BOOK EXTRACTS

Acclimatising to change

54-Shyam-Saran Let’s talk: Shyam Saran, former Indian foreign secretary, before the third round of India-Pakistan composite dialogue in New Delhi, in 2006 | Sanjay Ahlawat

Shyam Saran’s recently released book details how India has modified its foreign policy in recent decades

  • Xie wagged his finger at Obama, exclaiming that the American president had brought nothing to the table and was making outrageous demands on China.

In his book How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran explains the historical sources of India’s worldview, looks at India’s neighbourhood and the changing world, and growing problems such as climate change and cyber terrorism. Saran takes the reader into negotiating rooms and gives firsthand accounts of moments that defined the outcomes of summits. Exclusive excerpts from the book, which was released by former prime minister Manmohan Singh on September 6:

Obama’s art of the deal

I LEFT THE negotiating room soon afterwards to brief the prime minister and also to prepare for our departure that evening for Delhi. It was already past five in the evening and it seemed unlikely that an agreement would be reached in time for a closing plenary, when we received a message that Wen Jiabao was requesting an urgent meeting with our prime minister. He had also invited the other BASIC leaders to the meeting to take stock of the day’s deliberations. The prime minister conveyed that he was about to leave for the airport and a meeting may not be possible. There was another call repeating the request and urging our prime minister to agree, as a personal gesture to the Chinese premier. We had no option but to defer our departure. The meeting was set for 6 p.m. in a small conference room at one end of the hotel.

When we arrived, Wen Jiabao was already waiting, and we were soon joined by Presidents Lula and Zuma. Our delegation consisted of Jairam Ramesh, Environment Secretary Vijay Sharma, Ambassador Dasgupta and myself. The Chinese premier was accompanied by Xie Zhenhua, vice minister at the National Resource Development Council and China’s chief climate change negotiator. The Chinese vice foreign minister, He Yafei, was also present. Despite his role as chief negotiator, Xie had been conspicuously absent from the negotiating room throughout the day, leaving it to He Yafei to hold the fort. Both Lula and Zuma were accompanied by their senior aides. While Wen Jiabao and our prime minister sat on one side of the table, Lula and Zuma sat on the opposite side.

Wen Jiabao welcomed his fellow leaders and said he wanted to discuss the manner in which BASIC should handle the impending failure of the summit, which the developed countries would squarely blame on the BASIC countries. He suggested a coordinated strategy to deal with the negative fallout. He also said the US president had asked to see him before his departure, and the meeting with him had been set for 7 p.m. So he also wanted advice on what he should convey to the US president.

An inconclusive discussion followed on what the BASIC leaders should say about the summit. It was agreed that while regretting the failure of the summit, a commitment to continuing the negotiations should be conveyed to the international community. It was also agreed that BASIC needed to strengthen their consultations and coordination in the negotiating process. The leaders agreed with the positions taken by their negotiators in the Friends of the Chair meeting. Wen was asked to convey all these points to the US president.

It was at this juncture that President Obama arrived at the glass door of the conference room, accompanied by Hillary Clinton and other senior aides. The deputy NSA for economic affairs and later the US trade representative Mike Froman was there, as was Stern, the US special envoy on climate change. Obama called out to Wen Jiabao from the door, asking whether he should come in or wait for the meeting to conclude. Wen Jiabao looked questioningly at his counterparts, who readily agreed to invite the US president to join the discussions. Obama was invited to sit next to Zuma. The room had become very crowded, and several accompanying aides had to stand.

The US president began by saying that a failure of the Copenhagen summit would be a very serious setback and every effort should be made to salvage it. He said most of the proposed Copenhagen Accord had been agreed on except for the impasse on a few remaining issues. For the US, the issue of international review of mitigation actions undertaken by developed and developing countries was most important, he said. For him to persuade the US Congress to approve significant financing for developing countries, the transparency of action taken by all parties was crucial. He conveyed that if acceptable language could be found on this issue, then the accord could be saved. If not, he was prepared to go ahead with an agreement with those willing to join the accord. The rest would have to explain to the world why they were standing outside the agreement.

Wen Jiabao conveyed the willingness of the BASIC countries to record their voluntary actions in their respective NATCOMs, which could meet the transparency objective. However, Obama said this would not be sufficient. He suggested an attempt be made to find some acceptable language. He asked Mike Froman to consult with the representatives of the BASIC leaders to see if a compromise could be reached. Froman was joined by He Yafei from China, Jairam Ramesh from India, Lula from Brazil and Alf Wills from South Africa. They went into a huddle in a corner of the room while the leaders continued to discuss other issues. After about ten minutes, the group returned with the formulation ‘technical analysis and assessment’ as applicable to developing country mitigation actions to meet the transparency criterion.

Obama was not satisfied with the wording and wanted a stronger, more explicit, formulation. After some further back and forth, he suggested the phrase ‘international analysis and assessment’, but the Chinese looked sceptical. At this point Jairam proposed ‘international consultations and analysis’, which Obama seemed inclined to accept. He turned to Wen Jiabao to ask whether the latest formulation would be acceptable to China. Wen Jiabao in turn looked around to see if the others had any reservations. When the other leaders kept their counsel, he nodded his head in assent.

It was at this point that all hell broke loose. Xie Zhenhua, China’s chief climate negotiator, who had been following the exchange with increasing distress, got extremely agitated and began to loudly and angrily berate his own premier. Since I knew Mandarin, I could broadly follow what he was saying. Xie wagged his finger at Obama, exclaiming that the American president had brought nothing to the table and was making outrageous demands on China. He then banged the table with his fist and warned his premier against accepting any compromise that would be akin to selling out the country. Obama asked Wen Jiabao’s interpreter to translate what Xie was saying. She was extremely flustered and said she could not translate what had been said. Wen Jiabao sat impassively and did not retract his acceptance of the compromise formulation.

Xie’s outburst was most unusual and unexpected. For an official to angrily disagree with his own premier in public would be unthinkable in any country, and more so in an authoritarian and strictly hierarchical system like China’s. However, Xie continues to serve as China’s chief climate change negotiator to this day and does not seem to have been taken to task for his public outburst at his premier at Copenhagen.

Having pocketed what he had been looking for, Obama proceeded to sell his European allies down the drain. He agreed to have all references to the 50 per cent reduction in global emissions dropped from the final draft outcome document as well as the reference to the developed countries’ commitment to 80 per cent emission reduction by 2050. He also agreed that there need not be any reference to a legally binding outcome that the European countries had been insisting upon. He then left to consult with his allies still waiting in the main negotiating room. After about twenty minutes, he emerged to announce to the gaggle of American and international press: ‘We have a deal.’

For a leader representing a country that had brought nothing to the negotiating table, this was indeed a public relations coup. The Europeans were given no opportunity to demur.

Earlier when we were exiting the small conference room after Obama’s departure, Xie Zhenhua, whom I had worked with closely during the past two years, came up to me, held my hand and declared with barely concealed frustration: ‘The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have been buried at this meeting and we will learn to regret this day.’

The process of attrition and systematic hollowing out of the UNFCCC had begun. The Paris Agreement of 2015 represents the culmination of the dismantling exercise. And India dare not acknowledge that it has been complicit in it.

Excerpted with permission from Juggernaut.

56-How-India-Sees-the-World

How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century

By Shyam Saran

Published by Juggernaut

Price: Rs 599

Pages: 312

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