the same as a journalist.

“Sometimes my relatives and friends are like ‘What? A girl working in the field of landmines and war remnants?’” she says.

Nabbout explains that though she is in EORE training now, people around her sometimes worry that she would be tasked with other missions like landmine removal. Her parents are less traditional, but still worry about her safety.

“I’m like, if I’m not the one making the first move and doing it, who will? Even if they put me in [mine] removal, I dream of taking the training, making choices and going to the field.”

In the northern part of the country, Hiba Al Hassan is doing exactly that. She has been working in demining with HALO for over six months. Dressed in a grey and black niqab and abaya, she helps her colleagues set up a device to perform a circuit continuity check before carrying out the detonation. She motions with routine hand gestures to communicate with those on the other end of the field.

“I feel every day like I’m doing something for my village, my country. It’s really nice, an indescribable feeling, honestly,” she says.

Before the disposal, the team conducts a brief, where they go over points such as the nearest hospital and the safe areas on the field. As they finish, Hassan heads to her designated spot for the day, to set up an emergency medical point in case of any accidents during the disposal. Silence follows, then a thunderous explosion. The war remnant has been blown up into hundreds of fragments.

The women who work in this field have their own reasons for picking it. In Nabbout’s case, it is driven by her personal experiences. For Mahameed, it was the novelty of the job, and the feeling that it was a way for her to help people more.

“I like to switch things up, to move from job to job for the better,” Mahameed says. “My old job was just in the office, and I don’t like office jobs.”

Unlike Syria, India is not at high risk of UXO, but following the latest round of conflict with Pakistan, contamination has risen at the Line of Control. The area had already been facing high threat levels after previous cross-border fighting. After the cessation of hostilities in May 2025, the Indian Army announced that it was working on safe disposal of UXO and clearing of the areas.

But in the aftermath of war, it is almost always the innocent who pay the price. Thirty-year-old Khalas Saleh’s story is one of indescribable euphoria followed by the pall of injury. In early December, Saleh heard that the Assad regime had been driven out of his hometown, and set off to see the land he had left behind. On his way back, he stopped at the side of the road and when he got off his bike, he stepped on a mine. Bleeding and in pain, he administered first aid to himself.

“I tied my leg tightly [with my belt] and went directly to the hospital,” he explains.

Saleh is receiving physiotherapy and rehabilitation at Aqrabat Hospital after his right leg was amputated below the knee. He approached the establishment—one of the sole specialised orthopaedic hospitals in the area in northern Syria—when his pain returned post-surgery.

Now, Saleh is hoping to be fitted with a prosthetic, so that he can return to his life. Before his accident, he used to be a heavy vehicle driver; a job he is keen to continue if he can, in a new Syria.

“I’m so happy to get an artificial limb, maybe in a month or two,” he says. “I just want to return to having a working leg and walking, and to live my life.”

mazagon-dock-colombo-dockyard-deal

Sat Jul 12 17:06:11 IST 2025

One plus one is two. But not when India’s leading shipbuilder—a maker of submarines and warships—joins forces with Sri Lanka’s main shipbuilder. In this case, the total is much more than the sum of its parts.

In June end, the board of the India government-owned Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited okayed an investment of about 0450 crore to acquire at least 51 per cent privately owned existing shares of the publicly listed Colombo Dockyard PLC (CDPLC).

The CDPLC shares include that of the majority-stake-holding Japanese Onomichi Dockyard Co Ltd. One reason for the sell-out is the non-provision of Sri Lankan bank guarantees to the loss-making CDPLC.

With a pedigree in new builds and repairing, CDPLC lies within the strategically located Colombo port, which is just 76 nautical miles from major shipping lanes connecting the west, Middle East, the far east, Africa and Australia. This means there is tremendous scope for undertaking ship repairs, maintenance and overhauls.

With a current order book of more than $50 million and a pipeline order of $300 million, CDPLC fell into bad times during 2019 because of black swan events like the April 21 Easter bombings and the island nation’s economic crisis, followed by the pandemic.

“We see it as a robust business proposition that will unlock operational synergies by a cross-fertilisation of varied capabilities,” Biju George, director (shipbuilding), MDL, told THE WEEK.

Significantly, MDL was evaluated as the most suitable from about 40 interested buyers. “In about four months, MDL will assume managerial control and CDPLC will become a subsidiary,” said George. “We are primarily looking at it as a business-to-business deal aiming at enhancing and expanding our commercial shipbuilding and ship repairing capacity, although it has a government-to-government aspect, too. It will transform Mazdock from a domestic naval shipbuilder to a regional shipbuilder with global aspirations.”

Of course there are caveats. No foreign warships can be built or repaired at the port without approval by the Sri Lankan government.

At the strategic level, the move is path-breaking as it complements India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) objective—a pet project of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The SAGAR doctrine has a geopolitical dimension, too, in view of China’s growing footprint in the region.

Said Commodore R.S. Vasan (retd), director general of the Chennai Centre of China Studies: “It’s a wonderful win for both when the two sides can draw up plans for revamping the shipping-related industry. The possession of a huge dry dock that can take ships up to 1,25,000 DWT (dead-weight tonnage) confers flexibility options for all customers, including from India and other countries. At another level, there are certain gains from the fact that the Japanese were involved in this company and therefore some of the best practices would be adopted by the company.”

As it is, India’s vast maritime potential remains untapped in general and in shipbuilding in particular with just 0.06 per cent share in global shipbuilding.

“This is a great opportunity to resurrect the joint shipbuilding and repair options,” said Vasan. “That MDL and the Indian government are thinking globally and acting regionally is encouraging.”

If for India the latest foray into Lankan waters means more fuel to fire its growing maritime ambitions and adding strategic depth, for Sri Lanka it is about an economic turnaround, further nurturing of a traditionally vibrant maritime ecosystem and protection of the jobs of about 3,000 workers. But more than anything else, the move is being seen as a convergence of the visions of two South Asian nations in a very closely contested space.

A senior official connected with the Colombo dockyard said the new government under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake had actually requested the Indian government to encourage investments in the dockyard. “Our Colombo dockyard has been suffering huge losses for years now. MDL was shortlisted based on its financial strength and its track record in shipbuilding,” the official told THE WEEK on condition of anonymity. “It will generate revenue continuously. We believe MDL can route new construction contracts to Colombo. The revenue generation will happen through repair, refit and these construction contracts.”

When Dissanayake took over, it was felt that Sri Lanka-India relations had taken a back seat—the leftist government, it seemed, was leaning more towards China. This deal breaks that perception.

But there is also controversy. The Frontline Socialist Party (FLSP), a fringe group in Colombo, has raised concerns of foreign control, threat to national sovereignty and economic transparency. “This would strip the government of majority control over a strategically vital maritime institution,” Pubudu Jagoda, an FLSP office-bearer, told the local media.

The Sri Lankan government, however, said that the deal had only strengthened the country’s hold on the maritime route as India, a key neighbour, will not go against Sri Lanka. Said Eranga Gunasekara, Sri Lanka’s deputy minister of youth affairs: “The deal will address Sri Lanka’s long-term benefits, especially for workers and local industries connected to the port.”

Analysts would be quick to compare notes with the nearby port of Hambantota, which was an opportunity squandered by India, allowing China to make inroads. So, for many reasons, this long-term investment would pay rich dividends.

“For India to claim it is a maritime nation and to reclaim its past glory, it has to expand the scope of such outreach,” said Vasan.

In 2021, India ranked a lowly 21st in shipbuilding, but has ambitious plans to rank in the global top five by 2047. That is why the latest acquisition in Colombo may be in perfect alignment with the plan. “It can be the veritable force multiplier,” said George.

israel-attack-on-iran-is-not-just-about-nuclear-issue

Wed Jun 25 20:40:16 IST 2025

WHEN ALI SHAMKHANI, the head of Iran’s negotiating team in the nuclear talks with the United States, was targeted, though unsuccessfully, along with the killing of military leaders, nuclear scientists and civilians in the first set of Israeli missile strikes in Iran, we knew that the diplomatic path to a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue had also been killed by Israel. President Donald Trump said “the persons I was dealing with are dead”. Iran abandoned the nuclear talks in Oman once the Israeli attacks intensified and it began counterattacks. The Israeli political leadership, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in particular, wanted a direct military confrontation with Iran and knew very well that Trump would ultimately come around.

Trump was consulted by Israel before launching the air campaign against Iran, and it has become clear that he gave the nod. Netanyahu’s genocidal military campaign in Gaza was dragging on without any foreseeable end. War, to him, had become a means of conducting everyday politics. He did not want Iran to undertake any level of nuclear enrichment, nor did he entertain any possibility of a negotiated settlement between the US and Iran. For Netanyahu, the military option against Iran was not just about the nuclear issue but also about dismantling Iran’s military and political leadership. The regime change agenda with respect to Iran was stressed by him in the initial statements following the missile attacks. This is where, strategically, no end point seems to be in sight. To achieve any of these objectives, the involvement of the US becomes necessary.

Israel has long nurtured a nostalgia for its military success in 1967, when it defeated neighbouring Arab armies and captured large swathes of their territories: the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, the Golan Heights of Syria, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, all in six days. Israeli leaders and citizens have also taken great pride in the state’s defence capabilities and security apparatus. Taking advantage of the context of the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the US, Israel was able to bring the element of surprise to its attack on Iran. Iran seemed unprepared. But the expectation of a quick success evaporated when Iran regrouped and launched counterattacks on Israeli targets within a day. The intensity of the Iranian response, using drones and long-range missiles, shook the notion of the invincibility of Israel’s defence system.

The very idea of regime change and its past implementation in West Asia have had huge consequences. Not only does it challenge the foundational principles of the Westphalian sovereignty-based international system, it also propagates the myth that a foreign intervention can fundamentally alter a political system and take away the agency of citizens to determine their future. There has been genuine opposition in Iran to the government on several issues related to the economy, women’s rights and more. People have expressed their political opinions in various elections as well. Netanyahu’s call to remove Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, or the threat by Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz that “Khamenei will have the fate of Saddam Hussein”, is actually a challenge not just to the Iranian regime but also to the political will and acumen of the Iranian people. Israel and the US somehow believe that eliminating the leadership will destroy long-standing structures and institutions of power.

Trump posted on his social media handle immediately after returning from the G7 summit in Canada that “we now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran”. Strangely, he claimed such control even before formally entering the conflict that Israel had initiated. He was also calling for everyone in Tehran to evacuate immediately. The point here is the synchronisation of Israel’s actions with those of the United States. Trump seems to be shedding his initial reluctance to join Israel’s military adventure.

The Trump administration could project a credible and well thought-out strategy with respect to Iran. But Trump’s personality and the unpredictable nature of his decision-making make it difficult to discern any consistent pattern in US behaviour. What is emerging now is a reactive rather than proactive American stance on developments in West Asia. The pulls and pressures from Trump’s own MAGA circles on the question of entering another war, combined with lobbying from strong pro-Israeli groups and many Republicans, complicate the formation of a policy that weighs both short-term and long-term implications of US involvement.

There are many things the Trump administration must consider before involving itself in Iran. It is not only the violation of his campaign promise not to pursue wars abroad, but also the economic consequences of a conflict spilling into the Gulf oil fields and shipping lanes that his administration must account for. It was Trump’s unilateral withdrawal in 2018 from the Iran nuclear deal that cost the US a significant opportunity to resolve the nuclear issue with Iran. The American and British role in overthrowing the elected Iranian government of Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 continues to have lasting consequences. In this context, the memory of the far-reaching implications of the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79 and the hostage crisis should also serve as a cautionary reminder to the United States before it fully commits to military confrontation with Iran.

The author was professor of West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

bangladesh-general-elections-muhammad-yunus

Sat Jun 14 12:35:49 IST 2025

FEW FIGURES IN modern Bangladesh have evoked as much reverence, and as much suspicion, as Muhammad Yunus. Once the universally celebrated “banker to the poor”, the country’s interim chief adviser finds himself at the fulcrum of a national power struggle. Ten months after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, Yunus finds himself steering an unelected regime through overlapping allegiances, foreign pressures and growing internal dissent.

According to insiders, Yunus’s central challenge stems not from a lack of vision—he has outlined reform, justice and elections as the way forward—but from his attempt to balance too many contradictions. At 84, with no formal political base and limited time, he is gambling on his moral authority and international profile to shape Bangladesh’s political future. But the forces he is relying on—student leaders, the Jamaat-e-Islami, former leftist and far-right ideologues within the interim setup and the United States, to some extent—are increasingly at odds with other pressure groups like the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the Awami League, military and India.

For Yunus, the forces that are supporting him have been both a platform and a liability. The student leaders, Jamaat and far-right ideologues, for instance, have lent ground support to install the interim government, but their ideological volatility has made him a suspicious face in the international arena. The student leaders of the newly formed National Citizen Party are piggybacking on the interim government to find their feet electorally, because of which Yunus has been accused of being partisan and delaying elections.

On the other hand, Yunus’s relationship with the military, particularly with Bangladesh army chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman, has deteriorated significantly. Multiple plots have been attributed to the strained relation, resulting in the military, the BNP and the Awami League (if it is able to participate in the elections) being on the same page to ensure elections are held on time. India wants early elections, too.

Amid this churn, Yunus’s strategy has been to engage with multiple camps without becoming completely beholden to any of them. “Let’s not think Yunus doesn’t understand anything; he maintains active communication with different groups,” says an insider. “He is a brilliant person... he understands how to run an institution, because he built one of the biggest in this country. And he understands politics as well. Whenever he is making a decision, he mobilises or gets help from each group. But the problem is: everybody thinks Yunus is their card.”

Yunus has been part of a less-read, much less-deciphered chapter in Bangladesh politics. Parallels are being drawn with the ‘minus two’ doctrine, used to exclude Hasina and Khaleda Zia from the political process, and a failed attempt to install him as the caretaker head of state to oversee the 2008 general election. “There is a view that the US has long supported the Nobel laureate, both through civil society networks and diplomatic channels,” says Asif Bin Ali, doctoral researcher at Georgia State University in the US. But the political waters were muddy then and the tenure was short. “Yunus declined and a new caretaker government—led by Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, a former governor of the central bank—was sworn in. The outcome was unexpected for all quarters,” says Ali. The Awami League swept the elections and stayed in power for 15 years.

The remnants of the ‘minus two’ architects are still active and backing Yunus’s interim government, albeit in an ideologically reshaped avatar. This makes both the military establishment and the BNP not trust him completely. Moreover, the state machinery Yunus has unwittingly inherited is also not new. “The state machinery that is still in place was built under Hasina to suppress opposition and rig elections. It will take several reforms before it becomes credible and non-partisan,” says Ali. Till then, there is a fear that the machinery—part autocratic with a propaganda apparatus—can be turned inward to preserve the interim regime against calls for election and accountability.

Therefore, when Yunus says Bangladesh will head to polls in early April 2026, the BNP and other forces are not convinced, suspecting it to be a calculated move to delay the election process further and favour the NCP. In the absence of its archrival Awami League—banned and in exile—the BNP claims to represent the largest percentage of the country’s democratic movement. “The interim government’s credibility hinges on maintaining open communication with three essential pillars: the people, the armed forces and political parties, especially the BNP,” says Dr Ziauddin Hyder, adviser to the chairperson of the BNP and a former World Bank senior official.

Political courtesies have, meanwhile, been maintained by Yunus. He has met Khaleda and inquired about her health since her return to Dhaka. But the lack of transparency and a clear roadmap to implement reforms and hold the election has been fuelling confusion and creating an environment of mistrust, says Hyder. The Consensus Commission, set up to mediate and propose reform measures, is expected to deliver its final charter by mid-July. “Our commitment is to finalise reforms and impress upon all parties to demand elections be held by December,” says Hyder.

India, too, is supporting the BNP and military’s call for early elections. “India wants an election, Yunus wants time,” says an Indian government official.

Political observers in Bangladesh, meanwhile, are analysing the pros and cons of two scenarios. First, an extension of the interim government’s tenure will result in giving more time to the NCP to roll out its electoral plans and capitalise on its projection of “youth-led reforms”, breaking the cycle of a two-party system.

“The NCP will be happy with delayed elections as they are trying to buy some time because the party is still not registered and lacks grassroots support,” says Zillur Rahman, executive director of the Centre for Governance Studies in Dhaka. Sources said the NCP may also seek revision of the voter list and rally to bring down the voter age limit from 18 to 16 years to increase youth participation. This may, in turn, give it more time to explore the possibility of alliances to give the BNP a tough fight. “It is likely that the Jamaat and other Islamic political parties will form an alliance before the election,” says Zillur.

The downside to this scenario is that by sidelining the BNP and empowering far-right groups, Yunus may open the door to far-right resurgence. He is said to be aware of the risk, but the interim government has little room for manoeuvre as it remains dependent on the ground mobilisation capacity of this support base.

Second, if the elections are held earlier, the NCP’s electoral debut can be in jeopardy and while the Awami League may sit it out, it can tacitly allow the BNP to take the reins of power from Yunus. The BNP’s future course is now increasingly centred on Khaleda’s son Tarique Rahman, whose return could mark a significant shift in the electoral narrative and amplify calls for early polls. “His presence would certainly energise the party’s base. If arrangements are made, he could return before the elections,” noted a source.

The meeting between Yunus and Tarique on June 13 in London gains significance as there is growing realisation that both need to be on the same page going forward. “It is not just about election dates, but Professor Yunus needs to hear all political parties to be able to steer Bangladesh out of disarray and deadlock,” said a person familiar with the developments. “To that end, he can’t afford to be a lonely man who is cut off from others”. An understanding between Yunus and Tarique will be welcomed by most quarters in Bangladesh.

The Jamaat, on the other hand, is a survivor and has created enough room for itself to play ball in any court. “The Jamaat is supportive of the students and the Yunus regime, and would not lose any chance to reap electoral dividends, especially after it is back in the electoral fray with its registration as a political party being restored,” said an insider. “But it is also equipped to sit in opposition, if the need arises.” The Jamaat leadership has held meetings with the military, the BNP, and even the US and Chinese representatives.

In either of the scenarios, the road ahead is still riddled with uncertainties. “There will be many constituencies where the BNP will face tough competition from Jamaat-backed candidates, many of whom are local heavyweights with solid grassroots connections,” explains Mohammad Tanvir, political and human rights analyst. Another wild card is the Awami League voter base. If the die-hard Awami supporters simply opt out, their absence will change the dynamics in key constituencies. “Most critically, young voters and swing voters will play a decisive role. Their turnout and preference could tip the scales in unexpected ways,” says Tanvir.

From New Delhi’s perspective, Bangladesh needs a democratic structure and stability, the prolonged absence of which can make it a breeding ground for inimical forces. The urgency can be gauged from the fact that there is considerable worry in security circles over the next steps of Bangladesh’s national security adviser Khalilur Rahman on the passageway for Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh’s Cox Bazaar to Myanmar’s Rakhine state. The past few years have seen a rise in Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh after violence hit Myanmar’s Rakhine state. With the US and the United Nations prompting Dhaka to open a corridor to provide a passage to the Rohingyas, the intertwined strategic interests can no longer be ignored. Any passage, security sources said, cannot rule out the possibility of smuggling of weapons into the conflict region that shares borders with northeastern states like Manipur.

What is also not being ruled out is the direct benefit to extremist groups in Bangladesh from political and security relaxations that come along with a delayed transition of power to an elected regime. “It is true that global actors are watching closely,” says Hyder. “While alignment with international standards is critical, it must be done without compromising domestic priorities.”

Pressure is mounting on Yunus to realise that reforms and elections are inseparable. “Besides the armed forces, political parties, neighbours and international community, it is also the business community and common people who want peace, stability and inclusive elections,” admits Zillur. “We either achieve both, or we risk losing both.”

As Yunus’s balancing act gets frayed, his next moves will define not just his own legacy but the political roadmap of Bangladesh. If he is able to guide the country towards a peaceful transfer of power, he will rise as a stabilising elder, who may be given a golden handshake by the next elected government. But if he is trapped by his own alliances and overtaken by a movement he helped unleash, he may go down as a polarising figure in the most contested period of Bangladesh’s post-1990 history. For now, he has little choice but to brave a growing legitimacy crisis and the international crosswinds to reach the finish line.

adviser-to-the-ministry-of-information-and-broadcasting-bangladesh-mahfuj-alam-interview

Wed Jun 18 09:01:01 IST 2025

Interview/ Mahfuj Alam, adviser to the ministry of information and broadcasting, Bangladesh

HISTORY BOOKS HAVE turned a new page in Bangladesh. The textbooks will now include major political events, such as the uprisings from 1952 to the one last July. Behind this change are efforts by Mahfuj Alam, adviser to the ministry of information and broadcasting, who believes Bangladesh has made a historic break from binary politics. Alam, 28, played a key role in the student-led protests in July 2024 that saw the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government, by unifying people through a cross-spectrum campaign. Literature, history, cinema and activism are powerful tools to connect across ideological lines, he says. “I had long-standing relationships with many segments of society. That’s how I could help—by strategising, choosing where and how protests would happen, even naming them,” he says.

Looking ahead, Alam is cautiously optimistic. Excerpts from an interview:

Q. How are you addressing the concerns of political uncertainty in Bangladesh?

A. After Professor Mohammad Yunus’s speech on the eve of Eid announcing the time frame for general elections (April 2026), there should be no uncertainty. But the BNP is still demanding elections be held in December or January, and some parties siding with it are citing reasons that range from examination dates to the weather. I think this debate will go on, and those fuelling uncertainty will continue to accuse Professor Yunus of trying to hold on to power. But the interim government is waiting for the Consensus Commission to finish consultations with political parties and come out with the July charter. Once that happens, I am sure it will bring more certainty and stability, and election-centric work will begin.

Q. What are your thoughts on inclusive elections?

A. The idea of inclusivity does not mean participation of all political parties. In the last 15 years, parties with an authoritarian outlook were involved in democratic erosion. If they still jump into the fray, they will face resistance from people. The Awami League is banned and I don’t think they will participate in the upcoming elections. On the other hand, people from all walks of life, especially youngsters who participated in the July uprising, want to cast their votes. Our generation did not vote for the last 15 years, but we will vote this time. Therefore, this election will be more youthful, more inclusive with women and other citizens joining the electoral process.

Q. There is talk of a new political space being created. How can you ensure it doesn’t replicate old structures?

A. That’s the biggest challenge. But in every revolution, something new emerges. The Algerians called it the emergence of the “new man”, not in terms of age, but in terms of ethical grounding and vision. I believe our generation can be that new force. We have already shown that we don’t want politics as usual. Our uprising wasn’t driven by the desire for office or power; it was driven by the desire for fairness, justice and dignity. We have to be vigilant though. Power corrupts. That’s why the emphasis must remain on transparency, rotating leadership, internal democracy and listening to the people who stood with us.

Q. What’s your position on political Islam and the future role of Jamaat-e-Islami?

A. Political Islam in Bangladesh has a ceiling. Historically, it never crossed 12–15 per cent of the electorate. Jamaat will remain a marginal force. Also, globally, political Islam has changed. We are in a post-Islamism phase, where even Islamist parties are moderating and revisiting their ideologies. Bangladesh is no exception. The old 1971 logic no longer applies. That said, I am clear that the state must be secular. But secularism should not be turned into a weapon against traditional communities. We need an inclusive state which is not Islamist, not anti-religion but one that respects all.

Q. What kind of challenges are students’ representatives facing today?

A. We wanted a full systemic overhaul—new laws, electoral reforms and independent oversight. That hasn’t happened yet. Also, there is an imbalance. Our generation which led the uprising has no presence in the establishment. They are way too junior to have friends in the bureaucracy, judiciary and military. They have no leverage in the business community. The BNP has that. Even the Jamaat or Awami League has that.

But the youth are the new men and women of Bangladesh. And that will matter in the long run. So yes, we will likely participate, but the imbalance remains. This isn’t the new settlement the youngsters dreamed of. But we also know change takes time.

Q. Can that lead to more unrest?

A. Not necessarily. It depends on how inclusive the process becomes. This is the time for national consensus, not another round of violence. If political parties and state actors listen—really listen—to what the people are saying, we can transition peacefully. But if not, and if exclusion continues, then history tells us that frustration will return to the streets.

Q. What about engagement with India?

A. I say this with complete clarity that we are open to India. In fact, Indian civil society has already shown support, especially student groups in Kolkata. During the curfew, they stood with us. That meant a lot. But we need more than symbolic gestures. The Indian government and media must engage beyond just the Awami League. Their current policy of disengagement is short-sighted. Bangladesh is not a monolith. There are many voices here. India should hear all of them. More importantly, India must not look at Bangladesh through the lens of fear—fear of Islamism, fear of instability. Our trajectory is different. Our secular spirit, though damaged, is alive.

Q. How do you view Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan and China in this new context?

A. Bangladesh has the right to engage with all nations. As long as those engagements respect our sovereignty and regional stability, there should be no problem. India and Bangladesh are two sovereign nations with a long-shared history and people-to-people contact. India must stop viewing us through the lens of Islamophobia. We are not another Pakistan.

Q. You are facing criticism for being a students’ representative in an interim government with overlapping interests.

A. It is the BNP and their allies who are spreading these rumours. Students were the leaders of the July uprising. They did not have a plan to capture the whole government and rule the country. Instead, they opted for Professor Yunus to lead the country and helped build a team of people from different sections of society to run the interim government. The student representatives have played a key role in providing legitimacy to it. They have their own ministries and commitments, but they are not helping the National Citizen Party. The fact that the BNP, Jamaat and some others have greater influence than the NCP demonstrates that such allegations are biased and politically motivated.

new-german-chancellor-friedrich-merz-intends-to-thwart-donald-trump-from-diminishing-europe-into-a-sideshow

Sat May 24 12:26:46 IST 2025

CAN FRIEDRICH MERZ, the new German chancellor, spark a ‘Sputnik’ moment in Europe? In 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world’s first earth-orbiting satellite, shattering the US grandeur of tech supremacy. American president John F. Kennedy immediately mobilised his “moonshot” programme, which culminated in the US landing on the moon in 1969. A “giant leap” indeed for mankind.

Few expect Merz, 69, to lead Europe to such glory. But there is anticipation that he may herald a significant turning point in the continent. His very first proclamation after the election victory portends the winds of change: “Europe has to be independent of the United States,” he declared. The bombshell made headlines because he—and Europe—have consistently been pro-America. Says political analyst Nahal Toosi, “Merz’s attitude now is ‘How can we punish the United States?’”

Merz’s about-turn was provoked by President Donald Trump who peppered Europe with insults and snubs, and threats to impose tariffs, seize Greenland, ditch Ukraine and meddle in elections. Trump’s destabilisation of the world order undermines the European Union’s geopolitical status, economic interests and social cohesion. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen observed, “The west, as we knew it, no longer exists.”

Though Merz’s conservative Christian Democratic Union and its ally Christian Social Union won the elections in February, Merz was appointed chancellor only in May because the complicated coalition formation negotiations dragged on for months, which is typical in Germany. But even as chancellor-in-waiting, Merz backed his call for independence from the US with historic action.

After the 2009 financial crisis, Europe had restricted government loan-taking to 0.35 per cent of GDP to control debt. With impressive determination and speed, Merz shepherded through the parliament a massive €1trillion financial stimulus package to revamp infrastructure and defence. “This sends a clear message: Germany is back,” he proclaimed triumphantly. Says Mohamed El-Erian, leading economist and president of Queens’ College, Cambridge, “This change in funding is a potential ‘Sputnik moment’ in Europe.”

Like the US in the 1960s, Merz says Europe must awaken from its complacency and regain its self-reliance and independence to achieve its rightful destiny in the world. He says there must be an assertive “European voice” speaking the “language of power”.

But power usually flows from the barrel of the gun. After WW2, Europe transformed from a shattered military-industrial complex to a “lifestyle superpower”. Relying on US protection, Europe ignored defence and invested in welfare policies to achieve peace, progress and prosperity.

But this reliance cemented Trump’s loathing of Old Europe—France, Germany, the UK and Spain—as “pathetic, freeloaders”; a view trumpeted by his advisers. Trump displayed his contempt for Europe by excluding it from the Russia-Ukraine talks, insinuating he might not defend European countries if Russia attacked and showing willingness to recognise Russian sovereignty over Crimea. Under Trump, European borders suddenly seemed vulnerable. Merz explained the €1 trillion financial bazooka would counter deteriorating relations with the US and a menacing Russia on its border.

Merz now strives to cobble European unity to face international threats. But even achieving national unity is tough. The 2025 polls—a historic election at a historic time—revealed the fragmentation of the liberal-conservative polity that had shaped Germany’s post-WW2 shared vision and consensual decision-making process. At 84 per cent, voter turnout was the highest since the 1990 East-West German reunification. Securing a pitiful 16 per cent of votes, the outgoing liberal Social Democratic Party (now a junior member of Merz’s coalition) suffered its worst defeat since its founding in 1863.

A feisty lawyer and fiery orator, Merz entered politics in the 1970s, determined to become chancellor one day. But he was outwitted by his party colleague Angela Merkel, who was chancellor for 16 years. Of their rivalry, Merkel said candidly in her memoir: “He always wanted to be boss. There was one problem. So did I.” Frustrated, Merz quit politics, joined the investment company BlackRock, made millions, shopped luxuries including a private plane and returned to politics after Merkel quit.

Symbolising a seismic shift in voters’ mood was the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) winning 21 per cent of the votes. German establishment’s firewall prevents the xenophobic AfD’s inclusion in ruling coalitions. But, as the second largest party, it now leads the opposition. The far-left and far-right together command a third of parliamentary seats. They can block constitutional procedures. Adding to Merz’s headaches, both groups are Eurosceptic, anti-immigration, anti-woke, pro-Trump and pro-Putin.

The AfD attracts voters, especially the youth, who distrust the government. It is the refuge of neo-Nazis, extremists, anti-vaxxers and other conspiracy theorists. The rise in immigrant crime doubled the party’s vote share in four years. Its distortions of history matter little. Co-leader Alexander Gauland dismissed Nazi atrocities as “just bird shit”. Contradictions matter even less. The misogynistic, homophobic party that virtue-signals “real families” comprising father-mother-children is led by a lesbian, Alice Wiedel, married to Sarah Bossad, a Sri Lanka-born film producer, who lives with their two adopted sons in Switzerland with an in-house Syrian refugee who Wiedel claims is a “guest”, not migrant worker. A former investment banker, Wiedel has a Hitler-appointed Nazi judge grandfather, who was dragged out of the family closet only recently.

After its electoral win, the hard-right AfD has become harder. It inducted into its parliamentary group several rabble-rousers and street fighters, including Matthias Helferich, the self-described “friendly face” of Nazism. He refers to immigrants as “beasts,” reminiscent of Trump’s description of migrants as “vermin”. Another one, Maximilian Krah, who underplayed Gestapo crimes, was embroiled in a scandal over receiving payments from Russia and China. Dario Seifert, a former member of a notorious extremist party’s youth wing, won Angela Merkel’s seat. Calls to ban AfD renewed this week after Germany’s domestic intelligence classified the AfD as “extremist” for violating the constitution by “encouraging prejudice”. Far-right groups in Germany, France and the UK are fanned by Trump, his advisers J.D. Vance, Elon Musk and Steve Bannon. “The AfD is becoming more extreme than it was even three years ago,” says political scientist Benjamin Höhne.

Merz’s anti-Russia rhetoric annoys left and right-wing sympathisers, but mainstream voters appreciate that he “speaks understandably”. Research institute Forsa’s poll, however, shows two-thirds of voters find him “untrustworthy”. They disapprove his flip-flops—he crossed the red line to vote with the untouchable AfD to crackdown on immigrants; broke his campaign promise of financial restraint to leverage €1 trillion. Ever since he voted in 1997 against liberalising abortion and criminalising marital rape, Merz has been unpopular with women voters. Still, in these uncertain times, his “Forward Again” slogan promising stability, economic growth and a stronger role for Germany in the EU contributed to his election victory. But since February, his party’s low popularity ratings have gone even lower, stalling at 24 per cent—the same as AfD.

Fuelling AfD’s rise is German economic and security anxieties. Covid slowdown, sanctions against Russia that deprived Germany of cheap Russian oil and gas (which had lubricated its export-oriented economy for decades), inflation, low-priced Chinese imports and Trump’s tariffs undermine the manufacturing heft of Europe’s biggest economy. It makes tanks and missiles, but its conventional military is understaffed and underequipped. People worry Trump may withdraw the 35,000 American troops stationed in Germany. In the past, Russia would not dare to attack, knowing the US would defend Europe. Now nobody is sure. France and the UK are nuclear powers, Germany is not. Merz explores the possibility of French and British nuclear umbrella for Germany to replace US nuclear guarantees. Clever idea, but time-consuming and complex to execute, involving issues of capabilities, command and control.

Fear-mongering aggravates nervousness. Nato secretary general Mark Rutte warned, “I am telling you very clearly: we must prepare for war.” Carsten Breuer, the German chief of defence, warned the Russian threat was “deadly serious”. Denmark’s Defence Intelligence Service claimed Russia would be able to move against another neighbour within six months. Germany’s interior ministry is drawing up a list of bunkers that could provide emergency shelter for civilians.

The EU sees augmenting its defence as integral to its security, especially because it has prickly relations with Russia, China and now the US. Merz intends to thwart Trump from diminishing Europe into a sideshow, a bystander that gets squeezed in the US-China collision. He asks voters: “Do we want to keep playing in the lower leagues, or be in the Champions League and play a role in the world?” Last time, that quest ended in catastrophe. But post WW2, contrition and renunciation of war has served Germany well, especially economically.

Now Germany is determined to reclaim its military might. Repurposing a train factory to produce parts for Leopold tanks and infantry vehicles is an example of Germany’s military-industrial tilt, away from its faltering manufacturing sectors of automobiles, machinery, and chemicals that have shed 2,50,000 jobs since the pandemic. But military manufacturing is sustainable only if wars continue, an uncomfortable thought yet to gain traction.

For years, Europe talked about ‘strategic autonomy’ but cradled into strategic US reliance. Forced to yank its head from under the sand, Europe scans the terrain, spotting both dangers and opportunities. Decisive German leadership can strengthen Europe militarily and economically. Cherrypicking is not EU-style, but plucking low hanging fruit is. A mere 2.4 per cent increase in intra-EU trade can make up for a 20 per cent fall in exports to the US. Defence collaboration with Nato-member Britain can increase, so can trade by smoothening Brexit frictions. Measures can be implemented to enhance Europe’s competitiveness.

Despite its reputation as a soft power, Europe commands significant hard power. With 450 million citizens, the European Union is the world’s largest market, bigger than America’s 340 million. It is a world leader in good governance, regulatory frameworks, democratic credentials, welfare policies, independent institutions, liberal values, sophisticated products and work-life balance. Now, the rearmament programme resurrects its military industrial complex.

Dramatic election defeats of Trump-like politicians in Canada and Australia prove that Europe is not alone. Says British economics journalist Martin Wolf, “Biden may be old. But Trump is crazy. Alas, he is not amusingly crazy, he is dangerously crazy.”

Experts agree Trump’s decisions have hurt US stocks, bonds and currency, jeopardising global stability and fomenting a vacuum. “The free world needs a new leader. It is up to Europeans to take up the role,” says EU’s representative for foreign affairs Kaja Kallas.

Merz seems ready for the challenge. He promises the financial package will achieve several goals—make Germany strong, strengthen its role in Europe, build a new European defence community, deter Russia, stimulate the economy and create jobs. Merkel was a clever, soft-spoken facilitator, appropriate for her time. Sharp-tongued Merz is different. Says Herfried Münkler, a political scientist at Berlin’s Humboldt University, “Merz is rougher and bossier.” He is the man of the hour. It may or may not be Europe’s Sputnik moment. But it certainly is Merz’s.

india-and-the-uk-can-forge-a-common-future

Sat May 10 16:54:08 IST 2025

GREAT BRITAIN SIMPLY cannot have enough of India. The countries just signed a cultural pact, while a larger and comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) is in its final stages. More consulates, more flights, more tourists, more students and more cultural, fine arts and sports exchanges are on the anvil. But the big question is, is the UK safe for Indians any longer?

“The UK is a divided nation,” admitted Lisa Nandy, secretary of state for culture, media and sport in the Keir Starmer government, who recently was in India. “We went through a period in the last decade of losing our self-confidence as a nation. But we’ve got a new government and we are at the start of a decade of national renewal. We are recovering our self-confidence.”

If the increasing number of Indians looking to Britain to study, work or migrate would still need stronger assurances from the Labour government, they cannot be blamed. Hate crimes have regularly been reported from across the UK in recent years, peaking in the race riots of last summer. Though not specifically targeted at the Indian or South Asian diaspora, the incidents did shake up not just Indian-origin residents, but students and those who aspire to move there.

Add to that the increasing Hindu-Muslim diaspora tensions, hitting a crescendo with the Leicester unrest of 2022 following an India-Pakistan cricket match, the very image of the UK as an attractive destination for studies and work seemed to have taken a knock.

Then there are the frequently reported tales of bias and harassment against Indian students. The UN even warned the UK government last year of its approach to hate speech and migrant protection. It is no surprise that the number of Indian students joining educational institutions in the UK showed a drop last year―down to 1.11 lakh from 1.39 lakh in 2023.

The riots against ‘outsiders’ could equally be a reason as much as the previous Conservative government’s (run, ironically, by an Indian-origin PM and an Indian-origin home secretary) crack down on economic immigration, limiting job prospects after finishing studies and a clampdown on foreign students being allowed to bring along their dependent partners and spouses.

“We have always been a warm, open, diverse nation. And that certainly hasn’t changed,” said Nandy, who was born to an Indian father and an English mother. In fact, she quotes her father, Dipak Nandy, an academic who moved from Calcutta to Britain in the 1950s and was instrumental in the UK’s landmark Race Relations Act of 1976. “His message to me has always been that when you have racism and discrimination, every generation has to pick up the battle and fight those battles anew. That’s as true in India as it is in the UK. It’s true all over the world.”

The Starmer regime, for one, has its priorities straight in mending the decade-plus era of Conservative rule, which saw many prime ministers coming and leaving 10, Downing Street and leaving more or less one contentious legacy to show―Brexit. And, perhaps at a deeper level, the larger seeds of divisiveness it sowed in what was once a proud-to-be-multicultural nation.

The Starmer regime, Nandy said, was not just repairing that damage, but was staunch in its path of global cooperation, even as the post-Trump world seemed to be headed in the opposite direction―imposing tariffs, limiting migration and the building of a social media-fuelled narrative of ‘us versus them’.

“We’ve had a difficult decade where we left the European Union and tore ourselves apart over that decision,” Nandy said. “One of our missions is to reconnect Britain with the world.”

While leaving the EU is a foolhardiness that is hard to reverse now, the Starmer government’s efforts have been to build a new rapprochement with Europe. “Those trends (nations going insular, building up trade barriers) are happening globally, but we’ve taken a decision as a government to travel in precisely the opposite direction. The message, loud and clear, is that Britain is open for business. We are determined to work much more closely with partners all over the world,” she said.

Nearly on an equal footing would be London’s recognition of New Delhi as a crucial partner strategically, culturally and economically. “Not just because of our history, but because of the future that we believe we can forge together,” said Nandy.

While the FTA will be the visible manifestation of this new courtship between Britain and its erstwhile Raj, a more potent manifestation will be on the cultural and social level―there are plans for more tie-ups in cinema, sports and, of course, education. While India remains a lucrative source of income for many British universities, collaborations in areas like films, fashion and gaming are also on the uptick.

“The world has lost its ability to understand one another. It feels more divided than it has for some time, and at moments like this, the power of culture and creativity is second to none,” said Nandy, quoting similar pronouncements made by both Starmer and Prime Minister Narendra Modi “We believe that India and the UK can be the exemplar of how you bring people together, breaking down national boundaries, in order to forge a common future.” The upcoming collaborations include touring of science museum collections and exhibitions of artefacts like the Kohinoor across England and India.

“It’s incredibly important that our nations work together,” said Nandy. “We often talk about the contribution that Britain made to shaping India. We talk less about the contribution that India has made to shaping what it means to be British.”

more-than-a-decade-on-the-scars-of-syrias-chemical-attack-survivors-are-far-from-faded

Sat Apr 19 11:57:00 IST 2025

DAMASCUS

Abdul Rahman Idris was woken up by the sounds of screaming and ambulance sirens. A resident of Ein Tarma, an area in the Damascene suburb of Ghouta, the 10-year-old was accustomed to the chaos that the Syrian civil war brought. That night, however, was different. Amid the screams of panic were whispers of an unprecedented horror in the area―a chemical attack.

His eyes widened as he realised that the strike had been near his sister’s house. He rushed there with some family members, but was met with haunting nothingness.

Nearly 12 years later, Idris narrates this story as we drive through the streets of Ein Tarma. As with many hotspots of the war, the road we are on is a stretch of ghostly reminders of the life it once held. The air is dusty, and the brown we are enveloped by is sometimes splashed with the colour of a lone shop or a restaurant among the ruins.

Idris points to the skeleton of a building, indistinguishable to me from the ones on either side of it. “That used to be my house,” he says.

In late August 2013, Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime attacked multiple towns in Ghouta with the nerve agent sarin, killing over 1,100 people. The attack was part of the civil war that killed more than 2,30,000 people between 2011 and 2024, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights. The war was brought to an abrupt end after a blitz takeover of the government in December 2024 by rebel forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Assad and his family fled to Moscow, one of the regime’s staunchest allies during the war.

After the attack, photos of the effects of the nerve agent on women and children emerged online, horrifying the local and international community. The regime vehemently denied responsibility but multiple investigations by human rights organisations said otherwise.

Idris explains how the situation was uncharted territory for everyone. At the time of bombing, residents of the area usually took refuge in bunkers, even associating the sound of aircraft with a rapid descent into underground chambers. However, gas is heavier than air and sinks into basements, many of which were used as hospitals.

“At the time, the regime was conducting airstrikes along with the chemical attack,” says Idris. “If people went up to their roofs to breathe clean air, they would face the airstrikes.”

I ask him if he could really understand what was going on, considering how young he was. “Living in that atmosphere makes children grow up,” he replies.

“We had responsibilities. We didn’t live our childhood very well, we didn’t play in the neighbourhood because of the constant bombing.”

Idris is 22 now and works in mass media. In Hamouriye, we walk through a cemetery, home to multiple mass graves. Idris says many of the people buried there were killed in the chemical attacks. I notice that many of the headstones said ‘21 August 2013’; the date of the attacks.

He stops near one of the headstones and points to it. “That’s my sister,” he says.

Idris’s losses included his nieces Jana, four, and Hala, three. He explains how they found the children before their mother, and thus buried them in a different spot.

“Hala had a needle sticking out of her neck [when we found her],” he says. “Maybe she was on the verge of death and doctors were trying to save her, but they couldn’t.”

Later that year, under American and Russian pressure, Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and declared its chemical weapon stockpile, which was later destroyed under a joint mission by the UN and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). But in 2017 and 2018, more rebel-held areas were gassed, sparking strong suspicion that Syria still possessed significant undeclared chemical weapons and capabilities. These claims, however, were difficult to investigate because of the ongoing fighting and the lack of access during Assad’s rule.

The chemical attacks in the suburbs of Damascus are seared into the memories of those there. Marwan Othman Abuqr, 55, and his wife, Ruwaida Mohaity, 49, are among them. I meet the couple in a workshop they own. They are eager to share their story, and Mohaity pulls out her phone to show me photos of her children, Israa, 11, and Hasan, five, whom they lost to the attacks in Ghouta.

Abuqr was one of 17 people working at a relief centre when the attack happened. He covered his nose and tried to flee, but lost consciousness. When he opened his eyes, he was in a clinic, surrounded by ailing women and children, many of them foaming at the mouth.

“My wife’s aunt told me that she saw me at 3am, foaming at the mouth and bleeding from the nose. Death seemed certain,” he says.

Mohaity explains how she had no clue about what was going on, and all that she felt was a sense of strangulation. Her last memory was of her daughter asking to go to the wash room. “I couldn’t even get up to take her to the toilet,” she says.

“I was paralysed in a wheelchair for about 40 days after regaining consciousness.”

A Lancet study from 2015 shows the higher probability of adverse birth outcomes in pregnant women and their children following exposure to such gases. Mohaity tells me she was pregnant at the time of the attack, and that she miscarried six months into her term, possibly an effect of the poisonous nerve agent.

Abuqr says that he, too, experienced the effects of the gas for some time following the attack. “Our minds were affected, we couldn’t concentrate,” he explains.

“It was like that for a while, and then God gave us back our health.”

Not far from the workshop, I meet a man building a wall. He appears to be in his 70s. People around him explain that he was a survivor of the gas attack, and that the building he is helping reconstruct was destroyed during the war. He rolls up his sleeve, showing me an injury on his forearm from explosives.

Syria’s new administration has promised to destroy any remaining traces of chemical weapons and capabilities. In early March, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani addressed an OPCW meeting at The Hague, promising full compliance and transparency pertaining to ongoing investigations. In late March, President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced a caretaker government, with limited inclusion of those from the country’s minorities.

For survivors like Idris, justice means holding those who authorised these war crimes to account. “Especially the higher-ups,” he says. “Maybe the supporters [of the regime] were servants of their employers, but the higher-ups were responsible for the massacres.”

Another survivor I met, Khaled Mohammed Hazoume, tells me about the collective fatigue among the survivors from talking to the media. He says that reliving the trauma feels pointless when the one thing they want―for Assad to be held accountable―still appears to be distant.

Those who lived the years of war are trying to pick up their lives once more. Time heals, but some scars take longer than others to heal. “I had only one sister, and she was so kind to me, especially because I was the youngest in my family,” says Idris.

He chokes up, unable to complete his thought. “We really felt her loss. I was the only sibling for quite a while....”

His mind wanders, eyes moist with sorrow and fond remembrance.

j-d-vance-and-his-wife-usha-greenland-visit

Sat Apr 05 12:22:33 IST 2025

Trump blinked. Greenlanders won. US Second Lady Usha Vance’s self-declared “heritage tour” of this remote Arctic island morphed from charm to harm to flop offensive. Outraged by President Donald Trump’s brazen plans to annex their land―a semi-autonomous region of Denmark―Greenlanders declared frostily that the Vance entourage was uninvited and unwelcome. Citizens refused to even meet her and husband J.D. Vance. The “cultural” excursion to see a dog-sledding race and other gems were unravelling into a media disaster for the whole world to see: a shuttered museum, empty streets, snowy landscapes without dogs and protesters turning their backs to the motorcade, holding placards that read, “Make America Go Away”.

So Trump withdrew. Video from Greenland capital Nuuk’s airport showing American armoured cars retreating into the hull of two Hercules aircraft was the first clue that Trump had blinked. Gleaming bulletproof cars had arrived for the motorcade through charming Nuuk, home to one-third of Greenland’s 57,000 citizens. But as there would be no cheering Greenlanders lining the streets, all public events were abandoned, the cars were sent back, and Team Vance flew directly to the icy, isolated US Space Base in Pituffik, 2,000km from Nuuk. Locals have no objection to Americans visiting their out-of-sight base.

Trump covets Greenland for its mineral wealth and to surveil the Russians and the Chinese prowling the Arctic. Both goals are achievable without an invasion. The US can sign mining leases with Greenland, and as NATO leader, it has operated, closed and augmented bases here for decades. But invasion is about power and profiteering.

Greenlandic authorities viewed the “cultural” foray as “highly aggressive” because it initially included National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Republican Senator Mike Lee, a grab-Greenland trooper. The Signalgate scandal and Greenlanders’ glacial reaction persuaded the White House to drop the officials. J.D. Vance stepped in last-minute. When he stepped out into the Arctic base, he blurted, “It’s cold as shit here. Nobody told me.” His mobile phone probably did. The irony―he was speaking from the world’s most sophisticated space surveillance centre.

Still, why waste a trip? Europe-baiter Vance, who “loathes” Europeans for being “pathetic freeloaders”, baited NATO ally Denmark for “neglecting” Greenland, whose independence movement he endorsed in a staged video from the maximum-security base. Greenlanders want independence from Denmark but equally want to stay out of US control. Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen said the botched Vance soft-power visit arose from the “false American narrative” that the islanders would enthusiastically welcome the visitors and happily become US citizens. That myth originated from Trump’s namesake son, Jr., who landed in Greenland in a Trump jet in January, even before his father took office. He invited 15 allegedly homeless people to lunch, distributed MAGA caps, shook hands, showed off dad, went home and “raved about how cool it was”.

That myth imploded as the chilly public reception turned the Vance visit into a pointless parody. What cultural activity could Usha Vance do in a military encampment with its 10,000-foot runway, deep-water port, radar systems and a satellite receiving station―but not a single receiving Greenlander? The heritage expedition became a nonsensical Vance Voyage, flying 16 hours to speak to a few US service personnel. Local entrepreneur Jakob Nordstrøm summed it up: “It is a big win for Greenland.”

Trump blinked, but his third eye opens. He told NBC, “We’ll get Greenland, 100 per cent.” Nuuk resident Nanna Jørgensen, 34, fears for her and her son’s future. She worries, “I don’t think it’s over. On the contrary, I’m afraid it’s only just begun.”

trump-zelenskyy-clash-points-to-be-noted

Sat Mar 08 17:34:32 IST 2025

When Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Washington two years ago, he was hailed as a hero. It was December 2022, just days before Christmas, when the Ukrainian president made a quick visit to the United States. He thanked President Joe Biden for America’s unwavering support in his country’s war against Russia. Later, after addressing a joint session of Congress, he handed speaker Nancy Pelosi a blue-and-gold Ukrainian battle flag and, in return, received a framed American flag that had flown over the Capitol in his honour. The visit underscored the deep alliance between Washington and Kyiv, forged in the fire of Russia’s brutal invasion. It was a moment of democratic solidarity that felt unshakeable.

Fast forward to last month, and that unity lay in tatters. Zelensky’s highly anticipated meeting with President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance at the White House was meant to cement a new agreement on Ukraine’s rare earth minerals, an asset vital to both nations’ economic interests. Instead, the talks held on February 28 unravelled into an unprecedented diplomatic debacle, with Trump and Vance accusing Zelensky of ingratitude and the Ukrainian leader pushing back defiantly. Unlike foreign leaders who navigate Trump’s temperament with flattery, Zelensky challenged the administration’s apparent reluctance to confront Russian aggression. A visibly enraged Trump scrapped a planned joint press conference and sent Zelensky back without even inviting him to the lunch arranged in his honour.

It marks a pivotal moment in global politics, signalling not just a dramatic shift in US foreign policy but a serious challenge to the post-World War II liberal order. Washington appears to be embracing a new form of great-power dealmaking, one that could leave Ukraine, and much of Europe, perilously exposed.

Russia wasted no time in capitalising on the fiasco. Dmitry Medvedev, a former Russian president and close Putin ally, mocked Zelensky as an “arrogant fool” and a “cocaine clown”, echoing longstanding Kremlin propaganda. Moscow hailed the split between Kyiv and Washington as a geopolitical triumph. Trump’s subsequent remarks only fuelled speculation of a pivot towards Russia. Speaking to reporters, he praised Putin, drawing parallels between their shared grievances over the so-called “Russia hoax” about election interference that had dogged his first term. Since returning to office, Trump has pursued a foreign policy sharply at odds with America’s post-war commitments, prioritising transactional diplomacy over democratic alliances. Ukraine, once a bipartisan cause in the US, now finds itself on the periphery of American interests, with Trump hinting that its fate might ultimately lie with Russia.

This shift extends far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Trump’s approach signals a potential dismantling of NATO’s unified stance on Russia and a broader reconfiguration of global power dynamics. Instead of the G7 or G20, he seems to prefer a G3, echoing the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of 1945, when the world was carved up into spheres of influence—a triumvirate of Washington, Moscow and Beijing dominating the stage. Even within Trump’s administration, former hawks have realigned. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, once an outspoken Putin critic, now champions a US-Russia-China realignment, mirroring Trump’s strategic outlook. “The US president’s talking points on Ukraine and his Yalta-inspired vision of dividing the world into spheres of influence come straight from the Kremlin,” writes Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe. “At best, the transatlantic relationship is hanging by a thread. Whether that thread holds will depend on whether Trump can be persuaded to maintain NATO’s military backstop for a European-led mission in Ukraine.”

Behind the scenes, high-level negotiations hint at a larger game. Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s former defence minister and current security council head, recently travelled to Beijing for an unscheduled meeting with President Xi Jinping, in what was considered an unusual break in protocol. Shoigu was visiting Indonesia and Malaysia when he was diverted to Beijing, following a phone call between Xi and Putin. Seasoned observers believe Putin wanted to apprise Xi of the progress in the US-Russia rapprochement. Reports also suggest American investors are being courted for a revival of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Europe, a project stalled after the 2022 invasion. All of this has come after the US-Russia talks held recently in Saudi Arabia, with another round expected soon, possibly in a Gulf state. European leaders watch with growing alarm, bracing for the fallout of an American tilt towards Moscow.

Stephen Bryen, a former Senate foreign relations committee staff director, argues that the Trump administration is already negotiating with Russia over Ukraine’s future. “This is a radical shift in US policy,” he wrote on Substack. “It is clear that the administration is moving towards a new security arrangement, one that favours engagement with Moscow over confrontation.” With a potential Trump-Putin summit looming and speculation rife about a deal to end the Ukraine war, the stakes are immense.

Much of the US acquiesced to Trump’s pro-Russia stance without any visible protest. A token display of defiance came during the Oscars from host Conan O’Brien. Tying the runaway winner Anora—a movie about a sex worker marrying a Russian oligarch’s son—to Trump’s Putin ties, O’Brien quipped, “Anora’s killing it with two wins. Guess Americans love seeing someone stand up to a powerful Russian.” After a moment of stunned silence, the crowd erupted in applause.

Across the Atlantic, meanwhile, European leaders were swift to condemn Trump and Vance’s treatment of Zelensky. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, delivered the sharpest rebuke: “The free world needs new leadership, and Europe must step up.” French President Emmanuel Macron denounced Trump’s apparent moral equivalence between Ukraine and Russia as “a dangerous falsehood”, while leaders from Germany, Poland, Sweden and beyond voiced support for Zelensky.

Britain, too, stepped up its support for Zelensky. A day after his White House humiliation, Zelensky was received by Prime Minister Keir Starmer at 10 Downing Street, with a promise of Britain’s unwavering support “for as long as it takes”. Later, King Charles hosted him at the Sandringham Estate, reinforcing the UK’s commitment. Zelensky was in London to attend a European conference on March 2 to find a way forward for Ukraine. Another meeting will take place in Brussels on March 6. These gestures underscore Europe’s intent to remain a key player in ensuring the continent’s and Ukraine’s security, even as the US wavers.

Unfortunately, time may not be on Europe’s side, as Trump announced on March 3 a pause in American military aid to Ukraine until he was convinced that Zelensky was serious about peace. Without US aid—estimated at $114 billion since the war began—Ukraine’s resistance could falter. Europe’s $132 billion in assistance lacks the advanced weapons and intelligence that only Washington provides, and a sudden American withdrawal could halt Kyiv’s war effort.

Since 1945, the transatlantic relationship has been the keystone of western unity, grounded in shared democratic values and collective security. Trump’s administration, however, signals a stark departure, embracing a worldview closer to that of Putin and Xi, where might is always right. This ideological rift surpasses even Cold War tensions when Europe feared American isolationism but never its alignment with adversarial powers. Now, as Trump steers US policy towards deal-making, European leaders face an uncomfortable reality: the America they relied on may no longer be an ally.

This fracture was ideologically crystallised at the Munich Security Conference in February, where Vance delivered a speech many saw as a calculated provocation. Traditionally a forum for reaffirming western resolve, the conference became a stage for Vance to attack Europe’s “entrenched elite”, accusing them of suppressing populist voices and ignoring domestic discontent. His meeting with the leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party deepened the sense that Washington was encouraging Europe’s populist movements, a tactic from the Russian and Chinese playbook. “If you fear your own voters,” Vance warned, “America can do nothing for you.” For European leaders, this was a signal that Trump’s White House views traditional allies as competitors, even obstacles, to its new vision.

The ramifications for NATO are profound. If Trump prioritises Russia over European security, potentially refusing to back a Europe-led mission in Ukraine, the alliance’s foundation could crumble. Poland and the Baltic states, long wary of Russian aggression, are already boosting military spending to nearly 5 per cent of their GDP, proportionally more than the US. Yet, Trump’s strategy seems designed to fracture Europe from within, amplifying far-right voices to weaken unity.

Vance’s rapid rise from freshman senator to vice president reflects the Republican Party’s populist shift. His scepticism of US aid to Ukraine has gained traction, reinforcing the view that America should refocus domestically. At Munich, he argued that Europe’s dependence on American security had become a liability, exacerbated by the war. His vision is not necessarily NATO’s dismantlement, but its redefinition, forcing Europe to bear more of its own defence burden. Writing for Responsible Statecraft, Mark Episkopos, Eurasia research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Washington, DC, argues that “Vance’s political ascendance represents a generational passing of the torch to a new wave of leaders who are fundamentally rethinking America’s role in the world.” These leaders see the “link between overcommitment abroad and decline at home, and they are seeking ways to break that cycle.”

At the White House on February 28, it was Vance who took the lead in attacking Zelensky and praising Trump for pursuing what he called a diplomatic resolution to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Visibly frustrated, Zelensky fired back with a pointed question: what kind of diplomacy could work with someone who had repeatedly violated previous accords? Vance took that as a personal affront. “I think it’s disrespectful for you to come into the Oval Office to try to litigate this in front of the American media,” he retorted, although it was the White House that had invited the press to the meeting in the first place.

The White House showdown will likely be remembered as a turning point in transatlantic relations. Trump’s alignment with Putin, Vance’s antagonism towards Europe, and Zelensky’s defiance encapsulated a shift from democratic solidarity to great-power pragmatism. For some, it marks the unravelling of the post-war liberal order; for others, the start of a new era where US power is no longer assumed and Europe must chart its own course. Was it a spontaneous explosion or a calculated strategy? Experts like Sam Greene of London’s King’s College believe it was deliberate, a move to reshape global geopolitics. Others see it as the unpredictable disruption that has defined Trump’s career.

Perhaps the late Henry Kissinger put it best. He made a prophetic observation on July 17, 2018, a day after Trump met Putin for a summit in Helsinki: “I think Trump may be one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretences. It does not necessarily mean that he knows this, or that he is considering any great alternative. It could just be an accident.”

For Ukraine and Europe, caught in the crosshairs, it is a bitter twist of fate either way.

india-should-protect-its-strategic-autonomy-in-external-affairs-in-the-wake-of-trump-zelenskyy-clash

Sat Mar 08 17:24:11 IST 2025

Contentious exchanges like the one between the presidents of the United States and Ukraine on February 28 are quite common in bilateral meetings between leaders and their delegations down the hierarchy. The difference that stood out at the Oval Office meeting between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky was that the spat occurred in public.

It has been an open secret in Washington that, in 2022 itself―after the war started in Ukraine―president Joe Biden clashed with Zelensky. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both had ugly dust-ups with successive Israeli prime ministers. However, whenever the two sides appeared in front of television cameras, everything was sweet as honey. That is what public diplomacy is meant for.

India has had its share of such situations. Prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee found himself in potentially the same situation as Zelensky after he ordered nuclear tests in 1998. Manmohan Singh, too, faced intense pressure from his interlocutors abroad for his uncompromising positions and unwillingness to dilute India’s nuclear deal with the US to suit the global architecture on non-proliferation.

As part of a multi-nation diplomatic outreach to explain Pokhran II, one of the first visits abroad by Brajesh Mishra, principal secretary to Vajpayee, was to Moscow. The post of national security adviser had not yet been created. Mishra was received by foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, who had a reputation for being sympathetic to India. However, as their talks began, Primakov delivered a stern lecture on why India’s nuclear tests should not have been conducted. Five minutes into Primakov’s lecture, Mishra abruptly stood up, indicating that he had heard enough. He told Primakov that if he had wanted to hear about the merits of non-proliferation, he would have gone to Washington instead to meet the US secretary of state Madeleine Albright. There was no point in continuing the meeting, Mishra signalled. The Russian side was in shock. The quick-thinking KGB stalwart softened under such pressure. From that moment onwards, Russia was conciliatory, like France, towards India’s compulsions for testing nuclear weapons. All of this was in private, of course, but was told to me in confidence by Mishra when he returned from Moscow.

Vajpayee was discomfited in public―like Zelensky―once, by the venerable Nelson Mandela. Opening the 12th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Durban in 1998, the South African president raised the Kashmir dispute in Vajpayee’s presence. NAM had a tradition of not discussing bilateral disputes among member states at its summits. Moreover, as a founding member, India had appropriated NAM as its diplomatic fiefdom, until Mandela shattered that illusion by referring not only to Kashmir but also by speaking against India’s nuclear tests.

A furious Vajpayee buttonholed Mandela at the summit’s opening banquet later that night, telling the iconic leader that his remarks were “uncalled for and unacceptable”, according to briefings by both countries. However, India was so stung by what happened at the inaugural session that Vajpayee insisted in his NAM address the following day that India would not accept any “third-party involvement” in Kashmir. Indian diplomats worked overtime to salvage the situation, scuttling efforts by several countries to name India or Pakistan in the summit’s 127-page final document. Reversing Mandela’s stance, the document did not name any country but merely called for bilateral dialogue to resolve disputes peacefully.

The public dressing-down of Zelensky is a timely reminder that India should zealously protect its strategic autonomy in external affairs. During the Kargil War, US president Bill Clinton wanted both Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, to travel to Washington to trilaterally negotiate an end to the conflict. Vajpayee refused the invitation. Sharif, as a US ally, had little choice. However, Clinton did not receive Sharif in the White House. Instead, in the library of the adjacent Blair House, Sharif was asked to sign on the dotted line and withdraw Pakistani fighters from Kargil.

After Pokhran II, since India and the US were not allies, Clinton took the stance that he would unilaterally punish India with sanctions rather than negotiate, as Trump is now doing with ally Zelensky. There would be no meetings with Indians at any level. In fact, visas were refused to Indian officials, even those engaged in work unrelated to the US. It was a blessing in disguise, allowing India to pursue its strategic options with countries like France. This clean slate later proved helpful when Vajpayee’s emissary Jaswant Singh and US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott began a rapprochement, paving the way for Clinton’s historic visit to India and everything that followed in India-US relations. Unlike Zelensky, Singh had no baggage to carry.

The author was a foreign correspondent in Washington.