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Namrata Biji Ahuja
Namrata Biji Ahuja

NAXAL STRIKE

Back to basics

36rajnathsingh Last respects: Home Minister Rajnath Singh, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh and Minister of State for Home Hansraj Gangaram Ahir pay tribute to the CRPF martyrs | PTI

Apart from a revised anti-naxal policy, an operational overhaul of the security forces is the need of the hour

Come monsoon and Dandakaranya, the biggest naxal den in India, will be swept in rain and slush, hampering movement of the rebels who seek refuge in its dense forests. Soon, they will be forced to lie low and live incognito in villages. That’s one reason why the CPI(Maoist) carries out its Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC) between March and June, striking security forces in huge numbers. Maoists have carried out largely successful TCOCs over the past several summers—Dantewada in April 2010, Darbha valley in May 2013, Bhejji area in south Bastar in March 2017 (all in Chhattisgarh).

The April 24 attack that killed 25 Central Reserve Police Force personnel at Kala Pathar near Chintagufa in Sukma district of Chhattisgarh was another such tactical exercise—a bloody and brazen message to the Narendra Modi government that Maoist terror was nowhere close to elimination. A day later, as wreaths were being laid on the martyrs in Raipur after Indian Air Force choppers worked overnight to move the bodies, Home Minister Rajnath Singh looked visibly pensive. He returned to Delhi with one resolve: Dandakaranya—what Maoists call the liberated zone—requires a special anti-naxal grid formation. Its aim will be to flush out Maoists from the worst-affected districts and ensure minimum casualties of security forces.

And, meetings ensued. On April 26, national security adviser Ajit Doval, home ministry’s senior security adviser K. Vijay Kumar, home secretary Rajiv Mehrishi and other top officials met Singh behind closed doors to revise the anti-naxal policy. The same day, the government woke up from its slumber and appointed 1983 batch IPS officer Rajiv Rai Bhatnagar as the director general of CRPF. The post had fallen vacant after K. Durga Prasad retired in February.

37chhattisgarh

A secret file containing ‘anti-naxal’ doctrine, too, came out of hiding from a cupboard of the home ministry’s Left Wing Extremism (LWE) desk. This dusty doctrine, in 2014, was touted as the first comprehensive anti-LWE policy with a four-pronged strategy of security-, development-, rights- and entitlement-based measures and public perception management, as against the UPA’s two-pronged approach of development and security. The doctrine envisaged seamless operations in the Red Zone by making CRPF a world-class counterinsurgency force that will hold the anti-naxal grid together. The doctrine, no doubt, will be revisited and revised. Also, on May 8, chief ministers and DGPs of ten states, top officials and district magistrates of 35 worst-affected naxal districts will brainstorm over the NDA government’s anti-naxal policy.

“The bitter reality is that the anti-naxal policy changes with each government,” said retired IPS officer Kashmir Singh. A former joint secretary in the ministry of home affairs, he supervised the first anti-naxal ‘action plan’ that was drawn up by home minister P. Chidambaram in 2009. “It appears that the policy of first clearing a [naxal-infested] area, holding it [by security forces] and then initiating any developmental work [by civic bodies] has been put on the back burner. The aggressive anti-naxal policy that was there earlier is missing now,” he said.

In the latest strike, the CRPF contingent became sitting ducks for the 300 heavily armed Maoists as they were on static duties, providing security to a road being constructed from Chintagufa to the Sukma district headquarters. Clearly, the 2014 doctrine had not changed anything for the CRPF.

“What is required today is an operational overhaul of the Central paramilitary forces battling LWE in ten states,” former director general of CRPF Dilip Trivedi told THE WEEK. “They cannot be on static duties in Maoist hotbeds for years together as they become vulnerable. The state government needs to pull up their socks. The civic works need to be technology driven.” He added that most of the development work in naxal-affected areas was just eyewash. “If the government is serious, why does construction of a 16km stretch of road in Sukma take years as is the case currently?” he asked.

Preliminary reports from the ground have revealed that the operational strength of the force is inadequate and there have been certain operational lapses. As the home ministry reviews these problems, the stress will be on making commanding officers stay with the forces rather than kilometres away. The standard operating procedures (SOPs) for conducting different kinds of operations will also be revised.

“The assistant commandant and the commandant have to be on the ground not only to keep the morale of the forces high but also to supervise their movements,” said a senior government official. “There is also a difference between what force is sanctioned by the government and the actual number of men on the ground. Against an operational strength of 135 personnel in one company of the CRPF, only 50 to 55 personnel are actually deployed for operational duties.”

Trivedi says it is always easy to blame the Central forces for not following the SOPs laid down by the policy makers in Delhi. Unless the basics are put in place and the forces used judiciously, precious lives will continue to be lost.

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The Week

Topics : #naxals | #terrorism

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